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Abstract 
Since the appointment of Chief Justice G. Roberts to the U.S. Supreme Court, political 
scientists and legal scholars have assessed the Court’s behavior in a diverse array of cases and 
issue areas, including those touching on federalism, reproductive rights, voting rights, and 
economic liberty (cases involving businesses and corporations).  Few issues have proven as 
vexing as the Court’s constitution of the First Amendment’s command “Congress shall make no 
law…abridging the freedom of speech…”   
In light of the Court’s ongoing constitution of the scope and coverage of the First 
Amendment, a narrative has emerged that paints the Court as distinctly conservative.  In a 
number of widely publicized, controversial decisions, the Court under Chief Justice Roberts has 
incrementally dismantled federal and state efforts at campaign finance reform, made union 
fundraising more difficult, and restricted the availability of First Amendment protection for 
students, prisoners, and government employees.  This explanation, however intuitive and 
prevalent, is complicated by another narrative.  During the same period, the Court has issued 
incredibly speech-protective decisions in cases involving the distribution of videos depicting dog 
fights, violence in videogames, protesters at the funerals of fallen service members, lying about 
military awards, NGOs working abroad to address the AIDS epidemic, roadside signage, and 
even government employees.  Adding another wrinkle to the fold is entire corpus of anti-speech 
claimant decisions that have been issued by a unanimous Court, or a Court divided in a way 
unexpected by the ‘liberals versus conservatives’ characterization of our nation’s highest 
tribunal.   
These dual storylines present a puzzle that motivate a set of interrelated research 
questions:  What is the nature of the Roberts Court’s constitution of freedom of expression?  Is 
judicial behavior within this politically salient issue area explained by the ideological preferences 
or attitudes of the justices?  If not, what is the alternative explanation?  And, more broadly, what 
are the limitations of the conventional means by which scholars study judicial behavior?  This 
dissertation explores these questions through a set of conventional and innovative approaches to 
the study of judicial decision-making. It examines the entire universe of free speech decisions of 
the Roberts Court from external and internal approaches to the study of judicial decision-making. 
To do so, the dissertation employs a multi-method approach, including large and medium-N 
analyses of Roberts Court free speech decisions and qualitative tools of conceptual development 
and process tracing.    
This project offers four key findings related to the effect of judicial attitudes on the 
constitution of protection for freedom of expression during the Roberts Era.  First, as indicators 
have incrementally improved upon accurately measuring a key concept of interest – the 
ideological direction of decisions in freedom of expression cases – the bivariate relationship 
between judicial attitudes and ideological voting becomes more tenuous.  This suggests the need 
for a continuing research program focused on conceptually valid operationalization of decision 
direction in freedom of expression cases and beyond.  Second, with the Rehnquist Court Era as a 
comparison point, the effect of judicial attitudes across all votes during the Roberts Era is 
statistically significant – stronger conservatism scores correlate positively with a pro-speech 
decision.  While this relationship does not exist for the Rehnquist Court, a conceptual typology 
of cases comparing the ordering of voting coalitions to the direction of decisions in those cases 
reveals that the Roberts Court is, in some ways,  less ideological than the Rehnquist Court Era.  
Third, through the tool of process tracing and the use of “hoop tests,” the Roberts Court is best 
understood as having a conservative orientation though not monolithically so – there is 
considerable heterogeneity in terms of the ideological orientation and conceptions of the judicial 
role held by the justices that frequently result in unexpected voting alignments.  Fourth, the 
Court’s certiorari process in free expression controversies is better explained by jurisprudential 
concerns rather than ideological cues.  However, once disaggregating the Court’s certiorari 
docket by issue area, there is evidence for both the ideological and legal explanations for the 
Court’s behavior in free expression decisions.   
The central finding wrought from this project is that the judicial constitution of 
contemporary free expression protection in the U.S. cannot be reduced to single-cause 
explanations. The complex and often secret nature of various stages of judicial decision-making 
at the US Supreme Court, as well as the competing, longstanding epistemological approaches to 
understanding judicial behavior, strongly suggests that scholars must take care to question the 
assumptions of and examine behavior from both “internal” and “external” perspectives on Court 
behavior.  Sacrificing the former at the altar of the latter leaves interested observers without a 
clear idea of the structure and language through which high politics is contested at the Court – a 
language that makes some claims possible and others untenable.  The reverse is also problematic: 
Taking the justices at their word and assuming that fidelity to legal principles and sincerely-held 
conceptions of the judicial role explains judicial behavior ignores what appear to be patterns of 
partisan or ideologically driven voting. Beyond answering a substantive question of great interest 
for scholars, lawyers, litigants, and citizens alike, this research presents new directions for the 
study of judicial decision-making that have great potential for traveling to other issue areas and 
constitutional courts Syracuse University. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
In the Vanguard? 
Introduction 
On December 6, 2005, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in No. 04-
1152, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR).  The case involved an 
association of law schools and faculty who argued that provisions of the federal Solomon 
Amendment requiring military recruiter access equal to the access allowed by other professional 
recruiters violated FAIR’s First Amendment rights of speech and association.1  Under the law, 
denial of equal access to military recruiters would result in a forfeiture of federal funding.  
According to FAIR’s brief, compliance with the federal law “conflict[ed] with law schools’ 
longstanding and evenhanded policies of refusing to assist employers that invidiously 
discriminate against their students.”2 Specifically, the respondent law schools and faculties 
protested the military policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” authorizing enlistment and retention 
distinctions made on the basis of sexual orientation of soldiers, airmen, seamen, marines, and 
other members of the U.S. Armed Forces.   
Among other arguments, E. Joshua Rosenkranz’s brief for FAIR claimed that the 
“Solomon Amendment requires law schools to give military recruiters more than just ‘access to 
campus’ and more than just ‘access to students’ on campus…the Solomon Amendment requires 
law schools to suspend their anti-discrimination policies…the Solomon Amendment requires law 
schools to collaborate with military recruiters in an effort - discriminatory recruiting - that the 
schools consider fundamentally unjust.”3  While not among the collection of speech-protective 
1 Freedom of Association is a derivative right of the US Constitution’s First Amendment Freedom of Speech clause.  
2 Brief for Respondents, 2004 U.S. Briefs 1152, i (2005).   
3 2004 U.S. Briefs 1152, 34-35 (2005).   
2 
 
 
 
decisions cited in the brief, FAIR’s First Amendment argument could easily have cited Justice 
Robert Jackson’s famous dicta in West Virginia v. Barnette (1943): 
 
 If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
 petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
 matters of opinion or  force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there 
 are any circumstances which  permit an exception, they do not now occur to us (319 U.S. 
 624, 642 (1943)). 
 
 Beyond the important substantive issues of law presented by the case – a confluence of 
the values of liberty and equality –FAIR is notable for being the first substantive free expression 
case heard by Chief Justice John Roberts, who was confirmed as 17th Chief Justice on September 
29, 2005 (Babington and Baker 2005). Shortly after oral arguments in FAIR but prior to the 
Court’s decision, Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed by the U.S. Senate to the Associate Justice 
position vacated by the retiring Sandra Day O’Connor, long thought to be at the ideological 
center of the Court (Keck 2004, 199-203).  The twin appointments of Roberts and Alito marked 
the end of an 11-year period of stasis on the Court, and signaled a transition from the Rehnquist 
to the Roberts Court.  Writing for The New York Times, correspondent David Stout noted that the 
appointment of Alito (following Roberts) was “a triumph for the conservative movement, whose 
adherents have longed to tilt the balance of the Court to the right.” (Stout 2006).    
 First Amendment claims have long occupied an important position on the Court’s docket 
(Lewis 2010; Perry 1991, 262), though the magnitude and ideological tenor of free expression 
votes and jurisprudence have varied over the years.  Scholars have found that while the Court 
under Chief Justice Earl Warren was remarkably protective of freedom of expression (Powe 
2009; Epstein and Segal 2011, 6), the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were considerably less 
willing to rule in favor of free speech claimants.  In addition, Justice O’Connor’s role as the 
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swing vote on the Court during the Rehnquist Era often resulted in “minimalist” decisions 
(Bybee 2001, 943-944); in the free expression context it was O’Connor (and sometimes 
Rehnquist) who were willing to uphold campaign finance regulations against First Amendment 
challenges (Keck 2004).  Spectators of the Court gained their first glimpse of the Roberts Court 
approach to freedom of expression on March 6, 2005, with the announcement of the Court’s 
unanimous opinion in Rumsfeld v. FAIR (547 U.S. 47 (2006)).  
 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Solomon Amendment’s 
requirement of equal access for military recruiters did not violate the First Amendment.  In 
dispensing with FAIR’s free expression claims, Roberts noted that “The Solomon Amendment 
neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything,” that the recruiting 
assistance mandated by the Solomon Act “is a far cry from the compelled speech in 
Barnette…plainly incident to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct,” and that 
“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and 
nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s 
policies.”  Concluding the Court’s opinion, the Chief Justice opined that “FAIR has attempted to 
stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines 
protect.”   
 While the Court’s unanimous holding in FAIR was an inauspicious start to the Roberts 
Court’s constitution of free expression, the Court has since demonstrated a willingness to deliver 
surprisingly robust protections of speech in a number of cases.  “Speech Rights Triumph as U.S. 
High Court Limits Government Power,” read the headline at the conclusion of the Roberts 
Court’s 2010 term. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Reporter for Bloomberg News, noted a series of 
speech protective decisions that prohibited state governments from restricting big pharmaceutical 
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companies’ access to prescription information (Sorrell v. IMS Health (131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011)) 
and  minors’ access to violent videogames (Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (131 
S.Ct. 2729 (2011)).  The article also noted decisions striking down a jury verdict for punitive 
damages resulting from the intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case pitting the 
Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, KS against the father of a marine killed in the line of duty 
in Iraq (Snyder v. Phelps (131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)) and a series of decisions striking down state 
and national limitations on election campaign financing (Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310 
(2010)) and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011)).  
Stohr summarized the Roberts Court record on protecting freedom of speech as follows: 
“Whether the topic was violent video games, pharmaceutical marketing campaigns or political 
contributions, the justices cast a skeptical eye toward government regulation of speech as they 
closed out their year with a flurry of First Amendment rulings” (Stohr 2011). 
 Conferring the ringing distinction of “pro-speech” on the Roberts Court blinks at reality, 
however, as the narrative exists alongside competing portraits of the Court as “not a free speech 
Court” (Chemerinsky 2011), or one only willing to uphold free expression claims in “slam-dunk” 
cases (Youn 2011).    Ten years into the Roberts Court era, the Court’s decisions in Walker v. 
Sons of Confederate Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)) and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona on 
June 18, 2015 reinforced the Janus-faced nature of the contemporary Court’s record on free 
expression.  In the former case, the Court through Justice Stephen Breyer held that Texas’ 
decision to reject a proposed license plate message did not violate the First Amendment rights of 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans because license plates constitute government speech, which is 
insulated from First Amendment suits.  In the latter case, a unanimous – but fractured in rationale 
– Court (through Justice Clarence Thomas) held that the Town of Gilbert’s differential regulation 
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of temporary signs was sufficient to infer impermissible content-based regulation, which remains 
the dominant categorical mode of analysis in free expression cases.  
 The result in Sons of Confederate Veterans was anti-expression, while the result in Reed 
was pro-speech.  In the former, the Justices split on ideological lines, with one notable defection 
– Justice Thomas (considered to be one of the Court’s most conservative members) joined 
Breyer’s majority opinion, along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan.  In the latter, while all Justices voted for Reed, the majority rationale (delivered by 
Thomas) was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, 
Samuel Alito Jr., and Sonia Sotomayor.  Justices Breyer and Kagan each filed concurring 
opinions that disagreed with Thomas’ rigid categorical analysis, which read more like dissents 
than concurrences (Denniston 2015).  The former case result appears more consistent with 
models of judicial decision-making that give primacy to the unobserved ideological values and 
preferences of the justices as key causal variables, while the latter appears to be less easily 
explained by these conventions.  And, in Sons of Confederate Veterans, the voting alignment 
was marked by a notable defection – Justice Clarence Thomas – drawing attention to the link 
between aggregate measures examining the effect of judicial values across a large number of 
votes and the observed voting alignments in decisions on the merits.  Are such defections the 
product of deeply held ideological convictions, or are they attributable to tough legal questions 
resulting from the facts of each case?   
 
Explaining Contemporary Freedom of Expression 
 How is it that a conservative majority Court has gained the title – albeit disputed – of the 
most pro-speech Court in history, despite the long pedigree of First Amendment jurisprudence as 
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a “lodestar of liberalism” (Epstein and Segal 2006)?  Why do some decisions appear consistent 
with the idea that ideological or partisan considerations dictate the votes of the justices, while 
still others suggest that a broad commitment to protecting unpopular speech from legislative or 
executive encroachment is shared by all justices – liberal and conservative?  Do these decisions 
appreciably differ from the prior Rehnquist Court – characterized as the most activist in history 
(Keck 2004) – and what is the nature of that difference?  And what, if anything do jurisprudential 
considerations have to do with the decisions issued by this conservative majority Court?  This 
dissertation is an effort to answer these questions, by contextualizing modern free expression 
decisions in broader scholarly debates about the nature of ideological and legal (doctrinal) 
influences on Supreme Court decision-making.  
  In this dissertation, I describe and explain the scope and coverage of contemporary 
freedom of expression protection in the United States through behavioralist and historical 
institutional lenses, with a focus on the votes of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States from the 2005 through the 2014 terms. The central, substantive claim of this dissertation is 
that the free speech agenda of the Roberts Court Era cannot be explained by externally-imposed 
ideological preferences alone.   An accurate, systematic explanation of the Robert’s Court’s 
constitution of freedom of expression is possible only by expanding the scope of inquiry beyond 
aggregations of individual judicial votes on the merits.  In addition to the conventional 
ideological scoring of case factors and judicial preferences, judicial decision-making studies 
attempting to explain this area of normative importance for journalists, scholars, and the average 
citizen alike can and should take account of the following: the measurement of the concept of 
ideology when scoring indicators for the direction of a decision, the composition of the voting 
coalitions (rather than aggregated, individual votes) in merits decisions, the interaction among 
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jurisprudential structures and different conceptions of the judicial role held by justices within and 
across cases, and patterns appearing in the decision to grant or deny certiorari. By examining 
each of these aspects of the Court’s behavior from varying epistemological perspectives, I assess 
the dimensions and overall veracity of the claim that the current Court’s record on freedom of 
expression can be explained by reference to the conservative, political preferences of a majority 
of the justices.    
 This dissertation also builds on the study of judicial decision-making by pushing back 
against single-method driven research.  Voting patterns can and should be contextualized within 
the broader historical traditions and legal structures that constitute judicial decision-making. In 
examining contemporary free speech from these various methodological and epistemological 
perspectives, I find that variance in the Roberts Era free expression agenda is explained by a 
combination of non-monolithic ideological preferences, contested jurisprudential structures, and 
divergent conceptions of the judicial role. Correlations between values and votes alone cannot 
explain the development of US free expression law; nor can this acontextual approach reveal 
how this area of law is constituted by competing jurisprudential and philosophical ideals that 
intersect with conceptions of the judicial role and ideological values of the justices.  Simply put, 
the explanation is incomplete without attending to the ways in which the values of the justices, 
understood to be revealed in voting patterns across cases, are constituted by conventional legal 
structures.  The answer to the question of whether it is preferences or principles that explain free 
expression decision-making in the contemporary era is “both.” 
 This chapter provides a broad overview of the contemporary free expression agenda in 
the United States, reviewing recent work at the intersection of judicial decision-making, free 
expression, and political science and contextualizing this project in broader scholarly debates 
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about the study of judicial behavior. I explain how this project not only explains an important 
outcome of interest for a specific period of the Court’s history, but also engages with broader 
theoretical arguments in the study of judicial decision-making by linking “external” and 
“internal” perspectives on judging (Feldman 2005). Chapters two through five represent the 
substantive portions of the project, each concerned with a specific aspect of the judicial process 
and epistemological assumptions concerning how and which data are best analyzed for the 
question at hand. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I provide an introduction to the 
content and study of freedom of expression in America.  I begin by contextualizing free speech 
as an important component of pluralist democracy in America.  I also provide a general overview 
of debates about freedom of expression within the broader agenda of the Roberts Court, as well 
as the findings and limitations of recent research designs that inform the questions asked and 
methods employed by this dissertation.   
 The remainder of this chapter summarizes the road ahead, offering general theoretical 
and research design components which will be elaborated upon within each specific chapter. 
 
Free Expression as Social, Legal, and Ideological Commitment 
 Near the end of his career, Anthony Lewis noted that while the Supreme Court has 
wavered on rights-based claims in the areas of privacy and equality (citing decisions in the 
aftermath of Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick), “Since the middle of the twentieth century, 
the idea of the First Amendment has acquired a powerful hold on the American imagination. 
Even conservatives, who had been found on the repressive side of speech controversies, now join 
in exaltation of freedom of expression.  People invoke ‘the First Amendment’ as if those words 
would settle whatever issue was being debated” (Lewis 2010, 169).  True to form, Americans 
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have invoked the free expression guarantees of the First Amendment in contemporary 
controversies ranging from the anti-marriage equality stance articulated by the founder of Chick-
Fil-A (Bomboy 2012), to comments made by Phil Robertson of Duck Dynasty fame (Curry 
2013), to a ban on the sale of Confederate Flags in the state of California (LA Times Editorial 
Board 2016).   The First Amendment has also been invoked recently in the higher education 
context, with the revocation of a job offer by the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign to 
Professor Steven Salaita for social media comments critical of Israel, as well as the perception 
that college campuses are ground zero for “political correctness” and regulating 
“microaggressions;” policies that may or may not be in tension with commitments to free inquiry 
and ideological diversity (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).   
 The ingrained commitment to the First Amendment among Americans parallels the right 
to free expression’s preferred place in the constellation of constitutional freedoms.  Because of 
its relationship to the democratic process – ensuring the continually refined search for truth in an 
abstract “marketplace of ideas” or furthering the ideal of “self-government” in a democracy – the 
free speech protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are unlike other valuable 
though ultimately inapposite protections of the Bill of Rights.  Freedom of speech is central to 
the American system of government in a way that the other protections are not.  One need not be 
the subject of criminal charges, incarcerated, or an ongoing trial to draw upon the protections of 
the First Amendment – it has application to the displaying of signs on public property, voicing 
displeasure with government policies, public works of art, depictions of sexual activity, 
videogames, door-to-door solicitation, economic advertising – even the location of newspaper 
racks.   
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Put another way, ten words of the United States’ most exalted legal document’s First (and 
originally, Third) Amendment permeate an incredible amount of the day-to-day components of 
society, and function as a barrier to government conduct that calls into action other important 
safeguards – being secure in one’s papers and possessions, protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment, a speedy and fair trial by jury, and the like.  It is prior to the protections afforded to 
citizens in the face of government prosecution, the freedom that makes liberty in a republican 
democracy possible, the lynchpin of the ideal pluralist system that locates the common good in a 
process whereby organized interests compete to gain resources, from institutions of government 
(Feldman 2008; 2013).   In the words of Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz, “Speech is powerful.  
It’s the lifeblood of democracy, a precondition for the discovery of truth, and vital to our self-
development” (2014, 122).   
Understanding the Roberts Court record on freedom of speech, then, is not just another  
arena for a strawman assessment of whether it is law or politics that best explains the 
motivations of justices:  It has important empirical and normative implications for scholarly 
understandings of the nature of the democratic process in America.  When scholars like Anthony 
Lewis point to the Court’s First Amendment tradition of protecting free expression and question 
whether the Court has generally favored speech claimants – from institutions such as 
corporations and unions to the traditional soapbox orators of the “dissent” tradition of free 
expression (Shiffrin 1999) – there is at least an implicit concern with the functioning of the 
democratic system.  In other words, there is a presupposition of a guarantee that must be 
available to all Americans wishing to speak on matters of political concern, to contribute to the 
free trade in ideas, and to foster self-realization and fulfillment of the idea of individual 
autonomy.  
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Broader Theoretical Debates 
 The political behavior orientation is not a substitute for other perspectives, but 
 supplements the approaches to knowledge which have been and continue to be the 
 hallmark of more traditional workways.  All research into politics and government in the 
 final analysis shares a common goal, i.e. to give meaning to the political phenomena 
 which we experience. This is no less true of the traditional approaches with their focus on 
 events, ideologies, institutions, and structures than of the behavioral orientation which 
 features the analysis of personal and group behavior in a political context. (Ulmer 1960; 
 cited in Bradley 2003, 109).   
  
 The Roberts Court speech docket also speaks to the longstanding but still relevant debate 
among scholars concerning the behavior of justices.  The First Amendment is a substantial 
component of the civil liberties docket considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, and civil liberties 
has been a flashpoint for the ongoing debate concerning the influence of law and politics on the 
decision-making of justices.  While the attitudinal model of judging (discussed in greater detail 
in chapters two and three) has demonstrated a high degree of correlation between the 
conservative and liberal values of justices and their subsequent votes on the merits in civil 
liberties cases (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Knight 1995; Segal and 
Spaeth 2002, 320-323; Gillman 2003, 14), some scholars have argued that free expression is an 
exception to this general association.  To build upon the previous section, this project is valuable 
not only for its substantive importance, but also because a single-issue area (the free speech 
clause of the First Amendment) decided by the same set of judges appears to defy the dominant 
forms of the attitudinal paradigm of US Supreme Court decision-making.   
 In an extended discussion of U.S. v. Alvarez (132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012)), a decision striking 
down The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 as unconstitutional, Mark Tushnet (2013) noted that “In 
many First Amendment cases the justices don’t line up according to the dominant ‘conservative 
versus liberal’ narrative.  You need doctrinal background to understand U.S. v. Alvarez” (217).  
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Tushnet is not alone in suggesting that free expression is something of an exception to 
conventional attitudinal explanations:  Lucas “Scot” Powe noted that despite the general 
conservatism of the post-Warren Court years, “The First Amendment continued to enjoy 
prominence in the justices’ hearts, and with modest recalibrations, the Court continued on the 
liberal path of the Warren years” (2009, 284).   
 Later, in discussing the landmark decision of Texas v. Johnson (491 U.S. 397 (1989)), 
striking down a Texas flag desecration law as unconstitutional under the First Amendment) and 
U.S. v. Eichman (496 U.S. 310 (1990)), striking down a federal flag protection law enacted in 
response to the Court’s Johnson ruling) Powe commented,  
 There is something about flag burning. Reagan appointees Antonin Scalia and Anthony 
 Kennedy were in the majority protecting the act, while Rehnquist was a dissenter. The 
 two cases, like an earlier one from the Warren Court, produced splits along no discernible 
 ideological lines.  On all other constitutional issues, however, conservatives stayed 
 conservative and liberals remained  liberal” (289).  
 
 These comments resonate with Keck’s analysis of the Rehnquist Court, who found in an 
assessment of all decisions where that Court invalidated federal statutes, the free expression 
cases of that particular era were often decided by voting coalitions not predicted by the 
attitudinal model of judging (2007).  Other scholars, even those as critical of the “free market 
Constitution” historically articulated by the Court as Timothy Kuhner, discerned a willingness on 
the part of liberal and conservative justices to reach a surprising, compromise decision in the 
landmark campaign finance decision of Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976); discussed in 
Kuhner 2014, 33-39).  Finally, in an eclectic edited volume on differing judicial philosophies in 
the area of free expression, Helen Knowles and Steven Lichtman (2015) note the erratic voting 
alignments in Roberts Court free speech cases and surmise that there is more to the story of 
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judging (at least in the realm of the First Amendment) than the political preferences of judges 
(239-243).   
 On the other hand, a different perspective on the Court’s free expression record suggests 
that these decisions – like other civil liberties decisions – can be explained by partisan or 
ideological commitments of the judges.  Cornell Clayton and Lucas McMillan, zeroing in on the 
Court’s much maligned and unpopular campaign finance decisions, have argued that “Campaign 
finance and the First Amendment is another area clearly reflecting the conservative movement in 
constitutional law, if not the even more immediate electoral interests of the GOP” (2012, 139).4  
David Gans of the Constitution Accountability Center, specifically reviewing Chief Justice 
Roberts’ record after a decade on the Court, narrated that “At the same time that Chief Justice 
Roberts and his conservative colleagues have substantially expanded First Amendment 
protections for corporations, the Court’s conservative majority has also reinterpreted the First 
Amendment to gut long-recognized protections for unions, striking a serious blow against 
organized labor” (2015, 10).   Political explanations are suggested in work by Youn (2011) and 
Chemerinsky (2011), who have both pointed to decisions striking down campaign finance laws 
and making union fundraising more difficult as evidence for the claim that the Roberts Court is 
generally conservative, and freedom of speech is not an exception to the attitudinal rule.   
                                                 
4 A national survey conducted by Pew Research from Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015, found broad bipartisan support for the 
idea that campaign finance laws “would be effective in reducing the role of money in politics.” (DeSilver and Van 
Kessel 2015). A previous Pew Research survey conducted from Jan. 11-16, 2012 found that of those respondents 
aware of the Citizens United ruling, 60% of self-identified Republicans, 63% of Democrats, and 67% of 
Independents agreed that the decision was having a negative impact on the 2012 Presidential campaign (Pew 
Research Center 2012).  A nationwide poll by the Gallup organization conducted from Oct. 1-2, 2009 - shortly after 
oral arguments in Citizens United – found that while majorities of Democrats (62%) and Republicans (64%) and a 
plurality of Independents (48%) agreed that “campaign contributions are free speech,” 61% of those surveyed also 
agreed that “government should be able to place limits on how much money individuals can give to a political 
candidate,” and 71% agreed that “government should be able to place limits on how much money corporations or 
unions can give to a political candidate.” When asked directly to prioritize either “placing limits on campaign 
contributions” or “protecting right to support campaigns,” 54% of Democrats, 53% of Independents, and 49% of 
Republicans prioritized limits on campaign spending (Saad 2010).     
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 In sum, this debate about the Roberts Court’s constitution of free expression is yet 
another manifestation of a longstanding, broader theoretical debate concerning the motivations of 
judges.  Arguments critical of the Court’s record on free speech often boil down to claims that it 
is the conservative ideologies or “attitudes” of the justices that explains the Court’s record on 
free expression, while those focusing on the Court’s willingness to protect liars, unpopular 
religious minorities, distributors of videos alleged to promote animal cruelty, and recognize 
videogames as artistic expression either explicitly or implicitly suggest that something other than 
traditional liberal or conservative ideological commitments is motivating the justices in First 
Amendment free expression cases.   
 
Competing and Disparate Explanations 
 The Roberts Court has proven a slippery concept for scholars of judicial decision-
making.  Calling to mind the observation that the “Cases you choose affect the results you get” 
(Geddes 1990), scholars have looked at the contemporary Court from a diverse collection of 
ontological assumptions and methodological approaches in order to gain traction on explanations 
of the Court’s votes and decisions.  For example, Marcia Coyle (2013) singled out four key areas 
of the Roberts Court’s agenda in constructing a narrative of a conservative Court muscularly 
flexing the power of judicial review to, among other things, recognize a 2nd Amendment right to 
own a firearm for self-defense in one’s home in D.C. v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)), and in 
short order incorporating that right against state and local governments in McDonald v. Chicago 
(561 U.S. 742 (2010)), dismantling federal and state campaign finance laws in Citizens United v. 
FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010)) and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (564 
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U.S. 721 (2011)), and narrowly upholding the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act while striking down its Medicaid expansion conditions imposed on the 
states in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012)).   
 In another account of the Roberts Court Era, Mark Tushnet raised the important insight 
that sometimes a Justice may deviate from his or her “core” liberal or conservative inclinations, 
though his treatment ultimately focuses on a sliver of the Court’s docket.  This observation is not 
to accuse these scholars and others of purposefully cherry-picking cases to reach a foregone 
conclusion:  Tushnet is explicit in that he intentionally focuses on the portion of the docket with 
politically salient overtones, or “most-likely” cases for the political Court argument.  Such case 
selection strategies, however, paint an incomplete picture of the Court and may unintentionally 
bias findings, whether they are in constructing a narrative of the Court as conservative, liberal, or 
the result of a complex mixture of ideology, jurisprudence, long-term strategic considerations, or 
deviations from ideological expectations.  Even Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz (2014), who 
recognize a “dizzying array of considerations” affecting the decision-making calculus of the 
justices, ultimately reject the utility of “deep explanations,” or those that tend to look for patterns 
of the effect of ideology or a particular jurisprudential regime across cases (4).  Instead, the 
authors provide richly detailed, contextual narratives of a number of cases across nine areas of 
law on the Roberts Court agenda in making the claim that the state of the law is mired in a level 
of uncertainty.   
 While there is nothing inherently wrong about these approaches, they are not without key 
epistemological and methodological limitations.  In other words, it is difficult to know the nature 
of the Court without attending to matters of case selection. Limiting assessments of the Court’s 
political dimension to those cases deemed “politically salient” (Tushnet 2013) and subsequently 
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finding that ideology or politics matters is not a difficult bar to jump.  The highly interpretive 
nature of these studies does not lend itself well to the sort of hypothesis testing associated with 
more systematic requirements of social science.    
 Recognizing the tradeoff between more parsimonious, cut-and-dried effects-of-causes 
research efforts - which typically look at the effect of one or two key variables of interest across 
a large number of cases - and richly detailed, interpretive causes-of-effects research - which 
typically examines the relationship among a number of relevant variables within a small number 
of cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012), some scholars have attempted to study judicial decision-
making from a middle ground of sorts.  For example, Diana Kapiszewski (2011) conducted an 
analysis of “26 politically crucial cases decided by the STF [Brazilian Supreme Federal 
Tribunal] between 1985 and 2004” so as to systematically facilitate “detailed analysis of each 
case and augmented the study’s internal validity” (473-474).  Similarly, Keck’s analysis of 
judicial coalitions in all 53 cases where the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute 
from 1981 to 2005 was structured by a medium-N approach to case selection and analysis, a 
“methodological choice [providing] a universe of cases large enough to look for patterns across 
decisions, but small enough to present some context and detail for each case” (2007, 324).    
 The Roberts Court free speech agenda has been the subject of sustained attention for 
political scientists working within a more positivist, large-N epistemological tradition as well.  In 
2006, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal suggested that the winds of freedom of speech had shifted – 
that the longstanding “liberal” right to free expression was quickly becoming a lodestar of 
conservatism (Epstein and Segal 2006).  The authors found support for the claim that the justices 
use free speech claims to instrumentally advance other ideological or political goals, noting that 
the Court’s liberal justices were more likely to vote against free speech claims when they 
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conflicted with another ideological commitment, such as the right to privacy.  In a follow-up 
effort, Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2013) found evidence that the justices tend to support free 
speech claims argued by members of their own ideological in-group – particularly the Court’s 
conservative justices – though the authors’ conclusions have been subject to criticism (Pettys 
2014; 2015).  In both efforts, the authors examined the effect of judicial attitudes across a large 
number of cases.  
During the same period, Monica Youn of the Brennan Center found that the Roberts 
Court ruled in favor of free speech claims in only 44% of the cases granted certiorari and argued 
on the merits.  Epstein and Segal (2011), conducting a similar study, came to a similar 
conclusion in simply examining the outcomes of Roberts Court free speech cases.  The focus on 
judicial attitudes as the key explanatory variable for free speech decisions has not been limited to 
large-N studies. By 2014, Chemerinsky dedicated a portion of a book-length condemnation of 
the Supreme Court’s historical performance to the Roberts Court’s oft-maligned campaign 
finance decisions (Chemerinsky 2014).  Similarly, Tribe and Matz (2014) argued that while 
“Well-defined categories of intensely protected speech can occasionally constrain judges in ways 
that matter” (146), ideological divisions on the Court go a long way in explaining the Roberts 
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment: “Partly because of rulings like Brown [striking 
down a California law restricting the sale of violent videogames to minors] and Snyder [finding 
the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, KS could not be sued under the tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)], the Roberts Court enjoys a strong “pro-speech” 
reputation.  Appearances deceive” (152).   
Many of these accounts have been less than comprehensive and at times fairly 
impressionistic, while others have facilitated very narrow inferences (though see Collins 2013).  
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Youn’s brief 2011 study (similar in method and style to Epstein and Segal’s brief 2011 report), , 
reduced the question to one of whether the Court was a free speech “maximalist” one (Volokh 
2002).  Eugene Volokh, a noted First Amendment scholar, simply coded each vote in Rehnquist 
Era free expression decisions as pro- or anti-First Amendment – with fractional values assigned 
to indicate when concurring opinions were more or less protective of speech than the majority in 
a particular case.  According to Volokh, such conceptual trade-offs may be necessary in order to 
protect against subjective biases: “Injecting my views about whether the Justices were right or 
wrong, and from subdividing the cases along  categories (for example, government-as-sovereign 
vs. government-as-funder, sexually themed speech vs. political speech) that would ultimately just 
reflect my own biases” (Volokh 2002).  Tribe and Matz’s recent contribution, citing the Court’s 
opinions in Morse v. Frederick  (551 U.S. 393 (2007), upholding the suspension of a high school 
student for the display of a banner reading ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”), Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 
U.S. 410 (2006), upholding the transfer of a Los Angeles area DA for comments related to 
corruption in a criminal trial), Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (564 U.S. 786 
(2011)), and Alvarez, note that a number of cases rejecting free speech claims have split the 
Court along ideological lines (2014, 153).  However, the authors attribute the broader agenda to 
the Court’s general categorical approach to First Amendment cases, where “speech is either fully 
protected by the First Amendment or entirely excluded” (153).  Similarly, Tushnet argues that 
the pattern of free speech decisions can be attributed to “a desire for simple rules,” while 
“politics doesn’t explain much” (2013, 215).   
 In sum, legal scholars have faced difficulty in gaining traction on the Roberts Court as a 
concept, at once finding the Court is deeply polarized and divided, conservative while also 
producing rights-based rulings favoring liberal causes, often united yet still producing sharply 
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split voting coalitions that fracture along ideological cleavages.  One contributor to the apparent 
slippery nature of the contemporary Court appears to be the case selection strategies selected by 
scholars, which go a long way in producing the results of scholarly inquiry.  Some have focused 
on a narrower range of cases thought to be particularly crucial or important for assessing 
hypotheses about the Court’s behavior.  Given the multitude of factors thought to influence the 
decision-making of justices, other scholars have attempted to gain traction on Court behavior 
through the methodological choice of Medium-N analyses – allowing for examination of patterns 
of influence of key variables of influence across many cases, while also leaving room for more 
fine-grained, detailed analyses of individual cases that demonstrate how multiple causal factors 
produce an outcome.  Still others have studied correlations between judicial preferences and case 
outcomes across entire populations of votes to gain inferential leverage.  Each of these 
orientations is not without limits, however, and fail if a necessary condition for the “big picture” 
understanding of Court behavior is comprehensiveness in case selection and description. 
 
Beyond Dichotomies  
 Behavioral studies based upon quantitative aggregation of the votes of individual justices 
continue to emphasize parsimony over richer, multi-dimensional understandings of the 
motivations of justices.  During the 2014 Jordan Saunders Seminar in Constitutional History at 
Stanford University, legal scholar Robert Gordon noted that, “Political Scientists have always 
been more interested in the bottom line,” while practitioners and law school professors continue 
to emphasize doctrinal norms, precedent, and the culture of judging over “counting votes” 
(Whittington 2000; Feldman 2005; Tamanaha 1996).  Going back to at least 1988 with Rogers 
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Smith’s influential article on incorporating the social, cultural, and legal context of judging to 
bear on what had become a generally behavioralist approach to public law studies, the “Neo-
Institutional” strand of judicial decision-making  literature has emphasized the role legal factors 
play in constituting decisions (Smith 1988; Clayton 1999; Whittington 2000; Feldman 2005).  In 
terms of epistemological approaches, scholars have successfully done so within interpretivist 
(Graber 1992; Gillman 1993; Bybee 1998; Bussiere 1999; Keck 2004, 11; Richards 2013) and 
positivist (Hansford and Spriggs 2008; Richards and Kritzer 2002; Bartels and O’Geen 2015) 
research traditions. 
 However valuable diversity of research orientations might be for the production of 
knowledge, the insights gleaned from disparate efforts are limited in contributing to studies of 
judicial decision-making so long as they continue to resemble ships passing in the night.   The 
review of recent scholarship aimed at explaining the constitution of freedom of expression by 
SCOTUS motivates the core substantive goal of the dissertation, but it also informs broader 
questions about judicial decision-making grappled with in the chapters to follow.  Rather than 
staking a paradigmatic claim to the exclusion of other possibilities, this dissertation follows the 
recommendations and ontological orientation of Stephen Feldman in unifying what have become 
known as “external” and “internal” approaches to the study of judicial behavior. 
 According to Feldman, external approaches are premised on the idea that “Judges' 
decisions are responses to stimuli that are substantially independent of legal rules, principles, and 
precedents,” while internal approaches believe “that precedents and legal rules have at least some 
influence on judicial decisionmaking.” (Feldman 2005, 93, 96).  For Feldman, when either of 
these paradigms structure the study of judicial behavior to the exclusion of the other, research 
findings are impoverished by a lack of comprehensiveness.  The external view has merit for its 
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systematic modeling and prediction of judicial votes, but falls short by tilting at legal model 
windmills that few scholars actually believe.  It can also be problematically acontextual, 
particularly when imposing ideological meaning on votes that may be too monolithic or do not 
easily map onto commonly understood meanings of liberal or conservative, or by ignoring how 
political preferences are constituted by the unique role of judging internalized by the institution’s 
actors.   
Conversely, the merits of the internal approach lie in the recognition that law is 
fundamentally an interpretive project, with judges in general agreement in terms of which 
jurisprudential rules and structures must be used to constitute decisions.  For critics, however, 
this approach falls short in that it is mainly descriptive (or, as in law reviews, descriptive but also 
offering normative recommendations and concerns), and at times seems unconcerned with the 
fact that the Supreme Court often hears hard cases where “the law has run out,” leaving policy 
concerns to fill the jurisprudential void.  It has also been criticized by eminent, positivist scholars 
for being an unfalsifiable and even naïve account of the effect of law on decision-making 
(Spaeth and Segal 1999, 288; Segal and Spaeth 2002, 44-53), as it is incredibly difficult to 
establish that, in the presence of various legal structures and tests, a justice votes differently than 
he or she would absent those purported constraints (though see Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 
2013 for evidence that law may act as a “decision-making vice” in some cases).  Keith 
Whittington has pointed out that these critiques may miss the mark entirely, insofar as the 
practice of law is best understood as an institution that shapes the preferences of actors – even 
those with political preferences: “Justices are likely to think about and act on public problems 
differently as a consequence of their experiences and expectations on the Court.” (Whittington 
2000, 615).   
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Linking these two perspectives on judicial decision-making remains an untidy enterprise, 
though some efforts since the publication of Feldman’s article have attempted to bring both 
perspectives together in a single frame (Corley et al. 2013; Richards 2013).  Barring 
epistemological and methodological orthodoxy, there is little reason to maintain a firm division 
between research projects interested in the genesis and influence of the preferences of judges, 
whether legal or political.  Because context is important and the meaning of legal norms and 
ideological preferences is characterized by periods of stability and fluidity (Smith 1988; Gerring 
1997), any explanation of judicial decision-making drawing on both perspectives would benefit 
from carefully specified periods and carefully specified areas of law.  A careful specification of 
scope conditions allows scholars interested in the effects of political or legal preferences across a 
series of decisions or votes to have a higher degree of confidence in the accuracy of results.  The 
obvious trade-off to this approach is generalizability for accuracy, as the emphasis is on 
explaining an outcome for a well-defined period rather than a universal, longitudinal trend across 
many decisions and contexts.   
The Court’s First Amendment, freedom of expression project remains an important 
flashpoint for scholars in the ongoing debate concerning the relative influences of legal and 
ideological factors on Supreme Court judicial decision-making.  In fact, the state of scholarship 
on the subject tracks the messy state of contemporary First Amendment free speech 
jurisprudence, with competing theoretical approaches and research designs mirroring 
increasingly complex subsets of jurisprudence, from the government speech to traditional content 
neutrality doctrines. Due to these scattered and disparate treatments, it remains an open question 
as to whether the Roberts Court is a pro- or anti-speech Court, whether free expression represents 
an exception to the attitudinal model of judging, whether the Roberts Court has reconstituted free 
23 
expression in a marked break from the previous Court, and the extent to which ideological 
preferences of justices or well-defined legal categories carries provides leverage on the question.  
In developing answers to these questions in the course of this dissertation, the project 
examines the constitution of contemporary freedom of expression law from both perspectives. 
Here, the term “constitution” refers to the fact that the justices, as members of a particular 
institution and set of practices embedded within a particular historical context, set the contours 
and limits of First Amendment protection in an ongoing, fluid process of adversarial legalism. 
This constitution of freedom of expression is best understood as a shared practice of norms 
among members of a particular community, structured by a set of rules that are neither wholly 
determinate or hopelessly indeterminate.  It accepts the premise that justices have an institutional 
duty to balance social facts and moral concerns, and that this practice is often fraught with 
“[cases] both similar to, and different from, a finite pattern of behavior in an infinite number of 
ways. Judicial discretion is inevitable because it is impossible for finite beings to guide conduct 
in ways that resolve every conceivable question.” (Shapiro 2011, 251).  
Because of law’s simultaneous, fundamental indeterminacy in hard cases – precisely the 
type likely to populate the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda – and its ability to provide general 
guidelines that steer collective decision-making by a particular standard like a principle of 
content-neutrality (akin to Hart’s “rule of recognition”(Hart 1994, 94-95, 98, 102-103)), studies 
of judging must account for the influences of social and moral preferences and legal principles 
alike.5  These efforts must take seriously the different types of knowledge gleaned from internal 
5 Shapiro invokes Hart’s “rule of recognition” and distinction between primary and secondary rules in suggesting 
constitutional law adjudication approaches a secondary rule – or rule of recognition – that government officials have 
a duty to “evaluate the conduct of citizens according to the rules these citizens are obligated to follow.” In dispute 
resolution before Courts on issues of constitutional law, Article III (2011, 84-86) functions as a primary rule, and is 
a rule of recognition agreed to by government officials.   In this project and specifically in chapter four, I view the 
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and external approaches to the study of judicial behavior and attempt to integrate them so as to 
gain the broadest possible perspective on an outcome of interest. This dissertation pushes back 
against the balkanization of judicial decision-making studies into camps sometimes bearing the 
labels quantitative and qualitative, behavioralist and post-behavioralist, attitudinalists and 
historical institutionalist. There is no guarantee that this structure will produce neat findings, 
however:  To some, the findings may be as easily digestible as a Bob Ross landscape but to 
others a big picture akin to Jackson Pollock’s work. This should be expected in any effort that 
brings the insights of competing perspectives together in offering a comprehensive answer to 
important political questions, providing empirical, quantitative analyses revealing measurable 
effects-of-causes, but also a detailed, complex causes-of-effects account.  If persuasive, the 
project not only explains an important outcome of interest but will also serve as a model for 
judicial decision-making scholars interested in particular periods and/or issue areas to follow.     
 
Plan of the Dissertation and a Brief Note on Research Design 
 Overall, the freedom of speech agenda of the contemporary Court is the broad outcome 
of interest to be explained in this dissertation project.  More broadly, the project also uses 
contemporary freedom of speech as a proving ground for a number of longstanding conventions 
of judicial decision-making, especially a primary focus on individual judicial votes (and 
aggregations) and the merits stage of decision-making.  In light of this structure and its 
accompanying methodological and epistemological pluralism, each individual chapter provides a 
specialized review of relevant literature and research design specific to the interrogation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Supreme Court bench as a microcosm of society and the justices as players who agree to the rule of recognition that 
content-based regulations of speech by government actors are highly suspect under the First Amendment. 
Previewing a theme explored in chapter four, I argue that the secondary rule of fidelity to this jurisprudential regime 
rests on increasingly shaky ground.   
25 
 
 
 
conception of the judicial process at issue.6  Material related to coding standards is included in 
the body of chapter two, and is developed further in a Appendices A through H of the 
dissertation.  Data have been generated by the observable portions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision-making processes and gleaned primarily from the close reading of judicial opinions and 
existing, universally accessible databases including the Supreme Court Database and the website 
of Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn.  The universe of free speech decisions decided on the 
merits during the Roberts and Rehnquist Court Eras was determined by cross-verification of 
several sources, including recent scholarship, The First Amendment Center, searches of the 
Supreme Court Database, and Westlaw key cites performed in connection with the Global Free 
Speech Repository (GFSR) at Syracuse University.  
 The following paragraphs provide an overview of each substantive chapter as well as key 
findings from each stage of the data analysis. Chapter two begins with the most fundamental part 
of judicial decision-making studies that may be taken for granted: the development of and 
scoring of indicators that accurately reflect concepts of interest.  Scholars have recently 
developed new indicators in free speech decisions that move beyond the conventional “policy 
direction” variable assigned by the Supreme Court Database, a variable that has been of key 
importance in attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making. These ongoing efforts are a 
reminder that the scoring of indicators developed to measure key concepts is a key first step in 
any research endeavor (Adcock and Collier 2000).  In chapter two, I develop and assess a new 
composite directional variable based on the idea of “INUS” conditions, defined as “an 
insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 
                                                 
6 Beyond that qualification – and consistent with best practices associated with data maintenance and transparency 
collected and examined by the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-method Research at Syracuse University (IQMR) -  
all data have been stored securely on a laptop hard drive with flash drive back-up copies and have also been 
uploaded to Dropbox with two-step authentication required for access.  Data, including STATA analysis do-files, 
will be made available publicly to all parties via dataverse.com following submission of the project.   
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result.” (Mackie 1965, 245; see also Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79-82). This composite 
indicator incorporates the identity of the speaker, speech act, and speech suppressor in assigning 
an ideological direction to judicial votes – each a necessary piece of information for determining 
the direction of a decision but none alone sufficient for characterizing a decision as liberal, 
conservative, or undetermined.   
 Chapter three assesses the Roberts Era free speech plenary (or merits) agenda from the 
perspective of the attitudinal model, specifying the probability of pro-speech votes primarily as a 
function of judicial attitudes (or ideological preferences) while controlling for a number of 
relevant case factors.  This approach is part replication and part building upon the models and 
findings offered by Richards (2013) in a book-length treatment of the influence of factors beyond 
ideology on the Court’s free expression decisions. I also argue for greater attention to the 
voting coalitions in cases as the key dependent variable of interest, rather than the probability of 
a pro-speech or anti-speech vote occurring given an aggregation of judicial votes.  To examine 
the concept of voting disorder on the Court, I construct and elaborate on a series of descriptive 
typologies. 
 Chapter four builds upon the ideological explanation by considering the influence of 
jurisprudential structures, differing conceptions of the judicial role, and free speech philosophies 
within and across cases.  This chronological and “causes of effects” explanation relies upon 
counterfactuals, cross-case, and cross-justice comparisons in the spirit of early work by C. 
Herman Pritchett, a pioneer of judicial behavior research who recognized the limits of effects-of-
causes research designs that – to varying degrees – have emphasized ideological preferences 
over other possible explanations.  While the model specified in this chapter is more complex than 
common judicial decision-making specifications, care is taken to mitigate against what could 
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become a scenario where “everything is somehow connected to everything else.” (Smith 1988, 
101; see also Davis 1999, 152).    
Chapter five takes a different, innovative tack and leverages a different part of the 
judicial process in an attempt to pinpoint what lies behind the Roberts Era free speech agenda: 
the certiorari cut-point.  To date, no issue-oriented study of the Supreme Court agenda has 
adequately – if at all –accounted for the non-random, discretionary nature of the Court’s agenda. 
This strategy is not without its own perils. The secrecy of the certiorari process, possible 
strategic motivations, and questions of what constitutes “certworthiness” all contribute to a 
number of difficult case selection and research design choices.  I develop an original dataset of 
all fairly comparable denials of certiorari in free speech cases from 2006-2015, and examine 
these cases via logit regression and case studies of issue area subsets within modern First 
Amendment law. The logic of looking to the body of cases denied certiorari is fairly 
straightforward, though complicated by the secrecy of the Court’s review process:  If the Court’s 
free expression agenda is ideologically motivated, we may expect to observe similar patterns at 
the certiorari stage.  
Chapter six summarizes the findings of this project, suggesting how this study could be a 
useful research program for other scholars interested in assessments of broad issue areas before 
the Court.  Overall, the key finding of the dissertation is that the Roberts Court’s constitution of 
freedom of expression is both ideological and legal.  The findings are consistent with a Court 
interested in advancing a particular political agenda – hostility to campaign finance regulations 
and unions, sympathy to expanding the scope of freedom of expression to include commercial 
transactions - while also clearly marking the bounds of the scope of free expression protection. 
The Court’s agenda has a clear conservative cast, though it is clearly not solely motivated by 
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conservative preferences.  The Court regularly deviates from the expectations of the attitudinal 
model of judging, and the nature of these deviations is consistent with post-behavioral 
understandings of the Court as populated by actors with heterogeneous ideological and legal 
preferences.  Simply put, the constitution of freedom of expression by the contemporary Court 
does not lend itself to bright-line dichotomies or categories. 
Beyond the substantive outcome of interest, the conclusion also connects the assumptions 
and approaches offered here to the internal and external perspectives on law described above.  It 
also suggests how this project may be expanded moving forward in the comparative courts 
context, the role of free speech in U.S. society, and the role of litigators in bringing cases before 
the Court.  If this account is persuasive, then, it will successfully describe and explain the 
contemporary free expression agenda of the Roberts Era Court: It will also improve conventions 
relied upon in quantitatively and qualitatively (or positivist and interpretive) oriented studies of 
judicial decision-making.   
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Chapter 2 
Rethinking Concept Measurement in the Study of U.S. Freedom of Expression 
Introduction 
The ideological coding of case outcomes is a key component of studies of Supreme Court 
decision-making.  Foundational work in the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making has 
found strong correlations between the ideological values of justices and career voting patterns 
(Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002).  The Supreme Court Database, a valuable 
research tool available to scholars of law and courts, has historically coded pro-free speech 
decisions as liberal – with some evolving exceptions, as in the case of decisions against 
provisions of federal and state campaign finance laws.  Yet scholars from both the behavioral 
and doctrinal judicial decision-making camps have noted that there are conservative and liberal 
free speech traditions (Epstein and Segal 2006), as well as multiple potential indicators in any 
free expression controversy (Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; Pettys 2015).7  If the indicators for 
ideological case factors do not closely reflect the underlying concept of interest - whether a 
decision’s direction is liberal or conservative - then the foundation of judicial decision-making 
studies may be flawed (Adcock and Collier 2000).  Thus, contemporary freedom of expression 
cases may represent a unique test population for some of the assumptions of what has become 
known as the attitudinal model of judging. 
Consider the sustained scholarly debate concerning the nature of the Court’s recent free 
speech decisions.  Some of the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions – particularly those 
involving campaign finance regulations and union fundraising - appear to be consistent with the 
7 For variation, cases generally concerning the First Amendment’s free speech clause during the period of analysis in 
this dissertation use the terms “free speech” and “free expression” interchangeably.  
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attitudinal theory of judging, while others do not appear to fit so easily within the attitudinal 
paradigm, including cases involving protestors at military funerals, a federal animal cruelty law, 
a state law regulating the sale of violent videogames to minors, and even a federal law restoring 
copyright protections to artistic works previously in the public domain. Indeed, for a number of 
recent free expression decisions, it is not immediately clear which case-level indicator best 
reflects the ideological content of the case: The ideological, “in-group” affiliation of the speaker? 
The partisan identity of the speech suppressor? Or what about the ideological valence of the 
speech act itself?  
The issue, then, is both substantive and methodological. Legal scholars continue to offer 
explanations of judicial behavior in Roberts Court Era free expression cases from a diverse array 
of epistemological perspectives and employing different methodological approaches (Youn 
2011; Coyle 2013, 199-219; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; Richards 2013; Tushnet 2013, 215-
246; Tribe and Matz 2014, 121-153; Pettys 2014; 2015;  Knowles and Lichtman 2015, 239-254). 
This sustained focus on the coverage and scope of free expression protection is connected to the 
First Amendment’s place as a “lodestar” of democracy in the United States, a right that, when 
litigated, has frequently produced strange bedfellows among the Court’s Justices (Edelman, 
Klein, and Lindquist 2008)  and even among interest groups filing amicus curiae briefs in merits 
cases before the Court (Swenson 2016).Whether operationalized through quantitative scoring 
and regression techniques or richly detailed, interpretive narratives, all of these accounts share an 
implicit concern for the relationships between the ideological values of the Justices and the 
ideological direction of votes in decisions on the merits. 
 Recently, some scholars have drawn attention to the importance of accurately measuring 
the values of the justices, stressing the importance of accurately measuring the ideological 
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preferences of Justices (Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016).   Alternatively, other scholars have 
highlighted the importance of accurately measuring ideology on the “votes” side of this 
relationship (Shapiro 2010; Hagle 2015). What else can be done to improve upon the content 
validity of the dependent variable operationalized in quantitative analyses of judicial decision-
making?  In this chapter, I focus on the votes side of the equation and develop an alternative, 
composite indicator for coding the ideological direction of decision direction in contemporary 
free expression controversies.  Drawing on concept formation literature and the notion of “INUS 
Conditions,” or “an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is 
itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1965, 245),  I develop a decision 
direction indicator that takes into account the speaker, speech suppressor, and valence of the 
speech act identified in each free speech decision issued by the Roberts Court since 2005.  In 
other words, membership in the sets of “conservative,” “liberal,” or “unspecified” categories of 
Supreme Court decisions follows from the presence of multiple conditions – the type of speaker 
(rights claimant), speech act (the content of the speech), and the partisan identity of the speech 
suppressor (entity enacting the law or taking action suppressing speech) - which can be 
configured in multiple ways.   
 This chapter proceeds as follows: First, I describe the conventional policy basis for 
coding ideological direction developed by the curators of the Supreme Court Database, a 
resource widely-used by judicial decision-making scholars.  Next, I review recent scholarship 
that has sought to improve upon the policy-based scoring of indicators by instead looking to the 
ideological affiliation of the speaker in a given case before the Court, as well as an emerging 
critique of this speaker-centric approach.  A key theme that has come to light in a recent 
exchange between judicial decision-making scholars is the multiplicity of potential indicators 
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that may function as stimuli for justices considering free expression controversies, including the 
identity of the speaker but also the content of the speech and identity of the speech suppressor.  
To build upon this emerging research program, I develop a composite indicator for ideological 
direction that also accounts for the latter two considerations.  Finally, I assess the composite 
indicator’s performance by replicating the original values and votes regression appearing in 
conventional analyses of judicial behavior. I find that as scholars have refined the indicators for 
decision direction assignment, the relationship between values and votes has not remained 
constant but become more tenuous.   
 This replication of conventional analyses with new concept measurement techniques has 
immediate implications for the study of contemporary free expression decisions, where the 
conservative voting percentages of Roberts Court Justices in free speech cases from the 2005-
2014 terms may be overstated.  While the inferences drawn from this piece are necessarily 
limited in scope to recent free expression decisions and one possible model specification of 
many, the problem of multiple indicators and coding choices has implications for any study 
relying on the decision direction indicator assigned by the Supreme Court Database. More 
broadly, it is hoped that this project will encourage continued discussion across the quantitative 
and qualitative cultures in the epistemologically and methodologically diverse subfield of law 
and courts. 
 
Measuring Decision Direction: The Policy-Based Approach 
 Ideology is a notoriously slippery concept.  As John Gerring notes, “it has become 
customary to begin any discussion of ideology with some observation concerning its semantic 
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promiscuity.”  Gerring defines ideology as “a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that 
belong to one another in a non-random fashion.” (Gerring 1997, 957, 980).   This definition 
captures the core element of the concept of ideology, and allows the researcher to add and 
subtract particular attributes as dictated by case factors that resonate with modern liberalism or 
conservatism.  In the dominant judicial decision-making paradigm, Supreme Court Justices, legal 
actors appointed in a political process to serve on the nation’s highest tribunal as a co-equal 
policymaking branch of the federal government, face fewer institutional constraints in voting on 
cases and are therefore likely to vote ideological preferences rather than (or in addition to) 
commitments to precedent (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000, 12; Hansford and Spriggs 
2008; Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 2013). Generally, there are two dimensions used to gauge 
ideological preferences in American politics – one economic and one social (Fiorina, Abrams, 
and Pope 2011, 170-173).  For illustration, pro-business decisions are coded as conservative 
while pro-union decisions are coded as liberal.  On the social axis, a conservative decision is one 
that favors evangelical Christianity, while a liberal decision is one that favors social equality (of 
ethnic minorities, LGBT causes, etc.).   
In a recent series of exchanges, judicial decision-making scholars have brought attention 
to potential problems with the assignment of decision direction indicator employed by the 
Supreme Court Database (SCDB)(Epstein and Segal 2006; Shapiro 2010; Epstein, Parker, and 
Segal 2013; Pettys 2014; 2015). These exchanges point toward the importance of accurately 
measuring the direction of votes.  The most important factor in determining the ideological 
content of cases coded by the SCDB is the issue area.  The Supreme Court Database emphasizes 
that, “Although criteria for the identification of issues are hard to articulate, the focus here is on 
the subject matter of the controversy (e.g., sex discrimination, state tax, affirmative action) rather 
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than its legal basis (e.g., the equal protection clause),” and that “The objective is to categorize the 
case from a public policy standpoint…”8  At some point, the decision direction coding for First 
Amendment is the issue area cases began to make exceptions, such that some pro-First 
Amendment decisions were coded as conservative (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 149-151).  
For example, the current coding for First Amendment issue area decisions describes liberal 
decisions as those that are “pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising 
less protected civil rights (e.g. homosexuality),” “pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in 
campaign spending,” “pro-privacy vis-à-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that 
of mental incompetents,” and “pro-underdog,” while conservative decisions are “the reverse of 
above” (Supreme Court Database 2015). As one illustration, in campaign finance cases where 
the Court strikes down such regulations as inconsistent with the First Amendment, the database 
codes these pro-First Amendment votes as conservative under the anti-corruption criteria – 
though even here the choice of issue area and coding seems problematic.9 
  
 Basic Concerns: Multiple Issue Areas and Ad Hoc Adjustments 
 Commentators have occasionally questioned the degree to which coder discretion is 
constrained or scoring decisions can be replicated by the coding rules adopted by the SCDB 
(Hagle 2015).  First, some cases present multiple issue areas.  Sometimes, the SCDB recognizes 
this by disaggregating a case and coding each issue separately, but sometimes multiple issues are 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court Database, 2015 release. 
9 Even in this limited subset of First Amendment decisions, it remains unclear how the issue area is decided.  In 
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, a 2012 per curiam decision holding unconstitutional a Montana statute 
prohibiting corporate spending in judicial elections, the database coded the decision as “liberal” in identifying the 
issue area as “First Amendment: Commercial speech, excluding attorneys.”  Nor is it clear why decisions favoring 
commercial speech claims are coded as liberal, given the link between such speech and a conservative/libertarian 
free market philosophy. 
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not recognized by database coders (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2012).  Consider a 
contemporary free expression controversy recently coded by the Database:  Walker v. Sons of 
Confederate Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)).  In a 5-4 decision with Justice Thomas breaking 
with the Court’s conservative bloc and joining Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, the Court held 
that the Texas Motor Vehicle Board’s rejection of a license plate design featuring the 
Confederate Flag was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it constituted 
government, rather than private, speech.  Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, attacked the majority for misinterpreting the 
precedent established in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)), another 
government speech case decided unanimously and also authored by Alito.   
 According to the SCDB, the issue area in the case is the First Amendment, a coding 
choice that dictates the decision direction should be conservative, and that individual votes in 
favor of the Sons of the Confederate Veterans in the case should be coded as liberal.  But is that 
the only issue area in the case?  Lurking in the background is an issue about deference to states, a 
familiar theme for the Court’s more conservative jurists during Rehnquist era (Volokh 2015). 
Should an additional issue area be added for the case (States’ Rights), with the decision coded as 
conservative and dissenting votes coded as liberal (anti-states’ rights)?  Or, ad hoc, should an 
additional issue area category be added (right-wing speech), similar to the addition of the “anti-
corruption” in campaign finance cases that transforms otherwise liberal First Amendment 
decisions to conservative ones because they struck down campaign finance regulations?   
 The potential to subtract and add coding rules without detailed explanation points to a 
related coding discretion issue: ad hoc measurement adjustments. As Carolyn Shapiro has noted, 
the issue area decision is important because it dictates the subsequent decision direction indicator 
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scoring. This choice has direct bearing on the dependent variables employed in attitudinal 
analyses of judicial decision-making (Shapiro 2010).  In a recent book-length treatment of the 
behavior of federal judges, one of the book’s co-authors offered corrections to a number of 
coding decisions in the SCDB based on a random sample of 110 cases drawn from the database: 
“We changed all votes to other from conservative or liberal in case type 30020, where every vote 
for the plaintiff in a commercial speech case had been coded as liberal, and in 30140, where 
likewise every vote in favor of requiring accountability in campaign spending had been coded as 
liberal.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 150).  The authors’ notes on coding changes end with a comment 
on coding exercises of judicial review from liberal to “other,” as “It would require a careful 
examination, which we have not undertaken, of individual cases to determine the ideological 
direction of a vote in favor of the exercise of judicial power.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 151). 
If, however, “The acid test of the role of ideology in Supreme Court decision-making is 
the ideological valence of the Justices’ votes,” then it should follow that a careful examination of 
case factors is appropriate for all types of decisions (Epstein et al. 2013, 105). This concern is not 
merely theoretical, as the Roberts Court’s decision in Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz v. U.S. (559 
U.S. 229 (2010)) illustrates.  Here, the Court ruled against a First Amendment challenge brought 
by a law firm specializing in bankruptcy claims, which was restricted from advising clients to 
incur additional debt under amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).  Another contested provision of 
the law required that “debt relief” agencies disclose their identity in advertisements. Should 
“Commercial speech” decisions in favor of the claimant be coded as conservative, while 
commercial speech decisions in favor of lawyers be coded as liberal, based on the finding that 
attorneys tend to contribute campaign donations to Democrats? (Bonica and Sen 2015) On the 
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commercial speech issue, the SCDB codes the decision as liberal (Commercial Speech, 
Attorneys (cf. Commercial Speech)), while on the First Amendment issue the Database codes the 
decision direction as conservative (First Amendment, Miscellaneous)(cf. Comity: First 
Amendment)).10  It is not clear why the two First Amendment issues point in different directions, 
or how to decide which decision (if it can be considered more than a single decision) should be 
given primacy – taking the case as a whole, is the proper decision direction “unspecifiable”? 
Table 2.1 – Decision Direction Assignments, SCDB (1946-2014 Terms) 
 Number of Cases Percentage 
Conservative 4,131 47.87% 
Liberal 4,356 50.48 
Unspecifiable 143 1.66 
Total 8,630 100.00 
 
 
 Table 2.1 illustrates how rarely the unspecified code has been assigned by the SCDB.  In 
Roberts Court free expression decisions, the unspecified code has never been assigned.11  As 
Shapiro notes, this remains problematic for scholars in both the empirical and traditional legal 
studies fields: The behavioral approach linking values to votes “assumes that there is a single 
dimension – liberal to conservative – along which all cases’ ideological character can be 
measured…In the U.S. Supreme Court Database, not only is the ideology coding unidimensional 
but it also binary.” (Shapiro 2010, 88). 
 
 
                                                 
10 Unless stated otherwise, Database results obtained via the Analysis tool (Analysis Case Detail) at the Supreme 
Court Database at http://supremecourtdatabase.org/analysis.php.  
11 Shapiro’s claim that the SCDB direction coding is binary is not technically true, but in practice the unspecified 
code is rarely assigned. Since the 2005 term, the SCDB has assigned the unspecified code a total of 11 times.  The 
code has not been assigned to any First Amendment free speech decisions during that period.  
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The In-Group Bias Debate 
 With these concerns in mind, scholars have recently developed an alternative indicator 
based on the ideological identity of the speaker in free speech cases (Epstein, Parker, and Segal 
2013; see also Richards and Kritzer 2002 and Richards 2013 for earlier efforts at controlling for 
the identity of the speaker in free expression cases).  In other words, the relevant stimulus for the 
justices is posited as the ideological identity of the claimant in a case, and the directionality of a 
judicial vote is determined by the purported alignment of the free speech claimant’s ideology 
with the conservative or liberal values of the justices. Specifically, Epstein, Parker, and Segal 
define a “Nature of Expression” variable, “to assess the ideological direction of the expression 
(or expresser) – such that homophobic (e.g., [Boy Scouts of America v. Dale]) or racist (e.g. 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell [1993]) behavior, to provide but two examples, are coded as 
“conservative” expression.  Nature of expression is liberal if the expression was, e.g., burning an 
American flag (e.g. Texas v. Johnson [1989]), providing support to (e.g. Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project [2010]), associating with un-American organizations (e.g. Barenblatt v. United 
States [1959]), and so on.” (Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013, 7).   
 The authors ultimately conclude that justices opportunistically rule in favor of pro-speech 
claims brought by members of their own ideological in-group, but with the caveat that 
“regardless of whether the law is liberal, conservative, or neutral, liberal justices are more likely 
to vote in favor of the expression,” while conservative justices are only more likely to vote in 
favor of expression when the nature of expression is conservative (Epstein et al. 2013, 10; see 
also Liptak 2014).  The study builds on conventional judicial decision-making scholarship in that 
it has spurred a re-assessment of whether free expression is simply another instrumental 
constitutional provision that justices put into service in the pursuit of liberal and conservative 
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causes, but the authors’ operationalizing the nature of expression variable may also hinder our 
ability to draw inferences. By failing to clearly distinguish between the nature of the expression 
and the identity of the expressor, the authors’ indicator may fail to reflect the underlying concept 
of interest.  As legal scholar Todd Pettys suggests, there are at least two potential indicators 
present – the nature of the expression and the identity of the speaker (Pettys 2014, 16-17).  
 Epstein, Parker, and Segal responded to this charge and others in an ongoing debate with 
Pettys, who has found a number of coding errors and questionable operationalization issues in 
the study.  One response by Epstein, Parker, and Segal included the admonition: “Another 
common misstep on [Pettys’] part is to conflate ideology and partisanship.  Were he devising the 
coding rules, it seems that he would always code, for example, a challenge to an election law 
brought by a Democrat as liberal (and a Republican, as conservative).  But that’s not our 
approach.  In these kinds of cases, a challenge motivated to bring about greater inclusion in the 
political process is liberal regardless of the challenger’s partisan label.” (Epstein, Parker, and 
Segal 2014, 1).  This response not only draws attention to the muddy distinction between the 
nature of the speech at issue and identity of the speaker, but also stakes the claim that 
partisanship and ideology are two distinct, easily separable indicators.  Recent scholarship in the 
political parties subdiscipline suggests that this claim may be more tenuous in contemporary 
politics, as the Democratic and Republican parties have become increasingly (though 
asymmetrically) more liberal and conservative, respectively, with partisan goals often reflecting 
the core ideological orientations of members of each party (Abramowitz 2011; Fiorina, Abrams, 
and Pope 2011). The point is not that the in-group bias approach to measurement is 
fundamentally incorrect in distinguishing partisan from ideological identity, but that the 
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distinction is not as cut-and-dried as their response suggests and that indicators employed to 
reflect concepts may be historically contingent.  
Epstein, Parker, and Segal also code laws - the “speech suppressor” - on the basis of 
whether they are liberal or conservative, but the authors’ definition is relatively thin:  “For our 
study (as in all the others), conservative laws are actions taken by government that tend to 
restrict liberal speech (e.g. restrictions on flag burning); liberal laws are the reverse (restrictions 
on anti-union expression).  The omitted category in our analysis is neutral laws – those that apply 
equally to liberal and conservative speakers, such as restrictions on campaign financing.” 
(Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2014).  Of course, laws against flag desecration or anti-union speech 
may have the effect of suppressing liberal or conservative speech, respectively, but these are 
obvious cases (Pettys 2015, 10). Here, it is not immediately clear whether the authors are coding 
the identity of the speech suppressor or their impression of the effect of that suppression. If it is 
the latter, and assuming the authors are serious about the claim that “votes to strike (and uphold) 
statutes tend to reflect [justices’] political preferences toward the policy content of the law,” then 
it is unclear why campaign finance statutes are excluded from the “liberal” category, as the 
conservative opposition to such regulations has been well-documented and predates the 
contemporary Court. 
Overall, this exchange underscores the importance of establishing a high degree of 
symmetry between systematized concepts and indicators: “Researchers routinely make complex 
choices about linking concepts to observations, that is, about connecting ideas with facts.  These 
choices raise the basic question of measurement validity: Do the observations meaningfully 
capture the ideas contained in the concepts?” (Adcock and Collier 2000, 529, 531).  In studies of 
judicial decision-making seeking to assess relationships between values and votes, measurement 
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concerns apply to both the independent variable – as is the case in the EPS study – and 
dependent variable. 
Shifting the focus to the dependent variable in fundamental assessments of this 
relationship, it remains unclear how multiple, identity-based conditions present in cases should 
be accounted for when scoring the directional indicator.   Consider another recent free expression 
case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)), a 5-4 decision upholding the 
Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the Bar’s canon of conduct prohibiting candidates for 
judicial elections from soliciting campaign donations.  Lanell Williams-Yulee is a member of a 
racial minority class and criminal-defense lawyer, suggesting the speaker identity for the case 
should be coded as liberal.  The nature of the expression, however, concerns soliciting 
contributions for electoral campaigns – speech that resonates with the conservative, free market 
commitment equating money with speech.  Further complicating matters is that the Florida 
Supreme Court adopted what is essentially an anti-corruption provision in regulating judicial 
elections in Florida.  Is a decision against Williams-Yulee conservative, on the basis of her 
ideological identity?  Liberal, on the basis of the speech suppressor in the case and the nature of 
her expression?  How should scholars choose among these indicators that appear to point in 
different directions when operationalizing the concept of ideological direction of the decision? 
Building on Recent Work: Case Conditions as INUS Conditions 
The upshot of this emerging judicial decision-making scholarship has been the 
identification of a number of potential ideological indicators in free expression decisions, to 
include the identity of the speaker, the identity of the speech suppressor, and the nature of the 
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expression itself.   Observers of the Court have no clear way of adjudicating among these 
components in terms of which is most relevant for assigning directional coding to a decision, as 
each component may have a conservative or liberal ideological valence.  To choose one defining 
characteristic of the ideological content of a case at the expense of others raises questions about 
measurement validity and may lead to inaccurate relationships between values and votes. To 
contribute to this ongoing discussion concerning measurement in judicial decision-making 
studies, I offer an alternative approach that evaluates the ideological content of multiple 
theoretically relevant defining characteristics of contemporary free expression cases.   I argue 
that accounting for these multiple, case-level factors  yields more accurate characterizations of 
the decision direction of a case and, in turn, a better understanding of the relationship between 
values and votes.  In the sections that follow, I build upon the speaker “in-group” account and its 
critiques by operationalizing the speech suppressor and speech act variables for Roberts Court 
Era free expression controversies.  I then demonstrate how these indicators can be considered as 
multiple conditions that, when present, indicate membership in the categories of “conservative,” 
“liberal,” or “unspecified” through the qualitative tool known as INUS Conditions.   
 
 The Speech Suppressor 
 If justices are responding to the ideological valence of the entity enacting laws that 
suppress speech, scholars require an indicator that captures this valence.  To operationalize the 
“speech suppressor” indicator in a way that is replicable and transparent, I draw upon a body of 
judicial decision-making literature emphasizing that Supreme Court Justices are appointed and 
confirmed by national partisan actors and will likely uphold statutes consistent with partisan 
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regime commitments and strike those inconsistent with said commitments (Dahl 1957).  The 
notion of regime politics is defined as “the various ways in which governing coalitions organize 
their power and advance their political agenda within a system of interrelated 
institutions.”(Gillman 2006, 107).  As the parties have become more polarized – with 
conservatives likely to identify as Republicans, liberals likely to identify as Democrats, the 
partisan composition of enacting legislative coalitions has become a more plausible proxy 
measure for the ideological nature of laws.   
 At least one scholar has already looked to the composition of enacting legislative 
coalitions to facilitate inferences about the nature of judicial review by the Supreme Court (Keck 
2007, 325).  To the extent that partisanship is highly correlated with ideology in contemporary 
politics, the partisan composition of legislative coalitions voting in favor of relevant amendments 
(i.e. BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Amendment”) or a relevant bill (i.e. The PROTECT Act) is a useful 
proxy for the ideological identity of the speech suppressor in a given case. As a proxy indicator, 
this approach is not without measurement validity concerns.  However, I argue that it still 
represents an improvement over directional scoring that does not attempt to account for a 
measurable condition present in free expression controversies. Another limitation stems from 
data collection, as similar data on state-level legislative coalitions may not be readily available.  
When this is the case, scholars may look to well-documented regime commitments operating in 
the context of the case as a proxy.  Ultimately, the assignment of a partisan or ideological 
identity to a government action suppressing speech calls for coder discretion.  Recognizing this, 
Appendix A provides details on how this discretion was exercised.  
 Take for example the Roberts Court’s decision in Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), which struck down a public workers’ 
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union fee assessment for electoral or ideological purposes as compelled speech prohibited under 
the First Amendment.  The suppressor in this case, a union fee assessment policy, is consistent 
with a longstanding Democratic regime commitment to labor unions, a key part of the 
Democratic electoral coalition (Karol 2009, 28-29, 37).12   In these state and local level cases, 
when the partisan identity of a suppressor is not available due to missing legislative records or 
when the speech suppressor is an unelected official, I code the suppressor as Republican (or 
Democratic) when it is consistent with documented regime commitments expressed in national 
party platforms.13  When such information is not available or the identity of the suppressor is 
unclear, set membership is coded as undetermined. 
 For example, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (559 U.S. 440 (2007)), the Court held 
that electioneering provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 were 
unconstitutional as applied to the anti-Democratic candidate speech that Wisconsin Right to Life, 
a pro-life (conservative) 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, wished to engage in.  The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act – despite its namesake – was passed with overwhelming Democratic and 
minimal Republican support.14  As such, WRTL II is a case of a conservative speaker and 
Democratic speech suppressor.  Any provision of a federal law can be categorized in the same 
way.  If the challenged provision of a law in question in a free expression case  passed with both 
majority Democratic support and Republican support in the House or Senate, it is coded as 
                                                 
12 As Karol notes, the problems associated with inferring unity and disagreement solely through reading positions 
articulated in platforms, I also adopt his recommendation of looking at votes cast by parties in the national 
legislature. The purposes of this project differ from Karol’s in that his goal is to explain party coalition management, 
while mine is to develop indicators for the ideological direction of court case decisions.  Party platforms offered by 
increasingly polarized elites are one way of doing so.   
13 “Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic National Platform,” last accessed Oct. 29, 2015, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101962.pdf; “We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform,” last 
accessed Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101961.pdf.  
14 Roll Call Vote Information for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as follows:  House of 
Representatives, Feb. 14, 2002:  Democrats – 198Y, 12N; GOP – 41Y, 176N. U.S. Senate, Mar. 20, 2002: 
Democrats – 49Y, 2N; GOP – 11Y, 38N.   
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Bipartisan.  For challenges to federal laws where the relevant provision was not offered by 
amendment, the roll call votes for the enrolled bill will be used to code the suppressor variable.  
If a federal law was enacted with majority Democratic (Republican) support, but with a majority 
of Republicans (Democrats) in opposition, then the nature of the speech suppressor is 
Democratic (Republican).  Of course, sometimes laws that suppress speech will not have a clear 
partisan identity, such as the one in question in U.S. v. Alvarez: The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 
was enacted with broad bipartisan support. In other words, the identity of the suppressor is 
neither Democratic (liberal) or Republican (conservative), but bipartisan.  Coding suppressors as 
bipartisan or undetermined bears some similarities to coding speakers without any obvious or 
commonly understood ideological identity as unspecified.  Appendix A provides descriptions of 
federal statute coding decisions. 
 A point of caution is in order: the basic assumption for coding the suppressor in a given 
speech controversy is that the justices respond to the valence of the legislative coalition or 
official because it is a known entity.  The difficulty associated with finding and determining party 
positions via legislative votes and even party platform positions suggests that the justices are not 
familiar with the in-group identity of these political actors or which partisan coalitions favored 
speech suppressive laws.  Admittedly, the results that follow in Table 2.3 do little to assuage this 
concern.  However, if scholars remain convinced that this potential effect should be controlled 
for in attitudinal analyses and replications, this operationalization offers a degree of transparency 
not present in previous analyses.   
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 The Nature of the Speech Act (Speech Content) 
 The shift from issue area to speaker identity followed work by Epstein and Segal (2006) 
that suggested that it is not at all obvious that all pro-free speech claimant decisions should be 
classified as liberal, notwithstanding the liberal tradition of robust protection for civil liberties.  
As Feldman has argued, a conservative free speech tradition exists alongside the liberal one – a 
tradition with distinctly Burkean elements (as in the Roberts Court’s decision in Morse v. 
Frederick (551 U.S. 393 (2007)), as well as free-market, libertarian elements, as witnessed in the 
Roberts Court’s line of decisions striking down campaign finance regulations (Feldman 2013, 
144-146).  Similarly, Timothy Kuhner (2014) has argued that the conception of a “free market 
Constitution” has influenced the justices in freedom of speech cases going back to at least 
Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976)) and has served to reframe economic controversies as civil 
liberties disputes.  Here, the focus is on the conservative economic valence of the free market 
argument for speech, an argument that has appeared with regularity in the claims filed by 
speakers protesting restrictions on unfettered campaign spending and contributions. 
  To the extent that a conservative free speech tradition exists, it exists alongside 
competing liberal traditions as well. In McCutcheon v. FEC( 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)), Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court striking down aggregate contribution limits on individuals 
under provisions of FECA was also part of a broader debate with Justice Stephen Breyer 
(speaking for the Court’s liberal bloc) about the role of free speech in the U.S. constitutional 
democracy. Roberts (along with the Court’s more conservative justices) place heavy emphasis on 
the negative liberty component of the First Amendment’s protections, while Breyer and the 
Court’s liberal bloc interpret the First Amendment’s command as a positive liberty.  The work of 
Feldman (2013), Tushnet (2013), and Kuhner (2014), as well as Pettys’ critique of the in-group 
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bias study (2015, 16-17) points to the relevance of the content of the locution at issue, or the 
nature of the speech act itself.   
 Late 20th and early 21st Century free speech jurisprudence has often turned on broader 
partisan and ideological commitments to protecting a “free market” conception of speech, 
extending coverage to claims against campaign finance regulations and commercial speech on 
the basis of ensuring an unfettered exchange of ideas.  As Kathleen Sullivan (2010) has 
explained, this tradition has sometimes clashed with commitments to egalitarianism, or speech 
acts that appeal to equal treatment.  In some controversies before the Court, this will be strongly 
correlated with the identity of the claimant.  Consider again the case of Knox, where a class 
action against a local shop of the Service Employees International Union was filed by non-
members of a union who objected to paying an additional fee assessed by the union to, in part, 
engage in ideological, pro-union speech in the heat of an election campaign.  The speaker – 
union non-members opposed to pro-union political activities – is best scored as conservative and 
the speech act – protesting being compelled to contribute to pro-union ideological fundraising – 
can also be understood as a conservative speech act.   
 Other cases, however, do not feature this tidy convergence.  Milavetz, described above, is 
one such example where the speaker in the case – a debt relief agency (lawyers) make a speech 
claim with conservative ideological valence (commercial speech).  In this case, then, scholars 
attempting to score indicators are faced with a speech suppressor – the BAPCPA of 2005 – 
passed with bipartisan majorities, a liberal speaker (lawyers), and a speech act with conservative 
valence.  Without a rule or weighting principle (or a view into the minds of the Justices to 
determine which factor was relevant in their respective voting decisions), how should coders 
proceed? 
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Table 2.2 – Proposed Coding Indicators for Roberts and Rehnquist Era Free Speech 
Cases15 
 Speaker Speech Suppressor 
 
Liberal 
 
Lawyers; prisoners; 
unions; students; faculty; 
Democratic politicians; 
oppressed racial/ethnic 
minorities, liberal interest 
groups; government 
employees (except 
police);  purveyors of 
adult entertainment and 
pornography; mainstream 
media outlets 
 
Pro-racial, LGBT 
equality; 
pro-Democratic Party; 
secular speech; academic 
speech; anti-war speech; 
whistleblower speech; 
controversial left-wing 
speech (anti-war; animal 
rights); artistic speech 
including pornographic 
images and nude dancing 
 
 
 
Federal Laws/provisions enacted 
with majority (minority) 
Democratic (Republican) 
support; laws consistent with 
most recent Democratic Party 
Platofrm. 
 
State and local laws/actions 
beneficial to unions, regulating 
campaigns, progressive-style 
ethics reforms; business 
regulations; abortion protections 
 
 
Undetermined 
 
No clear ideological 
identity; conflicting 
identities 
 
Speech act lacks clear 
ideological component 
 
Federal Laws/provisions enacted 
with majority support of both 
parties 
 
State and local laws without 
clear ideological purpose/object 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Businesses; doctors; law 
enforcement officials 
(police, corrections 
officers), mainstream and 
fundamental Judeo-
Christian groups and 
individuals, GOP 
politicians, conservative 
interest groups, members 
of pro-life movement 
 
Pro-life; anti-LGBT or 
racial equality; 
mainstream and 
fundamental Judeo-
Christian speech; 
commercial speech; free 
market (anti-campaign 
finance and anti-tax) 
electoral speech; pro-GOP 
electoral speech; 
controversial right-wing 
speech (KKK; white 
nationalism, etc.) 
 
Federal Laws/provisions enacted 
with majority (minority) 
Republican (Democratic) 
support; laws consistent with 
most recent GOP Party Platform 
 
State and local laws/actions 
beneficial to union non-members 
and right-to-work ideology, 
regulations of pornography/adult 
entertainment, actions by law 
enforcement officials; anti-
abortion legislation/actions 
 
  
 Human discretion in measurement decisions is inevitable, and the meanings of 
ideological terms like “liberal” and “conservative” are period-specific.  To ensure scholars may 
                                                 
15 Note that the identity of the speaker may be distinct from the speech act, such that if a student protests the use of 
university funds subsidizing “liberal” campus groups, absent other identifying information about the student the 
coding for the speaker would be “liberal” and the speech act “conservative.” In addition, labeling controversial 
speech by KKK members as conservative or ardent animal rights supporters as liberal indicates a general valence of 
the speech act that should not be taken to mean all conservatives are KKK sympathizers or all liberals animal rights 
activists. Such codes assume the speech act does, however, resonate with one part of the spectrum. 
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evaluate this measure on their own terms – a transparency issue - and to facilitate replication, 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the proposed ideological coding rules for the composite 
indicator components for the contemporary Court.  These classifications build on judicial 
behavior literature in the context of First Amendment theory so that “liberal” reflects a 
commitment to egalitarianism and political equality, while “conservative” tends to reflect an 
affinity for speech rationales committed to a free market theory of the First Amendment 
(Sullivan 2010).  They also reflect general ideological and partisan regime commitments, so that 
decisions favoring unions, prisoners, and students and their speech claims are generally “liberal,” 
while those favoring mainstream, Christian religious groups, businesses, police, and conservative 
interest groups are coded as “conservative.”  As concept measurement entails a great deal of 
description, the guidelines in Table 2.2 represent an effort to be transparent so that others may 
build upon and attempt to replicate this analysis (George and Bennett 2005, 105-106).  Others 
may disagree with these choices and configurations; critiques are valuable and welcomed in 
moving this broader research program forward. 
 Pettys’ charge that the EPS study conflates speaker and speech identity is an empirical 
question that can be systematically assessed through conventional statistical modeling.  In the 
study, EPS model votes on the speech claim in a given case (=1 for a pro-speech vote) as the 
effect of a number of theoretically relevant factors.  Support for the claim that the justices 
generally support speakers of their own ideological stripe is found in an interaction term between 
the ideological preferences of the Justices (Segal-Cover scores) and the nature of expression 
variable described above.  The authors find statistically significant support for the in-group bias 
claim for the Rehnquist and Warren Courts, but not the Burger Court.  As for the Roberts Court, 
the authors’ reported coefficient is in the expected negative direction (suggesting the current, 
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conservative Court is less likely to support liberal expression), though its magnitude approaches 
zero and does not register at conventional levels of statistical significance.  The authors attribute 
this to “the relatively small number of votes cast by the Roberts Justices (N=248, from 28 
cases).” (Epstein et al. 2013, 11).   
 At the conclusion of the 2014 term, that count stands at 388 individual justice votes.  
Scholars interested in the Roberts Court now have a decade of observations and 44 cases to 
leverage causal claims.  The death of Justice Antonin Scalia in early 2016 also represents a clear 
break from the previous ten year period , though the nature of the post-Scalia period is difficult 
to even speculate on given recent obstructionism by the GOP-controlled Senate and uncertainty 
related to President Trump’s forthcoming nominee.  With these new data and cases across a 
fairly stable period of Court membership, scholars can attempt to replicate or assess the in-group 
bias account.  In addition, scholars have also benefitted from the critiques of Pettys and others 
who have raised conceptual measurement concerns with the in-group bias account.  For example, 
the nature of expression variable can and should be operationalized as two separate indicators: 
one for the identity of the speaker, and a separate one for the identity of the speech act, or 
content of the expression.  A replication may either confirm the widely publicized findings of the 
initial study – at least as concerning the Roberts Court – or serve as a call for more circumspect 
characterizations of the modern Court’s work.   
 To assess the in-group bias account’s claims, I use logit analysis to model the vote on a 
free expression claim (=1 if pro-speech) as the result of the Justices’ ideological preferences 
(Segal-Cover scores), whether the law in question was a federal statute or official action (=1), 
the identity of the speaker in a case, the identity of the speech act, the partisan or ideological 
identity of the speech suppressor in a case, and interaction terms between the Justices’ 
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ideological preferences and the speaker, speech, and speech suppressor variables.  The speech 
and speaker variables were coded categorically, including liberal (=0), undetermined (=1), and 
conservative (=2). Speech suppressor was coded categorically as well, with the difference being 
liberal/Democratic suppressor (=0), undetermined (=1), and conservative/Republican suppressor 
(=2).  The undetermined categories are important to include in the model, because as Epstein and 
King (2002) note, “the quickest way to create a biased measure is to develop a procedure that 
relies in a biased way on responses from the population under analysis” (92-93). The baseline 
category for the speaker and speech variables is the liberal category, while the suppressor 
baseline is conservative/Republican suppressor.  Standard errors are clustered on the Justices for 
a total of twelve clusters.  Following the expectations of the EPS study, a positive sign on the 
speaker and speech variables would indicate that conservative justices are less likely to support 
liberal speakers and speech.  As well, positive coefficients on the interaction terms between 
ideological preferences and speakers and ideological preferences and speech would suggest that 
the “gap between liberal and conservative justices in their support for free expression grows 
when the speech under consideration is liberal speech.” (Epstein et al. 2012, 7).  
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Table 2.3 – In-Group Bias Account, Roberts Era (2005-2014 Terms) 
 Coef. R.S.E. 
Justice Level   
Ideology (Segal-Cover) -1.016 .6298 
Case Level   
Federal Law .2566 .2609 
   
Speaker   
Liberal (Baseline) --- --- 
Undetermined 1.592 1.214 
Conservative .2104 .6404 
Speech   
Liberal (Baseline) --- --- 
Undetermined .4563 1.263 
Conservative -3.284*** 1.102 
Suppressor   
Liberal/Democratic (Baseline) --- --- 
Undetermined .6698 .5748 
Conservative/GOP -1.803*** .5339 
   
Interactions   
Speaker   
Ideology x Liberal (Baseline) --- --- 
Ideology x Undetermined -1.325 1.907 
Ideology x Conservative .7969 .9032 
Speech   
Ideology x Liberal (Baseline) --- --- 
Ideology x Undetermined -.4968 1.490 
Ideology x Conservative 4.666**** 1.311 
Suppressor   
Ideology x Lib/Dem (Baseline) --- --- 
Ideology x Undetermined -2.086*** .6657 
Ideology x Conservative/GOP -.6208 1.303 
   
Constant .5430 .4614 
N = 388   
   
Note: Logit coefficients with standard errors clustered on 
Justice (C.S.E.). p<.001****, p<.01***, p<.05**, p<.10*.  
Pseudo R2=0.1585.  
 
 Table 2.3 reports the size, direction, and magnitude of logit coefficients for voting 
patterns for all freedom of speech decisions during the Roberts Court Era.  Compared to the 
initial EPS study, neither the speaker nor suppressor variables register at conventional levels of 
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statistical significance.  In addition, while the sign on the undetermined speaker variable is 
positive and significant, the sign on the speech variable’s highest category (conservative) is 
negative, which suggests that the presence of conservative speech is less likely to result in a pro-
speech decision.  This could be due to hostility to conservative speech claims brought by liberal 
speakers (such as lawyers, in the case of Williams-Yulee).  In addition, neither of the categories 
for the speech suppressor variable register at conventional levels of statistical significance, and 
the coefficient direction is the opposite of what would be expected.    
 More important for this replication effort and the lynchpin of the EPS study are the 
coefficients for the interactions between ideology and each of the theoretically relevant case 
factor categories.  None of the interactions between ideology and speaker are statistically 
significant, though the direction of the coefficient indicates that conservative justices are more 
likely to vote for speech claims brought by conservative speakers.  What is more important, 
consistent with Pettys’ critique , is the content of the speech in a case – the coefficient on the 
interaction between ideology and conservative speech acts is strong and statistically significant 
(2014, 5 (fn. 17)).  A statistically significant relationship exists for the interaction between 
ideology and the speech suppressor when the identity of the suppressor is bipartisan or 
undetermined, as conservative justices are less likely to vote for the pro-speech position. 
However, the relationship is not significant for the interaction between ideology and liberal or 
Democratic-enacted laws. In other words, there is reason to believe that either the concept that 
truly matters is the content of the speech act, or the finding of in-group bias may not apply to the 
current Court – at least as conceptualized in the EPS study.  Fundamentally, these findings 
suggest that the conclusions reached in the EPS study are not wholly supported by the data. 
Additionally, these findings suggest that evaluating correlations between each of these 
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constituent components and judicial votes may be insufficient for measuring and estimating the 
relationship between judicial values and votes in free expression cases. 
  
Visualizing and Applying INUS Conditions 
 The central claim of this chapter is that knowing the ideological or partisan affiliation of 
any one of these components alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for coding the ideological 
direction of a case.  To ensure the decision direction indicator reflects the underlying concept to 
be measured, scholars should account for the presence of multiple conditions when faced with 
coding choices. In contemporary free expression controversies, the identity of the speaker, 
speech act, and speech suppressor can be viewed as conditions that are “Insufficient but 
Nonredundant components of a combination of conditions that is Unnecessary but Sufficient,” or 
what are commonly referred to in the qualitative methods literature as INUS conditions (Mackie 
1965; quoted in Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79). Knowing the ideological identity of the 
speaker alone is not enough to classify the decision as liberal or conservative; one must also 
consider the valence of the speech act in a particular legal controversy and/or the 
ideological/partisan affiliation of the speech suppressor.  The interplay of these three 
theoretically relevant components in free expression cases can be depicted visually as well.  
Following Mahoney and Vanderpoel (2015, 79-82), Figure 2.1 depicts these relationships 
through the use of family resemblance and INUS concept formation diagrams. 
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Figure 2.1 – Family Resemblance and INUS Conditions for Direction Assignments16 
 
                                                 
16 Some ideological objects cannot be assigned a liberal or conservative coding, or involve laws enacted with 
bipartisan support (or actions without any clear ideological component).  As such, a middle “undetermined” 
category exists (similar to the “unspecifiable” category available – but infrequently assigned – at the Supreme Court 
Database).   
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 Figure 2.1 can be interpreted as follows:  Conservative (liberal) decision direction is 
assigned when a case is a member of the following sets: ABC, AB~C, AC~B, or BC~A.17  The 
“~” notation preceding a set category represents “not (set condition).”  AB~C reads as 
“conditions A and B are present but not C.”  In the contemporary free expression context, a case 
presenting a conservative speaker (business) engaged in conservative speech (commercial 
speech) but not presenting a Liberal/Democratic law or action claimed to be suppressing speech 
is sufficient for assigning a pro-speech vote (decision) the ideological direction of conservative. 
When only one member of the set can be classified as conservative (liberal) and the other two 
sets take on the values of undetermined, then the directional coding of liberal or conservative 
cannot be assigned with any certainty.  Again, this is because multiple considerations exist in a 
given case and it is not known which of those considerations ranks first for any member of the 
majority (or dissent) even if it is in fact A, B, or C alone that led to a conservative or liberal 
decision.   
 In some cases, free speech conflicts arise between two members of the same ideological 
group.  For example, Morse v. Frederick  (551 U.S. 393 (2007) ) is understood as a conflict 
between a student and school administrator, arguably both a speaker and suppressor with liberal 
identities.  One argument against this scoring of speaker and suppressor indicators is that the 
school official, Deborah Morse, is suppressing student speech so in this dialectic she is more 
properly scored as a conservative suppressor.  However, the rule adopted here relies on the type 
of speech category to break the tie – Frederick’s speech was pro-drug, political, student speech, 
which is coded as liberal.  The Supreme Court’s anti-speech decision in favor of Morse and 
                                                 
17 The “~” notation preceding a set category represents “not (set condition).”  AB~C reads as “conditions A and B 
are present but not C.”  In this context, the presence of a conservative speaker (business) engaged in conservative 
speech (commercial speech) but not a Liberal/Democratic law or action claimed to be suppressing speech is 
sufficient for assigning a pro-speech vote (decision) the ideological direction of conservative. 
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against Frederick, then, is conservative on the basis that it is AB~C.  Another Roberts Court case 
featuring a conflict between two ideological identities is Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 U.S. 410 
(2007)), where Democratic District Attorney Gil Garcetti’s retaliatory actions against Deputy 
District Attorney Ceballos is decided by the nature of Ceballos’ speech.  His administrative 
reassignment followed what can be considered “whistleblower” speech, for his efforts in alerting 
defense counsel in an ongoing criminal case of problems relating to a inaccuracies in an affidavit 
leading to the issue of a search warrant.   
 Again, the scoring of the decision as conservative, anti-speech follows from the presence 
of case factors as AB~C.  A complete listing of the combinations for classifying case outcomes 
is provided in Appendix B. The qualitative tools of concept formation – family resemblance and 
INUS conditions – consider the multiple ideological components of a free expression 
controversy in assigning ideological codes to merits decisions and therefore produce a more 
accurate indicator of the underlying concept of interest. In this approach to concept 
measurement, determining the ideological direction of the decision is independent of the votes of 
the justices and treats relevant case facts as defining characteristics rather than causal indicators 
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 127-138). Concept measurement and determining the essence of a 
concept is prior to causal identification or quantification (Sartori 1970, 1038). Accordingly, the 
composite indicator incorporates the theoretically relevant sets of speaker identity, speech 
suppressor, and type of expression in making determinations of decision direction for any given 
free expression case. 
 Using this conceptual framework, Appendix C contains the coding of case ideological 
content for all Roberts Court First Amendment free expression cases from the 2005 through 2014 
terms along with the directional coding assigned by the composite indicator developed here, the 
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issue area based decision direction coding assigned by the SCDB, and the ideological direction 
as assigned in light of the identity of the speaker in the EPS study.  For comparison purposes, 
Appendix D provides the same for the Rehnquist Era (1994-2004 terms).  For each case, the 
ideological direction of a decision (and by extension, the justices’ votes) turns on the totality of 
circumstances for a given case – in other words, there must be evidence from at least two of the 
three categories in order to categorize a given vote as liberal or conservative.  For example, a 
decision is coded as conservative when the vote is for a conservative speech claimant and 
conservative expression (i.e. a conservative non-profit interest group protesting campaign 
contribution or expenditure limits)), a conservative claimant and a Democratic (or liberal) law 
(speech suppressor), or some combination of at least two of the three categories that point toward 
the conservative end of the ideological spectrum.   
 This approach is not without limitations.  First, measurement decisions concerning the 
ideological identity of theoretically relevant case factors are likely to vary greatly across time 
periods.  Earlier canonical free expression decisions may be understood as “liberal” based on the 
Carolene Products commitment to protecting unpopular speakers and speech from government 
suppression.  Writing in 2006, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal noted that “political scientists have 
long equated liberalism with a fundamental commitment to the First Amendment guarantees of 
speech, press, assembly, and association.” (Epstein and Segal 2006, 82).  Consider Brandenburg 
v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444 (1969), which featured a member of the Ku Klux Klan punished for 
making a number of racially inflammatory statements at a ritual cross-burning. During this 
period of the development of free expression jurisprudence by the liberal Warren Court, the 
decision for Clarence Brandenburg may be best understood as a liberal, pro-expression decision: 
Direction assignment is based on scoring the speaker as “liberal” under the unpopular speaker 
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understanding, the speech type (racist speech) might be properly scored as “conservative” even 
during this era, but the official action of censoring expression could plausibly be scored as a 
conservative speech suppressor (a general, period-specific concern with government actions 
stifling expression).   
 This point hints at a second assumption made in judicial decision-making studies, 
sometimes implicit but often animating judicial decision-making studies:  A judicial vote can and 
should be reduced to interest in a particular partisan or ideological position, whether it is a policy 
orientation as imposed by the SCDB or a psychological affinity for members of a particular in-
group in the EPS study. The meaning of a judicial vote is a subject that will likely continue to 
divide scholars, though recent evidence from a series of experiments – the gold standard in 
inferring causation – suggests that this reduction to this bottom-line motivation is problematic 
(Kahan, Hoffman, Evans, Devins, Lucci, and Cheng 2014, 4): Judges tend to be more resistant to 
the sort of “top-down” reasoning assumed in external approaches.  The goal of the INUS 
composite indicator is to account for the different ideological or partisan referents in freedom of 
speech controversies, which places this effort squarely in the “external” camp of judicial 
decision-making studies.  But engagement with this understanding of judicial votes on its own 
terms should not be mistaken with an endorsement of that view.  Wallace Mendelson cautioned 
long ago that “no matter how precise and objective the neo-behavioralist's calculating machine, it 
cannot rise above the errors that are fed into it.” (Mendelson 1963, 595).  Though the approach 
outlined here may still – however unintentionally - feed Mendelson’s beast, it answers the charge 
to more carefully develop a system of indicators put to use in behavioral studies.  
 To summarize, the scoring of decision direction – with this composite indicator and any 
other approach to measuring the direction of votes – rests upon the meanings of these terms 
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within the social and political context of those terms at different points in U.S. history.  The 
approach is consistent with the “external” approach to decision-making studies described in 
chapter one, which reduces votes to a series of ideological indicators. While the idea of using the 
INUS conditions specified here travels to all free expression decisions issued by the Supreme 
Court, different issue areas embedded in different political and social arrangements entail the 
development of ideological indicators that account for these differences.  A full discussion or 
application of this approach to every issue area or time period is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but a brief example may help illustrate how scholars can employ this approach in 
other areas: In the federalism context, for example, an INUS approach to coding might consider 
the identity of the partisan identity of a legislative act allegedly encroaching on state sovereignty 
under the 10th Amendment, the in-group identity of the claimant if such information is available, 
or the ideological orientation of the state challenging a federal law.  As with the approach offered 
here, scholars would become familiar with the general characteristics of cases within the 
federalism issue area and, based on extant scholarship and theory, isolate theoretically relevant 
indicators of interest.  In the words of Hagle (2015, 384), “To understand the forest, one also 
needs a solid working knowledge of the trees.”  
 Finally, the INUS approach builds upon extant scholarship but it does not completely 
reinvent the wheel. Table 2.4 illustrates the degree to which the composite indicator coding 
correlates with the measurements employed by the SCDB and Epstein, Parker, and Segal (EPS).  
While they do not approach congruency, the generally high levels of actual compared to 
expected agreement suggest each indicator at least partially reflects the concept of interest 
(ideological decision direction of votes)(Viera and Garrett 2005).  In the next section, I assess the 
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performance of each of these measures through a series of basic, bivariate models designed to 
assess the degree to which Justices’ values and votes are correlated.  
Table 2.4 – Agreement With Composite Indicator, Roberts and Rehnquist Court Eras 
 Paired Observations Agreement 
(Expected) 
Kappa  Significance 
Roberts Era (2005-2014) 
Supreme Court 
Database 
43 62.79%  
(45.32) 
0.3195 .0018 
Epstein, Parker, 
Segal (EPS) 
26 71.34% 
(52.04) 
0.4043 .0008 
Rehnquist Era (1994-2004) 
Supreme Court 
Database (SCDB) 
54 49.06% 
(40.83) 
0.1390 .0936 
Epstein, Parker, 
Segal (EPS) 
52 76.47% 
(41.41) 
0.5984 0.0000 
 
 
 
The Bivariate Case Revisited 
 To assess the performance of the composite indicator and to replicate models 
demonstrating a strong correlation between values and votes, I construct the original bivariate 
relationship that appears in early and more recent attitudinal scholarship (Segal and Cover 1989; 
Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1993; 2002; Epstein et al. 2013). It 
is true that scholars have elaborated upon this relationship through other techniques (logit 
modeling) and have offered a number of control variables: The EPS study focuses on developing 
a directional indicator that explains the free expression votes of the Justices, establishing 
probabilities for pro-expression votes.  Instead, this chapter focuses on measuring a concept 
related to the dependent variable in a number of judicial decision-making studies, past and 
present (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1993; 2002; Epstein et al. 
2013; Bryan and Kromphardt 2016, 11; Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016, 173).    
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 The decision to reassess the bivariate model evaluating the relationship between values 
and votes is that it remains the most fundamental evaluation – or “acid test” - of this relationship 
(Epstein et al. 2013, 105).   In this relationship, as Justices’ Segal-Cover scores increase so too 
should their career conservative voting percentages.  Generally, plots of actual and fitted 
(predicted) votes reveal something about the performance of a model specification: A model 
featuring minimal residuals between the actual and predicted votes represents a good fit. 
However, if the indicator employed to reflect the concept of decision direction does not account 
for the multiple factors presenting themselves in controversies before the Court, then the model 
may be inaccurate – the model’s goodness of fit will be an artifact of concept measurement that 
is imperfect.  Importantly, this measurement concern is prior to estimating causal effects and 
subsequent econometric concerns about biased estimators and the potential for error terms in the 
dependent variable to be correlated with independent variables (Adcock and Collier 2000; Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012; Wooldridge 2009, 316-318).   
 If concept measurement issues distort the relationship between values and votes, we may 
expect that as indicators have improved in reflecting the concept of decision direction, residuals 
between the justices’ positions and a line of best fit will likely increase.  If this is the case, then 
basic assumptions about the relationship between values and votes may be incorrect – they may 
fail the “acid test” of judicial behavior. As such, assessing the bivariate relationship between 
values and votes with new measurements of the decision direction variable is a replication effort 
with substantive implications for the study of contemporary free expression controversies and 
broader methodological and substantive implications for the study of judicial decision-making. 
The dependent variable for the models that follow is the percentage of conservative votes cast by 
each Justice since the October 2005 term (the beginning of the Roberts Court Era), while the 
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independent variable is each Justice’s exogenously determined Segal-Cover score.  In the first 
model, to calculate the percentage of conservative votes cast for each justice during this period I 
use the decision direction variable assigned by the SCDB. In the second model, I base the 
conservative vote percentages on the speaker identity indicator developed in the EPS study.  In 
the third model, decision direction is scored based on the composite indicator developed via the 
INUS approach.   
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Table 2.5 – Ideological Scores and Percentages by Indicator 
Justice SC % Conservative FS 
(SCDB) 
% Conservative FS 
(EPS) 
% Conservative FS 
(Composite) 
Differences 
(SCDB/EPS) 
Roberts Court (2005-2014 Terms) 
A. Scalia 1 72.5 77.78 72.09 -0.41/-5.69 
S. Alito .90 70.27 75.00 62.50 -7.77/-12.50 
J. G. Roberts 0.88 65.00 81.48 67.44 +2.44/-14.04 
C. Thomas 0.84 72.50 74.07 69.77 -2.73/-4.30 
J. P. Stevens 0.75 50.00 52.38 27.27 -22.73/-25.11 
D. Souter 0.675 50.00 50.00 37.50 -12.5/-12.5 
A. Kennedy 0.635 72.50 77.78 67.44 -5.06/-10.34 
S. Breyer 0.525 52.50 51.85 30.23 -22.27/-21.62 
R. B. Ginsburg 0.32 47.50 48.15 32.56 -14.94/-15.59 
E. Kagan 0.27 40.00 50.00 27.78 -12.22/-22.22 
S. Sotomayor 0.22 43.48 54.54 34.62 -8.86/-19.92 
 
 
Note: N=11. Percentages based on conservative voting percentages of each Justice from the 2005-2014 terms of the 
Court (the Roberts Court Era).  For the SCDB and Composite vote percentages, the total number of decisions scored 
is 43. Due to the replacement of Souter and Stevens with Sotomayor and Kagan, respectively, the number of cases 
each of these Justices participated in is less than 43 (Justice Alito also did not participate in three of these cases at 
the beginning of his tenure on the Court).   
 
In addition, data collected in the EPS study for the Roberts Court Era is only available for the 2005-2010 terms of 
the Court.  For EPS vote percentages, the total number of cases scored is 27.  Justice Alito voted in 24 of these 
cases, Stevens in 21, Souter in 16, Sotomayor in 11, and Kagan in 6.   
 
Rehnquist Court (1994-2004 Terms) 
A. Scalia 1 75.93 78.85 64.81 -11.12/-14.04 
W. Rehnquist .955 62.96 67.31 55.56 -7.4/-11.75 
C. Thomas 0.84 68.52 75.00 61.11 -7.41/-13.89 
J. P. Stevens 0.75 29.63 28.85 31.48 +1.85/+2.63 
D. Souter 0.675 33.33 40.38 38.89 +5.56/-1.49 
A. Kennedy 0.635 51.85 67.31 64.81 +12.96/-2.5 
S. D.  O’Connor 0.585 55.56 63.46 53.70 -1.86/-9.76 
S. Breyer 0.525 50.00 44.23 38.89 -11.11/-5.34 
R. B. Ginsburg 0.32 35.18 36.54 31.48 -3.7/-5.06 
      
Note: N=9.  Percentages are the conservative voting percentages of each Justice from the 1994-2004 terms of the 
Court (the “stable” Rehnquist Court Era).  For the SCDB and Composite indicator vote percentages, the total 
number of decisions scored is 54.  For the EPS percentage, the authors do not code two First Amendment free 
speech decisions: Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) and San Diego v. Roe, 
543 U.S. 77 (2004).   
 
 Table 2.5 arrays the justices in descending order of their rescaled Segal-Cover scores, 
beginning with the most conservative (Scalia) and ending with the most liberal (Sotomayor).  
The table also includes the percentage of conservative votes cast by each justice in free speech 
cases since the Court’s 2005 term, using the ideological direction variable for cases at the SCDB, 
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EPS study, and the composite indicator.  The difference column takes a positive value when a 
justice’s proportion of conservative votes increased under the composite indicator, while 
negative values indicate the proportion of conservative votes decreased compared to the SCDB 
policy-based coding and the EPS speaker coding, respectively.  Table 2.6 provides the results of 
each model estimated with OLS regression, including robust standard errors.   
Table 2.6 – Bivariate Models: SCDB, EPS, and Composite Indicator 
 Roberts Era  Rehnquist Era 
 OLS Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
OLS Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
Model 1 (SCDB)   
Segal-Cover Value 38.68**** 
(4.06) 
48.54*** 
(12.27) 
Constant 33.18**** 
(2.73) 
17.54* 
(8.24) 
R2 0.68 0.41 
   
Model 2 (EPS)   
Segal-Cover Value 37.71**** 
(6.70) 
52.11*** 
(11.42) 
Constant 38.96**** 
(4.68) 
19.38* 
(8.24) 
R2 0.55 0.37 
   
Model 3 (Composite)   
Segal-Cover Value 52.65**** 
(8.83) 
38.75*** 
(8.75) 
Constant 14.53** 
(5.72) 
21.91** 
(7.40) 
R2 0.55 0.36 
   
Notes: N=11 for Roberts Era; N=9 for Rehnquist Era. p<.001****, 
p<.01***, p<.05**; p<.10*.  Robust Standard Errors.  
 
  
 The first point of interest is that there is a clear, statistically significant relationship 
between values and votes in each model specification.  Figure 2.2 displays the results of the 
attitudinal model’s bivariate regression as applied to Roberts Court free expression cases.  
Moving from left to right, the models plot the Justices’ positions relative to the line of best fit 
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based on predicted values of the dependent variable, using the SCDB, EPS, and composite 
indicator coding, respectively.  Justices closer to the line are well-predicted by the model.  If 
measurement of the underlying concept of decision direction does not vary across the models, 
this would indicate precision in measurement but not necessarily accuracy. If, however, the 
residuals vary markedly across the models, then concerns about model fit are somewhat 
irrelevant: accurate measurement of concepts is prior to these concerns.  Again, the central 
argument of this chapter is that the fundamental correlations among values and votes offered in 
support of the attitudinal model may be a product of suspect indicators.  If the structure of the 
composite indicator is persuasive, then large deviations from predicted values of the dependent 
variable may suggest that in contemporary free expression cases, considerations beyond ideology 
may be motivating the Justices. Specifically, if the fit becomes more tenuous as scholars refine 
the direction assignment indicator, then there is reason to believe that free expression decisions 
in the Roberts Court Era are motivated by considerations beyond ideological preferences, or that 
the ideological values of the justices in this area of law during this time period are somehow 
different.  
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Figure 2.2 – Actual and Predicted Votes, Free Expression Cases (2005-2014) 
 
 The SCDB model reveals that the Court’s conservative justices – as measured by 
exogenous, Segal-Cover scores - tend to vote conservatively (for the conservative position in a 
case) at higher rates than the Court’s liberal justices, though even the liberal justices’ 
conservative vote proportions are greater than or approach 50%.  Justice Kennedy tends to vote 
conservatively more frequently than would be predicted by the model, while Chief Justice 
Roberts’ position suggests that he is less conservative than would be predicted by the model.  
This suggests that the Chief Justice may indeed be at the helm of the Court in contemporary free 
expression cases (Baker 2015a).  This model specification is consistent with characterizations of 
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the Roberts Court record on free expression as generally conservative, as Erwin Chemerinsky 
(2011), Monica Youn (2011), Epstein et al. (2013), and Burt Neuborne (2015, 10) have 
suggested.   
 Though the minimal residuals suggest the model is a good fit, it is beside the point if 
indicators lack measurement validity. The model using the EPS indicator – which the authors 
argue is an improvement over the SCDB policy issue coding – features larger residuals yet still 
captures a general relationship between the values and votes of the Justices.  While the 
dependent variable in this specification is calculated with 17 fewer cases (and should therefore 
be interpreted cautiously), a clear relationship is present for the earlier Roberts Court period. 
Compared to the SCDB specification, Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens’ votes are less 
frequently conservative than would be predicted by the model. In addition, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ actual conservative voting percentage is larger than the model’s predictions.  Under this 
specification, observers might expect Justice Thomas to be a key player in the contemporary 
Court’s free expression merits agenda, with a conservative voting percentage aligned with the 
model’s fitted predictions and the lowest overall percentage of the Court’s conservative bloc.  
One recent narrative of the Court’s behavior in this issue area suggests that Thomas’s conception 
of the judicial role differs from other members of the Court's Republican-appointed bloc (Tribe 
and Matz 2014, 141, 153). This specification is consistent with that account.    
 At first glance, the general slope of the composite indicator model is similar to that 
observed in the SCDB and EPS specifications.  But note the plots of the individual justices by 
their actual and predicted conservative vote percentages.  The Court’s liberal justices are far less 
conservative than the issue area oriented bivariate model predicts, especially Justice Breyer.  
This may be the biggest difference between the composite variable and the EPS and SCDB 
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variables: It shifts most Justices points toward the less conservative end of the plots. The 
conservative voting percentages of the Court’s conservative justices are predicted well by the 
model, but these too are generally lower than the SCDB and EPS models.  Although some 
commentators have suggested that it is the “Roberts Court” and not the “Kennedy Court” when it 
comes to free expression (Baker 2015b), the composite indicator model suggests that Justice 
Alito has voted less conservatively than any other member of the conservative bloc on the Court.  
While the Chief Justice clearly has a special interest in free expression (Collins 2013), in practice 
his vote may only be controlling in some of the Court’s closely divided decisions – the most 
recent example being Williams-Yulee. Overall, this analysis suggests that while the Court often 
divides on ideological lines in contemporary free expression controversies, the degree to which 
the justices are characterized as conservative in using the coding of the SCDB and EPS study 
may be overstated.   
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Figure 2.3 - Actual and Predicted Votes, Free Expression Cases (1994-2004) 
 
 The finding that residuals tend to increase as indicators move beyond the coding imposed 
by the SCDB is also true for the stable Rehnquist Court Era prior to the Roberts Court.  Figure 
2.3 suggests the fit between values and votes is an effect of coding choices for the decision 
direction variable.  Substituting the EPS variable for the SCDB direction codes reveals that 
Kennedy and O’Connor in particular vote more conservatively than their values would predict, 
while Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist remain in the same relative positions.  Breyer’s position is 
closer to the predicted trend line, though the in-group bias codes suggest he is less conservative 
than the conventional bivariate model would predict.  Similarly, the wider residuals associated 
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with the composite indicator predictions more closely approximate the EPS codes than the 
SCDB, with the exception of Sandra Day O’Connor.  Interestingly, the composite measure 
suggests members of the Court’s liberal bloc vote in that direction more often than the SCDB 
and EPS models, while members of the conservative bloc tend to be less conservative overall 
than in those competing specifications.  A similar pattern appeared in the comparison of the 
Roberts Court specifications in Figure 2.2.   
 
Discussion 
 The importance of developing indicators that accurately reflect underlying concepts of 
interest is a standard shared across social science research traditions.  Determining what 
something is – sometimes known as content validity – as detailed knowledge and descriptions of 
case conditions comes prior to preferred model specifications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 
44-45).  In the judicial decision-making tradition, scholars have made great progress in 
developing and refining indicators that facilitate empirical assessments of the relationship 
between judicial ideologies and judicial votes.  Indeed, that project continues in earnest on the 
values side of the equation with scholars examining the performance of interval versus 
categorical level measures of Justices’ preferences (Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016).  But even 
this study relies heavily on the assumption that indicators for the ideological direction of votes 
are accurately coded (173).  The EPS study – while substantively focused on the motivations of 
Justices in free expression controversies – represents a refinement of this concept by developing 
a novel, speaker-centric indicator to reflect the ideological direction of votes.  Pettys’ critique of 
the in-group bias study encourages scholars to continue to refine and make clear how indicators 
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are developed and scored so as to ensure descriptive and subsequent analytical accuracy in 
establishing causal linkages between values and votes in free expression cases.   
 Caution is counseled in interpreting these findings.  As should be clear, this is an effort in 
improving on measurement accuracy in a set of decisions within a particular issue area and 
particular time period.  The ability to replicate these measures is a precision concern, and one 
that can be examined more closely in future work in this vein (Pettys 2015).  In addition, 
scholars can continue to assess the accuracy of measures through competing model specifications 
– the fundamental relationship examined in this chapter represents a first step in a broader effort 
to continue to refine indicators that will prove useful to traditional and empirical legal scholars, 
whether the focus is on the forest or the trees (Hagle 2015, 384). The composite indicator 
developed and assessed here does not claim perfection; it is best understood as a provisional 
alternative with application to a specific period and issue area of the Supreme Court’s docket. It 
is based on a qualitative tool of concept formation that has the potential to travel to other issue 
areas and time periods.  The finding that the model’s relationship becomes more tenuous as 
measures of decision direction have improved points toward alternative approaches in assessing 
the link between values and votes in judicial decision-making studies, including qualitative tools 
of descriptive inference.  For example, scholars interested in studying the influence of 
ideological preferences in conjunction with other considerations germane to free expression 
cases could conduct a broader “within case” study of a particular Court.  As chapter four of this 
dissertation demonstrates, carefully tracing the development of this issue area within a bounded 
period where individual cases can be reconceptualized as diagnostic, “causal process 
observations” that function as “hoop tests” for hypotheses to jump through (Collier 2011, 825).   
73 
 
 
 These research design choices are at the discretion of the scholar: If a number of cases 
within a period feature voting alignments not predicted by the attitudinal model – a necessary 
condition for the hypothesis – then scholars have good reason to closely assess what other 
conditions in a case may be present and exerting an effect on a decision.  If scholars find, 
through closely reading judicial opinions, that justices regularly interpret such jurisprudential 
rules as the content-neutrality doctrine in a less categorical manner or appear to be motivated by 
a certain conception of the judicial role, these findings may be sufficient conditions to validate 
“ideology-plus” hypotheses of judicial behavior.  This process-tracing approach is only one of 
many rigorous research design choices available to scholars interrogating this relationship. While 
social scientists may generally be divided into “two cultures,” it is hoped that the INUS approach 
to defining essential, ideological aspects of free expression controversies developed above is a 
bridge of sorts between the two worlds (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 Correlations among judicial values and votes have shown great promise in enriching our 
understanding of judicial behavior, and these contributions cannot be overstated. However, 
indicators used in quantitative studies of judicial decisionmaking – including the bivariate model 
often invoked in defense of the attitudinal model of judging – must accurately reflect the 
underlying concept of interest.  Scholars interested in studying judicial decision-making must 
consider multiple, theoretically relevant case facts unique to certain issue areas and historical 
periods before deciding to define a decision as conservative, liberal, or undetermined.   One 
factor that has contributed to sustained scholarly interest surrounding the contemporary Court’s 
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free speech decisions is the centrality of the First Amendment to the U.S. ideal of self-
governance in a democratic republic.  If the Justices’ voting percentages are less strongly 
correlated with exogenously determined values than would be expected as indicators are 
improved upon, then perhaps the idea that the Court’s constitutional protection extends only to 
“free speech for me, but not for thee” is something of an overstatement (Hentoff 1992).  
Giovanni Sartori’s admonition that conceptualization comes before quantification is increasingly 
relevant, as scholars strive to explain the motivations of the Roberts Court: A Court that has 
often decided to decide cases with wide-ranging implications for the role of free expression in 
the United States’ republican democracy.  In the next chapter, I assess the Court’s record from 
additional external perspectives on judicial decision-making. 
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Chapter 3 
Modern Judicial Conservatism and Contemporary Free Speech:  Attitudes, Votes, and 
Voting Order 
 “When it comes to freedom of speech, the Roberts Court has been very much a 
 conservative court. I think you can understand what the Roberts Court has done with 
 regard to free speech by just focusing on traditional, contemporary, conservative 
 ideology. I have often said I think you can understand the Roberts Court better by reading 
 the 2008 Republican platform than by reading the Federalist Papers, and I think that is 
 certainly true with regard to freedom of speech” (Chemerinsky 2011, 581).  
 “With the important exception of cases involving advertising and similar business 
 activities that happen to fall under the First Amendment, politics doesn’t explain much” 
 (Tushnet 2013, 215).   
  
 The observations by Erwin Chemerinsky and Mark Tushnet bring the spotlight back to 
the primary puzzle motivating this project: A number of Roberts Court free expression decisions 
appear to be consistent with attitudinal explanations of judicial decision-making; these decisions 
often involve challenges to campaign finance statutes at the state and national level, union 
challenges to restrictions on the collection of fees, and union non-member challenges to union 
fee assessments. Another group of decisions, however, appear to be less well explained by 
dominant attitudinal model. These cases include disputes involving the criminalization of 
depictions of animal cruelty, the sale of violent videogames to minors, and the prosecution of a 
government official for lying about military service.  
 Chapter two argued that characterizations of the Roberts Court as a conservative court are 
partially attributable to concept measurement issues. In replicating the bivariate model 
establishing a relationship between judicial values and judicial votes using three different 
indicators – the directional coding assigned by the Supreme Court Database, the speaker 
ideology indicator developed by Epstein, Parker, and Segal, and the composite indicator that 
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accounts for the identity of the speaker, speech, and speech suppressor through a basic set 
membership approach –the relationship between values and votes became more tenuous as 
measures of the ideological direction of free expression decisions improved.  That analysis 
followed from the finding that, contra the speaker in-group account developed by Epstein, 
Parker, and Segal, the purported ideological identity of the free speech claimant in First 
Amendment cases does not predict a vote in favor of the claimant.   
 Chapter two also found that votes in freedom of expression cases appear partially 
explainable by judicial attitudes, which moves this project to another broader issue in the study 
of judicial decision-making at the Supreme Court. The justice-centric, attitudinal explanation of 
judicial behavior generally models the probability of a binary outcome (a vote in favor of or 
against a particular position in a case) occurring given a set of theoretically relevant covariates. 
Scholarship in this vein has demonstrated the average effect of a particular variable – the 
ideological attitudes of the justices – across all votes within particular subsets of the Court’s 
merits docket, whether civil liberties, economic cases, or statutory decisions (Segal et al. 1995).  
 Some recent work has measured the effect of judicial attitudes across all votes on the 
Court’s free expression agenda (Epstein et al. 2013; Richards 2013), though the effect during the 
Roberts Era is less clear.  However, scholars have not systematically compared the nature of this 
effect to any comparable, well-defined period in the Court’s history.  In addition, scholars in this 
tradition have rarely deviated from this effects-of-causes approach, treating each case as little 
more than a loose collection of votes to be aggregated with other votes in other cases.  These 
observations raise a series of interrelated questions:  What is the average effect of judicial 
attitudes across votes in freedom of expression decisions?  What can this effect, once identified, 
be compared to?  Is this approach, with its reliance on pooled votes, a useful way to identify the 
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ideological nature of the Court’s decisions in this important area of law?  If not, what alternative 
assessments may shed more light on this aspect of the relationship between law and politics? 
 This empirical chapter presents a number of goals and testable claims that draw upon the 
contributions of previous attitudinal scholarship, and also offers an alternative approach to 
gauging the extent to which the free expression agenda of historical Courts can be characterized 
as ideologically driven.  Here, the analysis moves beyond concept measurement and the 
fundamental model replicated in chapter two and assesses the relationship between values and 
the likelihood of a pro-free speech vote while controlling for a set of theoretically relevant 
covariates.  To do so, this chapter employs two limited categorical dependent variable models 
(logit) to assess the extent to which the aggregated ideological preferences of the justices predict 
pro-speech claimant votes in First Amendment free expression cases during the Roberts (2005-
2015) and Rehnquist (1994-2005) Courts.   
 The Rehnquist period represents a period of stability on the Court prior to the current era 
that serves as a comparison point for claims about the degree to which the current Court can be 
considered pro-speech claimant or conservative. I find that, compared to the Rehnquist Era, the 
Roberts Court Era free expression decisions are well explained by judicial attitudes:  The effect 
of ideology is strong and significant across all judicial votes. In fact, the effect of judicial 
attitudes on freedom of expression votes in the Rehnquist Era does not register at conventional 
levels of statistical significance, suggesting the limits of that Court’s well-documented 
conservatism. The second part of this chapter develops an alternative to this conventional 
modeling approach that, instead of pooling individual judicial votes across cases, shifts the 
analytical focus back to the cases themselves.  Specifically, I develop a descriptive typology of 
the judicial voting coalitions present in all free expression decisions during the Roberts Era. I 
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demonstrate that “disordered voting” – or judicial coalitions that do not easily map onto the 
ordering predicted by quantitative measures of judicial values – is a more useful approach to 
discerning the role political values play in judicial decision-making, for scholars and 
practitioners alike.   
 From what has been described as a more agnostic perspective on judicial behavior 
(Fischman and Law 2009, 30-34), the typology reveals that a clear majority (67%) of Roberts 
Era decisions fit somewhat uncomfortably with conventional attitudinal expectations; that is, 
they feature disordered voting or are decided unanimously.  This is a higher percentage than the 
Rehnquist Era (62%), additional evidence suggesting that there is something special about the 
Roberts Era constitution of free expression.  Once accounting for the salience – or perceived 
importance of cases - by the justices, however, it is also clear that the current Court’s constitution 
of the right to freedom of expression is more polarized than previous Courts.  Importantly (and 
as with chapter two), this analytical approach has broader theoretical potential for the study of 
judicial behavior:  If this account is persuasive, scholars interested in predicting case outcomes 
as part of ongoing litigation efforts or connecting judicial behavior to longstanding judicial 
decision-making paradigms – such as realism or the new institutionalism – should consider the 
limits of effects-of-causes modeling when describing and attempting to predict judicial behavior.  
This perspective on judicial decision-making has the potential to travel to other areas of the 
Court’s docket beyond contemporary First Amendment free expression controversies.  
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A Brief Review of the Attitudinal Model 
 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s influential characterization of the primary causal factor 
(ideology) of judicial decision-making continues to resonate among political scientists.  Going 
back to the work of C. Herman Pritchett (1953) and even beyond with the work of the early-20th 
century legal realists (Holmes 1897; Frank 1931-1932; Fisher, Horwitz, and Reed 1993, 
Tamanaha 2010), scholars have long argued that judges – and especially Supreme Court Justices 
- are at least as much political as legal actors.  As Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) go to great 
lengths to demonstrate in two book-length accounts, Supreme Court Justices are appointed in a 
highly politicized process by the national leader of either the Democratic or Republican Party 
and subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate (see also Epstein and Segal 2007). 
 Once appointed, justices enjoy life tenure, generally lack political ambitions beyond the 
Supreme Court, and (due to the high bar required for a constitutional amendment) have the 
ability to be the final arbiters of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution (Segal and Spaeth  2002, 
92-97).  As such, the justices are relatively unconstrained in voting their sincere political 
preferences when it comes to the merits of a case.  The bivariate relationship between judicial 
attitudes as scaled by Segal and Cover and  the proportion of conservative or liberal votes cast 
represents prima facie empirical evidence in support of this claim.  In other words, in a 
counterfactual world where justices were primarily motivated by law – or were structurally 
constrained from voting their ideological preferences -we would not expect such robust 
correlations between the two variables.    
 The bivariate model replicated in chapter two – following the early work of Segal and 
Cover (1989) and Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) as well as recent work by Epstein, Landes, and 
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Posner (2013, 137-142) - establishes a statistically significant relationship between values and 
votes. Importantly, chapter two also demonstrates the importance of concept measurement in 
developing the indicator that has been the foundation of the attitudinal model. The fit between 
values and votes using the traditional “policy issue” coding could be problematic, given the 
numerous ideological referents (speaker, speech, and suppressor) present in any free expression 
controversy. The composite indicator is not without limitations, however: It does not help 
scholars understand the probability of voting for a pro-speech claimant given a group of control 
variables. Recognizing this in developing the attitudinal paradigm of judicial decision-making 
studies, Segal and Spaeth built upon the work of Segal and Cover (1989) and modeled the 
likelihood of a vote for a particular position as the result of judicial attitudes (Segal-Cover 
scores) and a number of case facts theoretically relevant to a particular area of law.   
 For Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, for example, Segal and Spaeth model 
the likelihood of a liberal vote (those prohibiting searches and seizures for being unreasonable 
due to evidentiary concerns or execution) as influenced by the presence of such facts as the 
location of the search (house, business, car), the circumstances under which government action 
occurred (warrant, probable cause), and exceptions to warrant requirements (incident to a lawful 
arrest)(Segal and Spaeth 2002, 316-318, 325).  They conclude, following logit analysis, that “one 
is clearly better off knowing the attitudes of the justices than the facts of the case.” (Segal and 
Spaeth 2002, 324).  This specific test of the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making has 
been replicated across other areas of the Court’s agenda and theoretically relevant covariates, 
including more recent work concerning the Court’s attitudes toward the First Amendment (see 
Epstein and Segal 2006 for a case-centric account; Richards 2013).   
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 Although some recent efforts have provided insight to the nature of the Roberts Era 
constitution of free expression, the takeaways have been more akin to a watercolor painting than 
polaroid.  Epstein and Segal’s 2006 analysis, “Trumping the First Amendment?,” found support 
for the theory that the justices vote for the pro-speech position in First Amendment cases in an 
instrumental way, such that when claims intersect with another value – such as LGBT equality as 
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale – the “liberal” value appears to dictate the votes of the Court’s 
liberal justices (90-91).  As described in chapter two, Epstein, Parker, and Segal develop this 
instrumental First Amendment account further with a theory of ideological in-group bias, finding 
some support for the theory that conservative and liberal justices vote for free speech claims 
brought by members of their own ideological in-group.  This account remains somewhat 
underdeveloped, however, as legal scholars have raised important questions about the 
assumptions motivating the authors’ operationalization of the speaker indicator (Pettys 2014; 
2015; Hagle 2015).   
 In perhaps the most ambitious account of judicial behavior in First Amendment freedom 
of expression cases, Richards coded 2672 votes by justices from the 1953 to 2011 terms and 
found that judicial ideology – measured by Segal-Cover estimates – is a statistically significant 
predictor of a pro-speech decision across all eras, and both before and after the Court’s decision 
in Grayned v. City of Rockford (408 U.S. 104 (1972))(2013, 93-95).  Richards’ goal was to 
demonstrate the existence of a content-neutrality regime that, once established, caused the 
justices to issue more speech protective decisions and, as such, does not disaggregate his analysis 
by particular historical eras of the Court.  Thus, readers interested in understanding why the 
Court decides free expression cases as it does in particular eras are left without defined periods 
allowing historical comparisons.   
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 Richards’ template, geared toward assessing the influence of jurisprudential regimes, is 
nevertheless incredibly detailed and provides a useful building block for making these 
comparisons.  Comparing the Roberts Court to the Rehnquist Court era is a sensible approach 
because both Courts have operated in a political climate (increasingly) animated by polarization 
and so-called “culture wars,” and both Courts feature relatively stable periods of membership.  
This comparison also serves as an extension and replication of Richards’ account, which found a 
general correlation between increasing Segal-Cover scores (more liberal attitudes) and the 
likelihood of a pro-speech decision (conventionally viewed as a liberal decision, though as 
chapter two notes the SCDB has since made some adjustments in this assignment).   
 The disagreement among scholars like Chemerinsky and Tushnet is an empirical issue: 
Do higher values of conservatism among the justices predict a pro-speech outcome?  The claim 
appears to be facially valid, given the proportion of pro-speech claimant cases featuring 
conservative claimants and conservative expression.  In fact, the only clear “liberal” win in the 
conventional understanding of the term has been Alliance for Open Society International v. 
Agency for International Development (2013), a 6-3 decision through Chief Justice Roberts 
holding that forcing NGOs fighting HIV and AIDS abroad to adopt an anti-prostitution plank in 
order to receive federal funding amounted to compelled speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.  If one stretches the liberal label to include such cases as Alvarez, U.S. v. Stevens 
(559 U.S. 460 (2010)), and Snyder v. Phelps (562 U.S. 443 (2011)) by reasoning that these are 
“unpopular speakers” within the traditional liberal tradition established by such decisions as West 
Virginia v. Barnette (1943), however, then the criteria for scoring claimants and types of 
expression as “liberal” are open to charges of vagueness.  The dependent variable of interest in 
this story, however, is the likelihood of a vote in favor of a First Amendment claim given 
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conventional measurements of the ideological attitudes of the justices.  The fundamental test of 
the conservative Court narrative can be constructed such that as the conservatism of the justices 
increases, so does the likelihood of a pro-speech claim vote.    
   
Research Design 
 To estimate the latent propensity to vote for a pro-speech claim, I estimate four logit 
regression models with the justices’ ideological values as the key independent variable of 
interest and the likelihood of a vote for a pro-speech claimant in a case as the limited dependent 
variable to be estimated. I operationalize ideological values as the estimates developed by Segal 
and Cover (Segal-Cover scores), which assign values of 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal) 
based on newspaper editorial characterizations of Supreme Court nominees from the time of 
nomination to the point at which the nominee is confirmed by the Senate.  I then invert this scale 
such that 1 is the most conservative score and 0 the most liberal, so that the expected relationship 
between a pro-speech vote (=1) and values is positive.  Segal-Cover scores for all justices are 
available in The Behavior of Federal Judges (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 108-109, 111). 
The measure is most appropriate for regression analyses measuring the relationship between 
votes and behavior because it is exogenously determined:  The measures are based on 
characterizations of the justices prior to established voting patterns while serving on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  The tradeoff is that Segal-Cover scores do not account for ideological drift over 
a judicial career (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007, 1491-1492).   
 The units of analysis for the first and second model are individual judicial votes in all 
Roberts Era cases (N=380), and the individual judicial votes in all Rehnquist Era cases (N=477) 
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for the third and fourth models.  The second and fourth models are restricted to the relationship 
between ideological values and votes, dropping all other theoretically relevant covariates.  If the 
conservative Court hypothesis is correct, the relationship between ideological values and votes 
should hold in the full and restricted specifications.   The logit specification is appropriate 
because the goal of the analysis is to determine the latent, unobserved propensity (y*) of a pro-
speech vote (y=1) given a set of theoretically relevant case factors.  The specification of either 
logit or probit differs in the magnitude of the coefficients produced because of the assumed 
modeling of the variance in the error term, which is an arbitrary choice (Long 1997, 60).  Stated 
differently, the predicted probability of a pro-speech vote is unaffected by assumptions about the 
nature of the variance for the latent variable (Long 1997, 61). 
  
 Variables   
  Judicial votes are coded as “1” if the vote in a case is for the speech claimant and “0” if 
against.  Following the model specified by Segal and Spaeth that includes case facts (1993, 218-
220) and judicial attitudes (2002, 320-324) as independent variables in the context of 4th 
Amendment search and seizure cases, as well as the work of Mark Richards (2013, 90-91; see 
also Richards and Kritzer 2002, 318), I include a number of case factor control variables.  These 
factors include dummy variables for the level of government involved (local, state, or federal), 
the identity of the speaker (i.e. religious, union, union non-member, government employee, 
politician, academic, student, non-profit/public interest group, business, media outlet, political 
party, politician, lawyer), and the type of speech involved in each case to control for the 
possibility that the justices may be more protective of certain types of speech (i.e. religious, free 
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market electoral (anti-campaign finance restrictions), commercial, whistleblowing, general 
election or policy speech, speech related to sex or gender, newsreporting, anti-equality, pro-
equality, pro-union, anti-union) than others.   
 The case factor categories were determined inductively and assigned values by closely 
reading the published opinion for the case, generally following the inductively determined 
variable lists specified by Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013). When the US 
Supreme Court opinion did not provide detailed information on the litigants or nature of 
expression involved in a case, the immediate lower court decision was used.  While it is true that 
the facts deemed relevant by the majority opinion may be endogenous to unobserved ideological 
preferences, it is worth noting that lower court opinions – as well as the briefs filed by petitioners 
and respondents – may also be read by the justices to make sense of a particular controversy.  
There is no perfect solution to this issue other than to closely read both opinions to ensure as 
accurate coding of case facts as possible.   
 These factors are often noted in the first or section sections of the majority opinions. It 
must also be noted that this assessment departs from that of Richards and Kritzer (2002) and 
Richards (2013) in that I am not interested in developing a theory of jurisprudential regimes.  
Chapter four specifically addresses the insights of jurisprudential regime theory, but the 
substantive goal here is to explain an outcome of interest – the constitution of free expression by 
the modern Court – via comparisons with the closest situated Court in terms of political climate, 
membership stability, and similar ideological composition.   
 Finally, I also control for amicus briefs filed in support of each position in each decision. 
I searched for each decision via the Lexis-Nexis Academic database and tallied the number of 
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amici filed in support of the petitioner and respondent and characterized each position as either 
pro- or anti-speech.  When the number of briefs for the pro-speech position in a case was greater 
(less than) than the anti-speech position, I assigned that case the positive (negative) differential 
between the two.  Drawing on scholarship finding a positive relationship between the number of 
briefs filed for a particular position and an eventual decision for that position (Collins 2007, 62), 
I expect that as the amicus differential increases so too will the likelihood of a pro-speech vote. 
     
 Limitations 
 There is a danger in this so-called garbage can regression approach insofar as the 
inclusion of many variables in a logit model may make “coefficients zip around” when variables 
are removed and included in models (Achen 2005, 336). Long also cautions against modeling too 
many independent variables as binary regression models appear to require more observations in 
order to ensure accurate convergence (1997, 67). In the full models, the various speaker and 
speech categories are unrelated to one another so that the direct effect of each variable is not 
diminished by the inclusion of another (Achen 2002; 2005, 329). Cases involving lawyers as 
speakers – conventionally thought of as liberal claimants – have regularly featured commercial 
speech claims, a type of claim that has conventionally been characterized as conservative 
(Supreme Court Database 2016; Batchis 2016, 130-139; Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2012, 
795).  Achen’s call for renewed emphasis on simpler tabulations and creative data presentation is 
answered in part by the typology approach described later in this chapter, though the logit 
models in the following pages are admittedly the types Achen cautions against.  This is primarily 
because of the status of scholarship in this vein and the present effort aims at confirming or 
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casting doubt on existing theories about Court behavior.  As a check against having too many 
independent variables and too few observations, I also compare the results of the full model to a 
restricted model regressing votes on Segal-Cover scores alone to ensure that the effect is robust 
in both specifications (see Achen 2002, 445-447 on the benefits of “A Rule of Three” 
independent variables).   
  With these considerations in mind, the logit regression results that follow test a key 
hypothesis concerning the nature of the Roberts Court record on speech.  In assessing whether 
the conservative Court narrative is true, I expect that – given the set of relevant variables 
included in the model and the general conservative tilt of the Court - as the ideological values of 
justices increase from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative), the likelihood of a pro-speech 
vote will increase with the most conservative justices the most likely to vote in favor of a speech 
claim.  Specifically, the models will reveal whether and how much ideological preferences and 
case factors affect votes in constitutional freedom of expression cases.  This approach is a 
conventional “effects of causes” analysis concerned with determining the average effect of 
particular causes across many individual cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41-42).  The units of 
analysis are individual judicial votes occurring within two discrete and generally stable eras of 
the Court (Rehnquist and Roberts).   
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Table 3.1 – Logit Regression, Case Factors and Rehnquist-Roberts Court Pro-Speech Votes 
 Roberts Era (2005-2014)(Full) Roberts Era (2005-2014)(Restricted) Rehnquist Era (1994-2004)(Full) Rehnquist Era (1994-2004)(Restricted) 
Variable Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. 
Justice Ideology         
Segal-Cover Attitudes 1.426**** .3250 .6644** .1928 .0481 .5242 .0146 .4396 
Post-Citizens United .8255**** .2087 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Level of Government         
Federal -2.747 2.354 --- --- 1.085 1.128 --- --- 
State -3.453 2.387 --- --- .3695 1.067 --- --- 
Local -7.392* 4.407 --- --- -.7246 .9136 --- --- 
         
Speaker Types         
Academic -4.988 3.582 --- --- -1.166* .6384 --- --- 
Student -3.295 2.377 --- --- -2.392**** .5888 --- --- 
Business .7407** .2737 --- --- .4700 .6839 --- --- 
Religious -12.459**** 2.074 --- --- 1.006 1.421 --- --- 
Union .2076 .7557 --- --- -.2558 .8582 --- --- 
Union Nonmember .3585 .9555 --- --- # # --- --- 
Media Outlet # # --- --- .5881 .5297 --- --- 
Lawyer -.9751 .5402 --- --- .6579 1.134 --- --- 
Gov’t Employee 4.065* 2.455 --- --- .9565 .7940 --- --- 
Non-profit or Interest Group .7198 .4471 --- --- .5070 .5709 --- --- 
Private Individual -.8206* .4682 --- --- -.5213 .3997 --- --- 
Political Party .9610 .6630 --- --- -.4542 .9062 --- --- 
Politician/Official -.3488 .2591 --- --- 1.462* .7806 --- --- 
         
Speech Type         
Free Market Electoral (Anti-CF) .7299 1.065 --- --- -2.177* 1.177 --- --- 
Religious Expression 16.84**** .8445 --- --- 1.596 2.186 --- --- 
Commercial Expression -.9551 .9375 --- --- -.5402 .8389 --- --- 
Union Fundraising/Pro-Union # # --- --- # # --- --- 
Union Nonmember/Anti-union # # --- --- # # --- --- 
Anti-equality  -1.124* .6238 --- --- .9867 .6113 --- --- 
Pro-Equality -1.455 .9410 --- --- -1.374* .8076 --- --- 
Whistleblower/Gov’t Corruption -.2556 1.052 --- --- .5408 .6583 --- --- 
Sex/Gender-related speech -.5415 .6768 --- --- -.1490 .3108 --- --- 
General Electoral/Policy Speech -.1703 .4919 --- --- 1.042**** .2459 --- --- 
         
Amici Differential .0158** .0064 --- --- .0146**** .0039 --- --- 
         
Constant .6132 3.266 -.6955**** .1594 -1.629* .9287 -.0144 .3394 
N 380  388  468  477  
Pseudo R2 .2248  .0050  .1223  .0000  
Note: Logit coefficients with robust standard errors (R.S.E.) clustered on justices. p<.001****, p<.01***, p<.05**, p<.10*.  # denotes dropped due to collinearity or perfectly predicting success. 
Log likelihood reduction from restricted to full model for: Roberts Era = -264.64 to -200.97; Rehnquist Era = -330.63 to -284.69.     
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 Table 3.1 reports the logit coefficients, robust standard errors (clustered on the justices), 
and levels of significance for the case factors included in the full model of all votes on free 
expression issues by Roberts Court justices from the 2005-2014 terms and Rehnquist Court 
justices from the 1994-2004 terms, as well as the initial models restricted to the effect of judicial 
attitudes.  Of particular interest is the magnitude and significance of the coefficient for Segal-
Cover scores.  For the Roberts Court Era, the direction of the Segal-Cover coefficient is 
significant and in the expected direction; that is, as a justice’s score increases toward the 
conservative end of the continuum, the likelihood of a pro-speech decision increases. This 
relationship holds for the restricted and full models, and demonstrates support for the 
conservative Court hypothesis.   
 Of some interest is that this average effect finding is inconsistent with part of Richards’ 
account, which found in a similar limited dependent variable model of free expression voting 
that the liberalism of the justices predicted a pro-speech vote (Richards 2013, 95).  Richards’ 
account – primarily concerned with detecting the existence of jurisprudential regimes (described 
more fully in chapter four) - divides data chronologically into pre- and post-Grayned free 
expression decisions and does not disaggregate further by historical Courts, which suggests this 
design choice misses the development of a conservative freedom of expression jurisprudence 
(see generally Batchis 2016). It also suggests that, despite the Court’s adoption of the content-
neutrality regime, those jurisprudential principles have been put to use in the service of 
conservative causes (Segal and Spaeth 2003, 33).  Using Stata’s margins command and setting 
all other variables at their respective means (Williams 2017), Figure 3.1 illustrates this positive 
relationship between the probability of a pro-First Amendment claim vote and Segal-Cover 
values for the Roberts Court Era (2005-2014). 
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Figure 3.1 – Marginal Effects of Judicial Ideology on Pro-Speech Vote (2005-2014) 
 
 
 During the Roberts Era, Figure 3.1 illustrates that while a justice characterized as highly 
conservative like Scalia (1.0) is likely to vote for a First Amendment claimant approximately 
59% of the time, a liberal jurist like Justice Sotomayor (.368) votes for that position at a rate just 
over 36%. Another interesting finding is the weak magnitude and lack of significance of Segal-
Cover scores as predictors of pro-speech votes during the Rehnquist Court Era. From this 
effects-of-causes perspective across all votes, judicial attitudes are not robust predictors of voting 
in freedom of expression cases in either the full or restricted model.  In contrast with the Roberts 
Era, the marginal change in the probability of a pro-speech vote from the most liberal to most 
conservative judicial ideology score is less than 2 percentage points (49.5 to 50.93%).   
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  This unanticipated, null finding may be partially attributed to that Court’s willingness to 
uphold some types of laws that its successor has been far more hostile to, such as the campaign 
finance cases.  In terms of robustness, these results do not change appreciably when substituting 
Martin-Quinn for Segal-Cover measures of ideology for either Court – both indicators are 
significant predictors of votes for the Roberts Era but not the Rehnquist Era.  This suggests that 
the Rehnquist Era freedom of expression merits agenda was less motivated by judicial 
ideological preferences than the Roberts Era.  Part of the explanation for this result may lie in the 
types of cases decided by each Court, described in greater detail in the discussion of voting 
disorder that follows. During the Roberts Era, other coefficients register in the expected direction 
and at conventional levels of statistical significance including the dummy variables for union and 
academic speakers (both negative).  Less intuitive are the coefficients for religious speakers and 
government employees, with the former negatively associated with a pro-speech vote while the 
latter is positively associated with a pro-speech vote. In addition, the significance and direction 
of the dummy variable for decisions after the Citizens United decision suggests that the Roberts 
Court pro-speech voting pattern is a relatively recent phenomenon.   
 The conventional models specified above provide some support for the conservative 
Court hypothesis.  Compared to the previous era, judicial attitudes during the Roberts Era 
emerge as statistically significant predictors of pro-speech votes in First Amendment free 
expression cases.  The relationship holds after controlling for a number of case factors, including 
the identities of speakers and speech types.  These models build upon and replicate the 
contributions of Richards and others, yet this approach has inferential limits.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I develop an alternative assessment of the Court’s merits agenda that draws upon the 
qualitative tool of conceptual typologies and a measurement strategy that connects the 
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ideological direction of decisions with voting alignments.  I find initial evidence that suggests the 
importance of accounting for conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices – a theme 
developed further in chapter four.   
   
Behavior in Institutional Context: Voting Disorder, Typologies, and Judicial Decision-
making  
 The analysis of aggregated votes via limited dependent variable models reveals that in 
contemporary free expression decisions, as a justice’s conservatism increases so does the 
likelihood of casting a pro-speech claimant vote.  This relationship is stronger during the Roberts 
Court Era, which supports the “conservative Court” hypothesis advanced in various forms by 
Chemerinsky (2011), Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2012), and Youn (2011), and is all the more 
striking given the lack of a relationship during the previous Rehnquist Era.  But this is only part 
of the story:  Frequently, members of the Court’s liberal bloc have joined the Court’s 
conservatives in decisions that can be characterized as conservative. Oftentimes, these 
conservative decisions have been unanimous, as was the case in the recent decisions of Wood v. 
Moss (134 S.Ct. 2056 (2014)) and Reed v. Town of Gilbert (135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015)).  Less 
frequently (but notably), members of the Court’s conservative bloc have joined the Court’s 
liberals in liberal decisions.  In the Court’s most recent term, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Clarence Thomas did so in Williams-Yulee and Sons of Confederate Veterans, respectively.  To 
be fair, the attitudinal model does not (and cannot) make point predictions about votes in 
particular cases – the goal is to ascertain the average effect of one theoretically dominant cause 
across a large population of cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).  
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 This critique follows from the epistemological limitations of effects-of-causes research: 
Causation is inferred from the effect of an independent variable of interest (here, unidimensional 
judicial ideologies or values) across a population of observations (here, case decisions).  In 
judicial decision-making studies of the Supreme Court, this dependent variable may take the 
form of a broader population of cases (i.e. “What is the effect of values across all cases where the 
Court heard a constitutional claim?”), or a narrower subset (i.e. “What is the effect of values 
across all Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure cases?”).  The analytical focus is geared 
toward determining the effect of an independent variable of interest, with the assumption that 
there are multiple potential independent variables that may lead to a particular outcome, known 
as equifinality (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41-42, 59-60). But this epistemological assumption 
and the methods designed to provide an average effect estimate are somewhat divorced from the 
practice of litigation at the US Supreme Court:  Because different doctrinal boundaries exist on 
the larger planet of First Amendment free expression jurisprudence, because reasoning by 
analogy is fundamentally an imperfect exercise, and because  the justices clearly do not 
mechanistically vote ideological or partisan preferences, average treatment effects cannot be the 
end of the story. The focus on aggregated votes at the expense of individual cases shifts attention 
away from the votes on the merits that matter for lower court judges, cause lawyers, and scholars 
interested in making inferences about the Court’s behavior.   
 Stated differently, this conventional assessment of the influence of ideological values on 
decisions is divorced from the actual practice of legal contestation at the US Supreme Court.  To 
be sure, there is scholarly and practical value in knowing that Justice Kennedy’s voting patterns 
place him at the median of the Court.   And there is something to be learned from knowing that 
Justice Scalia’s ideological values correlated with his observed, career conservative voting 
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percentage.  However, the goal of predicting outcomes at the US Supreme Court – whether to 
refine theories of judicial decision-making, to further various political causes via judicial fiat, to 
earn a victory for a so-called “one shot” litigant or repeat players (Galanter 1974)– has always 
been connected to the ruling of the Court in or across particular cases.  It has not been connected 
to correlations across aggregations of values and votes where the unit of analysis is an individual 
judicial vote.  In general, these individual judicial votes are wrenched from the context of each 
particular controversy and, most important for this effort, the particular arrangement of the 
justices on the bench at any one time.   
 At its core, this difference in perspective is tied to longstanding epistemological conflicts 
informing divergent research traditions, often reduced to a divide between quantitative and 
qualitative scholars.  In the field of U.S. Supreme Court judicial decision-making, the issue is 
less about whether or not to “count cases” and more an issue of which unit of analysis is most 
appropriate when attempting to make inferences about judicial behavior.  The primary argument 
of this chapter is that voting alignments within and across cases are more appropriate units of 
analysis when attempting to infer the influence of ideological values on court decisions.  To date, 
judicial decision-making studies continue to rely on aggregations of individual judicial votes 
(Richards 2013; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 137-144; though see Bartels and O’Geen, 
2015 for a case outcome-centered test of Richards and Kritzer, 2002 and the effect of 
jurisprudential regimes) in advancing explanations of Court behavior.  This approach is 
incomplete and less useful because it is divorced from the process of judicial decision-making at 
the Supreme Court as it is actually practiced.  To correct for this oversight, the next section 
develops the concept of voting disorder, building upon extant scholarship in demonstrating its 
applicability to explaining the constitution of free expression during the Roberts Era.   
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The Voting Order Assumption 
 According to Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist (2008, 821), voting disorder is an indication 
that something other than political or ideological attitudes is motivating the Justices in any given 
case.  The attitudinal model assumes that the justices can be arrayed spatially on a one-
dimensional continuum, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, using either 
the Segal-Cover or Martin-Quinn scores (or any other metric, for that matter). Voting disorder is 
a concept that highlights the limitations of the attitudinal model, which tries “to explain why 
Justice A is moderate over a series of cases while Justice B is liberal” (Segal and Cover 1989, 
562).  Knowing that Justice Scalia’s high levels of conservatism tend to correlate with the pro-
speech position over a range of cases – that is, gauging the effect of values on aggregated votes – 
is obviously useful for predicting Scalia’s general behavior in future cases.    
 However, what litigants, elite litigators, lower court judges, and even scholars are 
ultimately interested in are the case decisions themselves.  The point of emphasis here is that it is 
the majority decision in a particular case that establishes a rule or precedent for lower courts to 
follow, and it is the signal transmitted by voting coalitions that ultimately determines the 
contours of future litigation (Baird 2007), the structure of jurisprudence (whether one considers it 
to be a relevant mediating variable (Richards and Kritzer 2002; Richards 2013; Corley et al. 
2013) or an invariable mechanism that merely functions as a cloak for policy preference (Segal 
and Cover 1989, 562; Spaeth and Segal 2002, 53).  Simply put, examining the attitudinal model 
in light of the voting order of the justices in individual cases shifts the focus of judicial decision-
making from individual justices to the Court speaking as an institution.   
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 Figure 3.2 illustrates the expectations for ordered voting during the Court’s 2013 term.  
This visual illustration has previously been used in scholarship interested in developing 
continuous measures of case outcomes (Jacobi and Sag 2009, 21). Each justice is placed on a 
spectrum ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative according to his or her 
rescaled Martin-Quinn score, with higher values – those approaching one – representing more 
conservative attitudes and lower values (approaching zero) representing more liberal attitudes.  
Martin-Quinn scores are endogenous measures of the ideological attitudes of the justices, 
meaning that the scores are calculated – in part – by considering the previous votes of the justice.  
As such, these scores may be open to the circularity criticism associated with some of Segal and 
Spaeth’s early models examining the relationship between values and votes.  Rather than use 
Martin-Quinn scores as an independent variable to predict votes, here the scores are used as a 
baseline for the most precise estimate of ordered voting for any given Supreme Court term.   
 
Figure 3.2 – Illustration of Voting Disorder (Martin-Quinn Scores, 2013 Term) 
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 For the 2013 term, based on the scores calculated by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, 
the alignment above represents an educated guess as to the vote ordering in any given case 
before the Court.  We would expect coalitions that split the justices between Stephen Breyer and 
Anthony Kennedy, but also at any cutpoint on the spectrum so long as justices do not deviate 
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from their expected position.  In McCutcheon v. FEC (134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)), for example, the 
Court’s decision to strike down federal aggregate contribution limits split the justices between 
Breyer and Kennedy.  The decision was ordered as expected by the term’s Martin-Quinn scores, 
and could be characterized as “strongly ordered” in that the result is an exemplar or essence of 
the attitudinal model’s predictions.  Voting disorder is a matter of degree:  Some decisions are 
likely to be ordered and characterized by a clear split along liberal-conservative lines.  In 
McCutcheon, the conservative majority on the Court voted against the dissenting liberal bloc in 
striking down aggregate campaign contribution limitations as inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.  Others, like Alvarez, may be ordered as expected but the majority coalition cuts 
across the ideological divide – the justices were divided (but ordered) at a point between Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts.   
 Alternatively, some decisions may feature a single Justice who votes in a way that creates 
voting disorder:  For example, Justice Stevens joined the Court’s conservative bloc in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1 (2010)), a decision upholding the constitutionality of a 
federal statute prohibiting material aid (including aid in the form of teaching groups how to 
peacefully petition in lieu of violence) to groups placed on a government terror watchlist.  
Stevens, the most liberal justice of the term, jumped Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor to 
join a conservative majority opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts.  Similarly, “strong” voting 
disorder can be operationalized as those cases where more than one Justice deviates from the 
expected ideological array.  In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), Justices 
Sotomayor and Ginsburg voted in favor of non-union member Diana Knox’s claim that the 
SEIU’s collection of non-chargeable union expenses without a new “Hudson notice” 
accompanying each fee equated to compelled speech, in violation of the First Amendment.  In 
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other words, both justices jumped their expected voting position to join a conservative majority 
led by Justice Alito, while Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented.    
 In contrast to the ordered and disordered sides of the question, some cases fall on the 
edge of the coin and cannot be said to be ordered or disordered.   Wood v. Moss (134 S.Ct. 2056 
(2014)) saw all justices voting against a viewpoint discrimination claim brought by anti-George 
Bush protestors who had been relocated during an unscheduled campaign stop by Bush during 
the 2004 election campaign.  Unanimous decisions present something of a problem for this 
categorical approach, as one can make an argument that unanimity reflects disorder to the extent 
that no cut-point is visible in the voting alignment of the justices (conservatives are voting 
together with liberals), just as one can argue that the lack of a voting order cut-point indicates 
agreement among the justices. Segal and Spaeth (2002) do not take a clear position on this issue, 
though subsequent behavioral-oriented scholars have argued that “the fact that a substantial 
fraction of the Court’s decisions are unanimous despite the Court’s being ideologically divided 
suggests that legalism plays a role too.” (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 124).18 
 Conceptually, a unanimous decision like Moss lies somewhere between the ordered and 
disordered categories on the spectrum and would generally be unexpected by attitudinal models 
of judging.  It is neither ordered nor disordered, and the willingness to vote together despite 
                                                 
18 In their 2002 book-length elaboration of the attitudinal model, Segal and Spaeth are somewhat silent on relevance 
and causes of unanimous decisions.  The authors’ chapter on “Opinion Assignment and Opinion Coalitions” is silent 
on this point (2002, 357-405). Epstein, Landes, and Posner note that this body of decisions represents a 
comparatively neglected area of study, and define unanimous decisions as “ones in which no Justice dissented, even 
if there were one or more concurring opinions.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 124).  The authors’ preferred explanation is that 
“when the ideological stakes are small, a combination of dissent aversion and legalistic commitments is likely to 
override Justices’ ideological preferences,” and conclude that “ideology plays only a small role in unanimous 
decisions.” (126, 136).  The authors’ key a priori indicators for determining whether a case is relatively more 
ideological are based on the presence of a dissent in the decision below and whether the case involved a civil 
liberties dispute. As dissents below do not appear to be associated with a grant of certiorari in free expression 
decisions (see chapter five of this dissertation) and all free expression controversies are civil liberties disputes, I am 
relatively agnostic on whether cases ultimately decided unanimously can be easily gauged as ideological or non-
ideological before knowing the eventual decision on the merits.   
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measured preferences strongly suggests the decision is not primarily ideological (Corley et al. 
2013; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 124-136; though see Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2012 
for limited support for the influence of ideological considerations in unanimous cases).  
Concurring opinions, examined more closely in chapter four, do provide some indication of the 
nature of the disagreement between justices who otherwise vote together.  This chapter, however, 
is designed to be as deferential to the attitudinal paradigm of judicial decision-making as 
possible: The model generally views votes on the merits as the fundamental indicator on which 
causation is inferred; concurrences represent window-dressing on observable votes.  Excluding 
unanimous decisions from analyses, however, is a research design choice that may overstate the 
effect of ideology in Supreme Court decision-making. For this reason and unlike Edelman, 
Klein, and Lindquist (2008, 830), I do not exclude them from the analyses that follow.   
 
Research Design   
 To assess the degree to which free expression decisions are marked by voting disorder, I 
compare the judicial voting coalitions in all Roberts Court free speech decisions to the expected 
alignment of justices for that term according to the scores developed by Andrew Martin and 
Kevin Quinn (2002).  These measures can be downloaded from the authors’ website and are 
disaggregated by term in Appendix E.19  The scores - calculated using complex formulae as well 
as the votes of the justices – are more precise than Segal-Cover Scores, though the circularity 
inherent in using votes to predict voting tendencies generally rules out their use as independent 
variables in conventional, quantitative judicial decision-making analyses.  They can be used, 
                                                 
19 “Martin-Quinn Scores: Measures.” Last accessed Feb. 19, 2017. http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php  
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however, as a more precise approximation of the expected voting alignment for case decisions 
under the attitudinal model’s general one-dimensionality assumption of the ideological 
preferences of the justices. Scholars have already employed Martin-Quinn scores in assessing the 
ideological salience of cases (Shapiro 2010), voting disorder (Edelman et al. 2008), and even 
attempts to introduce a gradient characterization of the ideological nature of a decision (Jacobi 
and Sag 2009; see Shapiro 2010, 111-128 for an overview and limitations of these efforts). 
 Scholars have diverged in efforts measuring voting disorder among justices.  Edelman, 
Klein, and Lindquist measure divergence from expected unidimensionality along a liberal-
conservative spectrum by calculating the smallest distance Justices must move from their ideal 
points (Martin-Quinn score averages for any stable period of a historical Court of at least two 
years) to meet the expectations of the unidimensional characterization of Supreme Court 
decision-making.  Jacobi and Sag (2009, 69) create three separate, continuous measures of case 
outcomes and find that a “strategic” measure that relies on the majority coalition median and 
mean of Justices (again using Martin-Quinn scores) better reflects gradation in outcomes than 
binary conservative or liberal dummy measures imposed by the Supreme Court Database.  Yet in 
some ways, the approach of comparing individual case results (the authors focus on intellectual 
property decisions) with numerical measures of possible causal phenomena highlights the 
problem of behavioral equivalence – case outcomes can plausibly be explained in more than one 
way (Fischman and Law 2009, 15).  It remains unclear whether and how scholars should rely on 
myriad, discrete measures of such indicators as the coalition maximizing “strategic median” 
measure or the minimizing ideological measure, which assumes that the median Justice ideal 
point score is the most useful measure and reflection of ideological judging.   
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 These efforts, reliant on complex data modeling and mathematical assumptions - and 
geared toward performing large-N analyses - have advanced the study of judicial decision-
making by pointing toward more reliable empirical characterizations of case outcomes.  I build 
upon this work by incorporating the new composite indicator developed in chapter two with the 
basic Martin-Quinn ordering technique to provide comparative perspective on two Courts in the 
modern era within a well-defined area of law featuring a “medium-N” sized set of cases.  It is an 
approach that balances concerns for accessibility, accuracy, and replicability, allowing for 
comparisons across different types of cases combined with respect for the idea that legal norms 
may become entrenched for specific periods of the Court’s history (Gillman 1993, 11, 200; see 
also Banks and Blakeman 2012, 255-311, for a similar approach in the area of federalism).  
 By including an undetermined category, this analysis takes seriously the idea that 
decisions do not always easily lend themselves to categorizations of decisions as liberal or 
conservative. However, it is also a test largely deferential to the theory that justices vote on the 
basis of political rather than jurisprudential preferences (Edelman et al. 2008, 829). This design 
choice is purposefully an easy test for the attitudinal model’s voting order assumption, and uses 
measures of judicial ideology that capture ideological drift over time.  Most importantly for the 
puzzle to be addressed here, it provides a new and theoretically sound window into how often the 
Court behaves in ways unexpected by the unidimensional assumption underpinning canonical 
work in the attitudinal paradigm. Chapter four builds upon these analyses by tracing the 
development of Roberts Era free speech jurisprudence through the qualitative method of process 
tracing.   
 Methodologically, this approach is best understood as developing a descriptive or 
conceptual typology.  According to Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright, conceptual typologies are 
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tools that “explicate the meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimensions, which correspond 
to the rows and columns in the typology,” creating cell types that “identify and describe the 
phenomena under analysis.” (2012, 218).  More concretely, a typology of judicial decision-
making that compares coalition composition to the direction of a decision creates categories that 
facilitate descriptive explanations of the Court’s behavior, which may in turn be used to assess 
the observable implications of particular theories of judicial decision-making.  In this way, these 
typologies straddle the line between what Elman has described as descriptive and explanatory 
subtypes, as the column and row placement creates property spaces that facilitate theory testing 
(Elman 2005, 297-298). While some scholarship in the field of judicial decision-making has 
explicitly drawn on typologies in empirical analyses (Keck 2007, 327, 330, 332; Kapiszewksi 
2011, 484-485, 487-488; Banks and Blakeman 2012, 279-280, 294), its potential contributions to 
the study of judicial behavior remains underdeveloped.  Indeed, Seawright, LaPorte, and 
Collier’s categorized, bibliographical search of scholarship using typologies as an analytical tool 
includes approximately 100 separate examples - across all disciplines of social science - and 
none of the entries concern U.S. Supreme Court decision-making or even judicial decision-
making in general (2012, 4-5). Thus, this assessment not only builds upon this emerging 
empirical approach but also pushes back against the aggregation-centric, effects-of-causes 
paradigm dominant in the field of judicial decision-making.   The immediate hypothesis of 
concern is similar to that evaluated from the justice-centered, effects-of-causes perspective 
presented above: From this case-centered perspective and focus on the expected ordering of the 
justices in case outcomes, if the Roberts Court is a uniquely conservative tribunal in the area of 
freedom of expression, then the proportion of cases falling in the ordered columns would be 
expected to be higher during this era than in the previous Rehnquist Era.   
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Table 3.2 – Voting Disorder of Roberts Court Speech Cases (2005-2014 Terms)20 
Composite 
Direction 
Strong  
Ordered 
 Ordered Unanimous Decisions Disordered 
 
Strong Disorder 
 
Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C. 
(2007) 
 
Morse v. Frederick (2007) 
 
Davis v. FEC (2008) 
 
Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 
 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 
(2011) 
 
American Tradition Partnership 
v. Bullock (2012) 
 
Harris v. Quinn (2014) 
 
McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014) 
 
Randall v. Sorrell (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C. 
(2006) 
 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006) 
 
Davenport v. WEA (2007) 
 
New York State Board of Elections 
v. Torres (2008) 
 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
(2009) 
 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. 
v. U.S. (2010) 
 
Reichle v. Howards (2012) 
 
Wood v. Moss (2014) 
 
McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 
 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 
 
 
Beard v. Banks (2006) 
 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association (2009) 
 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project (2010) 
 
Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 
 
Sorrell v. IMS Health (2012) 
 
 
 
Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association 
(2011) 
 
Golan v. Holder (2012) 
 
Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 
1000 (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Decisions:  
61.36% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of 
Conservative Decisions:  
55.56% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of All 
Decisions: 34.09% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undetermined 
  
U.S. v. Alvarez (2012) 
 
 
 
TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy 
(2007) 
 
Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) 
 
 
U.S. v. Williams (2008) 
 
U.S. v. Stevens (2010) 
 
 
 
Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican 
Party (2008) 
 
 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 13.64% 
 
Undetermined 
Proportion: 33.33% 
 
All Decisions: 4.54% 
 
 
Liberal 
 
Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez (2010) 
 
 
 
Doe v. Reed (2010) 
 
Agency for International 
Development v. Alliance 
for Open Society 
International, Inc. (2013 
 
 
Locke v. Karass (2009) 
 
Nevada Commission on Ethics v. 
Carrigan (2011) 
 
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations 
(2012) 
 
Lane v. Franks (2014) 
 
 
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar 
(2015) 
 
Walker v. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans (2015) 
 
 
Hartman v. Moore (2006) 
 
Liberal Decisions: 
22.73%  
 
Pro-Speech Proportion:  
30.00% 
 
All Decisions: 6.82% 
 
 (22.73%) (9.1%) (36.36%) 
 
(20.45%) (11.36%)  
                                                 
20 N=44. Pro-speech claimant decisions are indicated by bolded text.   
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Table 3.3 – Voting Disorder of Rehnquist Court Speech Cases (1994-2004 Terms)21 
 Strong Ordered Ordered Unanimous  Disorder Strong Disorder Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia (1995) 
 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 
 
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly (2001) 
 
LA v. Alameda Books (2002) 
 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
(2002) 
 
U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union (1995) 
 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board v. Pinette (1995) 
 
Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996) 
 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000) 
 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002) 
 
U.S. v. American Library Association 
(2003) 
 
 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995) 
 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston (1995) 
 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island 
(1996) 
 
Shaw v. Murphy (2001) 
 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District 
(2002) 
 
Virginia v. Hicks (2003) 
 
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004) 
 
San Diego v. Roe (2004) 
 
 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission (1995) 
 
Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes (1998) 
 
NEA v. Finley (1998) 
 
Good News Club v. Milford (2001) 
 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society 
of NY v. Stratton (2002) 
 
 
U.S. v. United Foods, Inc. (2001) 
 
Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center (2002) 
 
Virginia v. Black (2003) 
 
 
Conservative 
Decisions:  59.26% 
 
Pro-Speech 
Decisions as 
Proportion of 
Conservative 
Decisions:  53.57% 
 
Pro-Speech 
Decisions as 
Proportion of All 
Decisions: 34.88% 
 
 
Undetermined  O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake 
(1996) 
 
Board of County Commissioners v. 
Umbehr (1996) 
 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997) 
 
Tory v. Cochran (2005) 
 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
v. U.S. (1999) 
 
Eldred v. Aschroft (2003) 
 
Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC (1996) 
 
Buckley v. American Constitutional 
Law Foundation (1999) 
 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 12.96% 
 
Undetermined 
Propotion: 71.43% 
 
All Decisions: 9.26% 
 
Liberal Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC 
(1997) 
 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. FEC (2001) 
 
McConnell v. FEC (2003) 
FEC v. Beaumont (2003) Reno v. ACLU (1997) 
 
Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth 
(2000) 
 
Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, 
Inc. (2003) 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 
(1995) 
 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott (1997) 
 
LAPD v. United Reporting 
Publishing Co. (1999) 
 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC 
(2000) 
 
U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group (2000) 
 
Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez 
(2001) 
 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
(2002) 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004) 
 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Association (2005) 
Liberal Decisions: 
27.78%%  
 
Pro-Speech 
Proportion:  26.67% 
 
All Decisions: 7.4% 
 
 (15.09%) (22.64%) (22.64%) (24.53%) (15.09%)  
                                                 
21 N=53. Bolded cases indicate a pro-speech claimant decision.  Underlined cases indicate a mixed or split decision on the speech claim.  For those cases, 
composite direction and speech decisions assigned based on counts of how many questions decided by the Court (if three provisions of a law were considered 
individually and the Court ruled for the pro-speech decision in two of them, then the case name is underlined but also bolded).   
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 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 arrange all Roberts and Rehnquist Court speech decisions by decision 
direction and the degree of voting disorder present in each case, respectively.  Decisions marked 
by one justice defecting from his or her predicted position are labeled as disordered, while those 
with more than one justice defecting are deemed strongly disordered. Similarly, decisions 
characterized by the conventional 5-4 split between the Court’s conservative and liberal wings 
are placed in the strongly ordered category, while ordered splits at any other point on the 
expected continuum fall into the ordered column. The far right column includes the proportion of 
cases with membership in each row, as well as the percentages of pro-speech decisions within 
that row and the larger era population.  Similarly, the table’s bottom row provides summary 
percentages of membership in each voting coalition category.  
 From this perspective, it is apparent that the Roberts Court free expression record is 
generally a conservative one, particularly in campaign finance decisions.  A greater proportion of 
cases fall into the conservative row in the Roberts Era compared to the Rehnquist Court though 
both Courts have typically issued conservative decisions. This finding holds when substituting 
the coding judgments of the Supreme Court Database, which features a number of coding 
decisions that appear questionable (see Appendices C and D for these typologies). With the 
exceptions of Randall v. Sorrell (548 U.S. 230 (2006)), a 6-3 decision by Justice Breyer and 
joined by the Court’s conservatives and Wisconsin Right to Life (I), a unanimous decision 
holding that a conservative, non-profit advocacy group could present an as-applied challenge to 
electioneering provisions of BCRA, these cases have always been 5-4 splits with the Court’s 
conservatives voting for the pro-speech position.  However, it is also apparent that the Court’s 
conservatism in this area is most pronounced in the number of unanimous, conservative 
decisions. In fact, the number of unanimous, conservative decisions (10) nearly matches the 
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number of strong attitudinal ordered decisions (9, or 43.18% of all cases when taken together).  
This finding that the Court’s liberals frequently vote conservatively in free expression cases is 
somewhat surprising when juxtaposed with the predictions of the logit model specified above, 
and occurs at a higher rate than the previous Rehnquist Era (24.53%).   
 As far as modern liberal decisions go, there has been only one true win during the 
Roberts Era:  Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, 
which struck down a federal statute’s requirement that non-governmental organizations receiving 
funds to combat AIDS abroad adopt an anti-prostitution mission statement (133 S.Ct. 2321 
(2013)).  Though Lane and F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations (132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012)) both fall 
into the liberal, pro-speech category as well, neither decision is an unqualified victory for free 
expression.  In the former, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion at once ruled in favor of Lane and held 
that Franks was protected from the suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity.  In doing so, the 
Court gutted any potential remedy for Lane, making the decision “pro-speech” in name only.  In 
the latter, the Court relied on the 5th Amendment’s vagueness doctrine in striking fines levied 
against Fox and ABC for three incidents involving a combination of fleeting expletives during 
awards shows and brief nudity.  The case is, while unanimously decided, something of an 
exception and included in the analysis because of the clear and present First Amendment 
implications.22 
 Some of the weakly disordered decisions are those that have gained much attention and 
have been invoked in narratives portraying the Roberts Court as a pro-free speech Court.  Snyder 
v. Phelps (131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)) was a pro-speech holding (through Chief Justice Roberts) that 
the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas, could not be sued under the civil tort of 
                                                 
22 A similar case selection decision was made with regards to Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (564 U.S. 379 
(2011)) which is technically a First Amendment petition clause case but the nature of Justice Kennedy’s analysis 
closely tracked the Court’s government employee jurisprudence.   
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Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress (IIED) for protests at military funerals, in part because 
the content of that speech was on matters of important political concern. Justice Alito, a reliably 
conservative jurist, departed from the rest of the Court and suggested that such speech is at the 
periphery of the First Amendment’s ambit.   
 On the other hand, members of the Court’s liberal bloc have regularly joined the Court’s 
conservatives in pro- and anti-speech conservative holdings. Some of these disordered defections 
have been minimal.  In Humanitarian Law Project, an anti-speech majority through Chief Justice 
Roberts held that while a federal law prohibiting material support or resources to groups 
designated as foreign terrorist organizations was indeed a content-based restriction on speech, 
judicial deference to the elected branches in matters of national security was appropriate – an 
institutional capability argument (561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010)). Justice Stevens – at the time the 
most liberal justice on the Court – joined the conservative bloc, with Justice Breyer writing for 
the Court’s liberal wing. Others have been more surprising: In Knox, Justice Sotomayor (joined 
by Ginsburg) joined the Court’s conservatives in ruling for non-members of Service Employees 
International, Local 1000.  For that term, Sotomayor and Ginsburg were the two most liberal 
justices on the Court, voting for the same bottom-line result as the Court’s conservatives.23   
 Others still have been notable for both conservative and liberal defectors.  Entertainment 
Merchants Association was a case featuring a conservative speaker (business association) and 
arguably, a liberal/Democratic speech suppressor (a majority Democratic California legislature 
enacting a law restricting violent videogame access to minors).  The type of speech at issue does 
not appear to carry any firm ideological valence – are depictions of gratuitous violence 
                                                 
23 The unit of analysis in attitudinal studies – specifically the limited categorical dependent variable models - is 
generally votes.  As such, these studies generally do not account for concurring opinions that reach the same result 
in terms of vote direction. Sotomayor and Ginsburg disagreed with a portion of Justice Alito’s majority opinion that 
held union members must affirmatively opt-in (rather than opt-out) of special fee assessments for electoral or 
ideological purposes.   
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conservative speech?  Or is the speech better understood as artistic speech, a category that 
(arguably) better resonates with modern liberalism?  The Court’s 7-2 decision in favor of the 
Entertainment Merchants Association was even more fractured than the votes reveal.  Three of 
the Court’s liberals and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia’s sweeping opinion, which cited 
Stevens for the proposition that the Court would not carve out a violence exception to the First 
Amendment.  Justice Alito, joined by Justice Roberts, concurred, but left open the possibility that 
the California legislature could craft a law that would survive strict First Amendment scrutiny in 
light of the sense that long-term effects of such exposure are difficult to foresee (131 S.Ct. 2729, 
2742 (2011)). The dissenters in the case, Justices Thomas and Breyer, could not be further apart 
in terms of conventional political ideology and judicial methodologies.   
 Shifting back to the conservative Court hypothesis, are these findings consistent with the 
argument that the Roberts Court record is distinctly conservative? The columns most useful for 
answering these questions are those populated by unanimous, disordered, and strongly 
disordered decisions.  Recall that these decisions are those least well-explained or least 
consistent with the predictions of the attitudinal model.  If the Roberts Court speech record is 
somehow exceptional such that free expression transcends ideological divisions in unexpected 
ways, we might expect a greater proportion of cases to fall into these categories compared to the 
Rehnquist Court Era.  For the Roberts Era, 68.17% of decisions fall into these categories, while 
62.26% of cases during the Rehnquist Era fall into these categories - a six-percentage point 
difference.  Viewed this way, there is minimal though some measurable support for the 
“exceptional Court” characterization.   
 A closer look at the column totals, however, reveals that the increase can be entirely 
attributed to the proportion of unanimous decisions rendered during the Roberts Era: The 
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proportion of decisions claiming membership in either the disordered or strongly disordered 
categories is marginally higher during the Rehnquist Era (4.8 and 3.83% points, respectively), 
while the proportion of unanimous decisions is lower (13.72% points).  In terms of voting, the 
Roberts Court can be understood as less conservative to the extent that the justices manage to 
find agreement in a variety of First Amendment issues, though this empirical support is 
complicated by the observation that membership in the strongly ordered column jumps from 
15.09% in the Rehnquist Era to 22.73% during the Roberts Era.  Additionally, membership in the 
two “soft” categories of ordered and disordered decisions has decreased from 22.64 and 24.53%, 
respectively, to 9.1% and 20.53%.   
 These findings appear consistent with an emerging phenomenon known as the 
“polarization paradox.”  As explained by Brandon Bartels, in recent eras, the Court has 
increasingly and counterintuitively produced more 5-4 split decisions while simultaneously 
producing more unanimous decisions (2015, 24-27).  According to Bartels, this empirical trend 
might be attributable to the Court’s dual commitments to maintaining what Pacelle has termed a 
volitional and exigent (or institutional maintenance) agenda.  The former represents the body of 
cases for which the Court acts to enforce particular ideological or partisan commitments, while 
the latter represents cases that serve to preserve the Court’s image as a legal – rather than 
politicized – institution (Pacelle 1991; cited in Bartels 2015, 24-27).  While chapter five focuses 
explicitly on the Court’s agenda-setting, certiorari docket during the Roberts Era, the conceptual 
typology of merits decisions adds a wrinkle to this account with the finding that the proportions 
of unanimous decisions that can be categorized as either liberal or undetermined have also 
marginally increased during the Roberts Era.   
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 To systematically assess whether the polarization paradox explains contemporary 
freedom of expression decisions, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 include an additional consideration: the 
political salience (importance) of the cases decided by each Court.  Multiple salience measures 
have been established, including a dichotomous variable based on front-page New York Times 
coverage after a decision has been rendered (Epstein and Segal 2000), a more nuanced indicator 
accounting for media coverage of Supreme Court cases at various stages of the decision-making 
process: coverage before oral argument, coverage of oral argument, coverage of cases pending 
decision, and the coverage of decisions once issued (Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015, 38-39), and an 
indicator designed to reflect the justices’ (rather than media elites’) sense of salient cases based 
on the number of words spoken by the bench during oral arguments (Black, Sorenson, and 
Johnson 2013).   
 Black, Sorenson, and Johnson’s measure better reflects the underlying concept of interest 
of salience because it is focused on the justices, rather than what cases mainstream media outlets 
deem as salient.  It is also a more practical measure, as measures are available through the 
Court’s 2010 term, while Clark et al. end at the Court’s 2008 term.   In addition, Strother’s 
assessments of the relationship between public opinion and salience, as well as salience in the 
coverage of Supreme Court opinions, found no difference in robustness of results when one 
measure was substituted for the other (Strother 2017a; 2017b).   These data facilitate testing 
additional hypotheses about these Courts’ free expression agendas:  If the polarization paradox 
applies to these Courts’ free expression agendas, then we expect cases with higher degrees of 
salience to appear in the  ordered and strongly ordered columns and, given both Courts’ 5-4 
conservative majorities, to fall mainly in the conservative row.  Because Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy are median or “swing” justices during these two eras, some cases with higher measures 
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of salience may also fall in the liberal row.  Conversely, cases falling in the disordered or 
unanimous columns would be expected to be assigned lower case salience scores. 
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  Table 3.4 - Polarization Paradox and Roberts Era Free Speech Decisions (2005-2010 Terms) 
Composite 
Direction 
Strong  
Ordered 
 Ordered Unanimous Decisions Disordered 
 
Strong Disorder 
 
Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 
[3.167] 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC 
(2007) 
[.4430] 
 
Morse v. Frederick (2007) 
[1.464] 
 
Davis v. FEC (2008) 
[-.0163] 
 
Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 
[4.150] 
 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 
(2011) 
[.3259] 
 
 
[1.589] 
 
Randall v. Sorrell (2006) 
[-.3413] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[-.3413] 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C. 
(2006) 
[.3285] 
 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006) 
[.6595] 
 
Davenport v. WEA (2007) 
[-.4708] 
 
New York State Board of Elections 
v. Torres (2008) 
[-.4474] 
 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
(2009) 
[1.101] 
 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. 
v. U.S. (2010) 
[.0938] 
 
[.2108] 
 
Beard v. Banks (2006) 
[.3855] 
 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association (2009) 
[.5441] 
 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project (2010) 
[.3945] 
 
Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 
[1.137] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.6153] 
 
 
Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association 
(2011) 
[1.232] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1.232] 
 
 
Conservative Decisions:  
64.29% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of 
Conservative Decisions:  
55.56% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of All 
Decisions: 34.09% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Salience of 
Decisions:  [.7861] 
 
 
Undetermined 
  
 
 
 
TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy 
(2007) 
[-.5474] 
 
Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) 
[-1.344] 
 
 
[-.9457] 
 
U.S. v. Williams (2008) 
[.4067] 
 
U.S. v. Stevens (2010) 
[.4985] 
 
 
 
[.4526] 
 
 
Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican 
Party (2008) 
[-.0996] 
 
 
 
 
[-.0996] 
 
 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 17.86% 
 
Undetermined 
Proportion: 20% 
 
All Decisions: 3.57% 
 
Salience: [-.2172] 
 
 
Liberal 
 
Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez (2010) 
[1.009] 
 
 
 
 
 
[1.009] 
 
Doe v. Reed (2010) 
[.9380] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.9380] 
 
Locke v. Karass (2009) 
[.1193] 
 
Nevada Commission on Ethics v. 
Carrigan (2011) 
[.0215] 
 
 
[.0704] 
 
 
 
Hartman v. Moore (2006) 
[.9076] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.9076] 
 
Liberal Decisions: 
17.86%  
 
Pro-Speech Proportion:  
0% 
 
All Decisions: 0% 
 
Salience: [.5991] 
 (22.73%) 
[1.506] 
(9.1%) 
[.2984] 
(36.36%) 
[-.0486] 
(20.45%) 
[.5611] 
(11.36%) 
[.6800] 
 
[.5736] 
Note: N=28.   
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  Table 3.5 -  Polarization Paradox and Rehnquist Era Free Speech Decisions (1994-2004 Terms) 
 Strong Ordered Ordered Unanimous  Disorder Strong Disorder Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Rosenberger v. UVA (1995) 
[.2545] 
 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
(2000) 
[.9532] 
 
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly 
(2001) 
[.2923] 
 
LA v. Alameda Books (2002) 
[.4589] 
 
Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White (2002) 
[1.293] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.6504] 
 
U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (1995) 
[-.4394] 
 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. 
Pinette (1995) 
[.9335] 
 
Colorado GOP Federal Campaign Committee v. 
FEC (1996) 
[.4609] 
 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000) 
[.4979] 
 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 
[-.3292] 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002) 
[-.1390] 
 
U.S. v. American Library Association (2003) 
[.5018] 
 
[.2124] 
 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995) 
[-.4793] 
 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, 
and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) 
[.3348] 
 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) 
[.6193] 
 
Shaw v. Murphy (2001) 
[-.2360] 
 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District (2002) 
[-.1424] 
 
Virginia v. Hicks (2003) 
[.9227] 
 
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004) 
[.4288] 
 
 
[.2068] 
 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995) 
[-.6715] 
 
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 
(1998) 
[.5018] 
 
NEA v. Finley (1998) 
[.3255] 
 
Good News Club v. Milford (2001) 
[1.439] 
 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of NY v. Stratton (2002) 
[.9745] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.5139] 
 
U.S. v. United Foods, 
Inc. (2001) 
[-.4196] 
 
Thompson v. Western 
States Medical Center 
(2002) 
[-.0896] 
 
Virginia v. Black (2003) 
[-.2100] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[-.2937] 
 
Conservative 
Decisions:  51.92% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions 
as Proportion of 
Conservative 
Decisions:  62.96% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions 
as Proportion of All 
Decisions: 32.69% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Salience of 
Cases: [.2976] 
Undetermined  O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake (1996) 
[.6806] 
 
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr 
(1996) 
[1.387] 
 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997) 
[.1176] 
 
Tory v. Cochran (2005) 
[.4789] 
 
[.6660] 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting v. U.S. 
(1999) 
[.3110] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.3110] 
Eldred v. Aschroft (2003) 
[.0153] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.0153] 
Denver Area 
Educational 
Telecommunications 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC 
(1996) 
[-.3377] 
 
Buckley v. American 
Constitutional Law 
Foundation (1999) 
[1.211] 
 
 
[.4367] 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 15.38% 
 
Pro-Speech Proportion: 
62.5% 
 
All Decisions: 9.62% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salience: [.4830] 
Liberal Turner Broadcasting System v. 
FCC (1997) 
[-1.138] 
 
Colorado GOP Federal 
Campaign Committee v. FEC 
(2001) 
[-.7603] 
 
McConnell v. FEC (2003) 
[5.456] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1.186] 
FEC v. Beaumont (2003) 
[-2.676] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[-2.676] 
Reno v. ACLU (1997) 
[-.1056] 
 
Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth 
(2000) 
[1.617] 
 
Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. 
(2003) 
[.4459] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.6524] 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 
[-1.710] 
 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott (1997) 
[1.048] 
 
LAPD v. United Reporting Publishing Co. (1999) 
[.2640] 
 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC (2000) 
[1.200] 
 
U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000) 
[.4989] 
 
Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
[1.422] 
 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (2001) 
[.0353] 
 
[.3940] 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition (2002) 
[.3912] 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU 
(2004) 
[-.9759] 
 
Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Association 
(2005) 
[.4415] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[-.0477] 
Liberal Decisions: 
32.69%  
 
Pro-Speech Proportion:  
29.41% 
 
All Decisions: 9.62% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salience: [.3208] 
 (15.09%) 
[.8512] 
(22.64%) 
[.1229] 
(22.64%) 
[.3378] 
(24.53%) 
[.4110] 
(15.09%) 
[.0014] 
 
[.3182] 
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 Tables 3.5 and 3.6 add the Black, Sorenson, and Johnson salience measures for each 
individual case for the Roberts Court (2005-2010 terms) and Rehnquist Court (1994-2004). The 
salience estimates are standardized measures of the number of words spoken during oral 
argument and calculate a z-statistic for each combination of Court alignment and the number of 
justices present for that argument (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013, 807).  For each cell in the 
typologies, I calculate the average salience score for cases falling in those cells, as well as row 
and column averages.  The inclusion of the salience dimension provides additional empirical 
support for Bartels’ polarization paradox hypothesis.  Cases claiming membership in the strongly 
ordered column were viewed by the justices as more salient compared to all others (1.506); the 
unanimous column scores lowest on the salience measure (-.0456).  In addition, the cell with the 
highest average salience score is the conservative-strongly ordered (1.589), while the cell with 
the lowest average is the undetermined-unanimous category (-.9457).  In other words, the most 
polarizing decisions in terms of voting alignment are also those decisions most salient to the 
justices. This is what would be expected from a Court that seeks to balance institutional 
legitimacy with partisan and ideological commitments, though this dynamic may be a 
contributing factor to – contra the Chief Justice’s desire - perceptions of the Court as an 
increasingly politicized institution (Barnes 2015).  
 Viewed alongside the Rehnquist Era typology in Table 3.6, the salience dimension also 
suggests an increasingly polarized Court in the field of free expression.  The average salience of 
unanimous decisions by the Rehnquist Court is considerably higher (.3378) than for its 
successor, while the average salience for cases claiming membership in the strongly ordered 
column is lower (.8512).  In addition, while the average salience measure for the conservative-
strongly ordered decision cell is still relatively high (.6504), is also lower than the same cell’s 
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average during the Roberts Era.  It is the liberal cell within that column with the highest overall 
salience score (1.186).  This finding should not be overstated, however, as the average is almost 
wholly attributable to McConnell v. FEC (540 U.S. 93 (2003)): the other two cases in this cell 
both register at negative levels of salience.   
 While these findings support the polarization hypothesis, it should also be noted that the 
average salience of cases claiming membership in the strongly disordered column increases from 
.0014 during the Rehnquist Era to .6800 during the Roberts Court.  This suggests that while 
polarization has occurred, the Roberts Court Era is also marked by cases that are salient to the 
justices in ways beyond political importance.  Unfortunately, stronger inferences are limited by 
data availability: The Black et al. dataset has not been updated beyond the Court’s 2010 term. 
This data limitation, along with higher salience averages in the strongly disordered column, 
suggests the limits of the polarization paradox while also suggesting that important cases will 
also be the most politically charged ones.   
 
Conclusion 
 This project began with the observation that the Court’s record on free expression is 
puzzling, insofar as a number of decisions appear to be explained by conventional, attitudinal 
models of decision-making while others do not fit comfortably within that paradigm.  Examining 
the universe of decisions from both the individual vote and case outcome perspectives, it is 
apparent that the Roberts Court’s free expression record is a conservative one. Upon closer 
examination and comparison with the previous Rehnquist Court, it is clear that in the field of 
First Amendment, freedom of speech litigation, the Roberts Court has balanced commitment to 
an ideological or partisan program with what appears to be a shared view of the judicial role that 
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simultaneously transcends ideological divisions and reduces First Amendment speech 
protections.  The proportion of decisions that do not easily fit within the attitudinal paradigm 
exceeds that of the previous Court and – due to the discretionary nature of the Court’s docket – 
suggests important considerations for the justices beyond the ideological characterizations 
conventionally offered by political scientists.  At the very least, it calls into question the 
unidimensional assumption of ideology imposed on the measurement of both judicial values and 
case outcomes and points toward ongoing efforts to introduce new dimensions to this concept 
(see Robinson and Swedlow 2014). This window on the US Supreme Court’s freedom of 
expression docket contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate concerning proper methods for 
teasing out purported influences on case outcomes, bringing the insights of qualitative research 
methods to bear on concept formation in attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making. 
 Specifically, what is generally missing from recent accounts is a closer examination of 
extra-ideological factors revealed by the justices’ statements in judicial opinions.  Numerical 
characterizations of the influence of ideology are limited to the extent that they are based on 
either editorial characterizations (Segal-Cover) or actual voting patterns of the justices (Martin-
Quinn).  The considerable variation in outcomes documented so far employ methods ill-equipped 
to capture the potential effect of sincerely held conceptions of the judicial role among justices, as 
well as variation in the type of ideological commitment sincerely held by the justices.  In the next 
chapter, the role of these considerations during the Roberts Era is parsed more closely to 
determine whether and how differing conceptions of the judicial role and jurisprudential 
structures affect decision-making in free speech cases.   
 To recap, voting disorder occurs regularly in Roberts Court free speech decisions, and 
anecdotally appears attributable in part to the somewhat consistent application of differing 
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judicial methodologies.  Alito’s aversion to extending the sphere of First Amendment protection 
to peripheral “distractions” and Breyer’s refusal to let doctrinal categories determine his vote are 
recurring themes that illustrate how moving beyond the “bottom line” of merits votes to the 
language of opinions informs our understanding of the observable judicial coalitions in 
contemporary free expression controversies.  These interpretive philosophies may interact with 
or trump ideological preferences to produce sometimes surprising decisions, and suggest a need 
to study the rationales offered by justices in order to make sense of salient, contemporary areas 
of case law.  How and when that happens are the questions examined through a comprehensive 
analysis developed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Beyond Single-Cause Explanations: Jurisprudence, Ideology, and Conceptions of the 
Judicial Role 
 “The mind of a man who happens to be a judge is the center of many contending 
 impulses when he is making it up, and an external reconstruction of the process is quite 
 impossible. However, the rules of the game require that judges supply clues to their 
 thought processes in the form of written opinions…It would be naïve to assume that 
 justices in deciding cases are completely free to vote their own preferences, or that a 
 voting record necessarily mirrors a justice's inner con- victions. On the other hand, it 
 would be even more naive to assume that a Supreme Court justice merely "looks up the 
 law" on a subject and applies it to the case in hand.” (Pritchett 1953, 321-322).  
  “First Amendment doctrinal change…was at least in part ideological. We have seen, 
 however, that the relationship between ideology and doctrine is far from straightforward.  
 It is rich and complex.  Influence flows in both directions. Ideology and doctrine are both 
 distinct and overlapping, independent and interdependent.  Ideological modeling of 
 judicial decision making may in some ways serve to clarify but in other important ways 
 obscure the nature of the relationship.” (Batchis 2016, 227).   
  
 The attitudinal model’s emphasis on correlations among justices’ values and lifetime 
proportions of conservative (or liberal) votes overstates the degree to which the Court’s decisions 
are distinctly ideological.  And, more fundamentally, the attitudinal model’s policy-based scoring 
of ideological direction ignores indicators that may be unique to free expression controversies – 
the recent debate between Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2013) and Pettys (2014; 2015) 
demonstrates that the identity of speakers, identity of speech suppressors, and the type of speech 
itself are additional, understudied factors that have provisionally been demonstrated to correlate 
with merits votes. Suspect indicators aside, while there is predictive value for (extra) judicial 
actors in knowing the effect of ideology on the probability of pro-claimant vote given a 
population of cases, this conventional approach does not help observers understand when 
deviations from expected ideological patterns occur.  A substantial proportion of contemporary 
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free speech cases are marked by voting disorder among the justices.  In addition, the Roberts 
Court is often unanimous in deciding free speech cases, suggesting that something beyond 
ideological attitudes must be evaluated in attempting to solve the puzzle.   How do these 
deviations relate to ideological values?   
  The evolution of judicial support for free expression in the United States from “lodestar 
of liberalism” to darling of conservatism will continue to elude comprehension by scholars so 
long as analyses give primacy the votes and values of justices at the expense of additional 
factors.  These factors are not easily operationalized into indicators that are often put into the 
service of translating social relationships into logical, numerical expressions.  Early to mid-20th 
century jurisprudential doctrines developed in cases brought by periodically “unpopular,” 
peripheral claimants like Jehovah’s Witnesses, racists, and unions – whether endogenous or 
exogenous to ideological preferences – have structured the free speech subset of the broader 
conservative rights agenda and have constituted claims previously outside the lexicon of U.S. 
free speech jurisprudence.  Doctrines once thought solely the province of the unpopular 
individual speaker, soapbox orator, or lonely pamphleteer have now become tools of 
conservative entrenchment for free market, libertarian economic enterprise (Kuhner 2014).   
 The replacement of judicial moderate Sandra Day O’Connor with Samuel Alito and 
judicial restraintist William Rehqnuist with Chief Justice John Roberts appears to tell part of the 
story.  Yet this univariate explanation does not tell us why the Court’s conservatives (and 
liberals) disagree with one another, not only in terms of voting but also decision rationales. It 
cannot tell us how claims once outside the acceptable boundaries of free speech jurisprudence 
now rest comfortably within its aura of legitimacy.   Nor does it distinguish between the types of 
conservative claims the Court has decided, which speaks to the problem of ideological 
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heterogeneity in cross-Court comparisons. More concretely, can the difference  in the editorial-
based conservatism score assigned to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito tell us anything 
about why they disagree on case outcomes beyond restating that one score is marginally different 
from the other (see Baum 1999, 202-204)?   The general focus on individual merits votes as the 
primary unit of analysis – and one interpretation of those votes, to boot - carries the cost of 
exacerbating the flattening of judicial behavior, ignoring what scholars have long characterized 
as a complex relationship among a variety of ideological, jurisprudential, and interpretive factors 
(Pritchett 1953, 321, 324; Shapiro 1963, 339-340; Smith 1988, 95-96; Gillman 1993, 11-19; 
Keck 2004, 11-12; Whittington 2000, 620-624; Feldman 2005, 91-92; Fischman and Law 2009, 
7-10; Bybee 2012, 73-75).   
 These concerns are not fresh out of the box by any means – a number of scholars have 
noted the limits of the effects-of-causes modeling of judicial ideological preferences, and all too 
often this debate has taken on a bitter tone (Law & Courts Newsletter 1994; 2003). For all the 
insights gleaned from the vast body of judicial decision-making literature interested in the now 
taken for granted correlation between values and votes, the price has been an acontextual 
understanding of the relationship between ideological preferences and principles.  If judicial 
decision-making is a context-specific enterprise marked by endogenous relationships between 
preferences and principles, then outcomes should be understood as longitudinal processes 
developing over time and contingent upon jurisprudential and ideological arrangements unique 
to particular periods of the Court.  To understand the present nature of the Roberts Court’s record 
on free expression, then, requires an explanation of how this process has unfolded.  Within this 
broad, historical case, causal inferences may be drawn from diagnostic pieces of evidence 
present in individual Court cases.  This analytical tool – sometimes known as “process tracing” – 
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allows researchers to move beyond effects-of-causes research designs and instead focus on 
complex relationships and descriptions of how an outcome came to be (see generally Collier 
2011).   
 In this chapter, I argue that a missing piece of the Roberts Court free expression puzzle 
lies in the confluence of competing judicial interpretive philosophies, jurisprudential structures, 
conceptions of the judicial role, and ideological preferences.  First, I briefly review scholarly 
work that has found evidence of the influence of jurisprudential considerations on Supreme 
Court decision-making – research that has been both quantitative and qualitative and has relied 
upon different epistemological assumptions (i.e. positivism v. interpretivism, or the “external” 
and “internal” views of judicial decision-making).  From this body of literature, I develop a 
description of judicial decision-making featuring ideological, jurisprudential, philosophical, and 
interpretive conceptions of the judicial role as constitutive elements of and  causes of judicial 
decisions. Finally, I offer a descriptive explanation via a comprehensive, “medium-N” study of 
the Robert’s Court’s 44 free expression decisions from the 2005 through 2014 terms of the 
Court, examining how and when these factors result in outcomes that do not comfortably fit 
within the attitudinal paradigm.  
 I find that substantial heterogeneity within the Court’s conservative and liberal blocs 
along with differing conceptions of the judicial role have produced the fractured decisions not 
easily predicted by purely ideological models of judging.  I also find evidence in support of the 
claim that the entrenched “content neutrality” regime structuring modern free speech 
controversies has slowly been eroded by this combination of considerations.  This development 
has occurred simultaneously with the Court’s gradual evolution into a “pro-speech” Court, an 
agenda that did not begin outside of the campaign finance decision context until the Court’s 2009 
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term and did not fully bloom until well into the Chief Justice’s tenure. On the issue of freedom of 
expression jurisprudence, then, the Roberts Court is best understood as a tribunal in transition 
and flux rather than an unqualifiedly ‘conservative Court.’These findings underscore that general 
correlations among values and votes – even while controlling for theoretically relevant covariates 
- offers an understanding of law and politics that is remarkably thin, often divorced from 
historical context and the jurisprudential structures that shape judicial decisionmaking. Beyond 
the confines of this project, it is hoped that this approach will be useful to scholars seeking to 
systematically draw attention to the complexity of judicial decision-making by assessing if, how, 
and when factors beyond conventional ideological explanations produce surprising outcomes. 
 
Fundamentals of Judicial Decision-making: An Overview 
 Battle of the Strawmen: Beyond Conventional Legal and Attitudinal Accounts 
 The debate concerning the influence of ideological preferences and jurisprudential 
principles implies multiple pathways exist in moving from the facts of a case and the eventual 
decision on the merits.  Unfortunately, a large amount of data is obscured by the self-imposed 
“black box” of Supreme Court decision-making:  Scholars cannot see the process that unfolds at 
weekly conferences, the exchanges between clerks, or the initial grant of certiorari.  Theoretical 
pathways do exist, however, and Figure 4.1 illustrates the crux of the debate.   
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Figure 4.1 – Conventional Mapping of Supreme Court Decision-making 
   Instrumental (Ideological Preferences) 
 
Case Fact(or)s         Decision on Merits 
   
  Good Faith Judging (Application of Jurisprudential Principles) 
  
 To varying degrees, the dominant approaches of Supreme Court decision-making are 
represented by the multiple pathways illustrated above (see also Weller and Barnes 2014, 1-7, 
25, 28-29).  The attitudinal approach is generally represented by the upper pathway, where case 
factors are interpreted in light of ideological preferences and determine the decision on the merits 
for any particular judge.  This understanding of judicial decision-making has been characterized 
as instrumental, meaning that to the extent jurisprudential principles are invoked in judicial 
opinions they are merely used to rationalize the decision – they do not control or, in the model’s 
purest form, influence the decision on the merits.  This model of judging may be deemed “top-
down” reasoning (Bartels 2011; Braman 2009).  Alternatively, the lower pathway approaches the 
legal model invoked in various forms by scholars claiming that judges wrestle with case facts in 
light of precedent, current social context, and other jurisprudential principles in reaching a 
decision on the merits (Kahn 1999; Kahn and Kersch 2006).  In other words, legal considerations 
can and do constrain the calculus of judges, who mostly engage in “analogical reasoning” in 
reaching the disposition of a case.  This model may also be described as “bottom-up” reasoning 
(Bartels 2011; Braman 2009; Carter and Burke 2005, 8-13).   
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 Each model is an ideal type insofar as in pure form, they are accounts of how judging 
occurs given relevant institutional constraints.  The lower pathway emphasizes legal constraints 
on justices, while the upper pathway generally assumes that justices are able to vote sincere 
preferences due to the position of the Court vis-à-vis other federal government actors; it is a 
stripped down version of more intricate rational choice judicial decision-making research 
programs.  Yet ideal types are not real types, and some scholars continue to emphasize that the 
process of judging is at least partially political and at least partially legal (Bybee 2010).  
Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013) have advanced a fairly developed theoretical 
account of this middle pathway and have offered large-N, empirical evidence in support of the 
claim that judicial decision-making is a process riddled by ideology and legal considerations in 
the First Amendment context (see also Batchis 2016, 46-64).  This middle pathway is illustrated 
by the vertical arrow suggesting a give-and-take between ideological preferences and extra-
ideological preferences related to judging.   
 The upshot of the middle pathway understanding, which considers both the lack of formal 
institutional constraints allowing ideology to operate at the Supreme Court and the constitutive 
effect of entrenched jurisprudential principles, is that the influence of factors beyond ideology is 
exceptionally difficult (though not impossible) to tease out.  Following Keck’s analysis of the the 
ideological and jurisprudential development of the Rehnquist Court Era, scholars can compare 
jurists’ attitudes and conceptions of the judicial role with votes across a wide-range of cases, 
examining opinions for clues as to each jurist’s interpretation of jurisprudential constraints 
(2004, 11-12). A decision that appears ideological may nevertheless be the result of different 
judicial methodologies applied by the justices, while a decision that appears to be consistent with 
established jurisprudential principles could simply be a reflection of the liberalism or 
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conservatism of the justices.  In a recent account of the persistence of the content-neutrality 
regime, Richards (2013, 129-130) argues that the 6-3 decision in U.S. v. Alvarez reflects a 
continued though perhaps tenuous commitment to closely scrutinizing laws that regulate speech 
on the basis of the subject matter communicated.  The likely rejoinder from those who emphasize 
the “political” in “political jurisprudence” might be that the decision was driven more by 
attitudes than Richards seems to believe, as the justices were divided along an imaginary line just 
to the left of Justice Alito and therefore the result is as expected once taking into account the 
expected ideological ordering of justices via Martin-Quinn scores.    
 
 Application to Contemporary Free Speech: Additional Considerations 
 
 A longstanding scholarly tradition has argued that the general attitudinal conception of 
judicial decision-making is complicated by claims that judges are socialized into a culture that 
places a premium on fidelity to jurisprudential rules and norms - institutional pulls that may 
create tension with preferred policy preferences (Dworkin 1978, 35-36; Richards 2013, 36; 
Whittington 2000).  As one scholar has put it, judges “are constrained by law, even as they 
advance contested understandings of what constitutes legitimate law. The strike zone in baseball 
is contested, but a pitch that bounces before reaching home plate is a ball…One can argue in 
good faith that precedent sanctions presidential wars, but not that Article I mandates a 
parliamentary system of government” (Graber 1999, 299-301; 2006, 53). Coupled with the idea 
that protection of freedom of speech is a common good in the pluralist vision of democracy 
ascendant in the mid-20th Century, as well as the Court’s general commitment to protecting 
“preferred freedoms” and Bill of Rights protections post-U.S. v. Carolene Products (304 U.S. 
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144 (1938)), it is theoretically plausible to suggest that free speech is a concern of justices that 
transcends partisan ideology (Feldman 2008; Tushnet 2013, 215, 217, 244; Knowles and 
Lichtman 2015, 242-243).  The uniqueness of the issue area of free speech, then, provides an 
interesting case study insofar as jurisprudential and philosophical influences may be at their 
apogee.   
 Specifically, the justices of the contemporary Court have inherited multiple 
jurisprudential traditions and longstanding theoretical justifications for the protection of free 
speech in America.  The former include the application of varying tiers of judicial scrutiny to the 
suppression of speech based upon whether the suppression at issue regulates speech on the basis 
of its subject matter – what Richards and Kritzer (2002) have described as the “content neutrality 
regime.” The latter includes philosophical rationales including the so-called “marketplace of 
ideas,” the argument from democracy, and self-fulfillment; the first two are consequentialist 
justifications insofar as protection for expression is important for its broader salutary social 
effects (the pursuit of truth, social progress, and political progress), while the latter is 
nonconsequential in that the importance lies in the fulfillment, development, or realization of the 
individual – put another way, free expression is an important value in its own right, outside of 
any broader salutary effects it might have for political or social progress.  Adding to these 
jurisprudential and philosophical considerations are varying conceptions of the judicial role, or 
the justice’s philosophy of judicial review: Does deference to legislative judgments play a key 
role in these decisions?  Originalism? And are these interpretive philosophies consistently 
applied by the justices of the current Court? 
 The nature of the jurisprudential and philosophical underpinnings of contemporary free 
expression jurisprudence is not merely an academic question.  The crux of First Amendment 
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judicial analysis has always been an attempt to balance legitimate government interests with the 
words that Justice Hugo Black deemed an absolute: “Congress shall make no law.”  Of course, 
this prohibition requires at least a working definition of what constitutes “speech” and the scope 
of that freedom.  Students have often readily invoked the Holmesian quip about falsely yelling 
“FIRE!” in a crowded theater (Schenck v. U.S, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).  But the issue runs 
deeper than that, particularly when one considers the communicative aspect of speech. Justices 
must decide whether the ambit of the First Amendment extends to speech that is artistic, whether 
in a traditional sense or what may be termed obscene, due to its focus on “prurient” sexual 
matters.  If it does not, there must be some justification for that choice, and likewise if the 
protection does extend so far.   
 Similarly, if the purpose of the First Amendment is deemed to be the protection of 
political speech and little else as in the famous account by Alexander Meiklejohn (1948), justices 
are expected to articulate the reason for that distinction.  And, if protection includes expression 
intertwined with conduct, the Court must articulate why some symbolic conduct is protected 
while other conduct is not. If the range of symbolic conduct captured by the First Amendment is 
extended to include, say, a motorist breaking the speed limit laws as a way of expressing 
displeasure with the limit of 65 m.p.h., then nearly all government regulation becomes suspect 
under the Constitution’s first freedom.  Conversely, if the First Amendment does not cover such 
conduct as the burning of draft cards to express opposition to the Vietnam War (U.S. v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968)), the robustness of that protection is also uncertain.   
 An imperfect analogy demonstrates a modern First Amendment problem centered on the 
question of what counts as speech and what does not:  the use of the free speech clause to strike 
down government regulations related to economic transactions.  In the post-Carolene Products 
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era, the Court has generally viewed legislation related to economic matters as subject only to 
rational basis scrutiny, a standard of judicial review entailing broad deference to legislatures.  In 
recent years, the Court has extended the scope of protection available to commercial speech 
(expression related to economic transactions) in a variety of contexts, including alcohol content, 
casino gambling, tobacco advertising, and even identifying information of doctors ordering 
prescriptions for patients.  Justice Breyer has compared the extension of free expression 
protections to economic transactions to the Lochner Era, the well-known period of Supreme 
Court history where justices held “class legislation” to a forerunner of the strict scrutiny standard 
(though see Kessler 2016 for a re-examination of this claim).   
 To recap, the Court’s apparent philosophical struggle to interpret the meaning of the free 
speech clause of the First Amendment has effects beyond the content of casebooks.  
Philosophical justifications for protecting expression  contract or expand the universe of potential 
outcomes for free speech controversies and have the potential to affect society and politics in a 
variety of ways.  
 
 Jurisprudential Constraints:  Roots of the Content-Neutrality Regime 
  Philosophical theories justifying the scope of free expression protection provide the 
foundation for judicial methodologies structuring concrete controversies before the Court. 
Richards and Kritzer have argued that the Burger Court’s decisions in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley (408 U.S. 92 (1972)) and Grayned v. Rockford (408 U.S. 104  (1972)) marked 
the beginning of a jurisprudential regime – content-based v. content-neutral methodology – that 
has since been entrenched as a doctrinal rule and institutional commitment of the Court, curbing 
the ability of legislatures and executive officials to regulate speech on the basis of its subject 
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matter.  The two cases concerned pro-racial equality picketing and the application of anti-
picketing ordinances that treated “ordinary” picketing and peaceful picketing differently – both 
of which were struck down as unconstitutional - and an anti-noise ordinance that regulated the 
time, place, and manner of speech (regardless of content), which the Court upheld in Grayned.  
The doctrine also provides a common, legitimizing language for justices of various ideological 
stripes to explain and coordinate decisions in a way that would not be possible in a world where 
justices mechanically voted their preferences (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 308; Richards 2013, 
34-35; Lindquist and Klein 2006, 141). 
 The research of Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013) clouds the distinction 
between  interpretivist and positivist approaches and suggests that justices - who are at once 
political and legal actors - create, maintain, are animated by, and (perhaps) constrained by 
jurisprudential regimes, defined as a shared commitment to evaluating facts of cases in light of 
relevant case factors and the application of appropriate forms of judicial scrutiny (Richards and 
Kritzer 2002, 310). More broadly, the concept of jurisprudential regimes describes “the way in 
which judges translate their political ideologies and identities into a preferred legal analysis.  
This legal analysis is made up of a set of rules, concepts, doctrines, precedents, and tests that 
collectively establish a standard operating procedure for the treatment of certain kinds of claims” 
(Gillman 2006, 114). These analyses suggest that a shared jurisprudential commitment may 
better explain Supreme Court decision-making for particular periods and in particular contexts 
than models treating justice ideology or partisanship as the primary explanatory variables of 
interest.  Qualitative research has also suggested a similar dynamic on the Court.  For example, 
in a medium-N comparison of all cases when the Rehnquist Court exercised judicial review to 
invalidate a federal law, Keck argued that free speech cases were sometimes an apparent 
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exception to ideological or partisan explanations of that Court’s decision-making. Stated 
differently, judges behave differently than legislators insofar as the former view freedom of 
speech in more expansive terms than the latter (Keck 2007).   
 The judicial methodology of distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral 
regulations is a way for the Court to ensure that the government has not restricted the free flow 
of ideas by prohibiting speech solely on the basis of its content.  While some justices and 
theorists may favor less absolutist, more contextual balancing tests for adjudicating free speech 
cases, this method is primarily a categorical approach to adjudicating free speech claims (Smolla 
1994, 3-7; Barron and Dienes 2008, 28-44). If the Court views the government action in question 
as a regulation of speech on the basis of the content being communicated (i.e. political 
advertisements, union speech, speech on abortion), then the government must meet the burden of 
either proving that the speech is “low-value” (one of a number of historically well-defined 
categories of speech deemed outside of First Amendment protection), or pass the Court’s “strict 
scrutiny” test.  To do so, the government must show that a regulation is necessary to achieving a 
compelling government interest.  Regulations that survive this strict scrutiny test are upheld as 
constitutional, while those that fail are unconstitutional abridgements of the claimant’s First 
Amendment rights.   
 Alternatively, if the Court views the government action in question as a regulation of 
speech unrelated to the content of the speaker’s message, then the government faces a far less 
severe burden in defending the law’s constitutionality.  Once categorized as content-neutral, the 
law in question is generally evaluated on the basis of whether it is a reasonable time, place, or 
manner restriction, or whether it satisfies a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Court’s O’Brien 
test (U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).  As one scholar has put it (somewhat humorously), 
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“Either a regulation of speech is content-based, in which case it is likely forbidden, or it is 
content-neutral, in which case it is likely permitted.  The government is free to prohibit your 
neighbors from blaring music at high decibels at two in the morning, even though that music 
may have expressive value.  But it is forbidden to ban only the playing of old Loggins and 
Messina records, simply because the government hates the music of Loggins and Messina” 
(Horwitz 2013, 32). 
 This last point serves as a reminder that the doctrine is clearly malleable enough to be put 
into the service of protecting liberal (or Democratic) and conservative (or Republican) interests.  
The Roberts Court has struck down regulations imposing “floating buffer zones” around 
individuals entering abortion clinics as impermissible, content-based regulations of speech, 
which could be considered a victory for the pro-life wing of the modern Republican Party.  On 
the other hand, the conservative Rehnquist Court also struck down state and federal laws making 
it a crime to burn the American flag as impermissible content-based regulations of expressive 
conduct, a victory for unpopular dissenters (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); U.S. v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).  While it does not appear that this shared commitment can be 
definitively traced to any clear partisan commitment that eventually became entrenched in the 
judiciary (Gillman 1993, 61), the doctrine is compatible with the idea that the Court sometimes 
acts in a way to protect what it perceives as uniquely institutional prerogatives from legislative 
encroachment.   
 While the content-neutrality doctrine may have appeal for its simplicity, this masks the 
fact that the doctrine does not provide any guidance on how to definitively distinguish content-
based from content-neutral regulations (Horwitz 2013, 32).  In other words, even if a 
jurisprudential regime establishes a new set of case factors that justices take into account when 
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deciding cases, the fundamental definitional problem and subjective nature of determining 
whether government regulations are wholly unrelated to the subject matter of the speech in 
question in a given case makes plausible the claim that jurisprudential regimes are simply more 
formalized vehicles for enacting justice policy preferences (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 310). The 
second, more fundamental reason is that ideological preferences and institutional commitments 
to principles are not readily observable (Fischman and Law 2009, 11-13).  Judges generally 
forswear the idea that politics influences decisions, and there is no way of definitively knowing 
whether judicial opinions reflect a sincere commitment to jurisprudential rules or instrumentally 
draw upon available precedents and rules to justify a preferred ideological outcome.   
 According to proponents of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, the institutional 
setting the justices operate in makes this pursuit of political preferences a foregone conclusion.  
In its purest form, however, this understanding assumes away a claim in need of closer 
interrogation: do jurisprudential structures, like the content-neutrality regime, exert any 
meaningful constraint on the justices?  While difficult to assess, previous scholarship points to a 
promising approach to this question.  In his re-evaluation of the maligned Lochner Era, Gillman 
found that “The patterns of judicial decision making and the preoccupations of judicial opinions 
display a remarkable degree of coherence and consistency, down to the kinds of issues the 
justices faced with near unanimity and the kinds of issues on which they divided.” (Gillman 
1993, 199).  For Gillman, the issue is not that studies attributing judicial behavior to ideological 
or economic explanations are incorrect (though they appear to be in the case of police powers 
jurisprudence during his period of analysis), but that they are fairly incomplete.  Explanations of 
behavior embedded in particular historical contexts must try to account for “the autonomous 
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influence of legal ideology as understood by interpretive communities” within those contexts 
(Gillman 1993, 200).   
 
 The Chicken and the Egg Problem – Jurisprudence and Ideological Values 
 While there is evidence for the claim that law may constrain the justices in some 
decisions (Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011; Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 2013), 
jurisprudential regimes can  clearly be invoked instrumentally to achieve certain results – that is, 
the choice of jurisprudential mode of analysis is likely endogenous to ideological values.  
Consider the Court’s recent decision in McCullen v. Coakley (134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014)), a fractured 
yet unanimous decision to strike down a Massachusetts law establishing so-called buffer zones 
around abortion clinics as incompatible with the First Amendment.  All the justices agreed that 
the law failed constitutional muster, yet the content of the concurring opinions reveals 
disagreement over the jurisprudential regime element.  The Court’s four liberals and Chief 
Justice Roberts, author of the opinion of the Court, held that the law in question was content-
neutral – applying equally to all persons wishing to protest at clinics – and similar to a “time, 
place, and manner” restriction on speech.  Four of the Court’s conservatives (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito) concurred in the result but viewed the law as a content-based (specifically, a 
viewpoint-based) restriction on speech.  The former characterization subjects laws to a lower, 
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny, while the latter calls for a more searching standard 
(strict scrutiny).  What determined the initial characterization of the speech suppression at issue?   
 Again, the question is not merely academic, as the choice is a cause and effect of political 
battles. The Court’s division along a general (though not perfect) liberal-conservative divide on 
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the jurisprudential standard suggests that ideological values play a role in the selection of modes 
of jurisprudential analysis.  Roberts’ characterization of the Massachusetts law as content-neutral 
may have been a concession to the Court’s four liberals (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan) in order to achieve unanimity, but the choice indisputably signals that states may regulate 
speech in and around clinics in a way that passes First Amendment scrutiny.  The decision to 
classify the law as content-based viewpoint discrimination would send a different signal – that 
state laws attempting to regulate speech (and safety) at clinics face a tough hurdle and are likely 
to be struck down as unconstitutional.   
 That scholars have historically been divided on the extent to which legal principles and 
political preferences affect decisions is well-trod territory. In a symposium critiquing The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, Segal and Spaeth responded to Herbert 
Kritzer’s comments in part by noting that, “If the Court reaches a leading conservative decision 
on one issue (e.g. probable cause) and then follows that up with conservative decisions on other 
issues (e.g., lessening the protection granted to house searches), that could just as easily be due to 
attitudinal considerations as to legal considerations” (2003, 19-21, 33).  Richards’ own response 
to this critique is that it borders on tautology, at least to the extent that claiming ideological 
preferences are the cause of ideological judging is circular (2013, 39-40).  Sara Benesh offered a 
similar observation in her biography of judicial decision-making pioneer Harold Spaeth, noting 
that, “Something caused the Court to vote Z in case X. Later, case Y is decided, and we predict 
from case X that the justices will again make decision Z. But, what caused the justices to choose 
decision Z in case X?” (Benesh 2003, 123-124). The introduction of Segal-Cover scores, 
described in chapters two and three, may not have fully resolved this problem, as the editorials 
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on which the ideological scores are based are at least partially a result of a nominee’s previous 
political positions or case decisions in lower courts.  
 
Modeling Judicial Decision-making and the Constitution of Free Speech  
Figure 4.2 – Multi-factor Mapping of Supreme Court Decision-making  
      
    Ideological Preferences 
Case Factors   Jurisprudential Structure  Decision on Merits 
    Philosophical Approaches   
    Conceptions of the Judicial Role 
  
 Figure 4.2 offers a framework of Supreme Court decision-making that takes account of 
three commonly referenced, extra-ideological components posited as causal explanations in free 
speech judicial decision-making studies, in addition to the ideological preferences of the justices.  
While impossible to recreate the total set of impulses animating judges in any given controversy 
or to assign relative weights, the basic factors included in this framework represent a synthesis of 
and an improvement over existing scholarship that may emphasize one factor (or only part of the 
Court’s record) at the cost of others. The framework is specific to studying freedom of speech 
judicial decision-making, though the general framework may be imported to other areas of law. 
It avoids the tendency to reduce explanations to a single causal factor, recognizing instead that 
the development of law is a complex interaction among ideological preferences, jurisprudential 
structures, conceptions of the judicial role, and philosophical interpretations.   
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  This framework admittedly trades parsimonious explanation for deeper analysis of the 
interaction of these specified components.  This thicker model of judicial decision-making is 
designed to bring scholars a step closer to the reality and complexity of Supreme Court decision-
making.  Because, as Robert Gordon has found, “legal forms and practices don't shift with every 
realignment of the balance of political force,” it follows that “they are independent variables in 
social experience and therefore they require study elaborating their peculiar internal structures 
with the aim of finding out how those structures feed back upon social life.” (Gordon 1984, 101).   
In the following sections, I provide an overview of recent work that hints at this complex 
relationship along with the research design for assessing these factors across the Roberts Era 
constitution of free speech. 
  
 Scratching the Surface: Roberts Era Speech Controversies 
 Some recent accounts of judicial decision-making in constitutional free expression 
decisions point toward this potentially complex relationship among a variety of causal factors.  
Justice Kennedy, one of the Court’s conservatives, frequently votes for pro-speech claims in a 
way that belies that ideological label (Knowles 2015, 170). Chief Justice Roberts has also 
demonstrated a special concern for freedom of speech, assigning free speech cases to himself at a 
higher rate than the other justices (Segal and Epstein 2011; Collins 2013, 465; Baker 2015) and 
sometimes breaking with the Court’s other conservatives in free expression cases.  Legal 
scholars have also touched upon the importance of considering different conceptions of the 
judicial role and varying ideological preferences within the current Court’s liberal and 
conservative blocs in recent commentaries of the Court’s free expression record.  Tribe and 
Matz’s account of this portion of the Court’s agenda noted that Justice Alito is “a different kind 
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of conservative,” pointing to a series of dissents in Stevens, Phelps, and Alvarez, as well as a 
cautious concurrence in Entertainment Merchants Association (2014, 141-142).  
 Similarly, Mark Tushnet’s assessment of Justice Breyer’s history on free speech 
controversies highlights his pragmatic, balancing approach that eschews what Breyer has called 
“a jurisprudence of labels” (Tushnet 2015, 215-238).  Other projects, like Mark Richards’ book-
length treatment of the Court’s content-neutrality regime, have focused on the Court’s voting 
alignment in Alvarez in an attempt to tease out divergent understandings of the regime among the 
justices (2013, 129-130; see also Collins 2013, 437-439).  These accounts are suggestive of the 
nuanced interplay among non-monolithic ideological preferences, longstanding jurisprudential 
structures, philosophical theories of free expression, and differing conceptions of the judicial role 
on the current Court.   
 Suggestive – but rarely systematic.  A systematic explanation entails a comprehensive 
examination of votes and opinions across justices and issue areas.  Even David Gans’s recent 
article on the Roberts Court speech record after ten years focuses disproportionately on the votes 
of the Chief Justice, emphasizing the Court’s campaign finance and union decisions (Gans 
2015). Others, like Ronald Collins, have attempted to shoehorn the Roberts Era constitution of 
free speech into new jurisprudential paradigms (“the new absolutism”) at earlier points in the era 
at the expense of other streams of jurisprudence or other theoretically relevant, judicial 
preferences (Collins 2013, 413).   
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Research Design 
 To assess the extent to which contemporary free expression is explained by factors 
beyond one-dimensional, ideological preferences – including conceptions of the judicial role and 
jurisprudential structures – I examine all judicial opinions from 2005 to 2015 written in the 45  
free expression merits decisions of the Roberts Era, and divide the Roberts Court Era into three 
distinct periods based on voting patterns and commentary focused on the Court’s free speech 
project.  This periodization reflects the identification of what George and Bennett describe as 
“turning points in the causal chain,” which allows researchers to “sort out which independent 
variables explain each step in the causal chain” (George and Bennett 2005, 92).  
 This analysis focuses primarily on majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, with the 
goal of determining whether particular patterns of reasoning structure a particular jurist’s 
decisions.  For each justice, conceptions of the judicial role apparent in written opinions will be 
considered in light of the purported ideological attitudes of the jurist and the decision directions 
(liberal or conservative) of votes within and across cases.  While this approach treats judicial 
opinions as the primary units of analysis, it differs from that of Gillman, whose seminal account 
decided “to focus on the jurisprudence and not the jurists.” (Gillman 1993, 15-16).  It does share 
with Gillman’s account a chronological structure and approach in an effort to detect when 
changes appear to have occurred in the Court’s free expression merits agenda and to make the 
analysis digestible for the reader (see generally George and Bennett 2005, 92-94).   
 To provide this context and to collect data, I engage in the interpretive approach of 
closely reading judicial opinions in order to determine the preferred rationales of justices 
deciding contemporary free expression decisions.  This approach explicitly recognizes the value 
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of judicial doctrines as both empowering and constraining justices who have preferred 
ideological goals: what legal policy should be and who should benefit from it.  As Elizabeth 
Bussiere has argued, “To some degree, judges who interpret the law through the filter of legal 
doctrines are acted upon by such doctrines because the existing categories of analysis shape 
judges very perception of, and reasoning in, the cases before them. (That, according to the new 
institutionalism, is what gives [justices] their uniquely institutional outlooks.)”(1999, 157-158).  
 Fundamentally, the method used in this chapter is best described as a medium-N case 
study employed to explain an important outcome of interest – the Roberts Court’s constitution of 
free speech.  By tracing the process through which the Roberts Era freedom of expression project 
has developed, this chapter is consistent with a definition offered by Ludvig Norman: 
“[Interpretive] process tracing…is a family of tools used to study how causal processes 
unfolding over time produce particular outcomes…it is also characterized by efforts to study 
intersubjective social institutions as part of causal processes.” (Norman 2015, 4-5).  In the 
context of judicial decision-making studies, Martin Shapiro describes the approach as a “set of 
related decisions, and then develops in the greatest possible detail all the institutional and 
individual attitudes and behavior that led up to and out of the decision. Such depth studies are 
designed to validate or suggest the broader hypotheses which it is the goal of the social sciences 
to formulate.” (Shapiro 1963, 306).  This project is medium-N in the sense that it balances in-
depth, single case analysis with attention to patterns across a manageable population of cases (on 
medium-N case studies see Barnes 2005; Keck 2007; and Kapiszewski 2011).   
 Generalization beyond the specific outcome of interest is always a concern in descriptive, 
historical studies, yet there are clear implications beyond the period of analysis in this project. 
Borrowing again from George and Bennett, if a number of contemporary free expression cases 
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exhibit voting patterns and opinion language inconsistent with univariate, ideological 
explanations, this would not be grounds for revising theories of judicial decision-making across 
all issue areas and time periods.  However, it does constitute a general argument about how 
judges are apparently affected by considerations beyond ideological values, which could then be 
developed in additional detail in other medium-N studies of particular constitutional issues in 
particular historical and political contexts (George and Bennett 2005, 93).  
 For each of three periods I have identified based on general periods of the Roberts Era, I 
focus on the following themes:  
(1) Identify language suggesting guiding philosophical rationale in majority opinions, 
concurrences, dissents (equality v. liberty; marketplace/democracy/self-fulfillment).  Doing so 
allows us to determine the philosophical underpinnings of contemporary free expression 
jurisprudence articulated by the Court.  Scholars interested in political theory and important 
contemporary debates (i.e. deliberative democracy, Rawlsian equality, “Nozickian” liberty) may 
find the results here informative for their own projects.   
(2) Identify key jurisprudential ideas (categorical approach, balancing, scrutiny tiers, and the 
content-neutrality regime).  Previous work suggests jurisprudential ideas and regimes may 
become entrenched for periods of time and structure or affect the decisionmaking of institutional 
actors with varying ideological preferences.  Identifying the preferred jurisprudential processes 
engaged in by the justices – and whether they do so consistently – allows us to understand 
whether entrenched norms transcend or enable the exercise ideological preferences (or both).   
(3)  Identify jurists’ conceptions of the judicial role (deference to legislative branch; living v. 
original interpretation; pragmatism).  Judges are not monolithic in terms of their ideological 
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preferences, nor do they all subscribe to the same interpretive philosophies.  Nor, for that matter, 
should opinions be dismissed outright as being entirely window dressing, as the rationale (or, 
derisively, rationalization) for a decision may be part of a broader pattern across cases within a 
particular issue area. As Pritchett noted long ago, “Every justice in deciding a case must give 
some thought to what is appropriate for him as a judge to do…While no justice can be oblivious 
to [jurisprudential] pressures, they are not self-enforcing, and he is free to make his own 
interpretations of their requirements in guiding his own judicial conduct.” (Pritchett 1953, 324). 
 More recently, Keck has argued that “To explain the jurisprudence of O’Connor and 
Kennedy, and hence that of the Rehnquist Court itself, we need to look at their visions of the 
judicial role as well as their political ideologies…Scholarly efforts to explain such decisions 
without reference to law tend to remain too vaguely specified to account for the actual pattern of 
judicial decisions.”(Keck 2004, 274-275).  Identifying different conceptions of the judicial role – 
and whether justices are consistent in applying those conceptions – allows us to understand 
whether interpretive philosophies prevail over or work in tandem with ideological preferences, 
and whether previous findings are limited to specific Court Eras.   
(4) Assess the dimensions of the ideological preferences of the justices across cases. 
Notwithstanding critiques of attitudinal studies that indict scholars for engaging in “behavioral 
equivalence,” or characterizing an outcome as ideologically motivated when the application of 
legal principles would lead to the same result, the idea that jurisprudence is endogenous to 
attitudes is a claim that must be taken seriously (Baum 1994, 4).  The clue that jurisprudential 
considerations exert an influence separate from ideological values was touched upon in chapter 
three, with the finding that a substantial number of cases exhibited voting disorder or were 
unanimously decided.  
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 Assessing the presence and extent to which extra-ideological factors come into play in 
decisions will be conducted in light of the expected ideological ordering of the justices votes as 
determined by the relevant term’s Martin-Quinn scoring of the justices’ preferences.  While the 
ordering predicted by these scores serves as a general reference point, it is important to 
emphasize that these measures do not necessarily distinguish between different types of 
liberalism or conservatism except in degrees of difference along a single dimension.  Again, 
attitudinal measures of ideological preferences assume a degree of ideological homogeneity that 
cannot distinguish between the conservatism of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas except 
to the extent that their voting patterns are more or less conservative – which in turn rests upon 
characterizations of decisions as either liberal or conservative (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 
2012, 712, 714-717). 
 This is not to impose a preferred explanation – ideological preferences – on the outcome 
of interest.  It is simply a recognition that ideological preferences are one causal factor among 
others to be interrogated, and that the ideological explanation remains dominant in political 
scientists’ study of judicial decision-making.  In fact, due to the problem of observational 
equivalence noted by Baum, the extent to which the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions 
are explained by additional considerations in this study could be viewed by some readers as an 
understatement of the degree to which these factors matter.   
   
 
  
 
143 
 
 
 Methodological Assumptions and Epistemological Objections 
 Before proceeding with the descriptive explanation of the Roberts Court record on 
speech, I wish to address a series of additional, interrelated concerns that scholars operating in 
the positivist and/or quantitative tradition may find problematic.  
 The first issue concerns the lack of parsimony evident in the framework specified in 
Figure 4.2.  While still a simplified version of reality, it is rife with a number of interpretive 
variables that are not easily reduced to numerical representation.  The original critiques advanced 
by behavioral scholars within the legal realist tradition of early and mid-20th century studies of 
judicial decision-making focused on (1) the tendency of legal scholars to emphasize 
jurisprudential rules as predictors of judicial behavior and (2) the lack of predictive leverage 
offered by interpretive, richly descriptive explanations of judicial behavior.  While it is true that 
jurisprudential norms, philosophies, and judges’ own descriptions of interpretive philosophies 
can function as camouflage for the exercise of ideological preferences, it does not follow that 
judges always invoke such considerations instrumentally – or, for that matter, that they can.   
 Even scholars operating within the behavioral and rational choice traditions of judicial 
decision-making have at least implicitly channeled Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 78 in noting 
that the vitality of the judicial branch is at least partially dependent upon maintaining legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public and other government actors (Epstein and Knight 1997, 117).  In other 
words, even if the justices are nothing more than legislators in black robes, successful 
policymaking is at least partially dependent upon the justices’ willingness to act as judges – 
whether sincerely or strategically - rather than legislators.   The justices’ own explanations for 
behavior – offered in opinions – can prove valuable when studied alongside expected voting 
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patterns specified by attitudinal scholars.  If a conservative justice’s preferred rationale is always 
accompanied by a conservative vote, then the so-called “window-dressing” assumption might be 
warranted.  However, if a justice’s preferred rationale – or conception of the judicial role – is 
found to be present in both conservative and liberal votes, then opinions can be useful data points 
in explanations of judicial behavior.  These artifacts may also be useful in assessing whether a 
justice agrees with such jurisprudential structures as the content-neutrality regime.  Ultimately, 
the extent to which opinions matter is an unknown unless scholars take seriously their potential 
as additional data in addition to votes (Friedman 2006, 265-267).  
 It is also evident that the characterizations that follow do not carry the same neatness as 
numerical expressions; indicators scored to reflect underlying concepts of interest.  The nature of 
the variables, in conjunction with an understanding of these broad legal factors as somewhat 
amorphous, is a barrier to the sort of quantitative correlations often associated with the 
ideological effects of judicial decisionmaking (though see Spaeth and Segal 1999, Hansford and 
Spriggs 2008, and Lindquist and Klein 2006 for attempts to characterize relationships among 
precedents, circuit conflicts, and textual meaning in a similar fashion).  In other words, this 
concern is a variant of the charge that scholars not engaged in constructing “rectangular data 
sets” (RSDs) grounded in experimental logic and characterized by scoring variables by a readily 
observable indicator are prevented from making sound causal inferences (Goertz and Mahoney 
2012, 43-45). 
 One potentially useful way to frame the descriptive explanation that follows can be found 
in the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative social research traditions offered by Gary 
Goertz and James Mahoney (2012). The “effects-of-causes” tradition, generally concerned with 
an effect across a population of cases (observations), is less useful to researchers interested in 
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developing “explanations that simultaneously apply to a group of cases and to each individual 
case within that group.” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 46).  Reducing complex relationships to 
numerical placeholders necessarily entails a loss of context and detail that works at cross-
purposes with research questions concerned with – and answered by – contextualized, 
descriptive explanations.  Here, the object of explanation is a broad outcome of interest – the 
Roberts Court’s free expression project.  This outcome is the product of an extended process 
featuring a number of discrete controversies (cases), and within these cases a number of so-
called “causal process observations” (CPOs) can be examined.  Prior research has identified free 
speech philosophies, differing conceptions of the judicial role, interpretations of the requirements 
of jurisprudential structures, and ideological preferences as the key factors affecting outcomes in 
individual cases.  In order to confirm these explanations as causes – as opposed to the thin 
explanation of judicial behavior based primarily on ideological preferences - these within-case 
observations should result in outcomes not predicted by the null hypothesis.   
 In this case, a null finding may be framed as an explanation largely consistent with the 
attitudinal model’s predicted alignment of the justices.  Endemic to all studies of judicial 
decision-making that takes opinions seriously is the realist argument that jurisprudential 
language is fungible; that is, it could be employed instrumentally to achieve a preferred 
ideological result.  In the language of qualitative scholars, invocations of philosophies, 
jurisprudential interpretations, and articulations of the proper judicial role are necessary 
conditions that are almost always present in the course of judicial decision-making. They 
represent easy “hoop tests” that do little work in supporting hypotheses (Goertz and Mahoney 
2012, 94). According to Collier (2011), a hypothesis passes a hoop test when evidence is 
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necessary for affirming causal inference: “Passing affirms the relevance of [a] hypothesis, but 
does not confirm it.” (825).  
  To contextualize this in the present study, what evidence would disprove the attitudinal 
hypothesis?  Unexpected voting alignments represent the best observable implication of the 
ideology-plus hypothesis, a sufficient condition that allows us to reject the null in cases where 
disordered voting occurs (see generally Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist 2008; Keck 2007 for a 
variant of this approach).  As chapter three argued, vote ordering is a key observable implication 
of explanations of Supreme Court behavior such that the presence of disordered voting – failing 
the hoop test – somewhat strengthens alternative hypotheses. To move beyond diagnosing by 
exclusion, however, there must be positive evidence in favor of some sort of link between 
decisions and such factors as jurisprudential structures, philosophical justifications, and 
conceptions of the judicial role.  This is a difficult task, as Carter and Burke (2005) make clear in 
pointing out that legal reasoning is an exercise in law and politics: “The legal process, for all its 
political characteristics, is still a distinctive kind of politics…Law, like any language practice, 
limits the horizons of what becomes thinkable within that framework.” (22).  In other words, the 
problem for scholars assessing the role of legal factors in decision-making is developing a case 
that principles beyond conventional ideological preferences may be sufficient for producing a 
particular outcome.   
 The analytical move that allows this project to advance beyond description (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1995, 39-41) is comparing these factors as expressed by the justices in the 
course of writing opinions to their votes, as well as the votes of the conservative and liberal 
coalitions on the Court.  If Justice Breyer’s vote in a particular case is disordered, then, this is a 
strike against the attitudinal hypothesis.  If, however, that vote is accompanied by an opinion that 
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makes explicit a certain conception of the judicial role, a unique interpretation of the existing 
jurisprudential regime, or relies on a particular philosophy of the First Amendment, we have 
some initial evidence in favor of the ideology-plus hypothesis.  This hypothesis may be 
provisionally accepted if we then find that Breyer consistently articulates these reasons and they 
accompany behavior that cannot easily be explained by the attitudinal hypothesis.  This adds 
some analytical bite to the study of judicial decision-making in a way that moves beyond a 
recognition that doctrinal considerations are constitutive elements of judicial decision-making – 
it suggests there is a causal element at play as well (NeJaime 2013, 10-11).   
 A descriptive explanation of the Roberts Court’s constitution of the republic’s free speech 
guarantee represents the “internal” perspective on judicial behavior that attempts to understand 
judicial decision-making as described by Tamanaha: A “practice based on a shared set of 
organized rules and standards” that are “nonetheless heterogeneous... The practice of judging 
contains norms oriented toward the application of rules but also norms oriented toward doing 
justice, demands which sometimes clash. Beyond the minimum necessary to constitute a practice 
as such, there is no reason to postulate or assume that the entire body of norms contained within 
that practice is internally consistent.” (Tamanaha 1996, 179).  While the gold standard for the 
internal approach would be an in-depth, qualitative analysis of all stages of the process – 
including observation of behavior behind closed doors – the secrecy of the Court prevents the 
sort of richly detailed, interpretive contributions to social science akin to the work of Richard 
Fenno (1978) on members of Congress in their home districts or even H.W. Perry’s seminal 
account of agenda-setting (1991).  Opinions remain the primary and most accessible window to 
the practice of judging and provide a different kind of knowledge than externally imposed codes 
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on particular behavioral outputs (see Curry 2017 for an overview of this epistemological conflict 
in the study of U.S. political institutions). 
 I also wish to make clear what this descriptive explanation is not. Importantly,  this is not 
simply an exercise in what Glendon Schubert characterized as “a comparison of the extent to 
which empirical policy norms, as stated in judicial opinions, deviate from the ethical content of 
ideal norms excogitated from the earlier writings of eminent constitution-makers, judges, and 
political philosophers, or depart from the subjective value preferences of the commentators.” 
(Schubert 1963, 1).  Or, as stated more recently by Brian Pinaire, the purpose is not “to devise a 
system of meta-principles – airtight in the abstract – only to apply them to the considerations and 
conclusions of the Supreme Court.” (Pinaire 2008, xiii). Instead, it is an effort to synthesize 
strands of research presenting evidence that multiple factors affect decisions all while accounting 
for the purported ideological preferences of the justices and to assess whether such factors cause 
deviations from expected voting alignments.  In the words of Rogers Smith, it is an attempt “to 
integrate the study of ideas in law with descriptive studies of the historical evolution of 
institutions and behavior.” (Smith 1988, 90).    
 If persuasive, the detailed account that follows provides evidence pointing toward the 
sufficiency of legal factors for producing case outcomes.  The problem of behavioral 
equivalence, absent a method for dissecting the judicial mind, will always prove a barrier for 
scholars.  However, when viewed alongside alternative accounts and research methods, this 
account takes seriously the idea that legal factors may play a role in the calculus of the justices 
beyond cloaks for policy preferences.    
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Not a Free Speech Court:  The Early Period (2005-2008) Terms 
 The Politics of Free Speech: Campaign Finance, Election Regulations, and Unions 
 The Court’s free expression agenda began in earnest with Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the 2006 
decision discussed at the outset holding that the Solomon Amendment’s military recruiter access 
condition to receive federal funding did not create an unconstitutional condition in violation of 
the First Amendment’s speech clause.  On January 23, 2006, however, the Court unanimously 
overturned a decision by the D.C. District Court against a pro-life interest group challenging a 
key provision of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, formally known as the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). 
 In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (546 U.S. 410 (2006)); hereafter referenced as WRTL 
I), a unanimous Court held that an as-applied challenge to § 203 of BCRA brought by a non-
profit, issue advocacy group was not foreclosed by the Court’s McConnell decision just three 
years earlier.  Returning to the D.C. District Court, a divided panel granted summary judgment, 
finding Wisconsin Right to Life’s intended radio advertisements (which had aired prior to but not 
during the pre-election blackout period marked by § 203) urging listeners to "Contact Senators 
Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster [of President George W. Bush’s federal 
judicial appointees]” were constitutionally protected  “issue advocacy” statements rather than the 
“express advocacy” of federal election candidates barred within the pre-election timeframe 
prohibited under § 203 (466 F. Supp. 2d, at 204).  The Court granted certiorari in the case and 
shortly thereafter heard arguments in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (551 U.S. 449 (2007)); 
heretofore referenced as WRTL II).  
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 Writing for himself and Justice Alito – and joined in part by the Court’s conservative 
bloc, Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the ruling of the district court, articulating a new test for 
determining whether speech fell within § 203 while suggesting general skepticism toward 
BCRA’s goals: “A court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate…” (551 U.S. 449, 469-470)), followed by the admonition, “Enough 
is enough.  Issue ads like WRTL's are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-pro-
quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them.  To equate WRTL's ads with contributions 
is to ignore their value as political speech.” (551 U.S. 449, 478-479)).  If WRTL I united the 
Court in an effort to clarify the reach of BCRA’s prohibitions, WRTL II divided the Court along 
what would become the San Andreas fault of this era’s free expression merits agenda.   
 In the midst of the ongoing litigation in the WRTL cases, the early Roberts Era hinted at 
suspicion of state-level efforts to regulate elections as well.  In Randall v. Sorrell (548 U.S. 230 
(2006)), the Court struck down Vermont’s Act 64 (Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002)) 
limitations on expenditures as lacking a compelling state interest, finding the argument that 
“such limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising money rather than 
devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters” as foreclosed by the Court’s decision 
in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976); 548 U.S. 230, 243), and finding the Act’s contribution 
limits to “magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a 
significant disadvantage…they are too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny.” 
(548 U.S. 230, 248).   
 The majority opinion in Randall was written by Breyer, who throughout emphasized the 
importance of following the precedents established by Buckley and enforcing electoral 
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regulations in a way that account for First Amendment concerns, and - among other concerns - 
noted that the Court lacked a “scalpel” to precisely determine the balance).  Following the 
Martin-Quinn ordering of justices for the 2005 term, Breyer’s willingness to strike down the 
Vermont Act’s expenditure and contribution limitations was not unsurprising from an ideological 
perspective.  Yet the emphasis on balancing and aversion to establishing a bright line test hints at 
a particular conception of the judicial role based on what I describe throughout as pragmatism 
that consistently – but not unfailingly – appears during the Roberts Era. Breyer’s opinion was 
joined in full by Roberts and Alito, which at this stage of the Court’s free speech agenda did not 
foreshadow the sharper hostility toward campaign finance regulations that would emerge by the 
end of the second era of the Roberts Court’s speech agenda.   
 The Court’s decision two terms later in Davis continued the scaling back of BCRA, as the 
justices were presented with a challenge to § 319(a), the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,”  
by Jack Davis, a wealthy, recurring Democratic (and more recently, Republican) candidate in 
Western New York.  Davis argued that the amendment’s contribution formula – raising the 
ceiling on contribution limits for publicly financed candidates running against those privately 
financed (and therefore not subject to the same spending restrictions) – was a content-based 
regulation that burdened his own speech.  Justice Alito and the Court’s conservative bloc agreed, 
characterizing the formula as “an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly 
exercises” the right to unlimited self-financing in federal congressional campaigns (554 U.S. 
724, 739) and rejecting the government’s asserted interest in ensuring “level electoral 
opportunities” as inconsistent with the philosophical rationale of “unfettered political speech” 
(554 U.S. 724, 739, 742).    
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 The campaign finance cases – even at this early stage of the Roberts Era – appear to be 
ideologically driven.  The Court’s conservatives are highly suspicious of legislative bodies in this 
area, and have often invoked strongly libertarian language in their opinions.  Roberts appealed to 
the political speech justification in WRTL II (citing, among other decisions, New York Times v. 
Sullivan (376 U.S. 254 (1964)), at 551 U.S. 449, 467, 469), while Alito echoed J.S. Mill (1859, 
84-88) and Alexander Meiklejohn (1948) in announcing faith in citizens’ ability to rationally 
evaluate candidates’ ideas (despite aggregations of wealth) and carving out robust protections for 
political speech related to self-government.  Considering the possible broad interpretations these 
philosophical principles can take and have taken – Meiklejohn’s argument from democracy has 
consistently been appealed to in majority and dissenting opinions - the early Roberts Court 
merits agenda can be described as undeniably anti-speech: These ideological and partisan-tinted 
decisions are the only decisions that can be characterized as “pro-speech” during the early 
Roberts Era. 
 Two other election-related speech cases have united the Court across ideological lines, 
though the decisions in Washington State Grange v. Washington Republican Party et al. (552 
U.S. 442 (2008))) and New York v. Lopez-Torres (552 U.S. 196 (2009)) were against the First 
Amendment claimants.  In Washington State Republican Party et al., Thomas wrote for the 
Court in dismissing a freedom of speech and association facial challenge brought by the 
Republican, Democratic, and Libertarian parties of Washington state to a ballot initiative (I-872) 
allowing candidates to self-identify their party affiliation on primary election ballots (the law 
also structured general election ballots so that the top two vote-getters in primaries would appear 
on the ballot).  Here, Thomas left open the possibility for an as-applied challenge but expressly 
eschewed the “strong medicine” of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Roberts, again joined 
153 
 
 
by Alito, concurred in rejecting the facial challenge and mused that, given a well-designed ballot, 
“Voters would not regard the listed candidates as "party" candidates, any more than someone 
saying ‘I like Campbell's soup’ would be understood to be associated with Campbell's.” (552 
U.S. 442, 461).  Scalia, joined by Kennedy in dissent, found Roberts’ concurrence especially 
problematic, noting that “The electorate's perception of a political party's beliefs is colored by its 
perception of those who support the party; and a party's defining act is the selection of a 
candidate and advocacy of that candidate's election by conferring upon him the party's 
endorsement.” (552 U.S. 442, 462).   
 Though Lopez-Torres again featured as dispute between establishment political parties 
and an underdog – this time, a New York Supreme Court candidate challenging the cryptic, 
Tammany-esque selection of candidates via a complex delegate process – the Court unanimously 
rejected Judge Margarita Lopez-Torres’ free speech claim.  Kennedy, who had joined Scalia in 
voting for the Washington State Grange, concurred separately with Breyer and opined that “Rule 
of law is secured only by the principled exercise of political will.  If New York statutes for 
nominating and electing judges do not produce both the perception and the reality of a system 
committed to the highest ideals of the law, they ought to be changed and to be changed now.” 
(552 U.S. 196, 213).  Ultimately, the unexpected voting alignment in Washington State Grange 
and the unanimity in Lopez-Torres cast doubt on any unqualified claims about the Court’s 
hostility to election regulations, and suggest an unwillingness to expand the First Amendment 
beyond traditional jurisprudential structures.   
 Two additional, unanimous decisions by the Court during the early period were – in 
hindsight - early signals of another Roberts Era political project.  In 2007, the Washington 
Education Association union raised a free speech challenge to § 760 of the Washington Fair 
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Campaign Practices Act (Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760), which held that unions could not spend 
agency shop fees contributed by non-members for election or political purposes unless the non-
member affirmatively opted in to such an arrangement.  Writing for a unanimous Court in 
Davenport v. Washington Education Association (551 U.S. 177 (2007)), Scalia viewed the 
union’s claim as misguided “for the simple reason that unions have no constitutional entitlement 
to the fees of nonmember-employees.” (551 U.S. 177, 185).  Breyer, concurring and joined by 
Roberts and Alito, disagreed only to the extent that the Court considered issues not properly 
raised by Washington in its briefs to the Court (551 U.S. 177, 192).  Two terms later in Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Association (555 U.S. 353 (2009)), a divided Court upheld Idaho’s Right to 
Work Act (Idaho Code § 44-2001) against a First Amendment challenge by another teachers’ 
union, which argued that the Act’s prohibition on union payroll deductions for political activities 
burdened the union’s constitutional rights.   
 In an opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court again emphasized that “Idaho does not 
suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public employer checkoffs 
for political activities.  The concern that political payroll deductions might be seen as involving 
public employers in politics arises only because Idaho permits public employer payroll 
deductions in the first place.” (555 U.S. 353, 361).  Ginsburg, in her second concurring opinion 
of the early Roberts Era, concurred in the judgment only on the narrow grounds that the 
municipal ban on payroll deductions was valid because municipalities are entities of the state and 
therefore subject to the restriction.  For Ginsburg, the controversy was outside of relevant First 
Amendment doctrines and marked the beginning of a comparatively disinterested or deferential 
take on the First Amendment.  Breyer again disagreed with the Court’s First Amendment 
analysis, suggesting the case should be remanded to the district court and subject to a form of 
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intermediate – rather than rational basis – scrutiny: “I would ask the question that this Court has 
asked in other speech-related contexts,  namely, whether the statute imposes a burden upon 
speech that is disproportionate in light of the other interests the government seeks to achieve.” 
(555 U.S. 353, 367).  Breyer also doubted whether the Court’s negative liberty interpretation of 
the First Amendment could (or should) be relied upon in evaluating all controversies, arguing 
instead that “The distinction is neither easy to draw nor likely to prove determinative.” (555 U.S. 
353, 366).     
 Earlier in the 2008 term, the Court heard another union fundraising-related challenge, this 
time brought by non-members who opposed fundraising fees assessed by the local shop being 
used for national union collective bargaining and litigation efforts – efforts that did not always 
directly benefit their local Maine shop.  In Locke v. Karass (555 U.S. 207 (2009)), Breyer wrote 
for a unanimous Court in dismissing the union non-members’ claim, stating “We can find no 
significant difference between litigation activities and other national activities the cost of which 
this Court has found chargeable.” (555 U.S. 207, 218).  Alito, concurring with the Chief Justice 
and Scalia, noted that the result in the case could have been different had non-members 
questioned whether the relationship between chargeable expenses for national litigation was in 
fact a reciprocal benefit for the local Service Employee’s International Union chapter (suggesting 
greater skepticism toward chargeable expenses than the rest of the majority).   
 Washington Education Association, Pocatello, and Karass marked the beginning of a 
series of cases where the Court first rejected free speech claims brought by unions, then became 
increasingly sympathetic to claims brought by union non-members.  In each instance, the Court 
was initially marked by unanimity but became progressively more fractured in the cases’ 
progeny. Similar to the the campaign finance decisions, the Court’s union decisions began to 
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take on a more political tone during the early era.  Apart from Justice Breyer’s call for a case-by-
case balancing approach in these cases, the Court generally operated within existing doctrinal 
structures. But these cases represent approximately half of the early Roberts Era free speech 
merits agenda. In suits brought by a government employee, prisoner, high school student, private 
school, an unpopular religious group, and an individual found guilty of trade in child 
pornography, the Court was consistently unwilling to rule in favor of speech claimants.   
 
 Bork’s Renaissance 
 The early Roberts Era hints that ideological bloc explanations may overstate consensus 
within  the liberal and conservative blocs came in the form of the student speech case Morse v. 
Frederick.  But before assessing the rationales and coalitions manifest in the student, government 
employee, prisoner, and other disfavored speaker cases, the important context of the extent of the 
imaginary sphere of protection requires elaboration beyond the content-neutrality regime.  
Following an extended period of concern for protecting speech related to the political process 
and scholarly treatises making the case for the highest level of protection for political speech 
(Meiklejohn 1948), conservative jurist Robert Bork argued that, “Constitutional protection 
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.  There is no basis for judicial 
intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of 
expression we call obscene or pornographic…I am, of course aware that this theory departs 
drastically from existing Court-made law, from the views of most academic specialists in the 
field and that it may strike a chill into the hearts of some civil libertarians.”  (Bork 1971-1972, 
20).   
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 On October 23, 1987, Ronald Reagan’s nominee to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated 
by moderate Lewis Powell was rejected by the U.S. Senate in a sharply divided 58-42 vote.  
While the confirmation hearings were notable for then-U.S. Senator Joseph Biden’s critiques of 
Bork’s “neutral principles” and purported judicial restraint, the implications of Bork’s published 
formulation of First Amendment theory are no less important to U.S. constitutional democracy.  
Bork’s First Amendment was limited in its scope of application to pure political speech, but with 
speech falling within that scope subject to absolute protection.  The formulation takes the ideas 
of Alexander Meiklejohn (1948) to their logical extreme, and fashioned a judicial First 
Amendment philosophy that like the shot of a professional sniper was limited in target but 
extremely effective.  For Bork, “Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even 
if there were no first amendment,” which is “the only form of speech that a principled judge can 
prefer to other claimed freedoms.  All other forms of speech raise only issues of human 
gratification and their protection against legislative regulation involves the judge in making 
decisions of the sort made in Griswold v. Connecticut.” (1971-1972, 21, 26). 
 For others, Bork’s incantation of the Meiklejohnian guide to First Amendment 
adjudication portended a world with far less color and sound:  “Robert Bork’s America is a land 
in which…writers and artists could be censored at the whim of government.” (Reston 1987).  
Bork’s nomination was quashed but his ideas live on.  Fast forward 20 years to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Frederick, the somewhat amusing controversy arising from a Juneau, Alaska 
high school student’s display of a banner during the running of the Olympic Torch (which passed 
by the high school) which read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”  High school principal Deborah Morse 
saw the banner and suspended student Joseph Frederick for – arguably – promoting a pro-drug 
use message during a school event.  Frederick was not on school property when he displayed the 
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banner, but he was attending the school sanctioned event (congratulating relay runners as the 
Torch passed) directly across from the high school.  In the tradition of the Tinker line of cases, 
Frederick brought suit against Morse under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, which allows for any person 
deprived of constitutional rights to file a civil action against an individual acting “under the 
color” of any law, custom, or regulation.24   
 The Court split along the expected ideological fracture in Frederick, though Justices 
Alito, Breyer, and Thomas all offered different roadmaps to reaching their respective 
conclusions, and Justice Stevens (joined by Souter and Ginsburg) provided a take on the First 
Amendment opposed to Justice Alito’s emerging disdain for peripheral First Amendment claims 
as well as the developing, selectively applied liberty vision of speech most visible in the Court’s 
campaign finance agenda.  Concurring in Frederick, Alito (joined by Kennedy) emphasized that 
the decision “goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a 
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and it provides no support for 
any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or 
social issue.” (551 U.S. 393, 422).  Alito’s emphasis on forum analysis – noting that the special 
context of schools relaxes First Amendment standards –disavowed any deviation from existing 
precedent that would erode speech protections for students: “Public schools may ban speech 
advocating illegal drug use.  But I regard such regulation as standing at the far reaches of what 
the First Amendment permits.” (551 U.S. 393, 425).   
                                                 
24“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, 
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 
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 Breyer, the most ideologically moderate liberal by Martin-Quinn estimates during the 
2005 term, concurred in the result except to the extent that the majority decision framed and 
decided the case as a First Amendment controversy.  Seeking to resolve the controversy on 
narrow grounds, Breyer argued that, “…the question focuses upon specific content narrowly 
defined:  May a school board punish students for speech that advocates drug use and, if so, 
when?” (551 U.S. 393, 425).  In ruling that Morse’s actions constituted qualified immunity from 
the monetary claims sought by Frederick, Breyer noted that “Teachers are neither lawyers nor 
police officers.” Resolving the case under the qualified immunity doctrine would “avoid the risk 
of interpretations that are too broad or too narrow,” and would instead make it “easy to offer 
practically valuable guidance.” (551 U.S. 393, 427-428). Breyer’s concurrence, though 
consistent with the vote order predicted by attitudinal models, again revealed a concern for 
pragmatism that would become a mainstay of his reasoning in free expression controversies in 
the Roberts Era.  Likewise, the emphasis on original understandings of the role of schools in 
society in Thomas’s concurring opinion, would reappear in later Roberts Era decisions.  This 
early example underscores the potential for differing conceptions of the judicial role to cut 
against common ideological rankings of the justices. 
 Frederick is also a useful jumping off point for assessing the constitution of free speech 
consistently articulated by Justices Stevens and Souter during the early Roberts Era, frequently 
joined by Justice Ginsburg.  In the early Roberts Era, dissents by Justices Souter and Stevens 
(with Justice Ginsburg always joining these opinions) have always favored relatively powerless 
speech claimants.  In Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 U.S. 410 (2006)), Justice Souter’s dissent argued 
that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s willingness to protect only government employee speech of 
public concern in the employee’s capacity as a citizen – rather than as an employee – effectively 
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gutted the limited sphere of protection carved out in Pickering and Myers.  For Kennedy, “The 
controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a 
calendar deputy… Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen.” (547 U.S. 410, 421-422).   
 Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, explained that “This significant, albeit qualified, 
protection of public employees who irritate the government is understood to flow from the First 
Amendment, in part, because a government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to an 
individual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically 
discounting a speaker's interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just because the 
government employs him.  Still, the First Amendment safeguard rests on something more, being 
the value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a public employee may 
disclose.” (547 U.S. 410, 428-429).  Stevens dissented separately as well, stressing Souter’s 
argument that “The notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and 
speaking in the course of one's employment is quite wrong.” (547 U.S. 410, 427).  
 The concerns expressed by the majority and principal dissent flow from the difficult 
context serving as the basis for Ceballos’s claim: His reassignment to another office and denial 
of a promotion following his investigation of possible police and prosecutorial misconduct 
related to the issuance of a search warrant in a criminal case. Dissenting separately, Breyer 
avoided the bright lines drawn by both the majority and principal dissent: “In a word, the 
majority says, "never." That word, in my view, is too absolute… While I agree with much of 
Justice Souter's analysis, I believe that the constitutional standard he enunciates fails to give 
sufficient weight to the serious managerial and administrative concerns that the majority 
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describes.” (547 U.S. 410, 446, 447).  The dissenters in Ceballos would, however, cite to the 
decision in ruling against a private school employee in Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic 
Association v. Brentwood (551 U.S. 291 (2007)), characterizing a state-sponsored, inter-school 
district association’s rules on “hard sell” football recruiting as “strik[ing] nowhere near the heart 
of the First Amendment.” (551 U.S. 291, 296).   
 Writing for a Court unanimous in voting but splintered in rationale, Stevens cited 
Ceballos favorably for the proposition that government employee speech was limited to speaking 
on matters of public concern in employees’ capacity as citizens, concluding that, “We need no 
empirical data to credit TSSAA's common sense conclusion that hard-sell tactics directed at 
middle school students could lead to exploitation, distort competition between high school teams, 
and foster an environment in which athletics are prized more highly than academics.” (551 U.S. 
291, 300).  Concurring in the result only, Thomas broke with the Court’s reliance on the 
government employee speech line of cases, opposing the Court’s willingness to expand the 
Court’s lenient yet speech protective standard to Brentwood – a private school (551 U.S. 291, 
306-307).  The Court’s other conservatives, through Justice Kennedy, appeared to be onboard 
with the Court’s government employee analysis though disagreeing with Stevens’ invocation of a 
precedent involving a lawyer’s challenge to the in-person solicitation of clients (Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); cited at 551 U.S. 291, 296).   
 Stevens has been far more speech-protective in other contexts, however.  In Beard v. 
Banks (548 U.S. 521 (2006)), an ideologically divided majority ruled that the Pennsylvania 
prison system’s Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU) policy prohibiting inmates from having 
newspapers, magazines, and photos was constitutional under the precedent established in Turner 
v. Safley (482 U.S. 78 (1987)).  Stevens, joined by Ginsburg, characterized the deprivation theory 
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of rehabilitation permitted by Breyer’s plurality decision as “[having] no limiting principle; if 
sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any regulation that deprives a prisoner of a 
constitutional right so long as there is at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain 
the right at some future time by modifying his behavior,” viewing the prohibition on inmate 
literature as “strik[ing] at the core of the First Amendment rights to receive, to read, and to 
think,” and preventing access to the exchange of ideas “central to the development and 
preservation of individual identity.” (548 U.S. 521, 546, 543, 552). Ginsburg, joining Stevens’ 
dissent and writing separately, expressed dismay at the plurality’s standard for summary 
judgment, fearing that  “By elevating the summary judgment opponent's burden to a height 
prisoners lacking nimble counsel cannot reach, the plurality effectively tells prison officials they 
will succeed in cases of this order, and swiftly, while barely trying.” (548 U.S. 521, 556). 
 The concern for speech claims brought by unpopular speakers was also a recurring 
concern for Souter, dissenting with Ginsburg in the 2007 term case of U.S. v. Williams (553 U.S. 
285 (2008)) in viewing provisions of the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end 
the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)) as 
impermissibly overbroad under the First Amendment.  Souter’s disagreement with Scalia’s 
majority opinion turned on the Act’s criminalization of engaging in child pornography 
“pandering” transactions not involving real images of children. For Souter, “The tension between 
ostensibly protecting the material pandered while approving prosecution of the pandering of that 
same material, and in allowing the new pandering prohibition to suppress otherwise protected 
speech,” violated free speech principles. (553 U.S. 285, 311). Pointing to a consistent though not 
all-encompassing concern among the Court’s liberal justices, Souter also noted that “What will 
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be lost is short on merit, but intrinsic value is not the reason for protecting unpopular 
expression.” (553 U.S. 285, 320). 
 At the conclusion of the 2007 term, Souter concurred in the Court’s holding against a 
claim brought by gnostic Christians in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)). 
The sect argued that the city’s acceptance of a Ten Commandments statute for display in a local 
park while rejecting a monument inscribed with the group’s “Seven Aphorisms” constituted 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Alito’s opinion for a 
unanimous Court reasoned that accepting Summum’s argument would make government 
decisions to approve public displays impossible.  Souter expressed some unease with the Court’s 
decision, stating, “I have qualms, however, about accepting the position that public monuments 
are government speech categorically.” (555 U.S. 460, 485). Breyer, while concurring, stressed 
that, “In my view, courts must apply categories such as ‘government speech,’ ‘public forums,’ 
‘limited public forums,’ and ‘nonpublic forums’ with an eye toward their purposes--lest we turn 
‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels.” (555 U.S. 460, 484).  Breyer’s express 
pragmatic approach argued that “it helps to ask whether a government action burdens speech 
disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government 
objective…After all, parks do not serve speech-related interests alone.” (555 U.S. 460, 484-485).  
For his part, Stevens (joined by Ginsburg) characterized the Court’s approach in less than 
flattering terms, noting “To date, our decisions relying on the recently minted government 
speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.” 
(555 U.S. 460, 481).   
 When considered in light of dissents in Frederick and Ceballos, members of the Court’s 
liberal wing occasionally – though not consistently and only rarely voting together – raised 
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concerns with the Court’s jurisprudential approaches to adjudicating claims.  Much as Lochner 
Era justices generally decided economic regulation cases within the strictures of the class 
interests formula born of a Founding Era fear of special, class-based legislation (Gillman 1993), 
the justices in the early Roberts Era were largely united by conventional jurisprudential 
structures, disagreeing only to the extent that application of these jurisprudential regimes – 
beyond simple content-neutrality and including doctrines calling for lower, intermediate forms of 
scrutiny – lead to different results.  Breyer’s approach – much as Justice Holmes dissent in 
Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905)) – is the exception that tests this rule, generally 
rejecting the content-neutrality formula. Even when united in votes, the justices provide clues to 
their preferred conception of the judicial role.  Often, these dicta invoke speech-protective 
philosophies that can legitimize either pro- or anti-speech votes.  But sometimes, it is apparent 
that certain conceptions of the judicial role create tensions not only with expected ideological 
voting, but also the conventions of jurisprudential regimes.  
 The preponderance of evidence gleaned from opinions and observed voting patterns in 
merits cases during the early Roberts Era provides marginal support for the ideology-plus 
explanation.  In the language of process tracing, the attitudinal explanation jumps a number of 
“hoops” with a number of cases splitting the Court into the 5-4 voting coalitions predicted by 
conventional estimates of ideological preferences.  But it also stumbles in a few cases as well: 
Banks, Pocatello, and WSRP each featured deviations from those expected alignments.  Perhaps 
the most notable fracture during this era is the willingness of members of the Court’s liberal bloc 
to generally favor speech claims brought by claimants at the “periphery” of the First 
Amendment’s aura of coverage, including prisoners, students, and those convicted for soliciting 
child pornography. The Court’s conservatives were generally far more willing to protect what 
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has been characterized as speech at the “core” of the First Amendment, or political speech.  
Table 4.1 provides an overview of behavior and trends in opinion reasoning during this early 
period, as well as a brief numerical characterization of each justice’s orientation toward the pro-
speech position across these cases. 
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Table 4.1 – Not a Free Speech Court: The Early Roberts Era (2005-2008 Terms) 
 Opinions Authored 
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting) 
Interpretive 
Preferences 
% Pro 
Speech 
Vote 
Deviations 
John Roberts FAIR  
Frederick 
WRTL II 
Pocatello 
WSRP --- Core 
Political, 
Institutional 
Maintenance 
 
25%  
John Paul Stevens Brentwood Lopez Torres 
Williams 
Summum 
Ceballos 
Randall 
Banks 
Frederick 
Davis 
Pocatello 
 
Periphery 31.25%  
Antonin Scalia WEA 
Williams 
Lopez 
Torres 
 
WRTL II 
Summum 
WSRP Core 
Political, 
Originalism 
31.25%  
Anthony Kennedy Ceballos 
 
Randall 
Brentwood 
Lopez Torres 
 
--- Core Political 31.25% WSRP 
David Souter --- Summum Ceballos 
Randall 
WRTL II 
Williams 
Pocatello 
 
Periphery 31.25% Banks 
Clarence Thomas WSRP Randall 
Banks 
Brentwood 
Frederick 
 
--- Originalism, 
Core Political 
25% WSRP 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg --- Pocatello Banks 
Davis 
 
Periphery 31.25% Pocatello 
Stephen Breyer Randall 
Banks (P) 
Karass 
 
WEA 
Frederick 
Summum 
Ceballos 
Pocatello 
Pragmatism 25%  
Samuel Alito, Jr. Davis 
Summum 
Randall 
Frederick 
Karass 
 
--- Core Political 23.08%  
Notes: N=16. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=25%.  For “Opinion” column, bolded cases denote 
a pro-speech claimant vote.  “Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions during this period.  “% 
Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims. One case, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
546 U.S. 410 (2006), was a unanimous, per curiam decision and does not appear in the opinion column but the votes are included 
in the percentage of pro-speech decisions category and overall N.  Another case, Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), was 
issued during this era but was omitted due to the absence of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts during oral argument and the 
Court’s decision.   
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The Most Pro-Speech Court in History? The 2009-2011 Terms. 
 Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010)) has become something of a touchstone for 
characterizations of a Court simultaneously willing to make difficult, speech protective decisions 
(Floyd Abrams, quoted in Liptak 2012) and placing hostility to campaign finance regulations 
above all other speech claims (Kairys 2013; Chemerinsky 2011; Youn 2011).  The decision, in a 
lengthy opinion by Justice Kennedy, held BCRA Section 203’s prohibition on electioneering 
expenditures from corporate, union, and non-profit treasury funds to be unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment for regulating speech on the basis of the subject matter communicated 
(political speech).  Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, 
emphasized the Court’s institutional responsibility to make difficult decisions and was likely at 
least partially attributable to the draft dissent circulated by Justice Souter after the initial oral 
arguments in the case – a dissent that criticized the Court for answering an issue not properly 
presented before it (Coyle 2013, 251-252).   
 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, joined by Thomas and Alito, reasoned that the First 
Amendment is agnostic when it comes to the identity of the speaker involved in a controversy 
because corporations had long been viewed as having rights despite a lengthy analysis offered by 
Stevens in dissent: “The Framers did not like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it 
follows (as night the day) that corporations had no rights of free speech. Of course the Framers' 
personal affection or disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can be thought to 
be reflected in the understood meaning of the text they enacted -- not, as the dissent suggests, as 
a freestanding substitute for that text.” (558 U.S. 310, 386).  
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 Scalia’s conception of the judicial role has its limits – he did not join Thomas’s 
concurring opinion in Frederick, and the two were at loggerheads in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association (discussed below).  For his part, Thomas dissented to the extent that 
Kennedy’s expansive opinion nevertheless upheld  BCRA’s disclosure and reporting 
requirements: “I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this 
Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and 
threatening warning letters.” (558 U.S. 310, 485).  Stevens’ dissent (joined by the Court’s liberal 
justices), an attempt to discredit Scalia’s brand of originalism, also feared that dismantling 
BCRA’s key regulation came “at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression,” (558 
U.S. 310, 475), a theme buried in an extended defense of the anti-corruption, equalizing rationale 
underlying Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 U.S. 652 (1990)) but would become 
more prevalent in later Roberts Era campaign finance decisions.   
 Until the Court’s near unanimous decision in April 2010 in the animal cruelty case of 
U.S. v. Stevens (559 U.S. 460 (2010)), the Court only ruled for speech claimants challenging 
state and federal campaign finance regulations.  Stevens was the first indication of the Court’s 
willingness to emphasize one strain of U.S. free speech jurisprudence – the so-called 
“categorical” or “absolutist” understanding, at least in an apparent unwillingness to specify 
certain types of speech areas as low-value categories not belonging to the core protections of the 
First Amendment.  The vehicle for this emerging agenda was a suit filed by Robert J. Stevens, 
the producer and distributor of a number of alleged dog fighting  and – less cynically – pit bull 
educational videos. Congress, viewing animal cruelty in the form of “crush videos” as a social 
problem in need of redress, criminalized the possession, distribution, and sale of such videos in 
18 U.S.C.S. § 48.   
169 
 
 
 For the first time in a non-campaign finance case and over four terms into the Roberts 
Era, the Court (through Chief Justice Roberts) ruled in favor of a free speech claim and did so 
through the “strong medicine” of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Roberts subjected the 
law to strict scrutiny, finding that Congress “create[d] a criminal prohibition of alarming 
breadth,” adding that “There is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results 
in the statute's banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban.” (559 U.S. 460, 
474, 479).  In sum, the Court declined to recognize depictions of animal cruelty as a categorical 
exception to the Court’s strict scrutiny regime and refused to adopt narrowing constructions of 
the statute, dismissing an exceptions clause as unconstitutionally underinclusive. Arguably, it 
was Stevens that signaled a willingness to aggressively enforce the First Amendment, rather than 
the ideologically divisive campaign finance cases. 
  
 Alito’s Conservatism (?) and Breyer’s Conception of the Judicial Role 
 Stevens is also notable for being the first clear instance of what Tribe and Matz have 
suggested is Justice Alito’s own brand of “Burkean” conservatism (2014, 141-142).  Dissenting 
alone in Stevens, Alito noted that “It is undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush videos may 
constitutionally be prohibited” by Congress, suggesting Roberts’ characterization of the law as 
facially overbroad as “straining” and, referencing the First Amendment philosophical search-for-
truth foundation, argued that “the harm caused by the underlying crimes vastly outweighs any 
minimal value that the depictions might conceivably be thought to possess.” (559 U.S. 460, 486, 
495).  
170 
 
 
 Alito’s dismissiveness of peripheral (as opposed to core political) speech claimants was 
most pronounced during the most pro-speech period of the Roberts Era.  This conception of the 
judicial role in free speech controversies has resulted in unexpected deviations from the expected 
ideological ordering of the justices.  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (564 U.S. 
786 (2011)), the heterogeneity within the Court’s conservative bloc was hinted at during oral 
arguments on November 2, 2010, when in response to a line of questioning by Justice Scalia – 
the eventual author of a majority opinion holding that videogames were a form of artistic 
expression protected by the First Amendment – Alito interjected, “Well, I think what Justice 
Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about videogames. Did he enjoy them?” 
(Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association - Oral Argument - Nov. 2, 2010; also quoted in 
Tribe and Matz 2014, 142).   
 Alito, joined by the Chief Justice, concurred in the judgment though he refused to enforce 
a categorical understanding of the First Amendment that refused to create a category of low-
value, violent speech less worthy of constitutional protection: “The Court is far too quick to 
dismiss the possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the effects on minors of 
playing violent video games) may be very different from anything that we have seen before.” 
(564 U.S. 786, 816).  In dissent, Thomas argued that the decision departed from original 
understandings of the First Amendment, putting him at odds with Scalia and underscoring the 
difficulty attached to characterizing the decision for an association of businesses as 
monolithically “liberal” or “conservative.” Breyer, dissenting separately and somewhat 
uncharacteristically, subjected the law to strict scrutiny but found the trove of studies related to 
effects of videogame violence on adolescents as a valid, compelling interest (and suggested the 
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law would survive as-applied challenges as well, though left that possibility open)(564 U.S. 786, 
841, 857).   
 In the funeral protester case of Snyder v. Phelps (562 U.S. 443 (2011)), Alito was again 
the lone dissenter and pitted against another ringing endorsement of free speech penned by the 
Chief Justice.  The Court reversed a finding of approximately five million dollars in 
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for Albert 
Snyder, the father of a fallen Marine who had died in the line of duty in Iraq. Snyder 
subsequently suffered depression and other ailments after viewing news coverage of the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s picketing of his son’s funeral as well as the Westboro Baptist Church 
penned “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder," an online post (533 F. Supp. 2d 
567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)). In finding for Phelps (the leader of the church), Roberts extolled the 
vice-protective virtues of free expression, stating, “While these messages may fall short of 
refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight--the political and moral conduct 
of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and 
scandals involving the Catholic clergy--are matters of public import,” (562 U.S. 443, 454 
(2011)), and pronouncing that “Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and--as it did here--inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we 
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different 
course--to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public 
debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this 
case.” (562 U.S. 443, 460-461).  
 Alito characterized the decision as allowing a private figure to be “brutalized,” and 
arguing that Roberts’ emphasis on protecting political speech was misguided: “This portrayal is 
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quite inaccurate; respondents' attack on Matthew was of central importance. But in any event, I 
fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because it is interspersed with 
speech that is protected.” (562 U.S. 443, 471).  From a jurisprudential angle and with 
implications for determining Alito’s conception of the judicial role, the dissent suggests a rigid, 
formal component to the adjudication of speech claims as well as the limits of framing 
controversies as involving speech on matters of public importance.  Stated differently, it is 
consistent with the formal Meiklejohnian conception of speech that Bork articulated during the 
Nixon/Reagan era of conservatism. Breyer again concurred in the result on the narrower ground 
that the Court “…does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide private 
individuals with necessary protection. Rather, the Court has reviewed the underlying facts in 
detail, as will sometimes prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected 
(say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict.” (562 U.S. 443, 462).  
 Breyer and Alito would again distance themselves from the majority in the copyright case 
of Golan v. Holder (132 S. Ct. 873 (2012)), dissenting from Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court 
that § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act – restoring previous “public domain” works to 
copyright-protected status – violated neither the copyright clause of Article I, Sec. 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution nor the speech clause of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.  Breyer, joined 
by Alito, dissented on the grounds that “By removing material from the public domain, the 
statute, in literal terms, ‘abridges’ a preexisting freedom to speak. In practical terms, members of 
the public might well have decided what to say, as well as when and how to say it, in part by 
reviewing with a view to repeating, expression that they reasonably believed was, or would be, 
freely available. Given these speech implications, it is not surprising that Congress has long 
173 
 
 
sought to protect public domain material when revising the copyright laws.” (132 S.Ct. 873, 
907).  
 The claimants in Golan were an amalgam of orchestra conductors and other individuals 
who performed or utilized works in the public domain – claimants offering a challenge that did 
not easily fit within the core political speech philosophy but resonated instead with human 
fulfillment (Emerson 1963, 879-881) and marketplace of ideas rationales (Mill 1859, 84-88; 
Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). Breyer’s unusually speech protective position - in light of 
previous statements seeking a more balanced, narrow rationale in speech controversies- 
highlights the complexity constituting decision-making, as does Alito joining Breyer’s dissent 
given his frequent focus on core political speech.  In fact, Alito’s moniker as “a different kind of 
conservative” (Tribe and Matz 2014, 141-142) may be something of an overstatement. Alito led 
the Court’s most conservative members in a dissent in Alvarez (discussed below), also 
characterizing lies about receiving military medals as low-value speech not entitled to robust 
constitutional protection (rejecting the content-neutrality requirement of strict scrutiny for the 
speech at issue).    
 Whether best attributed to a different sort of conservative ideological preference or a 
philosophical preference that affords the political speech philosophy primacy in free speech 
controversies, Alito’s majority opinion in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 
1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), characterizing the opt-out requirements related to the collection of 
union shop non-member fees as unconstitutional compelled speech, built upon an emerging 
hostility to union fundraising practices first evident in Washington Education Association and 
Pocatello.   The decision held that the union’s failure to send out a new “Hudson notice” for new 
fees charged to non-members violated the First Amendment, but the Court’s five conservatives 
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also held that union non-members must “opt-in” rather than opt-out of fee assessments for 
ideological purposes.   
 Concurring in the result only, Sotomayor (joined by Ginsburg) noted that while the 
SEIU’s “Political Fight Back Fund” – the subject of fee assessment in question and explicitly 
concerned with opposing anti-union ballot initiatives in California – required an opt-out 
provision for non-members, Alito’s majority opinion “proceeds, quite unnecessarily, to reach 
significant constitutional issues not contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued. 
Petitioners did not question the validity of our precedents, which consistently have recognized 
that an opt-out system of fee collection comports with the Constitution.” (132 S.Ct. 2277, 2297). 
Breyer dissented (joined by Kagan), fearing that the Court’s logic would apply to constitutional 
“chargeable” expenses related to collective bargaining as well as the non-chargeable, ideological 
fundraising activities, and would have upheld the entire SEIU administration of fees as 
constitutional under the Court’s Hudson precedent (132 S.Ct. 2277, 2305).   
 Union cases, like those related to campaign financing , business, and abortion, can be 
plausibly viewed as the most politically salient First Amendment cases the Court is likely to 
hear. Viewed this way, cases within the development of freedom of speech during the Roberts 
Era represent easy hoop tests for the attitudinal hypothesis to jump through.  Knox, a union case, 
is fairly inconsistent with these expectations, except the bottom-line finding that the Court’s 
conservatives voted wholesale against the union position in the case.  If we were to expect 
deviations from the predicted alignment of the Court in the case, then we might expect Breyer to 
take the split-the-baby approach advanced by Sotomayor and Ginsburg – the two most liberal 
members of the Court during the 2011 term.  Nor can it be said that the case counts squarely in 
favor of the ideology-plus explanation – Breyer’s regular aversion to hard and fast rules is in 
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tension with administrative deference in Knox, though both historically have appeared in his 
jurisprudence (Tushnet 2015, 215-217).  
  
 The Value of Concurring Opinions 
 These various preferences – legal and ideological – are difficult, though not impossible to 
disentangle. Though rationales revealed by Alito and Breyer have emerged as tenable 
explanations for unusual voting behavior during this period of the Roberts Era, a number of other 
examples illustrate diversity across and within voting coalitions on the Court.  To provide one 
illustration that has received relatively less attention in coverage of the free expression agenda, 
consider Doe v. Reed (561 U.S. 186 (2010)), a decision following on the heels of Citizens United 
and holding that petition disclosure requirements under the Washington Public Records Act were 
not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  The speaker, John Doe (on behalf of 
all signatories) was aligned with Protect Marriage Washington, a group opposed to a law 
extending benefits to same-sex domestic partners,  and expressed that disagreement by signing a 
petition in an effort to reach the 4% threshold needed to initiate a popular referendum 
challenging the law.   
 A close reading of the opinions in the case reveals a fairly fractured Court, despite 
agreement on the bottom line questions of whether the act of signing a petition is expression and 
whether the disclosure of petition signatories can survive a facial challenge. For Roberts, two 
factors were especially important: “To the extent a regulation concerns the legal effect of a 
particular activity in that process, the government will be afforded substantial latitude to enforce 
that regulation. Also pertinent to our analysis is the fact that the PRA [Public Records Act] is not 
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a prohibition on speech, but instead a disclosure requirement.” (561 U.S. 186, 195-
196).   Though Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion was joined by five other justices 
(Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor), each of those justices also filed concurring 
opinions.  Breyer characteristically joined the Court’s opinion and Sotomayor’s concurrence to 
the extent that careful balancing of interests was necessary for the Court to uphold the statute 
(561 U.S. 186, 202), while Alito argued for accommodating as-applied challenges in light of  
“The widespread harassment and intimidation suffered by supporters of California's Proposition 
8,” suggesting the law was unconstitutional in nearly all applications where a reasonable 
possibility of a threat existed while still upholding it under facial challenge (561 U.S. 186, 205).  
 Sotomayor, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, challenged Alito directly on that point: 
“Allowing case-specific invalidation under a more forgiving standard would unduly diminish the 
substantial breathing room States are afforded to adopt and implement reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory measures like the disclosure requirement now at issue. Accordingly, courts 
presented with an as-applied challenge to a regulation authorizing the disclosure of referendum 
petitions should be deeply skeptical of any assertion that the Constitution, which embraces 
political transparency, compels States to conceal the identity of persons who seek to participate 
in lawmaking through a state-created referendum process.” (561 U.S. 186, 215).  Stevens, joined 
by Breyer, underscored the speculative nature of Alito’s fears in boiling the case down to “a 
neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the State's possession that, 
it has been alleged, might one day indirectly burden petition signatories.” (561 U.S. 186, 215), 
while Scalia thought the controversy was wholly unrelated to the First Amendment, refusing to 
engage in “balancing” and providing a historical analysis demonstrating the First Amendment 
did not prohibit disclosures of information (561 U.S. 186, 220-221). Thomas, essentially 
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elaborating on his dissent in Citizens United and fearing retaliation against petition signatories, 
subjected the application of the PRA to petitions to strict scrutiny and found less burdensome 
means for Washington to achieve its asserted interest in transparency (561 U.S. 186, 243-246).   
 The Chief Justice’s nuanced reasoning in Doe, demonstrating a willingness to uphold 
some state election regulations affecting expression, was conspicuously absent during this 
period’s second campaign finance decision. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett (564 U.S. 721 (2011), or AFECFCP), invalidated a state campaign finance law that 
subsidized additional speech (campaign funds) for publicly financed candidates facing privately 
funded challengers.  For each dollar spent by or on behalf of a privately financed candidate 
beyond the state public financing cap, Arizona would provide matching funds to candidates 
agreeing to the state’s public financing arrangement.  The apparent deference to states articulated 
in Doe was absent from AFECFCP, with Roberts finding that “The burdens that this regime 
places on independent expenditure groups are akin to those imposed on the privately financed 
candidates themselves. Just as with the candidate the independent group supports, the more 
money spent on that candidate's behalf or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, the more 
money the publicly funded candidate receives from the State.” Roberts concluded that “laws like 
Arizona's matching funds provision that inhibit robust and wide-open political debate without 
sufficient justification cannot stand.” (564 U.S. 721, 738, 755). 
   Kagan, speaking for the Court’s liberals in dissent, argued instead that “the law has 
quite the opposite effect: It subsidizes and so produces more political speech,”  lamenting that 
“what petitioners demand is essentially a right to quash others' speech through the prohibition of 
a (universally available) subsidy program. Petitioners are able to convey their ideas without 
public financing--and they would prefer the field to themselves, so that they can speak free from 
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response. To attain that goal, they ask this Court to prevent Arizona from funding electoral 
speech--even though that assistance is offered to every state candidate, on the same (entirely 
unobjectionable) basis. And this Court gladly obliges. If an ordinary citizen, without the 
hindrance of a law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, he would 
be correct.” Kagan sharply characterized the Court’s dismantling of the program as “chutzpah.” 
(564 U.S. 721, 763, 766).    
 Campaign finance decisions appear across all periods of the Roberts Era, and have been 
marked by considerable acrimony. Notably, the disagreement is structured by the Court’s  
longstanding precedents and aversion to regulations that single out speech on the basis of its 
content: a hallmark of the content-neutrality regime. The jurisprudential keys to campaign 
finance challenges have been searches for compelling interests, measuring the burdens imposed 
on speakers, and an express concern for protecting political speech.  It is admittedly difficult to 
understand these decisions as anything less than political disagreements in terms of the positions 
taken by the justices (Republican appointees always voting to strike, Democratic appointees 
almost always voting to uphold). Ironically, John Stuart Mill’s search for truth rationale and the 
admonition that “truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting 
reasons” appears to have given the justices little pause, all while dividing into camps contesting 
how the unfettered exchange of ideas – the means to truth – requires striking or upholding 
regulatory measures (Mill 1993 [1859], 88). It is in this subset of cases that the endogeneity 
charge advanced by Segal and Spaeth (2003) appears to have its greatest force.  However, with 
the notable and consistent exception of Thomas, all justices have generally been united by the 
regime established in Buckley, differing only on the application of those standards to concrete 
controversies.  In the language of process tracing, the hypothesis that ideological preferences 
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motivate the justices jumps through the hoop here, though the issue of observational equivalence 
again makes finding a smoking gun in favor of either the ideological or principle explanations 
difficult.  
  A number of unanimous or near-unanimous decisions also appear during this second 
period of the Court’s free speech agenda, though these decisions notably united the Court against 
speech claims. Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz v. U.S. (559 U.S. 229 (2010)) marked the first 
opportunity for Justice Sotomayor to resolve a free speech challenge for the Court, this one 
brought by bankruptcy and debt relief attorneys opposed to disclosure provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).  Writing for 
the Court, Sotomayor dismissed the debt relief lawyers’ claims as failing to satisfy the less 
exacting scrutiny standard adopted by the Court in controversies involving attorney advertising 
and communication: “ § 528's required disclosures are intended to combat the problem of 
inherently misleading commercial advertisements--specifically, the promise of debt relief 
without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs.” (559 
U.S. 229, 250). Concurring separately, Scalia expressed disagreement with the Court’s analysis 
of the Act’s legislative history while Thomas wrote separately to express dismay with 
commercial speech’s position outside of the content-neutrality regime’s strict scrutiny 
requirements: “I have never been persuaded that there is any basis in the First Amendment for 
the relaxed scrutiny this Court applies to laws that suppress nonmisleading commercial speech.” 
(559 U.S. 229, 255). He would not have to wait long for the Court to revisit this issue.    
 In Reichle v. Howards (132 S.Ct. 2088 (2012)), a unanimous Court dismissed a 
retaliation claim brought by a citizen who approached – and touched the shoulder of - Vice 
President Dick Cheney at an appearance at a Colorado Mall.  The altercation occurred after 
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Secret Service agents overheard a phone conversation where Howards stated, “I’m going to ask 
him how many soldiers he killed today.” Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, concurred on the basis that 
those charged with protecting government officials must be allowed to make on-the-spot 
judgments, but left open the possibility that law enforcement agents could be sued for retaliatory 
actions (132 S.Ct. 2088, 2097-2098).  In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan (564 U.S. 
117 (2011)), a unanimous Court rejected the speech claim of Carrigan, an elected member of the 
Sparks, Nevada council (with GOP affiliation) who violated a state conflict of interest law after 
voting for an economic development project (The “Lazy 8” resort) spearheaded by a personal 
friend and consultant, Carlos Vasquez. Scalia’s opinion for the Court drifted deeply into a 
historical, originalist study of treatments of legislative actions as distinct from speech (564 U.S. 
117, 122-125).  In cases uniting the Justices, then, the nature of that agreement has been an 
unwillingness to expand First Amendment coverage.   
 
 The Kennedy Court? 
 Kennedy, while concurring in the result in Carrigan, suggested that the law had the 
potential to penalize any speech or voting that resulted from personal networks and political 
supporters through a hypothetical: “Assume a citizen has strong and carefully considered 
positions on family life, the environment, economic principles, criminal justice, religious values; 
or the rights of persons. Assume, too, that based on those beliefs, he or she has personal ties with 
others who share those views. The occasion may arise when, to promote and protect these 
beliefs, close friends and associates, perhaps in concert with organized groups with whom the 
citizen also has close ties, urge the citizen to run for office. These persons and entities may offer 
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strong support in an election campaign, support which itself can be expression in its classic form. 
The question then arises what application the Nevada statute has if a legislator who was elected 
with that support were to vote upon legislation central to the shared cause, or, for that matter, any 
other cause supported by those friends and affiliates.” (564 U.S. 117, 130)  Alito, while 
concurring in the judgment on the basis of Scalia’s tradition-based argument, sharply disagreed 
with the Court’s characterization of legislative voting as separate from speech (564 U.S. 117, 
132).   
 Though evincing a certain concern for electoral speech in Washington State Republican 
Party and without exception in the campaign finance decisions, Kennedy also wrote for the 
Court in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (564 U.S. 379 (2011)), a petition clause case involving 
the firing, rehiring (following the filing of union grievances), and sanctioning of a borough 
police chief resolved against Guarnieri primarily through the Court’s government employee 
speech doctrine.  Thomas, doubting that lawsuits against government employers qualified as 
petitions, essentially argued that the Court should adopt the Ceballos line of reasoning to 
adjudicate petition clause claims, denying claims arising from petitions filed in the claimant’s 
capacity as employee and allowing only those petitioning government as sovereign (564 U.S. 
379, 399-400).  In partial dissent, Scalia largely echoed Thomas’s approach  (offering an 
originalist analysis of uses of the petition clause) but would allow the retaliation suit brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to stand. 
  A term later in Fox Television Station v. FCC (132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012)), Kennedy led a 
unanimous Court in striking down provisions of the FCC’s 2004 policy on “fleeting expletives” 
as unconstitutionally vague – a decision that did not directly address the First Amendment claim 
in the case but carried clear implications for expression, nonetheless. Ginsburg concurred, but 
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argued that the Court should  go further and use Fox as an opportunity to overturn the Court’s 
decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726 (1978)), the anti-speech decision against a 
radio broadcasting company that had aired comedian George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” 
monologue.  With the possible exception of  Scalia (and Thomas) in Guarnieri, extra-ideological 
causes are difficult to isolate from expected voting patterns and unanimous decisions, and the 
reliance on existing jurisprudential categories also suggests shared affinity for conventional free 
speech legal norms.   
 Scholars have generally homed in on Kennedy for his median, libertarian position on the 
Court in the Roberts Era (Knowles 2013), and for sometimes falling to the left of O’Connor 
during the Rehnquist Era (Keck 2004).  Kennedy’s opinion in U.S. v. Alvarez (132 S.Ct. 2537 
(2012), a decision striking down the Stolen Valor Act as a content-based regulation of speech 
(and, for Kennedy, a manifestation of George Orwell’s Oceania), has been offered as evidence to 
support the libertarian label (Knowles 2013). As the Court’s reputation for being a pro-speech 
Court gained traction during the 2009 to 2011 terms, Justice Kennedy was not always in the 
vanguard in free expression cases.  As Table 4.2 notes, Kennedy’s  proportion of votes for the 
pro-speech position (55.56% ) tied with Thomas and lagged slightly behind the Chief Justice and 
Scalia, each at 61.1%.  If anything, to the extent that Kennedy’s libertarian streak in free 
expression cases is overstated, the swing positions on the Court may belong to Roberts, Alito, or 
Breyer.  With some regularity, these justices have either been hesitant in moving too far too fast 
(Roberts, in the campaign finance case progression), or voted and voiced reasoning at odds with 
majority coalitions applying fairly standard doctrinal rules.  For Kennedy, the strongly protective 
rationales advanced in Citizens United, IMS Health, and the Orwellian tone of Alvarez stand 
beside opinions that, while sometimes cautious (as in Carrigan and Guarnieri), have been 
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dismissive of claims.  Kennedy’s vote to join Ginsburg’s opinion in Christian Legal Society, v. 
Martinez (561 U.S. 661 (2011), hereafter “CLS”) also belies any broad, consistent libertarian 
description of Kennedy’s voting behavior in Roberts Era speech controversies.   
 The issue in CLS was the application of the Hastings College of Law’s “take all comers” 
policy, which prohibited registered student organizations from excluding students with beliefs or 
views the organization disagreed with.  The Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society 
argued that the non-discrimination policy violated rights to free speech, association, and free 
exercise under the First Amendment, as the “Statement of Faith” required of all official chapters 
of the group had the following tenets: “The belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of 
marriage between a man and a woman…to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in 
‘unrepentant homosexual conduct,’” and “students who hold religious convictions different from 
those in the Statement of Faith.” (561 U.S. 661, 672).  
 Writing for the Court, Ginsburg’s majority opinion characterized the membership 
condition as a “reasonable” and “viewpoint neutral,” applying intermediate scrutiny to the policy 
in light of the Court’s intersecting public forum (limited public forum) and free association 
strands of jurisprudence.  Concurring, Kennedy adopted a consequentialist justification for free 
speech that could – arguably – be viewed as anti-speech in the immediate case but broadly pro-
expression in rationale and potential effects.  Fearing the balkanization of student groups and 
referencing the loyalty oaths the Court frequently considered during the mid-20th Century, 
Kennedy concluded that “A vibrant dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from 
opposing points of view.” (561 U.S. 661, 705).  Stevens, largely in response to Alito’s strongly 
worded dissent, argued that the school’s amended policy (not properly before the Court) would 
likely also pass constitutional muster, emphasizing equality over speech in the immediate case:” 
184 
 
 
In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not sign its Statement of Faith or who engage 
in ‘unrepentant homosexual conduct,’ The expressive association argument it presses, however, 
is hardly limited to these facts.  Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews, blacks, and women--
or those who do not share their contempt for Jews, blacks, and women. A free society must 
tolerate such groups. It need not subsidize them, give them its official imprimatur, or grant them 
equal access to law school facilities.” (551 U.S. 661, 702-703).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Patterns During the Pro-Speech Period (2009-2011 Terms) 
 Opinions Authored 
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting) 
Interpretive 
Preferences 
% Pro 
Speech 
Vote 
Deviations 
John Roberts Stevens 
HLP 
Doe 
Phelps 
AFECFCP 
 
CU --- Content-
Neutrality; 
Core Political 
61.1%  
John Paul Stevens --- Doe 
CLS 
 
CU Collective 16.67% HLP 
Antonin Scalia Carrigan 
EMA 
CU 
Milavetz 
Doe 
 
Guarnieri Categorical; 
Originalism 
61.1% Guarnieri 
Anthony Kennedy CU 
Guarnieri 
IMS Health 
FOX TV 
Alvarez 
 
CLS 
Carrigan 
--- Content-
Neutrality; 
Core Political 
55.56%  
Clarence Thomas Howards CU 
Milavetz 
Guarnieri 
Doe 
EMA 
Core 
Political; 
Content-
Neutrality 
55.56%  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg CLS 
Golan 
Howards 
Fox TV 
 
--- Collective; 
Deferential 
38.89%  
Stephen Breyer --- Doe 
Phelps 
Alvarez 
HLP 
IMS Health 
EMA 
Golan 
Knox 
ATP 
 
Pragmatism, 
Collective 
33.33% EMA 
Golan 
Samuel Alito, Jr. Knox Doe 
Carrigan 
EMA 
Stevens 
CLS 
Phelps 
Alvarez 
 
Core 
Political, 
Burkean 
50% Stevens 
Golan 
Phelps 
Sonia Sotomayor Milavetz Doe 
Knox 
 
--- Deferential 44.44% Knox 
Elena Kagan --- --- AFECFCP 
 
Collective 40  
Notes: N=18. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=55.56%.  For “Opinion” column, bolded cases 
denote a pro-speech claimant decision.  “Revealed Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions 
during this period.  “% Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims. One case, American 
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012) – or ATP - was a per curiam decision and does not appear in the majority 
opinion column. However, the votes are included in the percentage of pro-speech decisions category and overall N.   
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 Kennedy’s position as median justice suggests that he would be the most likely justice to 
vote with the Court’s liberals – a liberal vote for Kennedy, then, based on a nuanced rationale 
could be endogenous to ideological preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2003). Yet Kennedy often 
takes the hard line in free expression controversies, as illustrated by the Court’s decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health (564 U.S. 552 (2012)), which struck down Vermont’s Prescription 
Confidentiality Law (“Act 90”) as an impermissible, content-based regulation of speech.  The 
law, which prohibited state pharmaceutical data miners from selling prescriber identifying 
information to drug industry salespersons (“detailers”) for fear of market capture and 
misinformation by large pharmaceutical companies, was characterized by Justice Kennedy as 
“burden[ing] a form of protected expression that [Vermont] found too persuasive.”  (564 U.S. 
552, 580).  Joined by the Court’s conservatives and, unexpectedly, Justice Sotomayor, 
Kennedy’s majority opinion found that “Act 80 is designed to impose a specific, content-based 
burden on protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”  (564 
U.S. 552, 565).  To be clear, the law regulated commerce in data that would be used - among 
other things - for more efficient marketing pitches to drug prescribers, yet the majority opinion 
appeared to elide and perhaps enhance the Court’s less-scrutinizing commercial speech doctrine. 
 In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Ginsburg and Kagan) viewed Vermont’s law as a 
regulation of data as a commodity rather than protected speech, and broke with the majority on 
the proper jurisprudential standard to be applied as well: “The far stricter, specially ‘heightened’ 
First Amendment standards that the majority would apply to this instance of commercial 
regulation are out of place here.” (564 U.S. 552, 582).  Breyer’s vote – essentially against big 
pharma – is consistent with an ideological explanation, as are the votes of the Court’s 
conservatives (though not Sotomayor’s), and the choice of the stringent, “heightened” 
187 
 
 
jurisprudential standard by Kennedy and the deference to the more relaxed, commercial speech 
standard by Breyer may be endogenous to broadly understood conservative and liberal policy 
attitudes, respectively.  
  Yet, Breyer’s aversion to the increasingly absolute nature of the Court’s content-
neutrality regime has been fairly consistent, as the following and preceding sections detail.  Here, 
Breyer questioned the Court’s reliance on various labels and tests (“The Court reaches its 
conclusion through the use of important First Amendment categories--"content-based," "speaker-
based," and "neutral"--but without taking full account of the regulatory context, the nature of the 
speech effects, the values these First Amendment categories seek to promote, and prior 
precedent.”), and did so in the course of making the point that the decision threatened to return 
the Court to “a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its interference with 
economic liberty.” (564 U.S. 552, 591, 602). It is also worth noting that Breyer’s reference to the 
importance of maintaining a robust marketplace of ideas was done so in opposition to a free 
speech claim (564 U.S. 552, 583), highlighting the ease with which philosophical justifications 
can be put into service of opposing ideological and interpretive positions but also the way that 
such longstanding theories structure the adjudication of free speech controversies.    
 The 2011 term was notable for an incredibly speech protective ending, with Floyd 
Abrams proclaiming,  “It is unpopular speech, distasteful speech, that most requires First 
Amendment protection, and on that score, no prior Supreme Court has been as protective as 
this.” (Liptak 2012). Yet it was also during this period that critiques of the pro-speech 
assessment emerged as well, particularly those by Erwin Chemerinsky and Monica Youn (2011).  
This assessment of merits cases decided during this middle era has revealed the importance of 
accounting for thicker understandings of judicial ideological preferences (Alito) and differing 
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conceptions of the judicial role, particularly in the cases of Breyer, Alito, and to a lesser extent, 
Thomas. This finding, based on reading all cases in light of the four variables of interest 
described above, is consistent with Tribe and Matz’s general impression of Roberts Era justices 
who often write separately in free speech controversies (2014, 153).   
 Yet, these disagreements run deeper than ideology. With some regularity, members of the 
Roberts Court have disagreed not only with the application of doctrinal tests – sometimes 
dividing in ways predicted by attitudinal explanations – but also across philosophies related to 
expression coverage (notably, Alito with political speech) and even with the jurisprudential 
structure itself (notably, Breyer’s aversion to a jurisprudence of labels like “content-based”). 
Sometimes, members within the conservative and liberal blocs have disagreed with one another 
in terms of the path taken to a result, and have done so through concurring opinions – not a cost-
free endeavor for an institution limited by time and a broader case load.  
 
Test of Reputation: The 2012-2014 Terms 
 By the end of the Court’s 2011 term, the Court had earned something of a Janus-faced 
reputation in free speech decisions.  Notable, early anti-speech decisions including FAIR, 
Ceballos, Brentwood, Banks, and Frederick had been pushed to the background by a flurry of 
decisions striking down campaign finance regulations and cases featuring Youn’s so-called 
“colorful” facts, of which Stevens, Brown, Phelps, and Alvarez share affinity.  Defections from 
expected voting alignments by Justices Breyer and Alito during this period have been suggestive 
of the effect of causal factors beyond monolithic ideological preferences, though the argument 
that these instances may be isolated cases still stands.   
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 Following a term that saw a variety of free speech challenges reach the Court, the 2012 
docket featured only a single constitutional free expression decision in Alliance for Open Society, 
International v. Agency for International Development (133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)).  In an opinion 
channeling Justice Robert Jackson’s ringing endorsement of free thought in West Virginia Board 
of Education v. Barnette (319 U.S. 624 (1943)), Chief Justice Roberts did not spare rhetorical 
flourish in striking down the federal government’s requirement that disbursement of funds to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fighting HIV and AIDS abroad could not be 
conditioned on the adoption of a formal anti-prostitution plank in the organization’s mission 
statement.   
 The 6-2 decision struck down the bipartisan-approved “Policy Act” provision of the U.S. 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. §7601 et al.), 
with Roberts characterizing the anti-prostitution statement requirement at issue (§7631(f)) as 
creating the unconstitutional condition of “requiring recipients to profess a specific belief,” and 
going “beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient.” 
(133 S.Ct. 2321, 2330).  For Roberts, the compelled speech controversy was resolved long ago 
by Justice Jackson’s famous dicta in Barnette, quoting the opinion for the proposition that “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” (319 U.S. 624, 642; cited at 133 S.Ct. 
2321, 2332).  In dissent, Scalia (joined by Thomas) argued that “The First Amendment does not 
mandate a viewpoint-neutral government. Government must choose between rival ideas and 
adopt some as its own: competition over cartels, solar energy over coal, weapon development 
over disarmament, and so forth. Moreover, the government may enlist the assistance of those 
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who believe in its ideas to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that purpose those 
who oppose or do not support the ideas. That seems to me a matter of the most common common 
sense.” (133 S.Ct. 2321, 2332). 
 
 The Chief’s Competing Concerns 
 In Alliance for Open Society International, Roberts was joined by the Court’s liberal bloc, 
was well as Justices Kennedy and Alito in an alignment predicted by conventional measures of 
ideological preferences. Beyond the sweeping statement and potential walking back of the 
Court’s position in FAIR, the decision represents the only unquestionably liberal (in terms of the 
identity of the speaker and content of the speech claim), pro-speech decision during the Roberts 
Era.  It is also during this period that the Chief Justice’s pro-speech reputation has been most 
visibly balanced by concerns for institutional maintenance, all while showing fidelity toward 
broader conservative and Republican goals.  In the 2013 term, Roberts’ opinions for a divided 
Court in McCutcheon v. FEC (134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)) and a unanimous (in terms of votes but not 
rationale) Court in McCullen at once demonstrated a willingness to temper the desires of the 
Court’s conservative wing while also providing opinions marking clear victories for wealthy 
Republican campaign contributors and abortion clinic “sidewalk counselors.” 
 The question before the Court in McCutcheon was whether the aggregate contribution 
regulations established by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and amended by BCRA (§ 
441a(a)(3)), capping contributions to candidates and political committees at $48,600 and $74,600 
respectively during the 2013-2014 election cycle (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-1443).  The aggregate 
limits were designed to work in tandem with base contribution limits so as to prevent committees 
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and party organizations to effectively skirt the base limits by pooling additional contributions 
and redistributing them to individual candidates.  In a pattern marked by only two exceptions 
during the Roberts Era, the Court split 5-4 in striking down the aggregate limits as an 
unconstitutional burden on political speech, lacking a closely drawn fit in addressing the 
government interest in preventing corruption. 
 In McCutcheon, Roberts – in no uncertain terms – provided a strongly libertarian defense 
of free expression, rooted in concerns for the abstract marketplace of ideas  and tossing aside the 
egalitarian rationale advanced by Justice Breyer and the Court’s liberal bloc (a rationale that has 
slowly developed in dissents by liberal members of the Court during this era). Citing the 
fallibility of majorities and rejecting anything approximating ad hoc balancing on the part of the 
Court, Roberts found “compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment 
by reference to such a generalized conception of the public good.” (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1449).  
Breyer’s public good argument , citing to Founding Era figures James Madison and James 
Wilson, stressed that the “First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right to engage in 
political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which 
collective speech matters,” whereas under  Roberts’ vision, “a free marketplace of political ideas 
loses its point.” (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1467-1468). This  vision of free speech that places the 
collective capacity to speak as the object of the First Amendment’s protection builds upon - but 
is distinct from - the level playing field rationale rejected by the Court in Citizens United, 
AFECFCP, and other recent campaign finance decisions.    
 From the ideological hypothesis perspective on judicial behavior, the dismantling of 
BCRA is likely unsurprising.  Yet even here, the Chief Justice did not go as far as dismantling 
the regime established under Buckley, apparently subjecting the aggregate contribution limits to 
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an intermediate standard of scrutiny rather than the “strict in theory, fatal in fact” approach the 
Court applies in cases falling within the content-neutrality regime (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1457).  
Roberts’ approach in McCutcheon did not escape comment by Scalia in McCullen, who penned a 
concurring opinion (joined by Kennedy and Thomas) noting that Roberts had written “an opinion 
that has Something for Everyone,” adding that the “specious unanimity” of the decision was 
achieved by answering a question not in need of deciding: “Just a few months past, the Court 
found it unnecessary to ‘parse the differences between . . . two [available] standards’ where a 
statute challenged on First Amendment grounds ‘fail[s] even under the [less demanding] test…’ 
What has changed since then? Quite simple: This is an abortion case, and McCutcheon was not.” 
(134 S.Ct. 2518, 2542 (internal citations omitted)).  As for McCutcheon itself, Roberts once 
again avoided dealing a death blow to the Buckley dichotomy between expenditures and 
contributions (over Thomas’s protests in a concurring opinion), though there is no denying that 
the Roberts Court has left far fewer options on the table for legislative bodies wishing to regulate 
the integrity of elections through redistributive instruments 
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Table 4.3 – Test of Reputation Period (2012-2015 Terms) 
 Opinions Authored 
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting) 
Interpretive 
Preferences 
% Pro 
Speech 
Vote 
Deviations 
John Roberts AOSI 
McCutcheon 
McCullen 
Williams-
Yulee 
 
--- --- Institutional 
Maintenance, 
Liberty 
Absolutism, 
Core Political 
81.81 Williams-
Yulee 
Antonin Scalia --- McCullen AOSI 
Williams-
Yulee 
 
Core Political 77.78  
Anthony Kennedy --- --- Williams-
Yulee 
Liberty 
Absolutism; 
Core Political 
 
90.91  
Clarence Thomas Reed --- --- Absolutism; 
Content-
Neutrality 
 
63.64 SCV 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg Moss Williams-
Yulee 
 
--- Collective; 
Pragmatism 
45.45  
Stephen Breyer SCV 
Heffernan 
Williams-
Yulee 
Reed 
 
McCutcheon Pragmatism, 
Collective 
45.45  
Samuel Alito, Jr. Harris McCullen 
Reed 
Williams-
Yulee 
SCV 
 
Core 
Political, 
Absolutism 
72.73  
Sonia Sotomayor Lane --- --- Collective, 
Deferential 
 
45.45  
Elena Kagan --- Reed Harris Collective, 
Pragmatism 
 
45.45  
Notes: N=10. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=63.64%.  For “Opinion” column, bolded cases 
denote a pro-speech claimant decision.  “Revealed Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions 
during this period.  “% Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims.  One case, Heffernan 
v. City of Paterson (2016) was decided in the post-Scalia period (2015 term). Another case, Friedrich v. California Teachers 
Association (2016) does not appear in the table because the decision was an unsigned per curiam opinion for an equally divided 
Court.   
 
 BCRA had been in jeopardy from the moment it was signed into law, with President 
Bush including a signing statement doubting the constitutionality of a number of the law’s 
provisions (Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Mar. 27, 2002).  
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The effect of the appointments of Roberts and Alito to the Court is most visible in the campaign 
finance issue area, with the union speech cases a close second.  George W. Bush’s appointees 
have voted in lockstep in every single campaign finance case (and some union cases), even 
specially concurring together in a handful of cases, demonstrating that ideological preferences of 
justices and ideological case factors – with Davis suggesting that the former trumps the latter at 
the margins – explain a substantial part of the saga.  However, the piecemeal fashion by which 
provisions of FECA, BCRA, and a handful of state campaign laws in Vermont, Arizona, and 
Montana have been invalidated suggests that Roberts does not wish to move too far, too fast.  
The Chief Justice’s willingness to assign a majority of these opinions to himself – Randall, 
Davis, and Citizens United as exceptions – suggests a concern for institutional maintenance by 
tempering the wishes of the Court’s conservative wing. Thomas – and to lesser degrees, Scalia 
and Kennedy – has consistently expressed skepticism of the entire Buckley regime.    
 McCullen is another indication of the Chief Justice’s apparent willingness to – at times – 
give policy considerations equal footing with institutional concerns.  The Court’s decision in 
McCullen was 9-0 against Massachusetts in striking down the state’s “floating buffer” zone 
abortion clinic law, yet the it was the Court’s liberal bloc joining Roberts’ opinion in full and the 
Court’s conservatives concurring separately.  In striking down the law, Roberts and the majority 
found that the law constituted a “time, place, or manner” restriction under the Court’s 
longstanding content-neutrality regime, and was therefore subject to intermediate – rather than 
strict – judicial scrutiny.  Hostility to abortion and women’s reproductive care services has been 
a mainstay of the religious conservative prong of the national Republican Party since at least the 
mid-1970s and perhaps beyond (see generally Price and Keck 2015, 886-894), and ruling that the 
Massachusetts law was content-neutral in purpose yet failing to pass a moderate level of judicial 
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scrutiny had the politically important effect of saving other similar state (and likely federal) 
legislative efforts from jumping a high First Amendment bar.  In other words, had a majority of 
justices found the Massachusetts law in question to be a content-based regulation of speech and 
subject to more searching judicial scrutiny, future attempts to regulate speech at or adjacent to 
women’s reproductive care clinics would be viewed as presumptively unconstitutional.   
 One term later, in Florida Bar v. Williams-Yulee (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)), Roberts again 
wrote for the Court but this time upholding a campaign solicitation provision of the Florida 
Canon of Ethics as a content-based restriction that nevertheless survived strict scrutiny in light of 
the compelling government interest in preserving the perceived integrity of the judiciary. In 
terms of votes, Roberts parted company with his conservative colleagues for the first time in a 
campaign finance-related case, though the Chief was careful to emphasize that the integrity of 
the judiciary presented a special contextual concern for the Court.  Scalia (joined by Thomas) 
and Kennedy (joined by Alito) each dissented, with Scalia allowing the content-neutrality regime 
to do all the lifting in the case, indicting Roberts for “applying the appearance of strict scrutiny” 
to a “vital public objective brooding overhead” and relying on original understandings in noting 
that  “the peaceful coexistence of judicial elections and personal solicitations for most of our 
history calls into doubt any claim that allowing personal solicitations would imperil public faith 
in judges.” (135 S.Ct. 1656, 1677-1678).  
 Kennedy, consistent with a recurring libertarian streak, connected the controversy to self-
fulfillment and self-governance justifications for expression: “First Amendment protections are 
both personal and structural. Free speech begins with the right of each person to think and then to 
express his or her own ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and conscience, in turn, 
creates structural safeguards for many of the processes that define a free society. The individual 
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speech here is political speech. The process is a fair election. These realms ought to be the last 
place, not the first, for the Court to allow unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.” 
(135 S.Ct. 1656, 1682-1683). Alito, nodding favorably to the dissents by Scalia and Kennedy, 
homed in on the “narrow tailoring” or “fit” requirement of strict scrutiny, viewing the Canon’s 
prohibition on mass mailing (which Williams-Yulee had done)  to even non-judicial actors as too 
restrictive to survive First Amendment scrutiny (135 S.Ct. 1656, 1685).   
 With the explicit exceptions of Breyer and Ginsburg (discussed below), Williams-Yulee is 
another example of the justices generally united by jurisprudential structure, but disagreeing in 
its application. While most of the normative work for Scalia was handled simply by the 
invocation of the content-neutrality rule, Kennedy took the time to connect judicial methodology 
to philosophical principles – though, unlike with Alito, it is more difficult to determine the extent 
to which these convictions dictate outcomes. As with McCullen, Roberts’ opinion is interesting 
for reaching an unanticipated, anti-speech result.  It is an open question as to whether Roberts 
would have based his vote on the same jurisprudential rationale had he not been in the position 
of institutional steward.   From one scholarly perspective, the difference is meaningless: those 
who are skeptical of the constraining power of rules may argue that the precedents established 
and jurisprudential regimes relied upon are simply endogenous to ideological preferences.  Yet 
congruency with the conservative Republican agenda would seem to predict the emphatic 
dismantling of key liberal Democratic legislative achievements rather than the hedging observed 
in McCullen and to a far lesser (but, I argue, still detectable) extent, McCutcheon.   
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 Voting Together, Thinking Apart 
 The most recent terms of the Roberts Era have featured cert. grants for claims brought by 
political protestors (Wood v. Moss, 134 S.Ct. 2056 (2014)), another embattled government 
employee (Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014)), and a small evangelical congregation seeking 
to place directional signs alongside roads in an Arizona town (Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 
2218 (2015)).  These decisions have all been unanimous verdicts, with the former decided 
against the speech claimant while the latter two cases serving as free expression victories.  In 
non-unanimous cases, the Court has rejected a claim brought by the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans civic group, upheld the Florida Bar rule prohibiting direct solicitation of campaign 
funds by judicial candidates, and ruled in favor of a retaliation claim brought by a Paterson, New 
Jersey police officer who had picked up campaign signs for his mother – signs for the candidate 
opposed to Democratic Mayor Jose Torres in an upcoming mayoral election (Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016)).  The latter case featured voting alignments predicted by 
attitudinal models of judicial behavior, while the former cases – Walker v. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)) and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)) – 
were marked by unexpected coalitions.   
 In chapter three, unanimity was defined by the votes on the merits of the case – the 
bottom line of the decision.  This choice was informed by the attitudinal paradigm’s general 
skepticism of looking to the content of opinions for explanations of voting behavior, and the 
desire to meet the paradigm on its own terms.  But, if concurring opinions are viewed instead as 
a potentially useful window on some other motivation for behavior, scholars are left with a 
painting of a Court far more fractured.  Of the unanimous decisions, only the political protest 
case – Moss – featured “true” unanimity among the justices:  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg spoke 
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for the Court, and no justice offered a concurring opinion.  Similar to the Howard case, speech 
claims that could be cast as potential threats to the security of the U.S. presidency have fallen on 
unsympathetic ears of any ideological stripe.  The other two decisions – Lane and Reed– were 
each decided by 9-0 votes, but the unanimity among the justices was only vote-deep.  In terms of 
rationales employed, Reed (and to a lesser extent, Lane) help illustrate the lack of jurisprudential 
and interpretive consensus underpinning the Roberts Era free expression agenda.  
 In Lane, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court may represent a step back from the 
stringent standard for government employee speech articulated by Kennedy in Ceballos – and 
may also reflect responsiveness to the high frequency of government employee whistleblower 
and retaliation claims petitioned to the Court via certiorari during this period (see Chapter Five).  
Edward Lane, following testimony in a federal investigation of alleged fraud and absenteeism by 
Alabama state legislator Suzanne Schmitz, was fired from his position as director of a local 
youth program at the Central Alabama Community College (CACC) – and was then one of two 
employees not rehired following a reassessment of what was originally Lane’s solution for 
CACC budget shortfalls.  Writing for the Court, Sotomayor announced that “Truthful testimony 
under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a 
citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public 
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.” (134 S.Ct. 2369, 2378).  
Arguing instead that the Court’s decision in Ceballos controlled the judgment, Thomas (joined 
by Alito and Scalia) concurred but noted that “We accordingly have no occasion to address the 
quite different question whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he testifies in the 
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.” (134 S.Ct. 2369, 2384).   
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 The Court’s decision in Reed vividly illustrates the tension between ideological 
preferences, conceptions of the judicial role, and jurisprudential regimes.  Every week, Reed - 
the pastor of a small evangelical church in Gilbert, AZ, and his congregation - placed small 
roadside signs indicating the time and location of the week’s services, which rotated according to 
logistical and financial considerations.  The town of Gilbert had adopted a sign code that treated 
such “Temporary Directional Signs” differently from political and other signage, requiring that 
signs be no larger than six square feet, be placed no more than 12 hours in advance, and be 
removed within one hour of the end of the event (§4.402(P)).  In a 9-0 decision, the Court struck 
down the sign ordinance as unconstitutional.  Justice Thomas’s majority opinion argued the 
ordinance was constitutionally suspect on its face because “The  restrictions in the Sign Code 
that apply to any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” 
(135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227).   
 Breyer, concurring in the judgment, offered a familiar assessment: “The First 
Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives 
and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as 
‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit. In my view, the category ‘content 
discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather 
than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” (135 
S.Ct. 2218, 2234). Kagan, concurring in the judgment, expressed considerable skepticism toward 
Thomas’s wide-reaching, content-based assessment, instead narrowly reasoning that “The 
absence of any sensible basis for these and other distinctions dooms the Town’s ordinance under 
even the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to “time, place, or manner” speech 
regulations. Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to 
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every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a subject-matter exemption.” 
(135 S.Ct. 2218, 2239).  
 Reed followed on the heels of Williams-Yulee, the divided decision discussed previously 
that upheld – under strict scrutiny – a Florida Bar canon prohibiting in-person campaign 
solicitations by judicial candidates.  In that decision, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in 
the result but wrote separately to criticize the Court’s characterization of the law as a 
constitutionally suspect, content-based regulation of speech.  In a brief concurrence, Breyer 
emphasized:  “As I have previously said, I view this Court's doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny 
as guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.” 
(135 S.Ct. 1656, 1673).  Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, rejected the application of strict scrutiny to 
state laws regulating judicial elections, as well as the majority’s reliance upon campaign finance 
precedents concerned with legislative offices.  If the focus is shifted to constituent members of 
the Court’s liberal bloc, Williams-Yulee illustrates cracks in the content-neutrality regime.   
 Breyer’s pragmatic approach has not been without limits.  In Sons of Confederate 
Veterans – also decided in the 2014 term – Breyer’s majority opinion could be read as a strong 
endorsement of the government speech doctrine, characterizing the messages displayed on state-
permitted vanity plates as reasonably interpreted as an endorsement of the message by the state.  
In dissent, Justice Alito mused that, “As you sat there watching these [specialty] plates speed by, 
would you really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the 
State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars? If a car with a plate that says ‘Rather Be 
Golfing’ passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: ‘This is the official 
policy of the State--better to golf than to work?’” (135 S.Ct. 2239, 2255).  The plate at issue in 
the case featured a depiction of a version of the flag of the Southern Confederacy, making the 
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division along liberal and conservative lines somewhat predictable – with one notable exception.  
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s liberals in rejecting the free speech claim, possibly motivated 
by a reprehension of what some might characterize as a vitriolic symbol of hate – as he did 
previously in dissent in the Rehnquist Era decision in Virginia v. Black (538 U.S. 343 (2003)) or 
perhaps a commitment to states’ rights, as Eugene Volokh has suggested (Volokh 2015).   
 Nor can it be said that Alito’s Burkean conservatism always pits him against his 
conservative colleagues.  The concern for limiting coverage to political speech that resulted in 
unusual votes in the second period of the Roberts Era has been followed with a period of unity 
with his conservative colleagues. As with Knox, Alito penned the Court’s majority opinion in 
Harris v. Quinn (134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014)), which invalidated a collective bargaining agreement 
among the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, and personal assistants under 
Illinois’ Home Services Program as unconstitutional. Following Knox, Alito’s opinion held that 
the First Amendment precluded the collection of even chargeable, “fair share” fees assessed on 
assistants who did not want to join the union.  
 For Alito, the relevant distinction was between full-fledged public employees governed 
under state collective bargaining arrangements and employees only considered public for the 
purpose of collecting fair share fees, as was the case for the home care personal assistants in the 
case.  Kagan, writing for the Court’s liberal bloc in dissent (united in this case), thought the fact 
that the personal assistants were nominally public employees was sufficient grounds for 
dismissing the First Amendment challenge, and approved the majority’s decision to not overturn 
the Abood precedent that permitted the assessment of fees on non-members to offset free-riding 
(134 S.Ct. 2618, 2645). The parallel to the Court’s incremental dismantling of campaign finance 
laws is apparent in the union decisions, though the latter has only recently been characterized by 
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conservative-liberal splits on the Court.  Returning to Alito, along with a dissent in Heffernan 
(again limiting the ability of government employees to state First Amendment retaliation claims, 
and in opposition to an opinion by Breyer that carved out protections against retaliation for 
mistaken assumptions about political beliefs) and joining Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon, 
President Bush’s second appointee regularly though not exclusively votes in ways consistent 
with ideological models of judging. 
  
 Discussion 
 Many of these voting patterns are consistent with but not necessarily explained solely by 
ideological preferences. The fundamental problem with causation – the inability to observe it – 
has long been a problem for judicial decision-making scholars.  The foregoing analysis of the 
most recent period of the Roberts Era constitution of free speech reveals that, since the 2012 
term, the reputation as being a “pro-speech Court” is indeed an accurate assessment, whether 
looking at the collective decisions or the voting percentages of each individual justice.  If 
anything, earlier assessments were prescient but premature.  The other emerging trend appears to 
be that it is Justice Breyer’s pragmatism that has gained cachet among the Court’s liberal bloc, a 
balancing approach that eschews the assertive interpretation of the content-neutrality doctrine 
offered by Justice Thomas in Reed.  As seen most clearly in Entertainment Merchants 
Association and Golan (but fairly consistently throughout the Roberts Era in concurring 
opinions), Breyer’s conception of the judicial role and aversion to labels has sometimes resulted 
in votes that are not easily explained by the attitudinal paradigm.  
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 The willingness of the Court’s liberals to increasingly vote with Breyer’s preferred 
rationale also calls into question earlier scholarship portending an emerging “new absolutism” on 
the Court (Collins 2013). Previous works by legal scholars and political scientists have suggested 
that Justice Kagan’s willingness to spar with the Chief Justice in Arizona Free Enterprise Club 
portended an emerging dynamic with Kagan leading the Court’s liberals in opposition to the 
Court’s hostility toward campaign finance decisions (Tushnet 2013, 280; Knowles and Lichtman 
2015, 245).  Yet the emerging pattern reveals Justices Ginsburg and Kagan penning or joining 
concurrences that resonate with Breyer’s fairly consistent conception of the judicial role as one 
of balancing rather than following various formulas.  This interpretation is underscored by the 
finding that the Court’s liberals have voted together in all cases during this period, while the 
record of the Court’s conservatives is more heterogeneous.   
 Returning to the model specified in Figure 4.2, this analysis of the constitution of Roberts 
Era free speech protections provides little support for the idea that abstract, philosophical 
justifications for freedom of speech have resulted in a speech-protective Court.  To the extent 
that such justifications as the search for truth (or “marketplace of ideas” theory) matter, they 
have been invoked strategically or, even more cynically, been paid lip service in nearly all 
decisions.  In the campaign finance context, it may be characterized as a democratic mean to a 
Platonic end.  Another theoretical proposition, that self-governance in a democracy is possible 
only when political speech is stringently protected, has sometimes appeared in opinions seeking 
to curtail free speech protections, from Alito’s decisions in Stevens, Phelps, and Alvarez, to 
Thomas’s decisions in Frederick and Entertainment Merchants Association.   
 To be clear, this assessment does not mean that philosophies of free speech do not matter 
– the justices clearly think it is important to couch decisions in language that echoes the 
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understandings of Milton (1644), Mill (1993 [1859], 84-88), and Meiklejohn (1948).  This 
speech protective language also constitutes the U.S. free speech tradition, as the justices struggle 
to trace the fluctuating limits of speech protection – language that in turn structures the dicta and 
rationales for future political and legal controversies.  But what these philosophical theories 
rarely do is function as testable predictors of how the justices will vote in free speech 
controversies – they are malleable to the point of being put into service of votes for and against 
claimants seeking to strike down campaign finance regulations, and for or against claimants 
more closely resembling the lonely soapbox orator.  
 This finding is admittedly consistent with what judicial behavioralists and attitudinal 
scholars have long claimed, but philosophical justifications for speech represented only one part 
of the model specified above.  As for ideological heterogeneity within the monolithic label of 
“conservatism,” Thomas’s dissents, as one example, are instructive. This heterogeneity that is 
not readily apparent from the assignment of editorial-based preference scores to the justices at 
the time of appointment or scores that take into account previous votes via simulation methods.  
Much as chapter two argued for taking into consideration a number of theoretically relevant case 
factors when assigning an ideological direction to a vote, this chapter has argued (and found 
supporting evidence) for making distinctions among justices often characterized as voting in 
conservative or liberal blocs. This finding, in turn, bleeds into the finding that differing 
conceptions of the judicial role can have meaningful effects on decisions exogenous to 
ideological preferences.   
 Put another way, Justice Breyer’s position as the most ideologically moderate member of 
the Court’s liberal bloc during the Roberts Era may be as much a reflection of his view of 
judging as a pragmatic, balancing exercise.  Breyer’s explicit and fairly consistent aversion to a 
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jurisprudence of labels – found in his written opinions and lines of questioning during oral 
arguments in Frederick, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Reed – has resulted in unexpected 
departures from the Court’s liberal bloc in Golan, Entertainment Merchants Association, and 
Morse, and has been a mainstay of concurrences, as found in Williams-Yulee, Reed, Summum, 
and dissents in Pocatello and McCutcheon. Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts has parted company 
with the Court’s conservatives in terms of voting and rationale employed in Williams-Yulee, and 
McCullen. This pattern – especially when considered in light of his votes in the two decisions 
upholding key provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 – can be 
characterized as a reflection of his view of the Chief Justice’s role as one of institutional 
maintenance. This too, however, is a pattern that has emerged only during the most recent period 
of the Court’s free speech project, suggesting claims that Roberts was “at the helm” of the 
Court’s constitution of free speech were prescient, but ultimately premature (Collins 2013, 452). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the attitudinal understanding of judicial decision-
making understates the effect of different conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices.   
 Other justices have played a much more subdued role in the Roberts Court’s constitution 
of free speech. As this descriptive explanation relies heavily on the reasoning of justices as 
revealed through their respective opinions, there is something of a missing data problem here. 
Due to this issue, this account shares with other recent efforts an emphasis on the patterns of 
Justices Breyer, Alito (Tribe and Matz 2014, 141-142, 153), and Thomas, as well as Chief 
Justice Roberts (Gans 2015).  In this analysis, disproportionate focus is an artifact of the data 
collection process and availability. Justice Ginsburg has only infrequently revealed her approach 
to free speech adjudication, though recent decisions suggest an emerging affinity with Justice 
Breyer’s pragmatism. Earlier opinions suggest either a circumspect role for speech, especially 
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when conflicting doctrinal strands are present (state-local relations in Pocatello and equality in 
CLS) or security is a concrete, particular concern (which might explain her opinion in Moss 
while also joining Breyer’s dissent in the more abstract threat presented by HLP).   
 The same growing warmth toward pragmatism might be said for Justice Kagan as evident 
in her concurring opinion in Reed and joining Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez, though attention 
to date has largely focused on her dissent in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC.  
Justice Sotomayor has generally operated within conventional jurisprudential structures in her 
opinions for the Court in Milavetz and Lane (both unanimous in result), though she has 
concurred separately to address Justice Alito’s opinions twice, first in Doe and again to criticize 
perceived overreach in Knox (joined by Justice Ginsburg in the latter). These limited data points 
are also consistent with the explanation offered here: Namely, that the content-neutrality regime 
is undergoing a slow, sporadic erosion. These patterns may become more clear as the Court 
populates its plenary docket with additional free speech controversies.   
 What then, can be said about the outcome of interest – the Roberts Court record on free 
expression?  If understood as the product of multiple layers of institutional concerns and 
individual level preferences, this period is best characterized as one of transition rather than 
stasis. Whatever benefits may be wrought from a content neutrality principle built on suspicion 
of legislative and government official actions, the alignment of justices during this period – 
reflecting a variety of political commitments and each with a preferred interpretive philosophy 
and vision of the judicial role – suggests the foundations of this longstanding order are being 
slowly eroded. Much as Grayned and Mosely represented a moment of synthesis of strands of 
free expression and equal protection jurisprudence, voting patterns and opinion language 
suggests the potential for an ad hoc rather than “definitional” balancing jurisprudential regime, 
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one that views speech not only as an individual liberty but a collective right.  Such a regime 
appears to be more concerned with scrutinizing the purposes of legislation and harms addressed, 
as well as the purported liberty interest cited by individuals bringing free expression suits.  This 
approach resonates with recent normative theory work by Sonu Bedi, who has highlighted the 
benefits of focusing on legislative purpose and taking seriously the idea of concrete harms 
visited upon legislative subjects.  The upshot of this approach, while less formally speech 
protective in the civil libertarian tradition, is negotiating the breakwaters of the harbor imposed 
by the knee-jerk emphasis on “rights,” a general social and political paradigm that often makes 
the experiment of democratic government impossible (Bedi 2009).   
 Taken as it is, the Roberts Court is undeniably Janus-faced, though this nature extends 
beyond news coverage pitting the Court’s conservative justices against the liberal bloc. There are 
more than two faces to the contemporary Court.  Some decisions appear consistent with 
ideological explanations, such as the campaign finance cases and, at times, the union decisions.  
Others are less compatible with that explanation.  Yet it would be an overstatement to 
characterize the enterprise as one of total uncertainty (Tribe and Matz 2014, 152-153). Closer 
readings of opinions – perhaps the only insight we have into the judicial understanding of what 
doctrine requires – reveals deeper disagreements about the application of jurisprudential tests and 
what judging requires.  We are left simultaneously with a “categorical” commitment to 
protecting certain types of speech (Collins 2013; Tushnet 2013, 215-231), a recurring yet 
inconsistent concern for political speech (Tribe and Matz 2014, 91, 133), and stewardship that 
sometimes searched for unity in politically divisive controversies.   
 On the notion of moving forward, on February 13, 2016, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia 
passed away in his sleep while visiting a west Texas hunting estate.  A month later, President 
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Obama announced the nomination of D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick Garland to Scalia’s seat.  
Senate Republicans quickly announced they would refuse to meet with or hold confirmation 
hearings for Garland, with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky declaring that 
“The nomination should be made by the president the people elect in the election that's underway 
right now," adding that “This nomination should not be filled, this vacancy should not be filled 
by this lame duck president." (Davis 2016).  Beyond being the latest entry in this period of 
ideologically polarized, partisan politics, the appointment of Neil Gorsuch may be most relevant 
for the two clear political projects within the broader constitution of Roberts Era freedom of 
speech: campaign finance and union fundraising cases.  
 The lack of a ninth vote on the Court defused what was anticipated to be a blow to public 
sector union fundraising in Friedrich v. California Teachers Association (136 S.Ct. 1083 
(2016)), a 4-4 split decision decided by a brief per curiam opinion that had the effect of allowing 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to stand. In addition, it is unclear what will become of the Court’s 
campaign finance agenda - though there are potential hints. In a counterfactual world where 
Merrick Garland was confirmed by the Senate, anecdotal evidence would suggest a second life 
for campaign finance regulations.  In SpeechNow.org v. FEC (599 F.3d 686 (D.C., 2010)), 
Garland joined the D.C. Circuit’s unanimous opinion striking down BCRA amendments to 
federal campaign contribution limits (2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3)). as applied to the 
pro-First Amendment, “527” political advocacy group SpeechNow ( a decision, when paired 
with Citizens United, allowed for the rise of so-called “Super PACs”).  Gorsuch’s First 
Amendment principles have been overshadowed by his statements on the sanctity of life, though 
there is some evidence that he strongly supports preserving well-established free speech 
traditions (Liptak 2017). Again, compared to a world where Garland filled Scalia’s seat, free 
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speech claims brought by union nonmembers objecting to fee assessments may find a 
sympathetic tribunal. The effect of Gorsuch’s appointment on the newest era of the Roberts free 
speech project remains to be seen.   
 
Conclusion 
 Explaining the constitution of freedom of speech in the modern era has proven to be a 
slippery subject for scholars and commentators. This inability to gain traction can be attributed to 
non-comprehensive assessments or a tunnel-vision like focus on ideological preferences. This 
chapter demonstrates that the Court is divided not only by fairly heterogeneous ideological 
preferences but also differing judicial interpretive methodologies, or what I have referred to here 
as different conceptions of the judicial role.  The justices, at times, also appear to differ in terms 
of modes of analysis and core First Amendment theoretical principles.   
 The more relevant distinctions among the justices, however, involve their relative 
willingness to protect core versus peripheral speech, and modes of reasoning engaged in the 
course of reaching a decision.  Studies of the Court’s free speech project have, to date, focused 
on important subsets of the free speech universe but have often done so at the expense of 
comprehensiveness (a case selection issue) or theoretically relevant causes of judicial decision-
making offered in previous scholarship.  No single, univariate theory, absent a considerable 
amount of straining and conceptual stretching, explains the modern Court’s constitution of free 
speech. The model presented here is agnostic on the exact order or precise formula needed to 
produce a result; instead, it offers a configuration that accounts for theoretically relevant 
considerations offered by previous scholars and assesses its performance through chronologically 
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structured, case and justice-centric description of the relevant issue subset of the Court’s docket 
and contrasts these empirics with the components of the model.  This detailed analysis attempts 
to balance an overarching concern with determining patterns across cases with more in-depth 
evaluations of rationales offered in individual cases; it is an exercise in what King, Keohane, and 
Verba label “descriptive inference.” (1994, 34-49; see also George and Bennett 2005, 92-98). 
 The findings are complex, but can be summed up as follows: A majority of the current 
Court’s justices – albeit sporadically - appear to be motivated by concerns beyond the preference 
measures conventionally assigned to them by political scientists, and this motivation - 
occasionally but not infrequently - leads to surprising decision coalitions and outcomes.  Justice 
Kennedy’s libertarian streak (Knowles 2013) and Chief Justice Roberts’s apparent special 
concern for free speech (Gans 2015) have been referenced in assessments of this important 
subset of the Court’s merits agenda, though across all cases it appears that the preferred 
conceptions of adjudication adopted by Justices Breyer and Alito – and to a lesser extent, Justice 
Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts – have the potential to cut against the preferred ideological 
positions measured by political scientists.   
 This review of the Roberts Era constitution of speech also suggests that the foundational 
content-neutrality regime structuring a great deal of the Court’s free speech decision-making 
may have far more cracks than previously understood.  While Collins (2013) and Richards 
(2013) pointed to Alvarez and a handful of other decisions in underscoring the limits of the 
regime, a growing number of justices are increasingly hesitant to wield the sword of content-
neutrality in the face of free speech claims. Even in the most politically salient cases – usually 
concerning campaign finance regulations and union fundraising – the written opinions of justices 
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suggest emergent trends that may usher in new jurisprudential regimes, the most visible being 
the collective vision of positive free speech liberty linked with Breyer’s pragmatism.   
 Chapters three and four have operated within the structures of modern judicial decision-
making studies, with a near-exclusive focus on votes, opinions, and decisions in cases accepted 
by the Supreme Court for argument and placed on the plenary docket.  This institutional process, 
however, is non-random. In the next chapter, I integrate the Roberts Court’s free speech 
certiorari docket with the analyses conducted thus far – a contribution to the study of the issue 
area of free speech and the study of Supreme Court decision-making in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 
 
 
Chapter 5 
A Tale of Two Dockets: Certiorari, Free Expression, and the Roberts Court Era 
 
 U.S. Supreme Court Justices influence the development of law at the merits and agenda-
setting (certiorari) stages of the decision-making process.  Judicial decision-making scholarship 
has found that judicial decisions are motivated by a confluence of legal principles and political 
preferences at both stages of the decision-making process. Assessments of the Roberts Court’s 
record, however, have focused exclusively on the merits voting patterns of the justices. In First 
Amendment freedom of speech controversies, these assessments often point toward the Court’s 
record of striking down campaign finance laws in support of ideological explanations of the 
Court’s behavior (Clayton and McMillan 2012; Collins 2013). In Randall v. Sorrell, FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life (II), Davis v. FEC, Citizens United v. FEC, Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, and most 
recently in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Roberts Court has struck down provisions of federal and 
state laws that either limit campaign contributions, expenditures, and electioneering advocacy, or 
have sought to equalize competition by subsidizing the speech of publicly financed candidates in 
various forms (Sullivan 2010).25   
 During the same period, however, the Court has also let stand a number of appellate court 
decisions upholding campaign finance regulations.  In Flint v. Dennison (488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir., 
2007)), for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a free speech claim 
                                                 
25 548 U.S. 230 (2006); 551 U.S. 449 (2007); 554 U.S. 724 (2008); 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 564 U.S. 721 (2011); 132 
S. Ct. 2490 (2012); 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). The lone exception to this pattern has been Chief Justice Roberts’ five-
justice majority opinion in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), which upheld a state canon of 
judicial conduct restricting direct campaign solicitations under the First Amendment.   
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raised by a student running for the Associated Students of the University of Montana (ASUM),26 
a legislative body with a “primary responsibility…to serve as an advocate for the general welfare 
of the students.” (488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir., 2007)). During his ultimately victorious campaign for 
president of that legislative body, Aaron Flint twice exceeded the $100 campaign expenditure 
limit imposed on ASUM students running for office, racking up electioneering expenses of $300 
and $214.69.  After being warned that the lavish spending was in violation of ASUM bylaws, 
Flint was denied office by ASUM and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  Flint’s claim 
was that the $100 expenditure limits violated his First Amendment right to free speech. 
 Writing for a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit, George W. Bush appointee Carlos 
Bea held that Flint’s claim did not apply to elections at public universities, describing ASUM as 
a “limited public forum…a forum opened by the University to serve viewpoint neutral 
educational interests” which outweighed the free speech interests of the students campaigning 
within that forum.  The panel was unpersuaded by Flint’s invocation of Buckley v. Valeo (421 
U.S. 1 (1976)), the court-constructed doctrinal wellspring for nearly all controversies concerning 
contribution and expenditure limits in election campaigns. Subsequently, Flint appealed to 
SCOTUS via a petition for certiorari (cert. petition).  On January 7, 2008, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied certiorari (552 U.S. 1097 (2008)).  
 Flint’s relevance becomes clearer once the case is contextualized within an emerging 
narrative invoked to explain protection for free expression during the Roberts Era: A 
conservative Supreme Court with a penchant for striking down various measures designed to 
equalize political campaigns and deter corruption decided not to decide a case that could have 
been a vehicle for accelerating the demise of democratically enacted (and generally, Democrat-
                                                 
26 James Bopp, frequent litigator in campaign finance free speech controversies, represented Flint.   
214 
 
 
supported) restrictions on campaign expenditures.  And though the denial of certiorari in Flint 
did not establish a binding federal precedent, the effect of denying certiorari was to let stand an 
important precedent within the expansive Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  This result, 
like many others, represents a shift in the availability of doctrinal resources available to students 
claiming free speech protections and schools seeking to maintain an ordered environment for 
learning (NeJaime 2013). This scenario raises a number of questions about the Roberts Court 
agenda that, to date, have been left unaddressed.  These questions are both descriptive and 
causal: What does the population of certiorari denials in Roberts Era free expression 
controversies actually look like? Which litigants have been the winners and losers at the Court’s 
gatekeeping stage?  Do ideological preferences explain patterns observed in denials and grants of 
certiorari? On the subject of freedom of expression, does the Court’s “hidden” certiorari docket 
mirror the far more visible merits docket?     
 This chapter is an effort to bridge the gap between the certiorari and merits stages of 
judicial decision-making. A large body of literature has examined determinants of judicial 
behavior at the certiorari stage, but far less attention has been given to the relationship between 
discretion in agenda-setting and broader effects on law and society. If scholars wish to make 
accurate inferences about what motivates judicial behavior within specific legal issue areas – as 
scholars have done with freedom of speech (Richards 2013; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; 
Tushnet 2013; Tribe and Matz 2014; Knowles and Lichtman 2015; Pettys 2015), federalism 
(Banks and Blakeman 2012), search and seizure (Segal 1984), and others – then patterns 
observed on the certiorari docket must also be considered.  To describe and assess how the 
certiorari decision influences the development of law and litigation, I develop an original dataset 
of 309 First Amendment, free expression cases for which certiorari was petitioned during the 
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2005-2014 Supreme Court terms.  The assessment is comprised of two parts: First, following 
conventional scholarship, I model the certiorari decision as a binary choice via logit regression. 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which ideological and jurisprudential 
considerations explain the variance observed in grants of certiorari in Roberts Era free 
expression cases.  
 The second part of this chapter focuses on the degree to which the Court’s free 
expression merits docket reflects the certiorari docket.  While the relationship between issue area 
“percolation” and granting certiorari is unclear, I begin with the premise that the Court will be at 
least somewhat responsive to the frequency of issues appearing in petitions for certiorari.  If so, a 
degree of congruency between the two dockets might be expected so that if government 
employee cases are frequently petitioned to the Court, the merits docket will be comprised of a 
comparable proportion of government employee speech cases. Instead, I find substantial 
disparity between the two dockets, such that the Court appears to be actively hunting for cases 
featuring claims against unions and campaign finance regulations.  These two issue areas are the 
most overrepresented on the Court’s merits agenda, while those involving claims brought by 
government employee whistleblowers and student speakers are the most underrepresented.  
Somewhat surprisingly, within-case analyses of these issue areas suggest the role of ideology in 
the decision to grant certiorari varies considerably and its effect is not always in the expected 
direction.  
 One of the key claims advanced here is that certiorari decisions have untapped analytical 
potential: They represent additional “dataset observations” or “causal process observations” that 
can be employed in assessing these theoretical claims (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).  Inference 
always entails “using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know,” but the failure to 
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connect the certiorari and merits stages in studies of Supreme Court decision-making – or even 
account for case selection issues in those studies – highlights just how little scholars actually 
know about the universe of cases before the Court (Epstein and King 2002, 21). The failure to 
account for the certiorari decision presents two related but distinct issues.  Methodologically, the 
exclusive focus on cases granted certiorari and formally decided on the merits essentially 
constitutes a truncated, non-random sample.  More formally stated, the problem is that all cases 
denied certiorari are dropped from the sample even though characteristics of the independent 
variable are available for all cases (Long 1997, 187, 199-201; Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999, 
552).  
 More substantively, ignoring the certiorari docket is to ignore normative concerns about 
the availability of the free speech clause’s protection for various interests and individuals in 
society (Fischman 2013, 120).  For many litigants, the denial of review by the nation’s high court 
is effectively the end of the line. As Yates, Cann, and Boyea point out, “By focusing primarily 
on decisions on the merits…the attitudinal model overlooks the fullness of the extended 
litigation process that leads to legal outcomes” (2013, 850). More than mere docket management, 
certiorari is a process by which the contours of law can be shaped to the benefit or detriment of 
various classes of individuals across geographically expansive federal judicial circuits. This 
effort, then, carries important implications for judicial decision-making studies seeking to make 
inferences about causes of judicial behavior across different time periods and within particular 
issue areas. 
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Free Expression and Certiorari: A Primer 
 As described in previous chapters, general reverence for the First Amendment is both a 
cause and effect of the scrutiny following Roberts Court’s decisions defining the scope and 
coverage of that fundamental protection. This scholarly focus has, in turn, generated numerous 
and contradictory descriptions of the Court as simultaneously “the most pro-speech Court in 
history,” “not a free speech Court,” a Court motivated by in-group bias, and a Court that has 
“really landed the plane” in difficult free expression cases (Ken Starr, quoted in Chemerinsky 
2011; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; David Hudson Jr., quoted in Liptak 2012).  For example, 
Chemerinsky has strongly denounced the Court’s decisions in student speech, prisoner speech, 
and campaign finance decisions in concluding the Court is “not a pro-speech Court” 
(Chemerinsky 2011). Similar efforts have varied considerably in terms of the number and types 
of cases evaluated in making inferences about the Court’s motivations in this area (Tribe and 
Matz 2014, Coyle 2013), but they have not featured systematic case selection and analysis. Some 
scholars have also suggested that the Roberts Court record on free expression is not well-
explained (or exclusively explained) by the ideological preferences of the justices (Tushnet 2013, 
215; Richards 2013; Knowles and Lichtman 2015, 242).  Common to all recent scholarship on 
free expression and the Roberts Era is the failure to even mention the Court’s discretionary 
powers in shaping the merits agenda.   
 
 The Court’s Criteria: Rule 10 
 The Court’s near-total discretion over its merits docket is the institutional rule that at 
once creates opportunities and problems for judicial decision-making scholarship. As Crowe 
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explains in his study of the development of the federal judiciary, “The Judicial Act of 1925 gave 
the Court near-complete control over its docket for the first time in history” (Crowe 2012, 
211).27  Certiorari, now the most common path to nation’s highest Court, is the decision by at 
least four members of the Court to accept a case to the Court’s docket for oral argument. Denials 
of certiorari have the formal effect of allowing the lower court decision to stand with limited 
precedential value (Baum 2008, 33).  The Court’s self-imposed, official guidelines for granting 
certiorari are now known collectively as Rule 10 (previously Rule 19), which suggests grants 
will occur when: 
  “A United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
 another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an 
 important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last 
 resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, 
 or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s 
 supervisory power;” or, 
 “A state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that 
 conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States 
 court of appeals;” or,  
 “A state court of a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of 
 federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an 
 important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decision of this Court.”28 
  
 Rule 10 is prefaced by the reminder that certiorari is “not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion.”  As should also be apparent, “the criteria in Rule [10] are sufficiently vague and 
various to prevent even likely guesses about reasons for denial” (Provine 1980, 53-54).  Further 
                                                 
27 Crowe also notes that, “The docket control was only “near-complete” because the act did preserve mandatory 
jurisdiction in a few select types of cases – notably, those relating to rulings by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and injunctions against administrative agencies.  In 1988, the right of appeal to the Court was virtually 
eliminated; 102 Stat. 662 (June 27, 1988)” (Crowe 2012, 211 (fn. 89)).   
28 “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.” Last accessed Oct. 12, 2016.  
https://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2013RulesoftheCourt.pdf  
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complications arise from the lack of transparency endemic to this stage of judicial decision-
making: Due to the “insane secrecy” surrounding the process (Cordray and Cordray 2008; see 
also Segall 2015), comprehensive data on the relationship between agenda-setting and merits 
votes is not available beyond those studies reliant on the released papers of a handful of justices 
during the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Eras (Provine 1980; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Ulmer 
1984; Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth 2006; Black and Owens 2009; see generally Brenner 
2000).29   
 The problems associated with the lack of judicial transparency are exacerbated by the 
decision rule for certiorari: Unlike votes on the merits, it takes only four votes for a grant of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court.  It could be the case that the Court’s four liberal justices 
frequently deny certiorari to prevent an expected conservative win on the merits of a case (a so-
called defensive denial) or that the Court’s conservatives deny based on uncertainty surrounding 
Justice Kennedy’s swing vote.  This may be especially true in free expression cases, where 
Justice Kennedy’s vote and libertarian streak have been important considerations (Knowles 
2015, 177-184).  Without access to records of individual judicial votes at the certiorari stage, 
however, the data generated by the certiorari process present an ecological inference issue that is 
difficult to surmount (King 1997, 1-6).  
 The missing data problem for different periods of the Court’s history has led some 
political scientists to caution against attributing outcome oriented voting to justices in all but the 
most narrow of decisions to deny certiorari (Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth 2006, 225).  As 
Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth have shown, attribution of outcome oriented voting without 
                                                 
29 Provine (1980) and Ulmer (1984) rely on the papers of Justice Burton, while Black and Owens (2009) mine the 
papers of Justice Blackmun.   
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individual voting data through the use of simulation techniques has overstated the degree to 
which outcome considerations drive the Supreme Court’s agenda (2006, 233).  Still, other 
scholars have examined the personal papers made public by former justices and found that 
strategic, outcome oriented voting is a “substantial” element of the case selection process while 
also acknowledging the importance of jurisprudential and institutional concerns (Cordray and 
Cordray 2008).  
 The struggle to give meaning to and extract inferences from the decision on certiorari is 
not limited to research design issues, however. In response to a question posed by Law Professor 
A.E. Dick Howard, “If you decide not to take a case, isn’t there an implicit affirmation of the 
result of that case below?,”  then-Associate Justice O’Connor responded, “There isn’t. It has no 
precedential value, a denial of certiorari.” Justice Clarence Thomas followed with, “I think some 
of the public reporting on what we say confuses what we’ve done in the cert. process. When we 
don’t take a case, often it is reported that ‘The Supreme Court today upheld…’ or ‘The Supreme 
Court today ordered…’ when in fact we’ve done no such thing.”30  These explanations, however, 
wink at reality. They do not adequately account for the experiences of individuals seeking 
redress by the Court: For many litigants, the denial of review by the nation’s high court is 
effectively the end of the line. Nor do they adequately account for the citizens residing within the 
federal circuits for which the decision left standing often takes on precedential value.  As 
Hellman noted, “the cases that become ‘Supreme Court cases’ do so as the result of a selection 
process that is no less interesting and important than the decisional process that follows” 
(Hellman 1985, 948; see also Ulmer 1972, 435).  
                                                 
30 Portions of this documentary are available on YouTube; the link to the relevant videoclip is “SCOTUS Video Part 
1,” scotusfan, Feb. 18, 2009 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6Noye3MKkg&spfreload=10 Last accessed Aug. 
31, 2016. 
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 From this perspective, the ability of the justices to powerfully yet fractiously shape law 
through certiorari docket management comes into focus. Seasoned justices surely understand that 
denials of certiorari have important political and legal effects; though lacking scalpel precision, a 
conservative judicial bloc can craft law to conservative preferences by consistently refusing to 
grant certiorari for prisoners alleging free expression violations. In that same scenario, liberal to 
moderate justices may deny certiorari for fear of judicial conservatives setting a more speech 
restrictive precedent for prisoners.  More unusual, however, would be for judicial conservatives 
to consistently deny certiorari in a way that is either damaging to conservative political interests 
or beneficial to liberal political interests.  If a conservative Court consistently denies certiorari in 
school speech cases featuring mainstream religious claimants, then the ideological explanation 
for judicial behavior has failed a fairly easy test, a result that casts doubt upon or further narrows 
the scope of ideological attributions of judicial behavior.  
 Even without access to the justices’ individual certiorari votes, earlier work concerned 
with determinants of Supreme Court agenda setting suggests the untapped potential of the 
Court’s certiorari docket.  Songer’s early study of the political considerations in play at the 
certiorari stage noted the problem of missing individual votes and the reliance on the papers of 
retired justices, yet still offered measures of association and data in support of the position that 
political cues are at least as relevant as jurisprudential ones in deciding whether to grant 
certiorari (1979, 1189-1192).31  The inferential object of Songer’s study and others examining 
votes on certiorari has been the motivations of the justices at the certiorari stage across issue 
areas and across time.  In other words, these scholars were more concerned with developing 
                                                 
31 Songer assigned decision direction codes (liberal or conservative) to all economic regulation cases decided in the 
1935, 1941, 1967, and 1972 terms, finding that conservative Courts tended to grant certiorari more often for liberal 
lower court decisions and that liberal Courts tended to grant when lower court decision favored conservative 
claimants.   
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general explanations for behavior at the gatekeeping stage, whether the relevant cues were 
ideological or jurisprudential.  These theoretical insights, however, can also help scholars 
connect the two stages of the Court’s decision-making process within particular issue areas: The 
inference that the Roberts Court favors a conservative vision of free expression becomes much 
stronger if it can be shown that the Court also denies certiorari at higher rates when litigants 
petition to challenge lower court, conservative “wins.” If this pattern is not observed, however, 
judicial decision-making scholars may need to be far more circumspect when making inferential 
claims. 
 
Research Design 
 Questions and Hypotheses 
 To gain additional leverage on the question of which factors help explain the Roberts Era 
free expression agenda, this chapter employs a multi-method research design combining 
conventional quantitative analyses commonly specified in studies of Supreme Court agenda-
setting with a less conventional series of within-case studies of particular issue areas of the 
Court’s certiorari docket.  The purpose of these analyses is to address the following research 
questions and related hypotheses: 
Q1:  To what extent do ideological preferences help explain the Court’s free expression agenda? 
H1: The likelihood of a grant of certiorari increases when the lower court decision direction is 
liberal and/or issued by Democratic-appointed judges. Conversely, the likelihood of a grant of 
certiorari decreases when the lower court decision is conservative and/or issued by GOP-
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appointed judges.  Confirmation of this hypothesis represents additional evidence in support of 
the claim that ideological considerations have driven the free speech agenda of the Roberts 
Court. 
Q2:  To what extent to do jurisprudential preferences help explain the Court’s free expression 
agenda? 
H2: The cases granted certiorari by SCOTUS are those presenting “jurisprudential cues,” 
including square conflict, the U.S. as a litigating party, amicus briefs, and the presence of a 
dissenting opinion in the court from which certiorari was petitioned.  Confirmation of this 
hypothesis represents additional evidence in support of the claim that legal considerations have 
driven the free speech agenda of the Roberts Court. 
Q3:  To what extent does the Roberts Court’s free expression merits docket reflect the certiorari 
docket? 
H3: The cases granted certiorari by SCOTUS are more likely to be those that have sufficiently 
“percolated” in the lower courts.  Confirmation of this hypothesis would suggest that the Court 
is responsive to litigation below, and that its record generally reflects the contours of legal 
contestation.  
  
 Data Collection 
 To identify all free speech denials of certiorari during the Roberts Court era, I used the 
search function of Lexis-Nexis Academic database.  I searched for all federal appellate decisions 
from January 1, 2005 to August 30, 2015 under the search term “free speech,” which returned 
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3,018 decisions.  I repeated this process for all state high courts during the same time period, 
yielding a total of 958 decisions.  On the search results screen, Lexis-Nexis provides a brief case 
history of the decision, including citations, dates, and prior/subsequent court decisions.  I 
scanned these results screens for those decisions that noted the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  
For these cases, I recorded the citation for the federal appellate court decision, date of cert. 
denial, and the federal circuit deciding the case (1st, 2nd, D.C., etc.).  I then read each opinion to 
identify the speech claimant (speaker), type of speech (commercial, anti-union, etc.), and the 
government entity suppressing the speech in the case (federal, state, local).  In order to exclude 
non-comparable cases that might be considered “frivolous” or would have an exceedingly low 
chance of being granted certiorari, I also read opinions to determine whether the appellate court 
assessed the free speech claim on the merits.   
 To ensure comparability between free expression cases decided by the Court and those 
denied certiorari, I excluded cases where plaintiffs did not appeal a decision on First Amendment 
free expression grounds, the case was considered not properly before the Court, the question in 
the case was determined to be non-justiciable on ripeness, mootness, or standing grounds, cases 
decided on statutory grounds, claims failing to meet the threshold (failure to state a First 
Amendment claim), and cases resolved on Younger-Huffman and Rooker-Feldman grounds - 
doctrinal rules generally concerned with justiciability of case in federal courts.  These 
theoretically replicable coding rules are employed to limit the universe of potential cases to those 
that have achieved a degree of “certworthiness” so as to avoid conceptual stretching and ensure 
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docket comparability via “the careful selection of cases that fit the research problem” (Ljiphart 
1975, 167).32  
 After applying the above criteria to the search, the resulting dataset contains 309 free 
speech cases decided by a federal appellate court or state high court where petitions for certiorari 
were filed since the 2005 term.  The dependent variable of interest is the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in a free speech controversy decided by a lower federal appellate 
court or state high court.  Because the votes of the individual justices to grant certiorari are not 
made public, the nature of the analyses conducted here are necessarily limited.  However, they 
still provide insight as to whether the Roberts Court can be accurately characterized as a 
conservative, pro-speech Court, and whether the Court’s free speech decisions on the merits are 
representative of the body of cases that have percolated through the lower federal courts.  
 
 Variables Overview 
 Previous scholarship reveals that judicial behavior at the certiorari stage is motivated by a 
mixture of jurisprudential and ideological “cues” or  signals that justices use to help decide 
whether a case should be added to the merits docket.  Here, the term “jurisprudential cues” refers 
to those case factors that generally indicate a case presents important legal questions that should 
be addressed.  Conventional jurisprudential cues include the presence of conflict between sister 
circuits, the presence of a dissenting opinion (which may indicate disagreement about the 
                                                 
32 This approach is not without its own infirmities, as “certworthiness” is a highly subjective concept that not even 
the Justices can agree upon or sharpen beyond a certain degree of abstraction.  The inclusion rules described here, 
however, theoretically allow for replication tests by scholars wishing to compare cases on either side of the certiorari 
decision. See also Mak, Sidman, and Sommer (2013) for similar concerns and response in the context of selection 
bias in litigator decisions to file petitions for cert.  
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application of the proper legal standard to the facts of a particular controversy), and the presence 
of the United States as a litigating party in the case.  “Ideological cues” refers to case factors that 
indicate a particular policy position, speaker, speech type, or even speech suppressor is at stake 
in a particular case.  These cues include the direction of the lower court decision from which 
certiorari is petitioned and the political composition of the panel majority or en banc Court from 
which certiorari is petitioned.  Admittedly, this categorical distinction has its limitations. The 
signals that have been characterized as jurisprudential-related may be as much an indication of 
the ideological divisiveness as the legal importance of an issue. This may be most problematic 
for the number of amicus briefs filed with the Court at the certiorari stage, described in further 
detail below. Each of these italicized terms or phrases represents a covariate included in the logit 
model specified in Table 5.1.  I also operationalize an issue area preference variable to gauge the 
extent to which the court’s certiorari docket is congruent to the merits docket.  In the paragraphs 
that follow, I describe the process for coding each of these variables. 
 
 Variables: Square Conflict 
 Previous work on certiorari has found that the existence of conflicts among circuits has a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of the Court granting certiorari (Ulmer 1976; 
1984).  Anonymous interviews with justices and clerks have also suggested that the existence of 
conflict among circuits increases the chance of a cert. grant.  Yet coding cases for the existence 
of conflict is not as straightforward as it may first appear.  Litigators wishing to have their case 
heard by the Court – knowing this concern – are likely to frame their dispute as one where 
conflict exists among federal circuits.  Ulmer’s work itself, often referenced in scholarship 
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concerned with the Court’s agenda-setting power, notes the problem of discerning “claimed” 
from “genuine” assertions of conflict but does not clearly state the coding rules for scoring cases 
as featuring genuine conflicts (Perry 1991; Ulmer 1984, 904).33  In addition, Perry was careful to 
note that conflict is no guarantee of a grant of certiorari, instead packaging it with other 
considerations (frivolity, important legal question, percolation) that are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for granting certiorari.  More recent work by Mak, Sidman, and Sommer (2013) 
ignores the conflict variable in its entirety, citing a lack of data and the incentive for litigators to 
find conflicts when none may exist (65-66).  
 Despite and because of these difficulties, I specify a conflict indicator based on the idea 
of “square conflict” defined by Estreicher and Sexton (1984).  A square conflict “occurs when 
two or more courts – federal courts of appeals or state courts of last resort – take contrary 
positions on the same legal issue” (732).  To determine whether square conflict exists in Roberts 
Court Era free expression cert. denials, I read each opinion via citation search on Lexis-Nexis 
and code “1” for conflict when opinion authors reference disagreement in approaches with 
“sister circuits,” or explicitly note the presence of intercircuit conflict.34  The latter is most likely 
to occur in dissenting opinions, as a circuit or state high court judge preferring a contrary result is 
more likely to state a case for conflict than the majority in a given case.  This reliance on 
dissenting opinions is open to the charge that a judge in such a position has an incentive to allege 
conflict when none exists – as Perry notes is the case for litigators – but in practice, both 
majority opinion authors and dissenters have noted the presence of intercircuit conflict.  Just as 
                                                 
33 Ulmer references the work of Feeney (1975), and collapses that framework to two categories of “genuine conflict” 
and “no genuine conflict.”  For Ulmer, genuine conflict occurs when either “direct conflict” (decision below deals 
with same explicit point as some other case and reaches a contradictory result) or “strong partial conflict” (decision 
below is in the same general area of the law as some other case and where the implications of the doctrine followed 
in one case would compel an opposite result in the other) is present.   
34 Another type of conflict occurs when a decision is arguably at odds with Supreme Court precedent.  Due to the 
general indeterminacy of precedent as applied to novel fact patterns, I do not code for this form of conflict.   
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majority authors do not always “distinguish” cases instead of noting conflict, dissenters do not 
always claim square conflict exists.35  A word of caution is needed, however, as this approach is 
not without shortcomings: Federal judges with preferred policy outcomes surely have incentives 
to use the language of conflict instrumentally. However, it is not subject to the same degree of 
“fluffing” as the claims filed by litigators in petitions for certiorari.  
 Because of the incentive and documented tendency of petitioning attorneys to claim (or 
overstate) conflict when none may exist, I err on the side of caution in scoring cases for conflict.  
Square conflict cases feature such language as that in Judge Clay’s dissent in Discount Tobacco 
City and Lottery v. United States (2013), stating, “The recent decision from the D.C. district 
court also supports my analysis and conclusion that the color graphic warning requirement 
constitutes compelled speech which violates the First Amendment” (majority in conflict with 
D.C. Court)( 674 F.3D 509, 530 (Clay, J., dissenting)), Judge Benavides’ majority opinion in 
Morgan v. Swanson (2011), noting that on the question of whether First Amendment law 
requires a “categorical ban on all viewpoint discrimination in public schools,” that,  “our sister 
circuits have divided over the question. Indeed, as we have previously recognized, ‘[a] split 
exists among the Circuits on the question of whether Hazelwood requires viewpoint neutrality" 
in public schools’” (659 F.3d 359, 379), and Judge Lynch’s concurring opinion in Locke v. 
Karass (2007), stating that, “The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 
representing non-unionized Maine state employees, brought this case in the hopes of persuading 
                                                 
35 There is no single accepted method in contemporary scholarship for determining the existence of actual – rather 
than alleged – conflict among circuits.  For example, Black and Owens (2009) code for “strong conflict,” “weak 
conflict,” and “alleged conflict” variables, with the former two determined by clerk notations found in the papers of 
Justice Harry Blackmun and the latter found by reviewing the petitioner’s brief for certiorari (1073).  Caldeira, 
Wright, and Zorn (2012) also code for alleged conflict based on the brief of the petitioning attorney, but do not 
include a description of how they coded for actual conflict (11).   
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the Supreme Court to resolve an issue that the Court left unanswered in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass'n and on which the circuit courts differ.” (498 F.3d 49, 66 (Lynch, J., concurring)).36   
 
 Variables: Amicus Curiae Briefs as Cue 
 Scholars have found that amicus briefs tend to correlate with grants of certiorari.  
According to Caldeira and Wright, the amicus-as-cue theory “assumes that the potential 
significance of a case is proportional to the demand for adjudication among affected parties and 
that the amount of amicus curiae participation reflects the demand for adjudication” (1988, 
1112).  Importantly, the authors found that the direction of the brief – for or against the grant of 
certiorari – matters less than the presence of the brief itself.  In other words, amicus briefs filed 
before the certiorari cut-point function primarily as signals to the justices regarding the policy 
importance of a case.37     
 To determine the presence and number of amicus briefs in a case prior to the certiorari 
cut-point, I entered the docket number assigned to cases by the Court in the search tool at 
supremecourt.gov.  The docket results for each case provides general case details, including the 
timeline of the case from the point at which a petition for certiorari was filed, all the way to the 
decision on the merits (for those cases granted certiorari.).  Following the work of Black and 
Owens (2009), I code the variable continuously with an expected positive relationship between 
number of amicus briefs and the probability of a grant of certiorari.   
                                                 
36 In addition, Judge Lipez’s majority opinion discusses the results reached the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits that 
created a conflict on the issue of union “pooled resources” (498 F.3d 49, 60-64).   
37 It is not clear whether the findings presented by Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn (2012) confirm a steadily declining 
trend in amicus relevance to cert. grants, whether scholars should continue to rely on amicus briefs in opposition to 
cert., or interest group maintenance as the primary reason for filing cert. stage amicus briefs (8).   
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 Variables: Composition of Lower Court Panel as Ideological Cue 
   The most readily apparent signal to Supreme Court judges (the “principals” in the 
principal-agent relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts) is the 
proximate ideology of the appointing president (see Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994, 679-680 
for additional indicators).  In this project, the question is not whether congruence or 
responsiveness exists between doctrinal goals of courts situated in a hierarchical relationship, but 
whether a relatively stable Roberts Court’s free expression agenda is marked by ideological 
considerations at the agenda-setting stage.     
 If ideological cues are an important consideration when considering cert. petitions, then 
we should expect the Court to be more likely to grant review when the majority decision below 
is issued by Democratic appointees and less likely when the decision is issued by Republican 
appointees. As Sisk and Heise (2005, 783-790) have noted, the appointing president proximate 
measure of ideology is imperfect. However, the differences between the measure and Judicial 
Common Space scores (which take into account the norm of senatorial courtesy) also appear to 
be marginal (see also Fischman and Law 2009, 36-40).   
 To determine the composition of the panel, Court en banc, or state high court deciding 
the case from which certiorari was petitioned, I searched for each judge’s appointing president at 
the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.38  Each decision was 
then coded as Democratic (majority decision of panel or en banc Court by Democratic 
appointees), Republican (majority decision of panel or en banc Court by GOP appointees), or 
Mixed/Unknown (majority decision of panel or en banc Court evenly split between Democratic 
                                                 
38 Federal Judicial Center, “Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,” Last accessed May 18, 2016.  
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html   
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and Republican appointees). Because state high court judges are often (though not always) 
elected in “non-partisan” elections or retain party affiliations that may not always be comparable 
to the interests of the appointing national party regime, these panels are also scored as Mixed or 
Unknown. 
 
 Variables: Issue Area Frequency as a General Proxy for “Percolation” 
 One point of emphasis in Perry’s account of the Supreme Court’s agenda setting was the 
idea of percolation, and its effect on the likelihood of a grant of certiorari: 
 Justices like the smell of well-percolated cases.  A case that has not percolated through 
 various courts will usually be considered uncertworthy.  The concept is one well known 
 in jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court exists primarily to clarify the law.  Once it speaks, 
 however, its interpretation is final, so justices want to make sure that when they do speak, 
 they can do so as intelligently as possible.  It is good jurisprudence and makes good sense 
 to put off rendering an interpretation as long as possible – or more precisely, as long as 
 the benefits of avoidance outweigh the problems – so that the Court can benefit from 
 analysis by others (Perry 1991, 230-231). 
 The idea that particular issues must be sufficiently percolated – heard by lower courts and 
discussed in other forums – is perhaps one of the most subjective indicators of certworthiness 
(Perry 1991, 232).  Recently, scholars have interrogated the relationship between the percolation 
of inter-circuit conflicts and the “optimum” time for the Supreme Court to wait until resolving 
the conflict (Beim and Rader 2015; Clark and Kastellec 2013). Alternatively, percolation may 
rest on a broader definition of issue area: “The Court had decided to stay away from certain 
areas.  For example, they decided to stay away from double jeopardy cases…they had decided 
several cases the year before, and they wanted to see how it was beginning to work its way out” 
(Perry 1991, 233). 
232 
 
 
  From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between the Court’s docket and the 
litigation that has percolated in the lower courts is unclear.  At a fundamental level, issue areas 
that have been more heavily litigated – as reflected in the number of cert. petitions filed – might 
be more likely to be reviewed than those that have not.  Recent work by scholars does not 
attempt to control for frequency within particular issue areas (Lindquist and Klein 2006; Mak et 
al. 2013; Beim and Rader 2014), perhaps due to the immense undertaking of disaggregating not 
only by general issue areas (First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, capital cases, etc.) but also 
specific issue areas within each of those subjects. In addition, Perry’s interviews with justices, 
clerks, and other Court actors pointed in different directions.  Some issues, for example, were 
deemed certworthy due to adequate “percolation” in lower courts due to the perception of 
intercircuit conflict.  Others reached certworthiness via percolation because a decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court had been applied by lower courts and the Court wished to revisit or adjust 
its approach based on observable results.  Generally, the certiorari function is a way for the 
justices to clarify law or correct perceived errors by lower courts (230-233).  Less has been 
written about how the Court’s filtering process and concern for percolation relates to entire 
classes of litigants within particular issue areas.   
 If the Court is concerned with making clear legal rules for lower courts to follow, 
engaged in error correction, or creating a rule that favors certain classes of litigants over others, 
then the relationship between issue area frequency and the likelihood of certiorari is at least an 
interesting  empirical question.  In order to better understand this relationship, I count the 
number of cases petitioned to the Court within each inductively determined issue area from 2006 
to 2015.  Generally, the modal categories for each year were assigned a code of “high 
frequency,” issue areas appearing less frequently were coded as “medium frequency,” and issue 
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areas petitioned only once or twice each year were coded as “low frequency.” Appendix G 
provides the counts for each issue area by year, as well as whether codes of high frequency (H) 
or medium frequency (M) were assigned. All others received the low frequency code.  
Additional details on the coding choices and assumptions employed in scoring these indicators 
are provided in chapter two, Appendix A, Appendix G, and Appendix H. 
 Issue areas were inductively derived on the basis of jurisprudential, speaker, and speech 
considerations.39  For example, religious student speech claims stand apart from “traditional” 
student speech claims due to the former involving additional jurisprudential considerations 
beyond the application of the Court’s line of Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) cases, such as 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Similarly, government speech cases – usually involving 
claims of retaliatory actions for speech or so-called whistleblower claims – generally fall into the 
Court’s Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) or Bivens (1971) streams of jurisprudence.40  
“Free market” electoral speech claims – challenges to expenditure or contribution limitations – 
differ from traditional political, electoral, or policy speech claims due to the divergent 
interpretations of what constitutes speech, as well as jurisprudential considerations; free market 
electoral speech claims are generally governed by a restrictive burden test in light of the 
government interest in regulating elections, while the latter is often – though not always - framed 
as a subject matter restriction controversy.   
  
                                                 
39 The “Controversial Ideology” category captures claims that could broadly be captured under the labels of “liberal” 
or “conservative,” but for concerns about harmful and/or inaccurate stereotypes mentioned by Pettys (2014) they are 
placed in this residual category.  This includes racist (KKK rallies), anti-war, animal rights, and pro-environmental 
speakers and speech.   
40 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), holding that 
individuals may bring suits for damage against federal agents acting under the color of law but acting 
unconstitutionally.  
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 Additional Variables: U.S. as Litigating Party and Dissent 
 Scholars have found correlations between a number of other variables and the decision to 
grant certiorari.  Tanenhaus et al. examined certiorari petitions from the 1947 to 1953 terms and 
found a number of cues increasing the chances for a grant of certiorari, including the presence of 
the United States as a petitioner, dissent among judges at the Court from which certiorari was 
petitioned, and the presence of a civil liberties issue (1963, 111).  These associations were 
confirmed by Armstrong and Johnson (1982), who examined samples of certiorari petitions from 
four terms during the mid-1960s and 1970s.  As such, I code the theoretically relevant “cue” 
indicators dichotomously.  I depart from Tanenhaus et al. and Perry in that I code the U.S. 
variable as “1” when the United States is either a petitioner or respondent in a particular case 
(Perry and Tanenhaus et al. code only for the U.S. as a petitioner).  Perry (1991) found a cert. 
grant rate of 100% for grants where the U.S. was petitioner, compared to just 4% when a 
respondent (136-137).  The choice to code for the presence of the U.S. as a litigating party 
(petitioner or respondent) was informed by work that has found a emergent hostility toward 
Congress in First Amendment free speech cases (Keck 2007, 332-333); cases presenting conflict 
between U.S. statutes and rights claimants often take a form such that the U.S. is a respondent in 
these cases.   
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Table 5.1 – Summary Statistics: Certiorari Docket and Free Expression (2005-2014 Terms) 
Independent Variable Denials 
(Mean) 
 
Grants 
(Mean) 
Overall 
(Mean) 
Coding 
Ideological Direction (Case) 
    Liberal 
    Undetermined 
    Conservative 
 
 
.3774 
.2906 
.3321 
 
.5682 
.2045 
.2273 
 
 
.4045 
.2783 
.3172 
 
=0 
=1  
=2 
Lower Court Composition 
    Democratic  
    Mixed/Unknown 
    Republican 
 
 
.3472 
.0755 
.5774 
 
.3864 
.2273 
.3864 
 
.3528 
.0971 
.5502 
 
=0 
=1  
=2 
Ideological Direction 
(Speaker)  
    Liberal 
    Undetermined 
    Conservative 
 
 
.4528 
.1623 
.3849 
 
 
.4091 
.0909 
.5000 
 
 
44.66 
15.21 
40.13 
 
 
=0 
=1  
=2 
 
Speech Claim Vote Direction 
    Anti- 
    Mixed 
    Pro-  
 
 
.7321 
.0792 
.1887 
 
.4545 
.0682 
.4773 
 
.6926 
.0777 
.2298 
 
=0 
=1  
=2 
Conflict 
 
.0830 .2045 .1003 =1 
Amicus Briefs  
 
.8576 
 
.1424 
 
.6246 
 
=0 to 16 
Dissent 
 
.1736 .4091 .2071 =1 
U.S. as Litigating Party 
 
.1811 .2955 .1974 =1 
Issue Area Preference  
     Low Frequency 
     Medium Frequency 
     High Frequency 
 
.4000 
.2943 
.3057 
 
.6136 
.2045 
.1818 
 
.4304 
.2816 
.2880 
 
=1 
=2 
=3 
 
N 265 44 309  
 
Results 
  The summary statistics in Table 5.1 provide ideological proportions of the lower court 
decisions from which certiorari have been petitioned. At this basic level, there is no clear 
ideological component to the Roberts Court’s free speech agenda – nearly 40% of the Court’s 
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denials of certiorari have let liberal lower court decisions stand, while just over 30% of denials 
have been for conservative lower court decisions.  While unobserved, strategic voting may play a 
role in some cases, at this aggregate level a Court motivated by political outcomes might 
generally be expected to deny certiorari at a greater rate for conservative decisions, or decisions 
issued by GOP-appointed appellate judges.   
Table 5.2 – Logit Regression, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2015) 
Variable Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. 
 (Full Model) (Restricted Model) 
Direction     
Conservative   -.8316 .5145 -.7926 .4197 
Undetermined -.9211 .5200 -.7612 .4271 
Liberal (Baseline) 
 
--- --- --- --- 
Speech Claim     
Pro-Speech 1.516*** .4086   
Mixed .6174 .7251   
Anti-Speech (Baseline) --- ---   
 
Panel Composition Below 
    
Majority GOP  -.3489 .4390 -.4755 .3763 
Mixed/Undetermined  .8672 .6420 1.097* .4723 
Majority Dem. (Baseline) --- ---   
 
Jurisprudential Cues 
    
U.S. Litigating Party 1.024* .4985   
Amicus Briefs .2624* .1151   
Conflict 1.124* .5135   
Dissent Below .0079 .5522   
 
Agenda/Issue Preference 
    
Low Frequency (Baseline) --- ---   
Medium Frequency -1.164* .5575   
High Frequency -.6706 .5502   
     
Constant -2.089*** .4805 -1.305*** .2902 
N = 309     
   
Note: Logit coefficients with robust standard errors 
(R.S.E.); p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*.  Log Likelihood 
Reduction: -126.47 to  -98.58 (full), -126.47 to  -118.54 
(restricted); Pseudo R2: 0.22 (full), 0.06 (restricted).  
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   Table 5.2 represents a more rigorous test of H1 via logit regression analysis. In Roberts 
Era free expression cases, the effect of ideology on the likelihood of a grant of certiorari does not 
register at conventional levels of statistical significance: This is true for the direction of the lower 
court decision from which certiorari is petitioned as well as the composition of the panel or en 
banc court majority for that decision.  All of the jurisprudential cue coefficients are in the 
expected positive direction, and all with the exception of the presence of a dissenting opinion 
below register at conventional levels of statistical significance.   
Figure 5.1 – Predicted Probabilities, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2014 Terms)41 
 
 
                                                 
41 The probability of a grant of certiorari is represented by labeled dots, while the brackets represent 95% confidence 
intervals around those probabilities.   
-.09
-.083
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.17
-.032
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.11
.025
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Undetermined Direction
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 To better visualize these relationships, Figure 5.1 provides the predicted probabilities of 
grants of certiorari via the average marginal effects of changes in each variable while holding all 
others constant at their means. Setting liberal lower court decisions as the baseline category, 
conservative lower court decisions are 8.3percentage points less likely to be granted certiorari, 
while ideologically undetermined decisions are 9.0 percentage points less likely to result in a 
grant. However, these relationships do not register at conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  At some level, whether the direction of the decision below affects certiorari is an 
artifact of statistical conventions.  While the p-value for the conservative direction coefficient is 
not less than the .05 threshold commonly set in regression results tables (and was chosen here 
prior to calculating results), it does pass the .10 threshold less commonly used.  In other words, 
the choice of cut-off value selected here might have resulted in a “type two error,” or accepting 
the null hypothesis (no relationship between the ideological direction of the decision below and 
the decision to grant certiorari). Ultimately, the borderline significance of the conservative 
direction coefficient is open to interpretation but it does at least partially address one important 
caveat to this chapter:  Strategic voting at the certiorari stage is not explored in great detail.  This 
is because, absent the individual voting information of the justices at the conference stage, there 
is little way of knowing whether the justices were engaged in strategic grants or denials of 
certiorari. However, the fact that the primary ideological variable (decision direction below) 
approaches conventional levels of statistical significance, it suggests that it is an important cue 
for the justices even while assuming strategic moves among the justices have occurred. 
 Of some interest, the Court is also more likely to grant certiorari for pro-speech decisions 
issued by lower courts compared to anti-speech decisions (17.43 percentage points).  Overall, 
however, jurisprudential cues are the best predictor of grants of certiorari in contemporary free 
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expression controversies, as the magnitudes of the effects indicate for U.S. as a litigating party 
(11.37 percentage points more likely when the condition is present), amicus curiae (2.5 
percentage points more likely for each additional brief filed), and conflict (13.3 percentage 
points more likely).  Across the population of cases petitioned for certiorari, there is statistically 
significant support for non-ideological explanations of judicial behavior in free expression 
controversies (H2), and less support for ideological explanations (H1).   
  
Hunting for Cases: Disaggregation by Issue Area 
 The coefficients displayed in Table 5.2 suggest that ideological cues are less important to 
the Justices than jurisprudential ones, as neither the direction of the lower court decision nor the 
composition of the panel majority for the decision from which certiorari is petitioned are 
statistically significant predictors of certiorari grants for free expression cases before the Roberts 
Court.  If it is the case that ideological characteristics of cases below do not correlate with the 
certiorari decision and, more subtly, that the Court’s merits and certiorari dockets reflect some 
degree of congruency, then scholars claiming a non-ideological explanation for the Court’s 
behavior in free expression cases have another analytical leg to stand on (H2).  If, however, 
disparities between the two dockets exist, there may be reason to believe the Court does respond 
to ideological cues but only within particular issue areas.  In fact, the probabilities reported in 
Figure 5.1 for issue area presence on the Court’s certiorari docket suggest such disparities. Issue 
areas coded as medium frequency are 9.9% points less likely to be granted certiorari and those 
scored as high frequency are 7.6%  points less likely than those characterized as low frequency 
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to be granted certiorari, though the latter does not register at conventional levels of statistical 
significance.     
  Table 5.3 sorts issue area categories in descending value of the difference between 
composition of the Court’s free speech certiorari docket and free speech merits docket.  The 
issue areas with the greatest positive difference (indicating overrepresented areas) are those 
concerning “Free Market Electoral” speech (challenges to campaign finance regulations), speech 
claims involving unions and/or union (non)members, and controversies featuring non-
mainstream  ideologies (controversial ideologies such as white nationalism, anti-war, animal 
rights, and others that may represent extreme conservative or liberal positions but do not 
comfortably fit within the mainstream of American politics). Conversely, the issue areas 
featuring the greatest negative difference include prisoner speech claims, government 
employee/whistleblower speech claims, and (non-religious) student speech claims.  If student 
speech claims involving religion – a separate issue area due to the additional jurisprudential 
consideration of Establishment and/or Free Exercise Clauses – are added to the student speech 
category, it becomes the most underrepresented issue area on the Court’s merits docket.  
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Table 5.3 – Comparison of Certiorari and Merits Dockets, 2005-2015 (Free Speech) 
Issue Area Grants Denials Difference 
Free Market Electoral 13.64 3.77 9.87 
Union 11.36 2.26 9.1 
Non-Mainstream Ideology 11.36 4.15 7.21 
Petition Circulation/Ballot Access 6.82 3.02 3.8 
Elected Official Speech 4.55 1.51 3.04 
Sex/Gender, Women's Health 4.55 2.64 1.91 
Sex/Gender, LGBTQ Equality 2.27 0.75 1.52 
Electoral/Political Speech 9.09 8.68 0.41 
Religious 6.82 6.42 0.4 
Media 2.27 1.89 0.38 
Terrorism/Security 2.27 2.26 0.01 
Faculty Speech 2.27 2.64 -0.37 
Lawyer 2.27 3.77 -1.5 
Libel, Related Torts 0 1.51 -1.51 
Child Pornography 2.27 4.53 -2.26 
Sex/Gender, Adult Ent./Pornography 0 2.64 -2.64 
Religious Student Speech 2.27 5.66 -3.39 
Commercial/Business 2.27 6.04 -3.77 
Miscellaneous 0 4.15 -4.15 
Government Employee/Whistleblower 9.09 14.34 -5.25 
Non-religious Student Speech 2.27 8.68 -6.41 
Prisoner Speech 2.27 8.68 -6.41 
    
Note: N for each category by year is noted in Appendix G. Percentages indicate 
proportion of overall certiorari docket from the 2005 through December of the 
2015 term. 
  
 The overrepresentation of campaign finance and union speech claims on the merits 
docket, which have overwhelmingly been anti-union and anti-campaign regulation, is consistent 
with the conservative Court narrative advanced most forcefully by Erwin Chemerinsky (2011), 
Monica Youn (2011), and David Kairys (2013). Continued litigation in the underrepresented 
areas focusing on the application of strands of the Tinker standard (student speech), the Turner 
test (prisoner speech), and the Ceballos framework (government employees) – have attracted 
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similar criticism.  Chemerinsky (2011) singles out the Court’s merits decisions in these areas for 
pointed criticism as evidence of the Court’s unwillingness to protect the interests of the relatively 
powerless in society.  David Cole (2010) and Youn (2011) have offered similar criticisms, 
pointing to the Chief Justice’s opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1 
(2010)) and the Court’s emergent anti-union streak (ruling for non-members’ compelled speech 
claims and against union fee collection efforts) as additional support for the ideological 
explanation narrative.  
 In the sections that follow, I sketch a more Janus-faced portrait of the Court that at once 
supports and casts doubt on ideological explanations for judicial behavior in contemporary free 
expression controversies.  To demonstrate how and why scholars can connect the two dockets to 
reach better inferences about judicial behavior, I conduct within-case analyses of substantially 
overrepresented issue areas on the Court’s certiorari docket: government employee and student 
(religious and non-religious) speech claims. These issue areas have been chosen because they 
have been flashpoints for scholarly criticism on the Court’s merits docket.  For each issue area, I 
examine three themes:  The extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court has responded to the 
petitioning of each issue area preference, any patterns that may exist concerning the ideological 
direction of lower decisions from which certiorari is petitioned, and the contours of cases denied 
certiorari in order to illustrate their geographically limited but substantial impacts on particular 
social and legal classes.  Overall, I find that the Justices are clearly hunting for vehicles to further 
a conservative, Republican agenda in the context of union and campaign finance speech claims, 
but that pattern has not been replicated within all of the underrepresented issue areas that 
scholars have singled out for criticism.   
  
243 
 
 
 
 Government Employee Speech: Whistleblowers and Retaliation 
  The Court’s government employee speech jurisprudence has historically attempted to 
balance the First Amendment rights of those employed by the government with the ability of 
government organizations to function.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1892 decision in 
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, a Massachusetts free expression decision against a local 
police officer for “talking politics” and notable for the line, “The petitioner may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” stands 
for the principle that government employment is a privilege rather than a right (155 Mass. 216, 
220 (Mass., 1892)).  This sentiment has been rejected or at least severely qualified by a series of 
subsequent decisions, most notably Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) and Connick v. 
Myers (1983) in order to both protect free expression and ensure government organization 
functionality.42   
 Generally speaking, the Court has adopted the “privilege” line of thinking in recent 
decisions, though all justices appear to accept the premise that government employees receive 
some level of First Amendment protection.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, decided in 2006, is a recent 
example of the Court’s approach to claims brought by whistleblowers for alleged retaliation. 
Richard Ceballos, assistant district attorney for Los Angeles County, faced a series of retaliatory 
actions after discovering (and sharing with defense attorneys) problems with a legal affidavit that 
was the basis for the issuance of a search warrant in an ongoing criminal case.  The Court, 
                                                 
42 391 U.S. 563 (1968), holding that the firing of a school district teacher for a letter published in a local newspaper 
critical of the school board’s attempts to raise revenues violated the First Amendment rights of government 
employees), and 461 U.S. 138 (1983), holding that a New Orleans’ ADA’s circulation of a workplace morale 
petition after being transferred to another position and resulting in her termination was not speech on matters of a 
public concern protected under the First Amendment.   
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through Justice Kennedy in a 5-4 decision split along ideological lines, interpreted the precedent 
established in Pickering v. Board of Education as allowing for retaliatory actions within 
government hierarchies only when a government employee speaks on matters of public concern 
as a citizen.  Put another way, the Court held that to give government organizations breathing 
room in the execution of duties, a free speech challenge can only stand when a government 
employee’s speech on matters of public concern (here, alleged corruption in the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney’s Office) is separate from that employee’s official duties.  Writing for 
the Court’s liberal bloc in dissent, Justice Souter assailed the formalistic, “false distinction” 
between speaking as a government employee and speaking as a citizen.   
 In 2014, the Court appeared to backtrack a bit on the Ceballos holding in Lane v. Franks 
(134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014)), which held that a government employee’s testimony in a federal 
corruption investigation of a faculty member (and former legislator) at an Alabama community 
college was protected by the First Amendment.  Justice Sotomayor’s expression of pro-speech 
principles was somewhat diminished by the simultaneous holding that the president of the 
community college who had refused to rehire Lane was protected under the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. Though the Ceballos decision has been maligned by some scholars (Chemerinsky 
2011; Youn 2011), less is known about the Court’s broader government employee speech 
agenda.   
 Though Table 5.4 reveals a generally unsympathetic trend toward government speech 
claimants, the Court’s hostility to government employee speech claims has been marked by 
important exceptions.  Consider Jackler v. Byrne, where a 2nd Circuit panel vacated a lower court 
decision that relied on Ceballos in dismissing a free speech claim brought by a police officer 
who refused to make false statements relating to an excessive force complaint brought by a New 
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York citizen (658 F.3d 225 (2nd Cir., 2011)). Jason Jackler, responding to a call for assistance by 
fellow officer Greg Metakes, arrived to find suspect Zachary Jones in custody.  Jackler described 
Jones as having “multiple abrasions on his face” and indicated that he was subsequently “struck 
in the face” by Officer Metakes after directing an obscenity toward him.  After Jackler filed his 
report in the course of Jones’ official complaint against Metakes, Jackler’s superiors pressured 
him to withdraw his supplementary report – which he refused to do.  Jackler, a probationary 
officer at the time, was subsequently denied promotion to permanent officer in the Middletown 
Police Department. 
 Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Kearse noted that while the Ceballos decision was 
controlling, the filing of a supplementary report concerning police misconduct was not simply 
speech in the course of Jackler’s official duties as an agent of the state.  Instead, “Jackler had a 
strong First Amendment interest in refusing to make a report that was dishonest. We think it 
clear that his refusals to change his statement as to what he witnessed when Metakes struck Jones 
were directed at a matter of public concern, rather than an effort to further some private interest 
of Jackler personally. The use of excessive force by a police officer is a matter of serious public 
concern...Metakes's use of force against Jones did not implicate Jackler's ability to do his own 
job properly…” (658 F.3d 225, 240). As such, the stated government interest in Ceballos – “the 
proper performance of government functions” and the “integrity” of the Middletown Police 
Department – was distinguished from the context of Jackler’s speech.    
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Table 5.4 – Government Employee Speech Cert. Denials [Merits Decisions], 2005-2015 
 Anti-Speech Mixed Pro-Speech Totals 
Liberal 5 
(12.82%) 
0 5 [2] 
(12.82%) 
10 
(25.64%) 
Undetermined 7 
(17.95%) 
3 
(7.69%) 
3 
(7.69%) 
13 
(33.33%) 
Conservative 16 [1] 
(41.03%) 
0 0 16 
(41.03%) 
Totals 28 
(71.79%) 
3 
(7.69%) 
8 
(20.51%) 
39 
(100%) 
 
 
 Beyond the Supreme Court decisions in the area of government speech which have 
generally made such claims more difficult to prevail upon (Ceballos) or removed the teeth of 
redress via qualified immunity (Lane), the frequency of government employee speech claims 
illustrates the importance of accounting for certiorari decisions prior to advancing broad-brush 
claims about the U.S. Supreme Court agenda.  Table 5.4 illustrates that there is a conservative 
cast to the Court’s agenda-setting decisions in this frequently litigated issue area.  The Court has 
been far more willing to deny certiorari for lower court decisions that have been decided in a 
conservative direction, though a handful of less restrictive, liberal decisions have been left 
standing.  If, instead of a closer contextual reading of the identity of the government employee in 
a case, the liberal outcome of interest is simply whether government employees prevail on free 
speech claims, then the effect of the Court’s cert. denials has been generally anti-speech (71.79% 
of all government employee cases).  Still, decisions like Jackler that the Court has declined to 
revisit in order to settle conflict signaled by lower court judges are useful legal resources for 
employees bringing whistleblower actions against government employment hierarchies and draw 
attention to how doctrinal standards can be meaningfully affected by the certiorari vote alone.  
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 Student Speech 
 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court considered the constitutionality of a school principal’s 
suspension of Joseph Frederick, who had displayed a “pro-drug” banner near school property 
during the passing of the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay through Juneau, Alaska.  Frederick, along 
with other students, unfurled a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” during the event, for 
which students were released from classes to attend.  Frederick was not on school property 
during the event, but the banner was clearly visible from the school.  In his opinion for the Court 
– again, mostly divided along ideological lines – Chief Justice Roberts argued that the school’s 
interest in maintaining an environment free of disorder and “pro-drug” messages outweighed 
Frederick’s countervailing interest in free expression under the First Amendment.  The decision 
was the latest in a line of student speech decisions that have incrementally chipped away at the 
robust protection for student speech articulated by Justice Fortas in the Vietnam War protest case 
of Tinker v. Des Moines (393 U.S. 503 (1969)).43 Mary Beth Tinker, her brother, and another 
student who chose to wear black armbands as a way to silently yet symbolically protest the 
Vietnam conflict and was subsequently suspended for doing so.  In ruling for Tinker and against 
the school district armband policy, Justice Fortas made clear that students do not shed their 
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate (393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).  
                                                 
43 The Court qualified the Tinker holding in subsequent decisions against student speech claims in Bethel School 
District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), which held that a school’s suspension of a student for a sexually explicit 
student election nomination speech did not violate the First Amendment because it was unrelated to any political 
viewpoint expressed, and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1987), which held that because schools were not 
traditional public forums, the school’s removal of parts of a student news publication entailed a more deferential 
level of First Amendment scrutiny.  The Roberts Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
represents a similar narrowing of student speech rights. 
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 Decisions on the merits represent only one vehicle by which the Court has adjusted the 
boundaries of student speech protection. Most notably, in 2005 the Court denied certiorari in 
Hosty v. Carter, a Seventh Circuit en banc decision that applied the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood 
v. Kuhlmeier standard for restricting high school student speech to a university’s student 
newspaper (412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir., 2005)).  In the case, Jeni Porche and other members of The 
Innovator, including Margaret Hosty, published articles critical of the Dean of the College of 
Arts and Sciences (Roger K. Oden) following the university’s dismissal of The Innovator’s 
faculty adviser, Geoffrey de Laforcade.  Following requests by college administrators to retract 
allegedly defamatory and false statements printed by the Innovator – requests falling on deaf ears 
– Dean of Student Services Patricia Carter called the printer of the Innovator and asked that 
printing cease for any issues not approved by the administration in advance.  Due to the 
uncertainty of funding for the printing of the paper, the printer complied and the student 
newspaper brought suit in federal court under the First Amendment’s free speech and press 
clauses.  Following a finding of summary judgment for all officials except Patricia Carter, Carter 
appealed the affirmance of a Seventh Circuit panel citing qualified immunity to the First 
Amendment claim.   
 A divided Seventh Circuit ruled that SCOTUS’s Hazelwood precedent favored Carter’s 
defense of qualified immunity, and that the Innovator’s First Amendment claim failed under the 
Court’s line of student speech cases.  Despite finding that the Innovator constituted a designated 
public forum and was therefore shielded from ex post censorship or punishment for printing 
materials the administration did not approve of, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion made clear that 
Carter was protected from the suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.  In other words, 
Carter could not have “reasonably” been expected to know the limits of the Court’s Hazelwood 
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decision, which Easterbrook interpreted as hinging on whether student speech occurred in a 
public forum or not, rather than whether the student speech at issue was that of a high school or 
college student (412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir., 2005)).  Writing in dissent, Judge Evans argued that 
the high school-college distinction was the rule articulated by the Court in Hazelwood rather than 
the forum analysis rule relied on by Easterbrook and the majority, and noted that the decision put 
the Court at odds with at least two other federal circuit courts (412 F.3d 731, 743-744 (Evans, J., 
dissenting)).  
Table 5.5 – Student (Non-religious) Speech Cert. Denials [and Grants], 2005-2015 
 Anti-Speech Mixed Pro-Speech Totals 
Liberal 7 
(29.17%) 
__ 3 
(12.5%) 
10 
(41.67%) 
Undetermined 1 
(4.17%) 
2 
(8.33%) 
2 
(8.33%) 
5 
(20.83%) 
Conservative 6 [1] 
(25%) 
__ 3 
(12.5%) 
9 
(37.5%) 
Totals 14 
(58.33%) 
2 
(8.33%) 
8 
(33.33%) 
24 
(100%) 
 
  
 The upshot of Hosty was a shrinking of the First Amendment protective sphere for 
students at public universities, continuing the backslide of student speech rights since the Court’s 
Tinker decision.  Paired with Frederick, there is at least some congruency between the Court’s 
certiorari and merits dockets when it comes to speaking in schools: According to Chemerinsky, 
“It is difficult to read [Frederick] and see the Roberts Court as protective of free speech” (2011, 
728).  Out of the 44 free expression decisions on the Court’s merits docket during the period of 
analysis, Frederick is the only source of light on that subject.  But expanding the scope of 
inquiry from merits decisions alone to the certiorari agenda suggests that this is an 
overstatement.   
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 Table 5.5 reveals the Court’s student speech certiorari decisions as generally evenhanded 
– liberal and conservative claims have either been rejected or granted at roughly the same rate.44 
The Court has left standing decisions upholding the constitutionality of school bans on displays 
of the Confederate flag as well as holding unconstitutional school disciplinary actions for the 
wearing of a shirt that portrayed President George W. Bush and the Iraq War in an unfavorable 
light.45  In two cases decided by the 3rd Circuit and denied certiorari in the 2011 term, the en 
banc decisions asserted that the Tinker precedent was not limited to “brick and mortar” 
schoolhouses, but also student speech originating on non-school district computers.46 If the 
assignment of more contextual, ideological codes for these claimants – a student speech claim 
brought by a student for such right-wing speech as Confederate Flag displays is not clearly a 
liberal win in the in-group bias account – is put aside and instead the liberal outcome of interest 
is the availability of free speech claims for all students, the effect of cert. denials is pro-student 
just over 33% of the time.  Again, however, for students across multiple federal jurisdictions, the 
Court’s Frederick precedent is not necessarily the most significant decision on the issue of 
student speech protection.  Certiorari denials have carved out notches of First Amendment 
protection that exist alongside the Frederick line of cases, creating flexibility and uncertainty in 
the law for would-be litigants.   
  
                                                 
44 Frederick has been cited in support of the storyline that argues a double standard exists in the Roberts Court’s 
treatments of some free speech litigants.  Monica Youn (2011) and Adam Liptak (2012)  have both cited Erwin 
Chemersinky’s “Not a Free Speech Court” (2011)  in presenting this argument.   
45 Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir., 2010), upholding Tennessee school district policy prohibiting displays of 
the Confederate Flag in light of historical and contemporaneous racial tension at the school; Guiles v. Marineau, 461 
F.3d 320 (2nd Cir., 2006), ruling in favor of student suspended for wearing shirt critical of President Bush, the Iraq 
War, and featuring drug references; Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir., 2008), upholding a school district ban on 
the Confederate Flag and other racially divisive symbols as permissible, content-based (rather than viewpoint-based) 
restrictions in applying the Tinker standard. 
46 Layshock v. Hermitage Area School District, 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3rd Cir., 2011); J.S. v. Blue Mountain School 
District, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir., 2011). 
251 
 
 
 Religious Speech and Schools 
 Writing shortly after the conclusion of the Court’s 2014 term, Linda Greenhouse noted: 
“The court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts has been one of the most religion-friendly Supreme 
Courts in modern history. Nearly every religious claim presented to the court has emerged a 
winner, from explicitly sectarian prayer at town board meetings, in last year’s closely 
divided Town of Greece decision, to beards for Muslim inmates in a prison system that banned 
facial hair — a unanimous decision that defied the court’s tradition of deference to prison 
officials and their rules” (Greenhouse 2015).  Speech claims involving religion have appeared on 
the Court’s docket with some regularity, beginning with the Court’s decision in Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)), the unanimous 2009 decision holding that a city’s 
refusal to place a Gnostic Christian statue depicting the sect’s “Seven Aphorisms” in a public 
park – while also choosing to accept a Ten Commandments statue for display in the same park – 
did not violate the First Amendment.  The decision was noteworthy for building on the so-called 
government speech doctrine, which would be elaborated upon in the Court’s Sons of Confederate 
Veterans decision in 2015.   
 Later, a 5-4 Court through Justice Ginsburg would uphold the University of California’s 
“take all comers” policy against a challenge by a Christian student organization, which sought to 
exclude members based upon certain characteristics, including sexual orientation (561 U.S. 661 
(2010)).  Perhaps most famously, an 8-1 Court struck down a jury award of damages for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the father of a marine killed in Iraq, whose funeral 
was picketed by the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas (562 U.S. 443 (2011)).  And 
most recently, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert (135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)), a unanimous Court voted to 
invalidate an Arizona municipality’s sign ordinance that – arguably – treated roadside signs 
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differently on the basis of content.  The victorious party in the suit, Pastor Clyde Reed and his 
Good News Presbyterian Church congregation had protested the town’s treatment of 
noncommercial signs as a content-based burden on speech.  The invalidated ordinance held that 
such signs be displayed no more than 12 hours before and one hour after an event – and be only 
six square feet in size – while political signs were regulated less stringently (Margolin 2015).   
 Viewed in light of the Court’s certiorari docket in student religious speech cases (or 
religion and schools generally), Greenhouse’s claim is clearly overstated.  It is true that the 
Court’s decisions in Summum, Phelps, and Reed were victories for mainstream Christian and 
conservative religious speakers, while only Christian Legal Society placed liberal anti-
discrimination and equality principles before the expression and association claims of a 
conservative Christian university organization.  A review of the Roberts Era certiorari docket 
demonstrates the Court has consistently ruled against religious speakers or for the secular 
position.   
Table 5.6– Religious and Non-religious Student Speech Cert. Denials [and Grants], 2005-
2015 
 Anti-Speech Mixed Pro-Speech Total 
Liberal 18 [1] 
(47.37%) 
- 2 
(5.26%) 
20 
(52.63%) 
Undetermined 3 
(7.89%) 
4 
(10.53%) 
1 
(2.63%) 
8 
(21.05%) 
Conservative 6 [1] 
(15.79%) 
- 4 
(10.53%) 
10 
(26.32%) 
Total 27 
(71.05%) 
4 
(10.53%) 
7 
(18.42%) 
38 
(100%) 
 
 
 Adding religious student speech cases to the analysis confirms that across all student 
speech claims on the certiorari docket, the pattern has been anti-speech and liberal (against 
religious freedom claims brought by parents and/or students): Nearly 50% of cert. denials in this 
253 
 
 
area have been both anti-speech and let liberal decisions standing.  These cases have generally 
featured students – or parents filing suit on their behalf – facing adverse actions by school 
administrators for making religious statements in various forms, from art projects to 
commencement addresses.  In these conflicts, the liberal position is generally that of school 
administrators taking a secular position against religious claimants, conventionally a 
conservative First Amendment claim.  In Morgan v. Swanson (659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir., 2011)), for 
example, parents of a student unsuccessfully brought a free speech claim against a local school 
after a teacher prevented distribution of a student (and apparently, parent) designed Christmas 
card retelling the Christian "story of the candy cane." Here, the Court had an opportunity to 
expand the sphere of First Amendment protection available to religious speakers and resolve an 
inter-circuit conflict in the process, but chose not to. 
 Occasionally, the Court has also denied certiorari to the benefit of conservative positions.  
Consider Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District (426 F.3d 617 (2nd Cir., 2005)), where a 
student project (completed with the aid of a parent) included overt Christian references on a 
kindergarten poster. The theme for this elementary school assignment was saving the 
environment. After the poster was rejected by the student’s teacher and the school principal, the 
student (and parent) completed a second poster – a poster that was displayed but partially 
censored at the discretion of the same officials.  By allowing the 2nd Circuit’s conservative 
decision to stand and assuming the justices vote preferentially at the agenda-setting stage, the 
Court’s conservative Justices may have viewed a denial as an effective vehicle to furthering the 
protection of mainstream religious speakers in public schools.  
 Alternatively, a grant in this case might have resulted in a merits decision that more 
strongly protects student religious claims, authoritatively and across the federal judiciary while 
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also resolving an inter-circuit conflict.   To be clear, the claim is not that a conservative Court, 
apparently sympathetic to constitutional claims by religious speakers, must always grant 
certiorari to the benefit of conservative religious claims or chagrin of liberal, secular causes.  But 
the substantial pro-secular trend in this area of free expression suggests that the Court is satisfied 
with the religious speaker and school forum standards established during the Rehnquist Era, or is 
actually less conservative on that issue and willing to allow gradual yet important adjustments 
via decisions on certiorari.  It could also be the case that the Court simply does not care as much 
about religion in this context, or at least not as much as recent commentary suggests.   
 
Discussion  
  Compared to the Court’s merits docket, denials of certiorari command far less attention 
from commentators and scholars, and have a more limited effect due to the formal geographical 
and legal limits of the state and circuit holdings left standing.  However, the within-issue area 
comparisons between the certiorari and merits dockets draw attention to the important effects of 
denials of certiorari on law and society.  The actions of the justices at certiorari shape doctrinal 
rules within particular issue subsets of First Amendment law, sometimes allowing circuits to 
walk back harsh standards imposed on claimants – as with government speech in Ceballos and 
Jackler – and other times further tightening speech-restrictive doctrines, as with student speech 
in Frederick and Hosty.  While recent work has examined how and when conflicts among 
circuits lead to grants of certiorari by the Court, these accounts tend to ignore how law and 
society are meaningfully shaped by certiorari decisions in their own right. In the future – and if 
eventually made available by one of the Court’s current justices - the degree to which 
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“aggressive grants” and “defensive denials” influence the free expression docket will become 
much clearer (Boucher and Segal 1995, 835).   
 Compared to union speech and free market electoral speech (campaign finance law), 
cases, government employee and student speech cases are substantially underrepresented on the 
Court’s merits docket.  The relatively high proportion of cases in the latter issue areas that 
continue to be petitioned to the Court post-Ceballos and Frederick is interesting, as the 
infrequency of cert. grants and the direction of the subsequent merits decisions suggest that the 
justices are less interested or hostile to these issues (Hurwitz 2006, 327).  In addition, available 
evidence demonstrates that there has not been one clear ideological winner, either.  Government 
speech denials of certiorari have generally been conservative, there is no clear ideological winner 
in non-religious student speech cases, and religious student speech cert. denials have generally 
been liberal (for school administrators or the “secular” position in the case).  This finding that the 
Court actively hunts for some types of cases – cases that are infrequently petitioned yet are 
overrepresented on the merits docket – is consistent with ideological explanations of Court 
behavior.  
 While there is less support for the ideological in-group explanation once accounting for 
patterns within those issue areas that commentators have singled out for criticism, the 
underrepresentation of cert. grants in the modal issue areas gives some reason for pause. This 
apparent lack of responsiveness to certain classes of litigants on the merits docket raises some 
questions about the extent to which continued, “upstream” efforts at agenda-setting – much like 
lower courts (Hurwitz 2006, 338), litigators (Baird 2004; 2007), and broader social and political 
trends (Pacelle 1991) - can be effective first-movers of sorts in influencing the US Supreme 
Court agenda outside of such areas as union non-member and campaign finance challenges.   
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Building upon recent work by scholars examining the ways in which unelected judges can 
produce quasi-democratic decisions in heavily litigated areas (Keck 2014), future research may 
also expand beyond free expression litigation in order to better understand how and the extent to 
which sustained, bottom-up litigation across different issue areas can secure a foothold on the 
Court’s limited merits docket.   Within the general legal area of the First Amendment and an eye 
toward theoretical development, the next step for this analysis is to look beyond the Roberts Era 
and compare certiorari patterns with the previous Rehnquist Era in order to better understand 
how these relationships have evolved over time. 
  
Conclusion 
 The free expression agenda of the Roberts Court has been the subject of sustained 
scrutiny by scholars and legal commentators.  To date, studies of the Court’s free expression 
agenda have been limited to votes on the merits of cases, with varying degrees of systematic case 
selection and vote analysis.  Scholars have examined these decisions in order to make claims 
about the Court’s agenda, sometimes describing it as applying a double standard and ignoring 
claims brought by vulnerable individuals. The conservative Court explanation, however, sits 
uncomfortably beside a substantial proportion of the merits docket upholding free speech claims 
brought by a menagerie of unpopular speakers. This study demonstrates how the certiorari 
docket may be leveraged by scholars attempting to adjudicate between this series of claims and, 
in doing so, offers a more nuanced picture of the Roberts Court’s free expression project.  
 In contemporary free expression controversies, access to the Court is most likely to occur 
when jurisprudential cues are present, including conflict, amicus curiae briefs, and the U.S. as a 
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litigating party.  This finding replicates traditional cue theory analyses and is somewhat 
unsurprising.  The cues that do not register at conventional levels of statistical significance, 
however, are the ideological indicators which include the direction of the lower court decision 
from which certiorari is petitioned and the political composition of the panel or en banc court 
issuing that decision. Once disaggregated by issue area, however, certiorari voting patterns 
provide support for and against ideological explanations of Court behavior, with patterns 
observed in student speech cases (religious and non-religious) perhaps the most counterintuitive. 
  These findings at once demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the conventional 
quantitative models often specified in studies of certiorari. First, modeling the effects of case 
factors on the certiorari vote provides additional leverage to scholars seeking to make broad 
claims about the Court’s motivations in particular issue areas.  Due to the issue of missing 
certiorari voting data for the individual justices in contemporary cases, scholars must remain 
wary of ecological inference barriers. The second point underscores a weakness of studies 
employing aggregate data: Disaggregating the Court’s free expression certiorari docket by issue 
area reveals that the Court has not been monolithic in furthering a conservative, Republican 
agenda.  The Court has had numerous opportunities to more effectively circumscribe free 
expression rights in the contexts of student (religious and non-religious) and government 
employee speech. Future efforts can and should expand beyond single issue areas and particular 
historical Courts to analyses that compare across these categories.   
 Beyond methodological concerns, it is clear that judicial behavior at the certiorari stage 
meaningfully shapes law across broad swaths of society, by virtue of the geographic sprawl of 
circuit court jurisdictions and the many individuals within institutional contexts shaped by these 
decisions. Extant scholarship has remarked on the importance of choices at the certiorari stage, 
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but these efforts rarely describe what those effects are or how they impact classes of citizens and 
litigants in practice (see Black and Owens 2009).  This chapter sketches one approach scholars 
may follow in putting “’jurisprudence’ back into ‘political jurisprudence,’” by describing what 
choices at the certiorari stage actually look like in practice and some potential effects on classes 
of litigants and citizens.  Ceballos was a doctrinal shift that placed the onus on government 
employees seeking to win First Amendment whistleblower and/or retaliation suits, yet lower 
circuit decisions like Jackler serve as a legal resource for many employees seeking redress for 
unconstitutional actions by employers. In cases involving offensive or disruptive speech by 
students – the classic Tinker speakers – the Court’s certiorari docket reveals that Frederick was 
not the last nor perhaps the most important word on the scope of student speech protections. 
Finally, the degree to which the label of “conservative” can be applied to the current Court’s free 
expression agenda appears to vary substantially across the issue areas scholars have identified as 
indicators of the Court’s commitment to protecting expression. The considerable variation within 
various issue areas on the discretionary certiorari docket suggests that U.S. Supreme Court 
observers and contemporary free expression scholars should be more circumspect in making 
inferences about the motivations of the justices.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Review of the Findings 
 This dissertation has been motivated primarily by the sustained attention to the Roberts 
Court’s puzzling constitution of U.S. First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.  As such, 
the dissertation focuses squarely on the actions and study of the justices in the contemporary era.  
A number of findings have emerged in each of the project’s chapters, beginning with rethinking 
concept measurement.  In chapter two, I developed and provided an initial assessment of a new 
composite directional variable based on the idea of “INUS” conditions, defined as “an 
insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 
result.” (Mackie 1965, 245; see also Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79-82). This composite 
indicator incorporated the identity of the speaker, speech act, and speech suppressor in assigning 
an ideological direction to judicial votes – each a necessary piece of information for determining 
the direction of a decision but none alone sufficient for characterizing a decision as liberal, 
conservative, or undetermined.  I assessed this variable’s performance in relation to the basic 
bivariate attitudinal model, finding that the relationship between values and career voting 
percentages in freedom of expression cases grows more tenuous as this indicator is refined to 
better capture the concept of interest: the ideological direction of decisions.  This finding is true 
for the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Eras under comparison, though particularly visible for the 
latter.  The upshot of this chapter is that additional work needs to be done in developing the 
indicators commonly employed in statistical analyses of judicial decision-making.  
 Chapter three answered the question of whether a relationship exists between the 
conservative attitudes of the justices and votes on First Amendment freedom of expression 
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claims for two Courts in the modern era. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Roberts Era is distinct in 
that the likelihood of pro-speech claim votes is strongly predicted by the ideological preferences 
of the justices, whereas the votes of the stable Rehnquist Court Era preceding the Roberts Court 
cannot be explained by those preferences.  This finding holds for both Segal-Cover and Martin-
Quinn operationalization of judicial preferences, and is not affected by the inclusion of various 
case-level factors in the regression models.  I did not anticipate this finding, particularly in light 
of previous work that found such a relationship.  
  In chapter three, I also argued for greater attention to the voting coalitions in cases as the 
key dependent variable of interest, rather than the probability of a pro-speech or anti-speech vote 
occurring given an aggregation of judicial votes. I find that a greater percentage of Roberts Era 
decisions (67%) are inconsistent with core assumptions of the attitudinal model of judging 
compared to the Rehnquist Era (62%).  A closer examination of conceptual typologies of Roberts 
and Rehnquist Era decisions finds support for the polarization paradox described by Brandon 
Bartels (2015, 24-27):  Fewer decisions in the current era are marked by weaker cases of voting 
order and disorder, yet more decisions are characterized as either unanimous or strong 
ideological ordering of the justices. 
 Chapter four shifted away from quantitative relationships between values and votes and 
instead adopts an internal view of judicial decision-making.  The period of analysis was the 
Roberts Court from the 2005-2014 terms, and the subject of interest was First Amendment free 
speech decisions.  While I did not enter this stage of the research with firm expectations, 
previous scholarship suggested that special attention be paid to conceptions of the judicial role, 
the role of various free speech theories, and the role of jurisprudential structures like the content-
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neutrality regime.  Chapter four took seriously the idea that the content of judicial opinions can 
provide valuable insight to the practice of judicial decision-making.  
 In drawing upon the method of process tracing and the use of “hoop tests” to highlight 
when and how the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions are particularly problematic for the 
attitudinal paradigm of judging, I found evidence that the Roberts Court’s make-up is actually 
fairly heterogeneous in terms of conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices and the types 
of ideological commitments held by those justices.  Furthermore, this comprehensive and 
detailed diagnosis of the Roberts Court justices’ constitution of freedom of expression revealed 
that the jurisprudential regime commonly known as “content neutrality” has been eroded by a 
competing, pragmatic approach regularly expressed by Justice Breyer (and now joined by 
members of the Court’s liberal bloc, including Justices Kagan and Ginsburg) and ideological 
fractures within the Court’s conservative bloc.  The latter finding is illustrated most prominently 
by the opinions of Justices Alito and Thomas, as well as Chief Justice Roberts’ apparent 
commitment to preserving the institutional legitimacy of the Court.  These results may be 
attributable to the types of cases the Court chooses to review compared to the Rehnquist Era, 
where fewer controversies focus on the rights of the traditional soapbox speaker embedded in 
First Amendment jurisprudence and more concern the emerging government speech doctrine and 
efforts to expand the meaning of speech under the First Amendment. 
 Chapter five offered an innovative approach to interrogating the purported ideological 
motivations of the Roberts Court, leveraging the certiorari process in evaluating claims that the 
Court has been generally conservative.  I developed  an original dataset of all fairly comparable 
denials of certiorari in free speech cases from the 2005 to 2014 terms (and some early 2015 term 
decisions prior to the death of Justice Scalia), and through the use of a logit regression model 
262 
 
 
find support for both ideological and jurisprudential considerations at the agenda-setting stage.  
Through case studies of the issue areas frequently petitioned before the Court, I also find that 
narratives critical of the Court’s decisions in cases involving students, government employees, 
and religious student claimants may be in need of revision.  While jurisprudential considerations 
appear to explain more grants of certiorari in aggregate, a closer examination of particular issue 
areas on the Court’s certiorari docket reveals both predictable and surprising ideological trends. 
 
External or Internal? 
 This project was motivated, in part, by scholarship seeking to integrate two perspectives 
on judicial decision-making that have often stood in opposition to one another: the external and 
internal approaches.  The external approach privileges observable behavior – judicial votes – 
over the content of opinions and generally seeks to establish correlations between judicial 
attitudes and patterns across decisions.  The internal approach emphasizes the institutional norms 
and rules that structure decision-making, viewing the constraining (or enabling) language of law 
as an important factor in evaluating the work of judges.  Here, scholars tend to take the content 
of opinions and organizing force of jurisprudential structures seriously – without denying the 
role played by ideological attitudes.   
 Beginning with the general premise that the judicial constitution of free expression may 
be an ideological or more nuanced, legal practice, this dissertation cannot claim to definitively 
settle this ongoing debate.  I am not even confident stating, as Feldman does, that in terms of 
prediction the more effective view is “ the external view, maybe (and I mean maybe ).” (2005, 
118).  This is due to the essentially contested nature of what the judicial enterprise is, and the 
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Rorschach nature of the enterprise of Supreme Court judging in particular.  Even with the 
caution in measurement expressed in chapter two and the effort to develop more valid indicators, 
scholars interested in the bottom line may view the key takeaway from this project as 
conservatism predicting the decisions observed in free expression controversies.  This claim is 
supported by the data, and there is nothing inherently wrong with it. 
 It is, however, an incomplete claim.  Deviations from expected voting patterns happen 
frequently enough that more detailed analyses giving attention to the so-called legal elements of 
the enterprise are warranted, even recommended.  After looking from both perspectives and in 
light of the data offered in this project, my position is that scholars interested in high court 
politics should give weight to both approaches.  If nothing else, an external view sympathizer 
will gain context beyond the bottom line and better understand the limits of such dominant 
paradigms as the attitudinal conception of judging.  Similarly, those who see judging as a 
particular form of bottom-up reasoning embedded in and constrained by the specific institutional 
context of the Court can gain a richer understanding of how the inevitable need for discretion in 
hard cases where ‘the law runs out’ opens the door for the insights of the external approaches.  In 
that regard, I provisionally accept Feldman’s more basic argument: “Both [approaches] are valid 
and…intertwine.” (2005, 129).  
 Beyond the broader contributions noted in each chapter, it is hoped that this project will 
serve as a more comprehensive, empirical model for other scholars seeking to understand how 
the two approaches intertwine in practice.  Despite my efforts here, I also recognize this account 
is underinclusive in that additional areas of the decision-making process can be leveraged in 
understanding the relative roles of ideology and legal structures.  For example, another direction 
this project may take as it develops is accounting for the strategies employed by litigators as they 
264 
 
 
seek review and adjudication of freedom of expression controversies.  Judges need law to justify 
decisions, no matter the grounds on which the decisions are actually reached.  And in the case of 
the Supreme Court, those legal options are presented to the justices by litigators. These litigators 
have an institutional capacity “to think and act independently, and thus to challenge official state 
law…especially true within the United States’ decentralized governmental and adversarial legal 
systems” (Wilson 2013, 22). Litigators transform claims into rights, and understanding their 
arguments sheds light on claims about the principled or power-politics views of law (Brigham 
1987; McCann 1996).   
 Though it is true that judges ultimately decide the content of rights, they are only one 
type of what Ran Hirschl terms “strategic legal innovators” who “determine the timing, extent, 
and nature” of constitutional guarantees (Hirschl 2004, 43).   Litigators provide information to 
the justices (McAtee and McGuire 2007), locate a case within a particular constitutional tradition 
(Wedeking 2010), and drive the agenda of the Supreme Court.  A key difference between the 
Supreme Court and the other branches of the federal government is that unlike members of 
Congress and the President, the justices are relatively passive actors.  They require litigators to 
articulate claims before them, to petition for certiorari in a complex, adversarial process (Perry 
1991), and to sharpen arguments made in briefs during oral advocacy (Johnson et al. 2012).   
 Theories of judicial decision-making are explicitly judge-centric: concerned with the 
determinants of the behavior of judges.  The general preferences of judges are inferred from 
observable behavior, as captured by the effect of a cause or package of causes within a single 
case or across a population of cases.  It is true that litigators craft persuasive legal arguments in 
the course of Supreme Court adjudication, yet the longstanding realist assumption is that legal 
doctrine does not offer a definitive, correct answer in particular cases (Tamanaha 2010; Holmes 
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1897), especially due to the method by which the Supreme Court is constituted.  For external 
view adherents, complicated free speech doctrinal rules such as public forum analysis, low v. 
high value speech, and speech v. conduct distinctions merely frame disputes for justices – it is 
somewhat problematic to suggest that law alone caused a result in a particular case or provided a 
definitively “correct” answer (Horwitz 2013).  
 Litigators then, whether motivated by winning a case for a particular client or seeking to 
establish case precedents favorable to broader partisan movements, must be intimately familiar 
with the preferences of the justices.  It follows that litigators should be expected to craft 
strategies based on the perceived preferences and motivations of judges.  While it is the case that 
lawyers need law (Price 2013), it is also true that judges need litigators to do more than simply 
frame cases within the appropriate area of law.  If theories of judicial decision-making do reveal 
something about the actual preferences of justices, then it stands to reason that litigators will 
appeal to those preferences in order to increase the likelihood of winning cases. 
 
Free Speech in U.S. Society 
 This dissertation is U.S. Supreme Court-centric.  I also recognize that however important 
the role of the Court in establishing the contours of this area of law, freedom of expression is not 
a value cabined by high court politics. This recognition points toward additional, future research 
avenues. During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election campaign, freedom of speech became a 
hotly contested issue.  Donald Trump began his campaign, in part, on a platform opposed to 
liberal, politically correct (or “PC”) culture in society (Itkowitz 2015).  In the immediate 
aftermath of the election, the news cycle focus shifted to the spread of so-called “fake news” – a 
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term which now encompasses everything from stories that are literally untrue, to stories based on 
anonymous, unverified sources, to others that clearly reflect a set of partisan or ideological 
commitments (Holan 2016).  Following inauguration on Jan. 20, 2017, President Trump has 
regularly been at odds with mainstream media outlets, in one example calling such outlets the 
“enemy of the people.” (Jackson 2017).  
 Concurrent with President Trump’s sparring, college campuses have witnessed new 
unrest in light of student efforts to organize talks by conservative or “alt-right” speakers.  The 
violent response by Berkeley students and other members of the community to a scheduled Milo 
Yiannopoulos appearance in late January 2017 (Fuller and Mele 2017), followed by the 
cancellation of a scheduled talk by controversial political scientist Charles Murray at Middlebury 
College (Volokh 2017), have tested the broader social commitment to free expression in the 
American polity.  Speech  in protest of conservative guest speakers on college campuses has 
rarely taken the form of the counterspeech Mill argued would strengthen truth in his canonical 
account, and has at times been accompanied by violent conduct.  Other American institutions and 
ideological orientations have not been immune to free speech controversies either, as members of 
the U.S. Senate learned in February 2017 following Senator Elizabeth Warren’s attempt to read 
Coretta Scott King’s letter against Jeff Sessions’ nomination to a federal district judge position 
nearly a generation ago (Chappell 2017). 
 These controversies underscore the role of freedom of expression as a political value 
often put in the service of competing ideological and partisan camps.  In the contemporary era, 
freedom of expression has at times been framed as in opposition to the goal of social and 
political equality for historically oppressed members of society.  Though a number of these 
battles involve disputes between bitterly opposed, private associations and interests, in recent 
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years freedom of speech has also been a mainstay on the nation’s legal agenda.  The justices of 
the U.S. Supreme Court are ultimately charged with constituting the content of our First 
Amendment protection as individuals come into conflict with government actions.  The opinions 
of the justices often remind us of why it is that freedom of expression is an important value 
beyond immediate instrumental use by political adversaries.  Further interrogation of the social 
constitution of U.S. free expression is one direction this study may take in the future: Laura Beth 
Nielsen’s (2004) assessment of the role of harassing speech of women in the public sphere and 
Josh Wilson’s (2013) study of the tactics engaged in by pro-life protestors are potential models 
for moving beyond courts and to broader society.  
 
Beyond the U.S. Context 
 In one notable respect, this dissertation is limited by the fact that the U.S. free expression 
tradition is only a single case study: It is an explanation for a single important event (the scope 
and coverage of contemporary free expression law) but it is unclear what, if anything, may be 
generalizable to the broader question of how constitutive rules of constitutional law structure 
judicial decision-making.  Throughout the project, the Rehnquist Court Era (1994-2004) has 
served as a comparison point for inferential leverage, and to assess what relative changes the 
Roberts Court has brought to the constitution of freedom of expression law.  I have also 
compared the merits agenda of the Roberts Court to its certiorari docket in an effort to assess 
various explanations for the Court’s behavior. 
 Moving forward, I intend to compare the Roberts Court Era to a similarly situated 
tribunal to better understand the interplay between ideology, legal structures, and case outcomes.  
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The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) frequently considers freedom of expression controversies 
brought under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  A package of 
associated rights, Section 2 states that “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) 
Freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful 
assembly; and (d) freedom of association.”  Unlike the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment or 
accompanying text, the Canadian Charter also contains a clear qualification to this package of 
related rights: Section 1 states, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”   
 As Richard Moon notes, Section 2(b) “roughly parallels the distinction in American 
jurisprudence between content restrictions and time, place, and manner restrictions.” (Moon 
2000, 34).  In terms of the two-step analysis which first requires the Supreme Court of Canada to 
determine whether the government has infringed on the fundamental freedom of expression and 
then calls for scrutiny under Section 1 (“The court asks whether the restriction represents a 
substantial purpose, advances this purpose rationally, impairs the freedom no more than is 
necessary, and is proportionate to the impairment of freedom.” (Moon 2000, 35)), the Court’s 
analysis approximates the heightened and/or strict scrutiny regime adopted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in cases where the government regulates speech on the basis of the message being 
conveyed.   
 Previous scholarship has also found another similarity between the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court:  the justices political preferences emerge as statistically 
significant explanations for career voting patterns.  Songer and Johnson (2007) found that the 
269 
 
 
party of the prime minister appointing a justice was positively correlated with career liberal 
voting percentages in cases involving economic disputes, though not in criminal or civil rights 
and liberties cases (928, 930-931).  This effort stood in contrast to the work of Tate and 
Sittiwong (1989), who found appointee partisanship as one of a series of judicial attributes 
related to voting percentages.  Still others have argued that the Supreme Court of Canada is not 
motivated primarily by partisanship: Alaire and Green (2009) assess the relationship between 
Segal-Cover score approximations for the Canadian justices and career liberalism voting 
percentages across five different case types – including Charter controversies – and find that “the 
attitudinal model of decision-making does not apply straightforwardly to the Supreme Court of 
Canada.” (33-36, 43). 
 C.L. Ostberg and Matthew Wetstein provide an assessment of the relationship between 
the Canadian justices and votes in free expression cases from 1994-2003 and find that the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in this area of law do not follow the same ideological 
patterns as U.S. cases (2007, 144).  Left unanswered is whether this finding is time-bound, and 
whether that difference may be attributed to the differences in constitutional language and 
jurisprudential structures. Recent work on additional ideological dimensions of decisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court beyond “liberal” and “conservative” suggests this is a topic that may benefit 
from a comparative study (Robinson and Swedlow 2015). Unsettled as this debate may be, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s record on freedom of expression would be an interesting comparison 
point for the U.S. Supreme Court in the modern era, particularly as the former has heard a 
number of cases related to campaign finance law and the practices of workers’ unions.  Earlier 
comparative work in terms of U.S.-Canada freedom of expression law focused on a narrow slice 
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of cases - hate speech and subversive speech – and at a an earlier point in the Canadian Court’s 
life (Greenawalt 1992).   
 Early data collection in connection with the Global Free Speech Repository project at 
Syracuse University has also found that, despite the comparatively short period of development 
for Canadian free speech jurisprudence, the justices often cite to the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
course of their opinions.  On multiple fronts, then, the debate between the external and internal 
perspectives may be fruitfully informed by a comparative angle in terms of patterns of decision-
making across aggregations of votes, patterns across subsets of Canadian free expression law, 
and the role of extra-ideological factors including the conceptions of the judicial role held by the 
justices.  It will also speak to Ran Hirschl’s call for “a more holistic approach to the study of 
constitutions across polities.” (Hirschl 2014, 15). Though in its early stages, this comparison 
represents a logical next step as this project moves toward publication as book length project.   
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Appendix A – Supplementary Data Collected on Federal Statutes, 1994-201547 
                                                 
47 A number of cases during the Rehnquist Era were coded previously in Keck (2007), specifically Rehnquist 
decisions striking down federal statutes.  I adopt those codes for cases included in this paper.   
Case/Statute Coding Choice Details 
Turner Broadcast System, 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 
(1994) 
 
Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 
1992, 47 USCS 
534 and 535 (the "must-
carry" provisions); Pub. L. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 
 
Decision: For FCC (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: Turner Broadcast Systems; Cable companies 
(Conservative) 
Speech: General anti-regulation; pro-free market (Conservative) 
Suppressor: Dem/Liberal 
 
Note that Congress overrode Pres. Bush veto 
S.12 bill enacted by 73-18 (GOP: 27Y, 14N; Dems: 46Y, 4N); 
initial vote on bill (pre-veto) was 74-25 
House vote on override: 308-114 (GOP: 77Y, 85N; Dems: 230Y, 
29N)(similar pattern in initial vote on conference report) 
 
C.Q. Almanac suggests that this was a Democratic-led effort with a 
pro-consumer valence that attracted substantial, though less firm, 
GOP support.  Close call, but coded as Dem/Liberal (171-183, 
1993). 
 
 
Direction Coding: Liberal 
Glickman v. Wileman 
Bros. and Elliott, Inc., 521 
U.S. 457 (1997) 
 
Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937 
(AMAA), P.L. 75-137 
Decision: For Glickman (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: Wileman Bros. and Elliott, fruit distribution business 
(Conservative) 
Speech: Advertising; compelled speech claim (Conservative) 
Suppressor: AMAA advertising fee assessments 
 
Direction Coding: Liberal 
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 
569 (1998) 
 
National Foundation on 
the Arts and Humanities 
Act, As Amended in the 
Department of the Interior 
and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1990, 
Pub. L. 101-121, 103 Stat. 
738, 738-742. 
Decision: For NEA (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: Karen Finley, other performance/controversial artists 
(Liberal) 
Speech:  Funding of controversial performance art (pro-feminism, 
etc.; anti-religious)(Liberal) 
Suppressor: Bipartisan (Williams/Coleman; 1990 Act) 
 
According to opinion, Congress adopted bipartisan 
“Williams/Coleman Amendment” that would not impose funding 
restrictions, but would provide agency guidance on acceptable 
decency standards 
 
Direction Coding: Conservative 
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Ashcroft v. ACLU (I), 535 
U.S. 564 (2002) 
 
Child Online Protection 
Act (COPA),   47 U.S.C. § 
231 (Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 
105-277) 
 
Decision: For Ashcroft (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: ACLU and other individuals groups purveying adult 
entertainment 
Speech: Sex/Gender; adult pornography 
Suppressor: GOP/Conservative 
 
HR 3783: Voice vote (bipartisan) 
-Language of COPA rolled into Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 
 
-Note that 2000 GOP Platform calls out pornography as “not a 
question of free speech,” language about porn addicts in libraries 
and need to protect children 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)  
 
No add’l information found; consistent w/GOP regime commitment 
 
Direction Coding: Conservative 
Eldred v. U.S., 537 U.S. 
186 (2003) 
 
Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105-
298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 
Stat. 2827-2828 
 
Decision: For U.S. (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: Artists, businesses, others making use of copyrighted 
works in public domain (Unspecified) 
Speech: Artistic (Liberal) 
Suppressor: Undetermined 
 
Introduced by Hatch (S. 505), discharged out of Senate Judiciary 
Committee, passed by suspension of rules in October, signed by 
President.  No additional information available in almanac. 
 
Direction Coding: Unspecified/Undetermined 
 
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 
U.S. 146 (2003) 
 
Federal Election 
Campaign Act,  § 441(b) – 
Corporation contribution 
ban 
 
Decision: For FEC (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: Elizabeth Beaumont and NC pro-life group (Conservative) 
Speech: Free market (contribution limits); pro-life advocacy 
(conservative) 
Suppressor: FECA regulations; campaign finance (Dem/Liberal) 
 
Direction Coding: Liberal 
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United States v. American 
Library Association, 539 
U.S. 194 (2003) 
 
Children’s Internet 
Protection Act 
(CIPA),   20 U.S.C.S. § 
9134(f) and 47 U.S.C.S. § 
254(h); Dec. 21, 2000, 
P.L. 106-554 
 
Decision: For U.S. (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker: American Libraries (Liberal) 
Speech: No defined act (academic freedom)(Liberal) 
Suppressor: GOP/Conservative 
 
According to CQ, originating in amendment by Ernest Istook, R-
OK, approved by House Education and Workforce Committees  by 
voice vote… 
 
Congress.gov has CIPA originating w/Charles Pickering (R-MS) on 
June 8, 2000  
 
McCain supported Senate version (S.97) though little information 
available beyond six of seven co-sponsors being Republican 
(exception was Fritz Hollings, SC (D)). 
 
Adopted as part of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 
 
Consistent w/2000 GOP Party Platform language  
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)  
 
 
 
 
Ashcroft v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 542 
U.S. 656 (2004) 
 
Child Online Protection 
Act (COPA),   47 U.S.C. § 
231 (Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 
105-277) 
 
Decision: For ACLU (Pro-Speech) 
 
Speaker: ACLU and other individuals groups purveying adult 
entertainment 
Speech: Sex/Gender; adult pornography 
Suppressor: GOP/Conservative 
 
HR 3783: Voice vote (bipartisan) 
-Language of COPA rolled into Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 
 
-Note that 2000 GOP Platform calls out pornography as “not a 
question of free speech,” language about porn addicts in libraries 
and need to protect children 
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)  
 
No add’l information found; consistent w/GOP regime commitment 
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Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Association, 
544 U.S. 550 (2005) 
 
Beef Promotion and 
Research Act of 1985 
 
Dec. 23, 1985, P.L. 99-
198 
 
 
Decision: For Johanns (Anti-Speech) 
 
Speaker:  Conservative (livestock businesses) 
Speech: Compelled; commercial (objection to fees); Conservative 
Suppressor: Bipartisan  
 
Close call:  Act passed House (HR 2100) on Dec. 18, 1985 
 
R: 131-47 
D: 194-49 
 
Senate: 55-38 
 
R: 33-15 
D: 22-23  
 
According to 1985 CQ Weekly (Index edition), virtually none of 
the debate focused on the Beef Promotion Act inclusion (never 
mentioned).  Close, but coding as bipartisan.  
 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 
U.S. 47 (2006) 
 
Solomon Amendment, 10 
U.S.C. Section 983 (b)(1) 
 
National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision:  Against FAIR (Anti-Speech) 
 
House Amendment 569 to National Defense Authorization Act of 
1995 (H.R.4301), sponsored by Rep. Gerald Solomon, R (NY-22) 
 
Purpose:    An amendment to prohibit the Defense Department from making 
grants to, or contracting with, educational institutions that deny access to military 
recruiters. 
 
103rd Congress 
 
HoR Roll Call no. 191 (5/23/1994) 
R: 162/1/14  (Majority GOP Support) 
D: 109/124/27 (Minority Dem Support) 
I: 0/1/0 
 
Source:    http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll191.xml (last 
accessed 8/11/2015) 
 
DOD policy extended to other federal funds in 1997, 1999; post-
2001 DOD policy codified by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2005 (P.L. 108-375); H.R. Rep. 
No. 108-443 
 
From 1994 CQ Almanac, p. 58-H:  Adopted in the Committee of 
the Whole 271-126: R 162-1; D 109-124 (N.D. 55-101, S.D. 54-
23); I 0-1; May 23, 1994.   
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Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 
U.S. 47 (2006) 
[continued] 
 
Provision:   (Sec. 552) Requires that military recruiters be given access to 
college or university campuses and students that is at least equal in quality and 
scope to the access provided to any other employer. Includes funds made 
available for the Department of Homeland Security, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration of the Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) among the funding sources that could be terminated if an institution is found 
to have a policy of preventing military recruiter or Senior ROTC unit access. 
 
GOP administration policy; no separate amendments; vote on the 
final bill was bipartisan (no add’l info in 2004 CQ Almanac). 
 
Source:   http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll528.xml (Senate gave 
unanimous consent) 
 
Partisan Suppressor Coding:  GOP 
 
Spaeth Ideological Direction: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity) 
Infrequently litigated statutes 
 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230 (2006) 
 
Vermont Act 64 
June 26, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic Regime Commitment (Campaign Finance) 
 
https://www.sec.state.vt.us/elections/election-results/election-
results-
search.aspx?primaryFilterId=12449&secondaryFolderName=1996+
Election+Results&q=  
 
HoR (6/12/1997) 
121Y/17N 
D: 78Y/5N 
R: 36Y/11N 
O:  4Y/1N 
NV:  10 
  
 
Senate (5/29/1997) 
20Y/9N 
D:  14Y/0N 
R: 3Y/9N 
D/R: 2Y/0N 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/1998/journal/SJ970612.htm  
 
Y: Ankeney (D), Backus (D), Bartlett (D), Costes (R), Cummings 
(D), Doyle (R), Greenwood (R), Hallowell (D), Hooker (D), Illuzzi 
(R), Kittell (D), MacDonald (D), Mazza (D/R), McCormack (D), 
Ptashnik (D), Ready (D), Rivers (D), Sears (D), Shumlin (D/R), 
Spaulding (D) 
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Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230 (2006) 
[continued] 
 
N: Bahre (R), Bloomer (R), Brownell (R), Canns (R), Ehrich (R), 
Ide (R), Maynard (R), Riehle (R), Snelling (R) 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic (CF regime commitment) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612  
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption), Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, assembly) 
 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006) 
 
Discretion of L.A. District 
Attorney 
Democratic D.A. (Garcetti) 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic 
Speaker: ADA/Deputy Att’y, Democratic 
Speech: Whistleblower 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, 
assembly) 
 
 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 
521 (2006) 
 
PA Prison Policy (LTSU 
2) 
Republican Regime commitment (Law and Order); Prison Officials 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  GOP 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, 
assembly) 
 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393 (2007) 
 
Juneau School 
Board/Principal’s Actions 
Partisan Suppressor:  Liberal (school administrator) 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment (Protest demonstrations 
based on First Amendment guarantees); Constitutional 
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, assembly) 
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Davenport v. Wash. Educ. 
Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 
(2007) 
 
§42.17.760 (hereinafter 
§760), which is a 
provision of the Fair 
Campaign Practices Act 
(Affirmative Consent by 
nonmember required 
before agency shop fees 
spent on election-related 
purposes) 
Republican Regime commitment (anti-union) 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545)  
Partisan Suppressor:  GOP 
 
State initiative approved by voters in 1992 
 
**Information not available on Wash. Sec. of State Historical 
Election Results page** 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (union or closed shop: includes 
agency shop litigation); Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Rep. Party, 
552 U.S. 442 (2008) 
 
Washington Initiative I-
872 
Ruling against Washington State Republican AND Democratic 
Parties, Grange Party is a populist component of Republican Party 
 
Coding:  Bipartisan/Undetermined 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights (Ballot Access of Candidates 
and Political Parties); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(association) 
 
U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285 (2008) 
 
18 U. S. C. 
§2252A(a)(3)(B); The 
Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children 
Today Act (PROTECT) of 
2003 
 
RC 127 (Conference 
Report) 
S. 151 (Conference 
Report) 
 
 
House R.C. 127 (Conference Report): 
R: 225/1 
D:  175/23/2 present (N.D. 123-19, S.D. 52-4) 
I:  0/1 
NV:  8 
 
Senate (S. 151; R.V. 132; 4/10/03):  98 YEA/0 NEA/2 NV 
 
Source:   https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senate-
bill/151/actions (unamended Senate Bill also unanimous vote) 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment (obscenity, federal); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, 
assembly) 
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N.Y. State Bd. of 
Elections v. Torres, 552 
U.S. 196 (2008) 
 
New York electoral 
system for choosing 
Supreme Court Justice 
nominees; Act of May 2, 
1921, ch. 479, §§45(1), 
110, 1921 N. Y. Laws 
1451, 1454, 1471. 
Democratic Candidates, but decision for Democratic Party 
 
New York electoral system for choosing Supreme Court Justice 
nominees; Act of May 2, 1921, ch. 479, §§45(1), 110, 1921 N. Y. 
Laws 1451, 1454, 1471. 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan/Unknown for now 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (association) 
 
 
Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Education Ass’n, 555 U.S. 
353 (2009) 
 
Idaho state law §44–
2004(2), banning union 
checkoffs for political 
activities. 
Republican Regime commitment (anti-union, right to work) 
 
Partisan Suppressor: GOP 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545)  
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 
(2009) 
 
Pleasant Grove City’s 
rejection of religious 
minority monument 
 
Gnostic Christian:  Religious Minority (left-wing) 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Code as Bipartisan/Unknown for now 
 
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 
207 (2009) 
 
Maine State Law, Use of 
Union Dues 
 
Pro-Union (Democratic Regime Commitment) 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283)  
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (union or closed shop, includes 
agency shop litigation); Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
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U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460 (2010) 
 
 
(PL 106-152); 1999 
18 U. S. C. §48 
 
Purpose:   Amends the Federal criminal code to prohibit, and set penalties for, 
knowingly creating, selling, or possessing a depiction of animal cruelty with the 
intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial 
gain. Makes an exception for any depiction that has serious religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value. 
 
H.R. 1887 (RC No. 514; 10/19/1999): 
R: 177/35 
D: 194/7 (N.D. 146-3, S.D. 48-4) 
I: 1 
NV: 19 
 
Senate: Unanimous Voice (11/19/1999) 
 
Introduced by Gallegly, R-CA; no other information found in CQ 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan 
 
**Note that Stevens’ book, Velvet and Steel, noted that pit fighting 
“should remain illegal,” brief frames him as somebody interested in 
educating and training pit bulls for salutary purposes 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/08-
769bs.pdf 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Infrequently litigated statutes 
 
 
Agency for International 
Development v. Alliance 
for Open Society 
International, Inc., 133 
S.Ct. 2321 (2013) 
 
U.S. Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 
 
(U.S.C.S. Section 7601) 
 
 
 
 
 
H.R. 1298 (RC 158; 5/1/2003): 
R:  183/40 
D: 191/1 (N.D. 140-0, S.D. 51-1) 
I: 1/1 
NV: 19 
 
Senate: Voice Vote (5/16/2003) 
 
Source:  https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-
bill/1298/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22U
nited+States+Leadership+Against+HIV%5C%5C%5C%2FAIDS%
2C+Tuberculosis%2C+and+Malaria+Act+of+2003%5C%22%22%
5D%7D&resultIndex=1  
 
Partisan Suppressor: GOP 
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Agency for International 
Development v. Alliance 
for Open Society 
International, Inc., 133 
S.Ct. 2321 (2013) 
[continued] 
The challenged provision was the Christopher Smith (R – N.J.) 
Amendment requiring any group receiving funds pledge not to 
support prostitution or sex trafficking.  According to CQ Almanac 
2003, “The vote was the only clear Republican win in the markup” 
(10-6).   
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, 
assembly) 
 
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724 (2008) 
 
Section 319(a) of the 
Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), 116 Stat. 109, 2 
U. S. C. §441a–1(a) 
 
 
 
H Amendment 422 – “Millionaire’s”  
-According to CQ Almanac, amendment offered by Shelly Moore 
Capito, raised hard money contribution limits to gain support for 
Shays-Meehan 
 
Voice Vote, 2/14/02  
 
Source:  https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-
bill/2356/amendments?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C
%22Bipartisan+Campaign+Reform+Act+of+2002%5C%22%22%5
D%7D&resultIndex=1  
 
BCRA 
H.R. 2356 (R.C. 34) 
R: 41/176 
D: 198/12 (N.D. 150-6, S.D. 48-6) 
I: 1/1 
NV: 6 
 
Senate (R.V. 54; 3/20/2002): 
R: 11/38 
D: 48/2 (N.D. 40-1, S.D. 8-1) 
I: 1 
 
Source:   
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_
cfm.cfm?&congress=107&session=2&vote=00054  
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption); Infrequently litigated statutes; 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
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U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 
2537 (2012) 
 
Stolen Valor Act (2006) 
PL 109-437 
 
18 U.S.C.S. Section 
704(b) 
 
 
S.1998 (9/7/2006): Unanimous Consent 
 
HoR (12/6/2006):  Voice Vote 
 
Per CQ Almanac: Introduced by Kent Conrad, D – N.D. on Nov. 
10, 2005 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Infrequently litigated statutes 
 
Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A., v. U.S., 
559 U.S. 229 (2010) 
 
Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 
 
PL 109-8 
 
 
S. 256 (3/10/2005; RV 44): 
R: 55/0 
D: 18/25 
I: 1/0 
NV: 1 
 
HoR (S.256; RC 108; 4/14/2005) 
R:229/0/0 
D:73/125/0 
I:0/1/0 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan (note that while the overall bill was 
generally a GOP leadership effort – closed rule, etc. – the 
provisions at issue here are generally consumer protection ones.  No 
separate votes found, but would seem to be in line with 
Democratic/liberal support).   
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Attorneys (Attorneys, Commercial Speech); 
Federal Statute: Bankruptcy Code, Act or Rules, or Reform Act of 
1978 
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Harris v. Quinn, 2014 U.S. 
LEXIS 4504 (2014) 
 
Gov. Blagojevich’s 
Executive Order 2003-08, 
and subsequent 
amendment to the Public 
Labor Relations Act 
(PLRA. Pub. Act no. 93-
204, §5, 2003 Ill. Laws p. 
1930.), which unionized 
PAs under the Illinois 
Home Services program. 
 
Democratic Governor, Pro-Union (Democratic Regime 
Commitment), Cannot find votes counts for legislature  
 
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283; 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961#restori
ng)  
 
Spaeth DD:  Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (Labor-management disputes: Right 
to Organize); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(speech, press, and assembly) 
 
 
 
McCullen v. Coakley 
(2014) 
 
2007 Amendment to 
Massachusetts 
Reproductive Health Care 
Facilities Act, establishing 
35-foot buffer zone 
Democratic Regime commitment (pro-choice) 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101962)  
 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic (pro-choice; Democratic Regime 
commitment) 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Privacy (Abortion: Including 
Contraceptives); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(speech, press, and assembly) 
 
FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, 132 S.Ct. 2307 
(2012) 
 
2001 F.C.C. Policy 
Statement on Indecency 
(extension of Title 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 bans the 
broadcast of “any obscene, 
indecent, or profane 
language;” failure to give 
fair notice to broadcasters 
of what counts as patently 
offensive and subject to 
broadcaster liability. 
Michael Powell: R seat (Clinton, 1997); Chair (Bush, 2001) 
Susan Ness: Clinton, 1994 
Gloria Tristani:  D (Clinton, 1997) 
Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth: Clinton, 1997  
 
Coded: Bipartisan/Unknown for now 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Due Process (Miscellaneous); Constitutional 
Amendment: Fifth Amendment (Due Process) 
 
Cert Grant:  (131 S.Ct. 3065 (2011)).  Sotomayor took no part in 
grant decision.  Cert explicitly notes Court limited to considering 
First or Fifth Amendment violated by FCC indecency regulations.   
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Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, 
131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011) 
 
California Assembly Bill 
1179 (2005), Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §§ 1746-
1746.5 
9/8/05, Floor Vote:  66 AYE/7 NO/6 NV 
 
Partisan Composition of Assembly was majority Democratic 
 
Gov. was Schwarzenegger (R), Brown (D) became party to suit 
after winning 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Dem/Liberal for now 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
 
Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806 
(2011) 
 
 
Arizona Citizens Clean 
Elections Act  (Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-940 et 
seq.) 
Citizens’ referendum (Prop 200), passed in 1998 following wave of 
scandals 
 
Passed:  481,963/459,373  (941,336) 
             (51.20%/48.80%) 
 
McCain and Jane Dee Hull also on ballot, both Republicans 
(Turnout ~ 45%) 
 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic (regime commitment) 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612)  
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf  
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 
(2011) 
 
Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 18, 
§ 4631(d) 
Prescriber Data provision 
 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=18&Chapt
er=091&Section=04631  
 
Vote data not found 
 
Coded: Bipartisan/Unknown for now 
 
Spaeth DD:  Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Commercial Speech 
Excluding Attorneys; Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(speech, press, assembly) 
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Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. 
Carrigan, 131 S.Ct. 2343 
(2011) 
 
Nevada Ethics in 
Government Law 
 
Michael Carrigan –Member of Sparks, NV City Council (Involved 
in GOP) 
 
Source:   
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?pers
onId=9104740&privcapId=1052525&previousCapId=1052525&pr
eviousTitle=Truckee%20Meadows%20Water%20Authority  
 
Nevada Ethics in Government Law – mid-1970s anti-corruption 
reforms 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
 
Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(2010) 
 
Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
 
18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AEDPA 
 
HoR (18 April 1996), R.C. 126 (Conference Report) 
R: 188Y/46N 
D: 105Y/86N 
I: 0Y/1N 
NV: 7 
 
Senate (17 April 1996) 
91Y/8N 
R: 51Y/1N 
D:  40Y/7N 
NV: 1 
 
IRTPA 
 
S.2845 (Scienter requirement, defining “expert advice” language in 
enrolled bill) 
 
H.R. 10 (Amendment to Senate Bill, insisted upon by House; 
also contains language pursuant to amending 2339B(a)) 
R.C. 523 (10/8/2004) 
R: 213/8/6 
D: 69/125/11 
I: 0/1/0 
 
Agreement to Conference Report 
HoR (R.C. 544; 12/7/2004) 
R: 152/67/8 
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Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(2010) 
[continued] 
D: 183/8/14 
I: 1/0/0 
 
Senate (R.V. 216; 12/8/2004) 
89Y/2N/9NV 
(Clearly bipartisan) 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan 
*Language to change 2339B was in H.R. 10, adopting 9/11 
recommendations, but all other parts of the eventual law approved 
with bipartisan majorities (note Stone 2006, wartime suppression of 
speech usually bipartisan); no specific amendments in record for 
language in question 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Federal or State Internal 
Security Legislation: Smith, Internal Security, And Related Federal 
Statutes; Infrequently litigated statutes; Constitutional Amendment: 
First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly); Constitutonal 
Amendment: First Amendment (association) 
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 
(2010) 
 
Washington Public 
Records Act (PRA), 
Wash. Rev. Code § 
42.56.001 
 
Washington HoR (H.B. 1133, 4 March 2005) 
96Y/0N 
 
Washington Senate (not found) 
 
Signed by Christine Gregoire (D) 
http://search.leg.wa.gov/search.aspx#document  
 
Coding: Bipartisan 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Privacy, Freedom Information Act and 
Related Federal or State Statutes or Regulations; Constitutional 
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 
S.Ct. 1207 (2011) 
 
Jury Finding of IIED for 
Snyder 
 
Minority/Extreme Right Christian Group (Conservative) 
 
Civil jury awards for IIED (Bipartisan/Undetermined) 
 
Coding: Bipartisan/Unknown for now 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Protest Demonstrations/Demonstrations and 
Other Forms of Protest Based on First Amendment Guarantees; 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, 
assembly) 
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Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488 
(2011) 
 
Police Officer bringing 
union grievance, 
subsequent issuing of 
directives by Duryea 
Council 
 
Police Chief (Republican, Law and Order), Anti-union (Republican 
regime commitment) council directives 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Conservative/GOP (Anti-union directives) 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (petition clause) 
 
Reichle v. Howards, 132 
S.Ct. 2088 (2012) 
 
Actions of Secret Service 
Agents, detaining Reichle 
for probable cause  
Secret Service for GOP VP (Republican), Republican regime 
commitment  (Law and Order) or undetermined? 
 
Partisan Suppressor: GOP 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights, Liability, Civil Rights Acts 
(Liability, Governmental and Liability, Nongovernmental, Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, Non-death Penalty); Constitutional 
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 
873 (2012) 
 
Uruguay Round 
Agreements  Act 
HoR (29 Nov 1994), R.C. 507 
288Y/146N 
D: 167Y/89N 
R: 121Y/56N 
I: 0Y/1N 
 
Senate (1 Dec 1994), R.C. 329 
76Y/24N 
D: 41Y/14N 
R: 35Y/10N 
 
Coding: Bipartisan 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: Economic Activity, Patents and Copyright: 
Copyright; Constitution, Article Section 8, Paragraph 8 (patent and 
copyright clause); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(speech, press, and assembly) 
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Wood v. Moss, 2014 U.S. 
LEXIS 3614 (2014) 
 
Actions of Secret Service 
Agents, relocating anti-
Bush protestors 
 
Secret Service detail for GOP President…strictly from association, 
GOP (but also Republican regime commitment to law and order) 
 
Would the Court have ruled the other way if it were a Democrat?  
Seems extremely unlikely.   
 
Partisan Suppressor Coding:  GOP 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Protest Demonstrations: 
Demonstrations and Other Forms of Protest Based on First 
Amendment Guarantees; Constitutional Amendment: Fourth 
Amendment 
 
Lane v. Franks, 2014 U.S. 
LEXIS 4302 (2014) 
Franks, President of Community College; Lane = fired employee 
for testifying in federal investigation 
 
Partisan Suppressor Coding:  Liberal 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
 
Section 203(c) of 
Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act 
 
PL 107-155 
BCRA 
 
HoR (14 Feb 2002) – Shays/Meehan (R.C. 34) 
240Y/189N/6NV 
R: 41Y/176N 
D: 198Y/12N 
I: 1Y/1N 
 
Senate (20 Mar 2002) 
60Y/40N 
R:  11Y/38N 
D: 49Y/2N 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly); Infrequently litigated 
statutes 
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Wisconsin Right to Life v. 
FEC, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) 
BCRA 
 
HoR (14 Feb 2002) 
240Y/189N/6NV 
R: 41Y/176N 
D: 198Y/12N 
I: 1Y/1N 
 
Senate (20 Mar 2002) 
60Y/40N 
R:  11Y/38N 
D: 49Y/2N 
 
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption); Federal Statute (Federal Election 
Campaign); First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity) 
 
 
Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic 
Association v. Brentwood 
Academy, 551 U.S. 291 
(2007) 
Against school district  
 
Coding:  Bipartisan/Unknown 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity); 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and 
assembly) 
 
Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 
(2010) 
 
Hastings CoL “Take All 
Comers” Policy for 
Registered Student 
Organizations 
Hastings College of Law (Democratic), Christian group right to 
Association (Republican) 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic (Equality regime commitment) 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Free Exercise of Religion; 
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (free exercise of 
religion) 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights (Sex Discrimination); 
Constitutional Amendment: Fourteenth Amendment (equal 
protection) 
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McCutcheon v. FEC, 2014 
U.S. LEXIS 2391 (2014) 
 
Aggregate Contribution 
Limits of Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA), as 
updated by BCRA 
 
 2 U.S.C.S. § 441a(a)(3) 
FECA (1971)  
 
Enacted on Feb. 7, 1972 as PL 92-225. 
  
Senate:  S 382 Passed on Aug. 5, 1971 (Senate Vote 182); 88Y - 2N (both 
Arizona Republicans). 
  
Democrats: 51Y - 0N 
Republicans: 37Y - 2N 
  
(Information above from the 1971 CQ Almanac, Vol. XXVII (92nd Congress, 1st 
Session): 883-896 "Major Congressional Action, and 31-S "CQ Senate Votes") 
  
HoR: HR 11060 Passed on Nov. 30, 1971.  Bill was nearly the same as S 
382.  Roll Call 283; 372Y - 23N. 
  
Republicans: 153Y - 12N 
Democrats: 219Y - 11N (Northern Dems 151Y - 2N, Southern Dems 68Y - 9N) 
  
(HoR information from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, no. 
50 (Dec. 11, 1971): 2580.) 
BCRA 
 
HoR (14 Feb 2002) 
240Y/189N/6NV 
R: 41Y/176N 
D: 198Y/12N 
I: 1Y/1N 
 
Senate (20 Mar 2002) 
60Y/40N 
R:  11Y/38N 
D: 49Y/2N 
 
Partisan Suppressor:  Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending 
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First 
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly) 
 
American Tradition 
Partnership v. Bullock, 
132 S.Ct. 2490  (2012) 
 
Montana Campaign 
Finance Law on Corporate 
Contributions 
Application of Citizens United holding to states, Democratic 
Regime Commitment (anti-corporate spending in judicial elections) 
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612)  
Coding:  Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Liberal 
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Commercial Speech, 
Excluding Attorneys; Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment 
(speech, press, and assembly) 
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Knox v. SEIU, Local 
1000, 132 S.Ct. 2277  
(2012) 
Republican Regime Commitment (Anti-union) 
( 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961#restori
ng)  
 
Coding: Democratic 
 
Spaeth DD: Conservative 
Issue/Legal Provision:  Unions, union-union member dispute 
(except as pertains to union or closed shop); Constitutional 
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, assembly) 
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Appendix B – INUS Condition Combinations and Classifications 
Identity of Speaker (A) Type of Speech (B) Speech Suppressor (C) Coding of Pro-Speech 
(Anti-Speech) Holdings 
Liberal Liberal Liberal/Democratic Liberal(Conservative) 
Liberal Liberal Undetermined/Bipartisan Liberal(Conservative) 
Liberal Liberal Conservative/GOP Liberal(Conservative) 
Liberal Conservative Liberal/Democratic Conservative(Liberal) 
Liberal Conservative Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Liberal Conservative Conservative/GOP Liberal(Conservative) 
Liberal Undetermined Liberal/Democratic Undetermined 
Liberal Undetermined Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Liberal Undetermined Conservative/GOP Liberal(Conservative) 
Undetermined Liberal Liberal/Democratic Undetermined 
Undetermined Liberal Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Undetermined Liberal Conservative/GOP Liberal(Conservative) 
Undetermined Conservative Liberal/Democratic Conservative(Liberal) 
Undetermined Conservative Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Undetermined Conservative Conservative/GOP Undetermined 
Undetermined Undetermined Liberal/Democratic Undetermined 
Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Undetermined Undetermined Conservative/GOP Undetermined 
Conservative Conservative Liberal/Democratic Conservative(Liberal) 
Conservative Conservative Undetermined/Bipartisan Conservative(Liberal) 
Conservative Conservative Conservative/GOP Conservative(Liberal) 
Conservative Undetermined Liberal/Democratic Conservative(Liberal) 
Conservative Undetermined Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Conservative Undetermined Conservative/GOP Undetermined 
Conservative Liberal Liberal/Democratic Conservative(Liberal) 
Conservative Liberal Undetermined/Bipartisan Undetermined 
Conservative Liberal Conservative/GOP Liberal(Conservative) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 
 
 
Appendix C – Ideological Content of Roberts Court Free Expression Cases and Direction Assignments 
 
Case (Claimant) 
 
Speaker Identity 
 
Speech Suppressor 
 
Nature of 
Expression 
 
SCOTUS 
Decision 
 
Composite 
Coding of 
Decision 
Direction 
 
 
SCDB Coding of 
Decision 
Direction 
 
Epstein, Parker, 
Segal Decision 
Direction 
 
 
Areas of 
Disagreement 
 
WRTL (I) 
 
Pro-Life, Non-
profit Interest 
Group 
(Conservative) 
 
BCRA, § 203 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Electoral Speech, 
Criticism of 
Democratic U.S. 
Senators  
(Conservative) 
 
 
For WRTL 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative  
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS = No 
Direction); SCDB 
Direction 
 
FAIR 
 
Law School 
Consortium 
(Liberal) 
 
Solomon 
Amendment, 10 
U.S.C. Section 
983(b)(1) 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Equality; Protesting 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” 
(Liberal) 
 
Against FAIR 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
 
Ceballos 
 
Deputy District 
Attorney Ceballos; 
Gov’t 
Employee/Lawyer 
(Liberal) 
 
 
District Attorney 
Gil Garcetti 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Gov’t Employee 
Speech; 
Whistleblowing  
(Liberal) 
 
Against Ceballos 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Randall 
 
Vermont Right to 
Life, Vermont 
Republican State 
Committee; 
Vermont 
Libertarian Party 
(Conservative) 
 
Vermont Pub. Act 
64 (2002) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Free Market; 
Protesting 
Contribution Limits 
(Conservative) 
 
For Randall 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Banks 
 
Prison Inmate 
(Liberal) 
 
LTSU Policy 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Equality Speech; 
Access to 
Information 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against Banks 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
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Washington 
Education 
Association 
 
Union 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
WA Fair Campaign 
Practices Act, 
Section 760 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Union Speech; 
Protesting 
Affirmative 
Consent 
requirements  
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against WEA 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Brentwood 
Academy 
 
School Employee 
(Liberal) 
 
State Athletic 
Association 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Faculty Speech; 
Recruitment Letter 
(Undetermined) 
 
Against 
Brentwood 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Speaker 
(EPS=Conservative); 
SCDB 
 
Frederick 
 
High School 
Student 
(Liberal) 
 
School Official 
(Liberal) 
 
Student Speech; 
Pro-drug 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Frederick 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Right 
to Life (II) 
 
Pro-Life, Non-
profit Interest 
Group 
(Conservative) 
 
BCRA, § 203 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Electoral Speech, 
Criticism of 
Democratic U.S. 
Senators  
(Conservative) 
 
 
For WRTL 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=No Direction); 
SCDB  
 
Lopez-Torres 
 
Non-establishment, 
Democrat 
(Liberal) 
 
N.Y. State Act of 
1921, ch. 479, 
sections 45(1), 110; 
Parties choose 
candidates 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Electoral Speech; 
Equality of Ballot 
Access 
(Liberal) 
 
Against Lopez-
Torres 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
Washington State 
Republican Party 
 
Republican, 
Democratic, 
Libertarian Parties 
(Undetermined) 
 
WA  Initiative (I-
872); Candidates 
declare affiliation 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Electoral Speech; 
Restricting Ballot 
Access 
(Conservative) 
 
Against WSRP et 
al. 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Speaker 
(EPS=Conservative); 
SCDB 
 
Williams 
 
Purveyor of Child 
Pornography 
(Undetermined) 
 
PROTECT Act (18 
U.S.C. 
2252A(a)(3)(B) 
(Bipartisan) 
 
Extremist Speech; 
Pictures of Children 
Engaged in Sexual 
Acts 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against Williams 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
  
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Speaker 
(EPS=Liberal); 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Conservative); 
SCDB 
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Davis 
 
Democratic 
Candidate, NY 
House District 
(Liberal) 
 
Section 319(a) of 
the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 
(BCRA), 116 Stat. 
109, 2 U. S. C. 
§441a–1(a) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free Market; 
Protesting 
“Millionaire’s 
Amendment” 
Contribution 
Formula 
(Conservative) 
 
For Davis 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal Claimant 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
Locke 
 
Union Non-
Members 
(Conservative) 
 
Maine State 
Employees 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Agreement 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-union Speech; 
Objection to paying 
fee for national 
collective 
bargaining 
(Conservative) 
 
Against Locke 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
Pocatello 
Education 
Association 
 
Public Employee 
Union 
(Liberal) 
 
Idaho Right to 
Work Act, Idaho 
state law §44–
2004(2) 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Union Speech; 
Protesting 
prohibition on 
collecting union 
dues through 
paychecks 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Pocatello 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
Summum 
 
Religious Minority, 
Gnostic Christians 
(Liberal) 
 
Pleasant Grove City 
Council’s rejection 
of Seven Aphorisms 
while accepting 10 
Commandments 
Monument 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Religious Speech; 
Placing a non-
mainstream 
monument in public 
park 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Summum 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Conservative) 
 
Citizens United 
 
Non-profit, interest 
group 
(Conservative) 
 
BCRA, Section 
203(c) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Electoral Speech; 
Documentary 
critical of Hillary 
Clinton 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Citizens 
United 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=No Direction) 
 
Milavetz, Gallop, 
and Milavetz 
 
Law Firm 
(Liberal) 
 
Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and 
Consumer 
Protection Act of 
2005 
(Bipartisan) 
 
Commercial 
Speech, Advertising 
(Conservative) 
 
Against Milavetz 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB 
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Stevens 
 
Distributor of 
Videos featuring 
animal cruelty 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
18 U.S.C.S. § 48 
(Bipartisan) 
 
Extremist Speech; 
Depictions of 
animal cruelty 
(Undetermined) 
 
For Stevens 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Speaker 
(EPS=Conservative); 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Liberal); 
SCDB 
 
 
Humanitarian 
Law Project 
 
Non-profit, human 
rights organization 
(Liberal) 
 
Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 
1996; (AEDPA) 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B and 
Amendments 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Academic Speech; 
Instructing terror 
groups on how to 
peacefully use law 
to resolve disputes 
(Liberal) 
 
Against HLP 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Conservative) 
 
John Doe #1 
 
Private individuals 
opposed to same-
sex equality 
(Conservative) 
 
Washington Public 
Records Act (PRA), 
Wash. Rev. Code § 
42.56.001 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-Equality 
Speech; Compelled 
disclosure of 
petition signatories 
 (Conservative) 
 
Against Doe 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Christian Legal 
Society 
 
Christian Student 
Organization 
(Conservative) 
 
Hastings College of 
Law “Take All 
Comers” Policy 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Anti-Equality 
Speech; Excluding 
students on basis of 
sexual orientation 
and religion 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against CLS 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Undetermined 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
SCDB 
 
Phelps 
 
Far-right, Christian 
Church 
(Conservative) 
 
Jury Verdict for tort 
of IIED; Damages 
Award 
(Undetermined) 
 
Anti-Equality 
Speech; 
Denouncing 
homosexuals 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Phelps 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal  
 
Conservative  
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB 
 
Carrigan 
 
Elected member of 
Sparks, NV City 
Council holding 
GOP leadership 
position 
(Conservative) 
 
Nevada Ethics in 
Government Law 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Free Market; 
Carrigan’s vote in 
favor of economic 
development owned 
by friend 
(Conservative) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against Carrigan 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=No Direction); 
SCDB 
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Guarnieri 
 
Chief of Police of 
Duryea, PA 
(Conservative) 
 
Council Directives 
relating to 
Guarnieri’s job 
(Undetermined) 
 
Gov’t Employee 
Speech; 
Whistleblower/ 
Union 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Guarnieri 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Speaker 
(EPS=Liberal); 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Conservative); 
SCDB 
 
 
IMS Health, Inc. 
 
Corporation of 
pharmaceutical 
companies and data 
miners 
(Conservative) 
 
Vermont Statute 
Ann. Tit. 18, 
Section 4631(d); 
protection of 
prescriber-
identifying info 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Commercial 
Speech; access to 
pharmacy records; 
Deregulation 
(Conservative) 
 
For IMS Health 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS=Liberal); 
SCDB 
 
Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club 
PAC 
 
AFECFCP; 
Arizona Taxpayers 
Action Committee, 
Arizonans for a 
Sound Economy; 
GOP Candidates 
for Office 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Arizona Citizens 
Clean Elections 
Act  (Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-
940 et seq.); Ballot 
Prop 200 (1998) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free Market; 
Protesting equality-
based expenditure 
limits/formula 
(Conservative) 
 
For AFECFCP 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Entertainment 
Merchants 
Association 
 
Business 
association of 
software and 
videogame 
industries 
(Conservative) 
 
California 
Assembly Bill 1179 
(2005), Cal. Civ. 
Code Ann. §§ 1746-
1746.5; restricting 
sale of violent 
videogames to 
minors 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Extreme Speech; 
Violent depictions 
(Undetermined) 
 
For EMA 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB 
 
Golan 
 
Orchestra 
conductors, 
musicians, others 
(Liberal) 
 
Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act 
Section 514 
(Bipartisan) 
 
Equality Speech; 
Use of works in 
public domain 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against Golan 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
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Howards 
 
Private Individual; 
opposed to Iraq 
War 
(Liberal) 
 
Arrest by Secret 
Service Agents 
(Conservative) 
 
Electoral Speech; 
Criticism of VP 
Cheney, Bush 
Administration’s 
Iraq Policy 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Howards 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
Knox 
 
Union non-member 
(Conservative) 
 
SEIU temporary fee 
for 
ideological/electoral 
purposes 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Anti-union Speech; 
Protesting fee 
assessment for 
ideological/electoral 
fund of public 
employee union 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Knox 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
Fox Television 
Stations 
 
Mainstream 
Broadcast Media 
(Fox and ABC) 
(Liberal) 
 
2001 F.C.C. Policy 
Statement on 
Indecency 
(extension of 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 
1464)  
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Sex/Gender Speech; 
Airing of two brief 
expletives in award 
shows, brief male 
nudity 
(Liberal) 
 
For Fox 
Television  
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
American 
Tradition 
Partnership 
 
Pro-business 
association 
(Conservative) 
 
Mont. Code Ann. 
§13-35-
227(1) (2011); 
Restrictions on 
Corporate Spending 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free market; 
Protesting 
expenditure 
prohibition in 
judicial elections 
(Conservative) 
 
For ATP 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
SCDB 
 
Alvarez 
 
Local Politician; 
Three Valley Water 
District Board of 
Directors 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Stolen Valor Act of 
2005; 18 U.S.C.S. 
Section 704(b) 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
False Speech; Lying 
about military 
service 
(Undetermined) 
 
For Alvarez 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
SCDB 
 
Alliance for Open 
Society Int’l, Inc. 
 
Non-profit 
organization 
combatting AIDS 
abroad 
(Liberal) 
 
U.S. Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Sex/Gender Speech; 
Adoption of anti-
prostitution 
message to receive 
funding 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
For AOSI 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
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McCutcheon 
 
Private individual, 
donor to 
conservative 
politicians 
(Conservative) 
 
FECA Section 
441a(a)(3) as 
amended by BCRA 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Free market; 
Protesting 
aggregate 
contribution limits 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For McCutcheon 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
Moss 
 
Anti-war 
protestor(s) 
(Liberal) 
 
GOP President’s 
Secret Service 
relocation of anti-
war protestors 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Anti-war Speech; 
Speech/protests 
critical of President 
George W. Bush’s 
policies 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Moss 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
Lane 
 
Academic Faculty; 
Director of 
underprivileged 
youth program at 
Central Alabama 
Community 
College 
(Liberal) 
 
 
President of CACC 
terminating Lane 
after testifying in 
federal fraud 
investigation 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Gov’t Employee 
Speech; 
Whistleblower 
(Liberal) 
 
For Lane 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
McCullen 
 
Private Individuals; 
Pro-life “sidewalk 
counselors” 
(Conservative) 
 
Massachusetts 
Reproductive 
Health Care 
Facilities Act 
(2007) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-abortion 
speech; Leafleting 
and counseling 
(Conservative) 
 
For McCullen 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
Harris 
 
Union non-member 
(Conservative) 
 
Gov. Blagojevich’s 
Executive Order 
2003-08, and 
subsequent 
amendment to the 
Public Labor 
Relations Act 
(PLRA. Pub. Act 
no. 93-204, §5, 
2003 Ill. Laws p. 
1930.) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
 
Anti-union Speech; 
protesting payment 
of collective 
bargaining fee 
(Conservative) 
 
For Harris 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
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Williams-Yulee 
 
Criminal-Defense 
Lawyer, Candidate 
for Hillsborough 
County Court 
(Liberal) 
 
Florida Supreme 
Court Canon 7C(1) 
of its Code of 
Judicial Conduct 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Free market; 
solicitation of 
campaign 
contributions 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against Williams-
Yulee 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
 
 
Sons of 
Confederate 
Veterans 
 
Non-profit interest 
group  
(Conservative) 
 
Texas Department 
of Motor Vehicles 
Board 
(Undetermined) 
 
Anti-Equality 
Speech; License 
plate design 
featuring 
Confederate 
flag/honoring 
Confederate 
servicemembers 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against SCV 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
SCDB 
 
Reed 
 
Pastor, Evangelical 
(Good News 
Community 
Church) 
(Conservative) 
 
Gilbert, Ariz., Land 
Development Code 
(Sign Code or 
Code), ch. 1, §4.402 
(2005). 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Religious speech; 
directional signs for 
service locations 
(Conservative) 
 
For Reed 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Authors Have Not 
Coded 
 
SCDB 
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Appendix D – Ideological Content of Rehnquist Court Free Expression Cases and Composite Direction Assignment 
 
Case (Claimant) 
 
Speaker Identity 
 
Speech Suppressor 
 
Nature of Expression 
 
SCOTUS Decision 
 
Composite 
Coding of 
Decision 
Direction 
 
 
SCDB 
Coding of 
Decision 
Direction 
 
Epstein, 
Parker, 
Segal 
Decision 
Direction 
 
 
Areas of 
Disagreement 
 
Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union 
 
Union 
(Liberal) 
 
Honoraria ban of 5 
U.S.C.S. Section 501(b); 
Ethics Reform Act of 
1989 (Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Academic speech; 
receipt of small 
honoraria (Liberal) 
 
 
For Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Suppressor 
(EPS = No 
Direction) 
 
Coors Brewing Co. 
 
Coors; Business 
(Conservative) 
 
§5(e)(2) of the Federal 
Alcohol Administration 
Act (FAAA or Act), 27 U. 
S. C. §205(e)(2) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Commercial speech; 
labeling requirements 
(Conservative) 
 
For Coors Brewing  
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
 
McIntyre 
 
Margaret McIntyre, 
anti-tax advocate 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
Section 3599.09(A)(Pro-
disclosure law) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-tax/small 
government advocacy 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For McIntyre 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Hurley 
 
Hurley; Boston 
Veterans Parade 
group/organizers 
(Conservative) 
 
Boston Alliance of 
Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Individuals 
(Liberal) 
 
Anti-LGBT Equality; 
Pro-military 
(Conservative) 
 
For Hurley 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
 
SCDB Direction 
 
Went For It, Inc. 
 
Injury Attorneys 
(Liberal) 
 
Florida Bar; Florida State 
Bar Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 
4-7.8(a) 
 (Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
 
Commercial Speech; 
Advertising/Soliciting 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against WFI 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Pinette 
 
KKK 
(Conservative) 
 
 
 
Capitol Square Review 
and Advisory Board 
discretion under Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. Section 
105.41 (Undetermined) 
 
 
Religious; Christian 
symbol (Conservative) 
 
 
For Pinette 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Do 
Not Code 
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Rosenberger 
 
Christian Student 
Organization 
(Conservative) 
 
University of Virginia 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Christian newspaper 
(Conservative) 
 
For Rosenberger 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
44 Liquormart, Inc. 
 
Business 
(Conservative) 
 
Rhode Island Gen. Laws 
§3–8–7 (1987) “Price 
Advertising Ban” 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Commercial Speech; 
Advertising 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For 44 Liquormart 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
Colorado 
Republican Federal 
Campaign 
Committee (I) 
 
State Republican 
Party Organization 
(Conservative) 
 
FECA, 2 U. S. C. 
§441a(d)(3) “Party 
Expenditure Provision” 
(Bipartisan) 
 
Electoral Speech (Anti-
Democratic); Free 
Market Speech 
(Conservative) 
 
For Colorado 
Republican Federal 
Campaign 
Committee 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Denver Area 
Educational 
Telecommunications 
Consortium 
 
Cable Media; 
Academic (Liberal) 
 
Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 
(1992 Act or Act), 106 
Stat. 1486, §§10(a), 10(b), 
and 10(c), 47 U. S. C. 
§§532(h), 532(j), and note 
following §531 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Sex/Gender Speech 
(Pornographic/adult 
images) 
(Liberal) 
 
For Denver Area 
Educational 
Telecommunications 
Consortium 
(Pro-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
O’Hare Truck 
Service, Inc. 
 
Government 
Employee/Business 
(Undetermined) 
 
Mayor Reid M. Paxon 
(Undetermined) 
 
Electoral Speech; 
Partisan support 
unknown; whistleblower 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
For O’Hare Truck 
Service 
(Pro-speech) 
 
 
 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative), 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal) 
 
Umbehr 
 
Government 
Employee/Business  
(Undetermined) 
 
Board of Commissioners 
of Wabaunsee County 
(Undetermined) 
 
Electoral speech; 
Whistleblower (Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
 
For Umbehr 
(Pro-speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
  
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative), 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal) 
 
Schenck 
 
Pro-life advocates 
(Conservative) 
 
Temporary Restraining 
Order by Reagan-
appointee Judge Arcara, 
Western District of New 
York (GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Anti-abortion 
advocacy/protesting 
(Conservative) 
 
Mixed; Fixed Buffer 
Zones upheld, 
Floating Buffer 
Zones struck down 
(Mixed) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
& Liberal 
(Split Vote) 
 
Conservative 
Claimant 
(Liberal) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Liberal) 
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Turner 
Broadcasting 
Systems (II) 
 
Turner 
Broadcasting 
Systems 
(Liberal) 
 
Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, 
sections 4 and 5 “Must 
Carry” Provisions 
 (Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free market; compelled 
speech 
(Conservative) 
 
Against TBS 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc. 
 
California Fruit 
growers, 
distributors 
(Conservative) 
 
Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937, 7 
U.S.C.S. section 601 et 
seq. (subsequently 
amended by 1966 31 Fed. 
Reg. 8177; 36 Fed. Reg. 
14381; 41 Fed. Reg. 
14375, 17528 (1976)) 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Commercial Speech; 
Compelled Advertising 
(Conservative) 
 
Against Wileman 
Bros. & Elliott 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction 
 
(Reno v.) ACLU 
 
American Civil 
Liberties Union & 
Others 
(Liberal) 
 
Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 
U.S.C.S. Section 223 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Sex/Gender Speech 
(Adult/Pornography) 
(Liberal) 
 
For ACLU 
(Pro-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Forbes 
 
Independent 
Candidate and 
former member of 
far-right party 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
Electoral Speech 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against Forbes 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal), 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Finley 
 
Avant-
garde/protest artists 
(Liberal) 
 
 
National Foundation on 
the Arts and Humanities 
Act, 20 U.S.C.S. section 
954 (d)(1); grant-making 
procedures 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Controversial art (i.e. 
Serrano, Mapplethorpe) 
(Liberal) 
 
Against Finley 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
American 
Constitutional Law 
Foundation 
 
ACLF 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
Colo. Rev. Stat. sections 
1-40-112(1); 1-40-112(2); 
1-40-111(2); 1-40-121 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pro-petition/ballot 
access advocacy 
(Liberal) 
 
For American 
Constitutional Law 
Foundation 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 (Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal) 
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Greater New 
Orleans 
Broadcasting 
 
Local media group 
(Liberal) 
 
18 U.S.C.S. section 1304 
“Casino Advertising Ban” 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Commercial Speech; 
Advertising for 
gambling/casinos 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Greater New 
Orleans 
Broadcasting 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Conservative), 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
 
United Reporting 
Publishing Co. 
 
Business, private 
publishing 
company 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Cal. Gov’t Code Section 
6254(f)(3) 
 (Undetermined) 
 
Commercial Speech; 
Advertising/Solicitation 
 (Conservative) 
 
Against United 
Reporting 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal), 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
 
Shrink Missouri 
Gov’t PAC 
 
Anti-tax/small 
gov’t interest group 
(Conservative) 
 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 
130.032.1(1) 
 (Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free Market Electoral; 
Electoral; support of 
State Auditor Candidate 
Zev David Fredman (R) 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against Shrink 
Missouri 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Southworth 
 
School students 
(Liberal) 
 
Board of Regents of 
University of Wisconsin 
imposition of student 
activity fee 
 (Liberal) 
 
 
Compelled Speech; 
against subsidizing 
liberal student groups 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Against Southworth 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal  
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Conservative), 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Pap’s A.M. 
(“Kandyland”) 
 
Adult 
entertainment 
business (Liberal) 
 
City of Erie, PA 
Ordinance 75-1994 
“secondary effects” 
ordinance 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Nude dancing; artistic 
expression (Liberal) 
 
Against Pap’s A.M. 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Playboy 
Entertainment 
Group 
 
Adult 
entertainment 
media (Liberal) 
 
Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 136 (47 
U.S.C.S. Section 561 
(Section 505) 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Sex/Gender (Adult 
Entertainment; 
Pornography) 
(Liberal) 
 
For Playboy 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Boy Scouts of 
America 
 
Traditional values 
community group 
(Conservative) 
 
NJ public 
accommodations law, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. Sections 10:5-
4, 10:5-5 (2000) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-LGBT Equality 
(Conservative) 
 
For Boy Scouts of 
America 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
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Hill 
 
Pro-life advocates 
(Conservative) 
 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 
18-9-122(3)(1999) 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Anti-abortion 
speech/protests 
(Conservative) 
 
Against Hill (Anti-
Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Velazquez 
 
Lawyers affiliated 
with Legal 
Services 
Corporation 
(Liberal) 
 
Legal Services 
Corporation Act, 88 Stat. 
378, 42 U. S. C. §2996 et 
seq., and funding 
restrictions imposed by 
Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 
1996 (1996 Act), §504, 
110 Stat. 1321–53 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Criticisms of welfare 
system; pro-indingent 
client speech 
(Liberal) 
 
For Velazquez 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Murphy 
 
Prisoner/inmate 
“law clerk” 
(Liberal) 
 
Montana state prison 
policy 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Legal 
assistance/representation 
of prisoners 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Murphy 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
Vopper 
 
Vopper, political 
radio commentator 
critical of unions in 
the past 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 82 
Stat. 211, entitled 
Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Electoral/Policy speech; 
anti-union – playing of 
illegally obtained tape 
capturing conversation 
between teacher union 
officials on air 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Vopper 
(Pro-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Good News Club 
 
Sponsors of 
children’s private 
religious 
organization; 
Christian 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Milford School 
community use policy 
restricting facilities to 
non-religious activities 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Use of school facilities 
for 
worship/congregation 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Good News 
Club 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
Colorado 
Republican Federal 
Campaign 
Committee (II) 
 
State Republican 
Party Organization 
(Conservative) 
 
FECA, 2 U. S. C. 
§441a(d)(3) “Party 
Expenditure Provision” 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Electoral Speech (Anti-
Democratic); Free 
Market Speech 
(Conservative) 
 
Against Colorado 
Republican Federal 
Campaign 
Committee 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
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United Foods, Inc. 
 
Large agricultural 
distribution/grower 
business 
(Conservative) 
 
Mushroom Promotion, 
Research, and Consumer 
Information Act, 104 Stat. 
3854, 7 U. S. C. §6101 et 
seq. 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Commercial; anti-
compelled speech (fee 
assessments) 
(Conservative) 
 
For United Foods 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction 
 
Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. 
 
Big tobacco 
businesses 
(Conservative) 
 
 
940 Code of Mass. Regs. 
§§21.01–21.07, 22.01–
22.09 (2000) , issued by 
Democratic AG 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Commercial 
speech/advertising of 
tobacco products 
(Conservative) 
 
For Lorillard 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB 
Direction/Issue; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Thomas 
 
Windy City Hemp 
Development 
Board 
(Liberal) 
 
Chicago Park District; 
maintaining and 
advocating for public 
property 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Speech/event to legalize 
marijuana usage 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
For Chicago 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Free Speech 
Coalition 
 
California adult 
entertainment 
association 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 
(CPPA), 18 U. S. C. 
§2251 et seq. 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Sex/Gender Speech; 
“morphed images” 
neither obscene nor 
child pornography 
(Liberal) 
 
 
For Free Speech 
Coalition 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
Western States 
Medical Center 
 
 
Licensed 
pharmacies 
specializing in drug 
compounding 
(Conservative) 
 
Section 127(a) of the Food 
and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 
1997 (FDAMA or Act), 
111 Stat. 2328, 21 U. S. C. 
§353a (advertising 
restrictions)  
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
speech/advertising of 
“compounded drugs” 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Western States 
Medical Center 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
(Ashcroft) v. ACLU 
(I) 
 
ACLU et al. 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Child Online Protection 
Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736 
(codified in 47 U. S. C. § 
23 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Sex/Gender speech 
(adult entertainment, 
sexual health, 
education) 
(Liberal) 
 
Against ACLU 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
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Alameda Books 
 
Adult 
entertainment 
establishments 
(Liberal) 
 
Los Angeles Municipal 
Code §12.70(C) (1978); 
“secondary effects” 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Sex/Gender speech; sale 
of adult pornographic 
videos and operation of 
viewing booths 
(Liberal) 
 
Against Alameda 
Books 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society 
 
Religious; 
Jehovah’s Witness 
(Conservative) 
 
Village of Stratton, Ohio 
Ordinance No. 1998–5  
(Prohibiting private 
property canvassing) 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
 
Door-to-door 
solicitation/advocating 
on behalf of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses 
(Conservative) 
 
For Watchtower 
Bible and Tract 
Society 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal) 
 
Republican Party of 
Minnesota 
 
Republican Party 
of Minnesota; 
Judicial candidate 
Gregory Wersal 
(Conservative) 
 
Minn. Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000), 
“announce clause” 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Announcement of views 
on Minnesota Supreme 
Court decisions; 
criticism of abortion, 
welfare, crime decisions 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Republican 
Party of Minnesota 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Eldred 
 
Individuals using 
works in public 
domain 
(Undetermined) 
 
Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105–
298, §§102(b) and (d), 
112 Stat. 2827–2828 
(Bipartisan/Undetermined) 
 
 
 
Pro-public domain use; 
anti-property 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Against Eldred 
(Anti-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal), 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
Black 
 
Members of KKK; 
far-right movement 
(Conservative) 
 
Va. Code Ann. §18.2–423 
(1996); cross-burning 
statute (Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious; far-right 
speech (cross burning) 
(Conservative) 
 
For Black 
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction 
 
Telemarketing 
Associates, Inc. 
 
Illinois for-profit 
fundraising 
corporations 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Fraud suit brought by 
Democratic Illinois AG 
Madigan (Dem/Liberal) 
 
Solicitation of funds for 
VietNow; false speech 
(solicitation generally 
funded corporation 
rather than charity) 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Illinois 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
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Beaumont 
 
North Carolina 
Right to Life; non-
profit advocacy 
group 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA), 
§441b “contribution 
restriction” 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Sex/Gender speech; 
anti-abortion; free 
market electoral 
(Conservative) 
 
For FEC 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
 
 
Hicks 
 
Private individual; 
non-resident of 
Whitcomb Court 
Housing 
Development 
(Undetermined) 
 
Richmond Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority 
(RRHA) “trespass policy” 
(Undetermined) 
 
 
 
 
 
No concrete speech act; 
general overbroad claim 
(Undetermined) 
 
For Virginia 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction; 
Speaker (EPS = 
Liberal) 
 
American Library 
Association 
 
 
Academic speaker; 
American Library 
Ass’n 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Children’s Internet 
Protection Act (CIPA), 
114 Stat. 2763A–335 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Compelled 
speech/unconstitutional 
conditions claim; 
Sex/Gender speech 
(requiring filters to 
screen out websites 
purveying obscene 
material) 
(Liberal) 
 
 
For U.S. 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
Conservative) 
 
McConnell 
 
 
Mitch McConnell, 
Senate Minority 
Leader 
(Conservative) 
 
 
Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), primarily Titles I 
and II “soft money 
contribution” ban and 
“electioneering 
expenditures” ban 
(Dem/Liberal) 
 
 
Free market electoral 
speech; opposition to 
expenditure limits and 
other provisions 
(Conservative) 
 
For FEC 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
Suppressor (EPS = 
No Direction) 
 
Z.J. Gifts, Inc. 
 
 
Adult 
entertainment 
business (Liberal) 
 
Littleton City Code §§3–
14–2, 3–14–4 (2003), 
“adult business licensing” 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Sex/Gender Speech; 
adult entertainment 
media 
(Liberal) 
 
For Littleton 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
 
(Ashcroft) v. ACLU 
(II) 
 
 
ACLU et al. 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Child Online Protection 
Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736 
(codified in 47 U. S. C. § 
23 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
 
Sex/Gender speech 
(adult entertainment, 
sexual health, 
education) 
(Liberal) 
 
For ACLU 
(Pro-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal 
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
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Roe 
 
 
San Diego police 
officer 
(Conservative) 
 
 
San Diego Police 
Department 
(GOP/Conservative) 
 
Sex/Gender speech; 
distribution of 
pornographic videos 
featuring respondent 
(Liberal) 
 
 
For San Diego 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Authors Do 
Not Code 
 
 
 
Livestock Marketing 
Association 
 
 
Livestock/cattle 
business 
associations 
(Conservative) 
 
The Beef Promotion and 
Research Act of 1985 
(Beef Act or Act), 99 Stat. 
1597 
(Bipartisan) 
 
 
Commercial speech; 
anti-compelled speech – 
fee assessment 
(Conservative) 
 
For Johanns 
(Anti-speech) 
 
Liberal 
 
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
(Conservative 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction 
 
Tory 
 
 
Ulysses Tory, 
former client of 
Johnnie Cochran 
for alleged civil 
rights violation by 
LAPD 
(Liberal) 
 
 
Superior Court of CA 
injunction against Tory 
(Undetermined) 
 
Defamatory speech; 
directed at Civil Rights 
Attorney Johnnie 
Cochran 
(Conservative) 
 
 
For Tory  
(Pro-Speech) 
 
Undetermined 
 
Liberal 
 
Liberal  
(Liberal 
Claimant) 
 
SCDB Direction 
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Appendix E – Martin-Quinn Ordering of Justices by Term (1994-2015 Terms) 
Note:  Martin-Quinn Scores have been rescaled and inverted to range from 0 (most liberal) to 1 
(most conservative) so as to approximate Segal-Cover scoring.   The line and justices’ individual 
scores and initials are designed to approximate the distance between the justices.  Ordering is the 
basis for classifying degree of order in decisions (chapter three).  
 
1994   (.266)          (.438)(.445)    (.522)  (.591)   (.658) (.708) 
            (.446)      (.523) 
 
     JPS             RBG   DS     SDO   WHR                AS     CT 
             SB         AK               
 
1995  (.249)          (.434)(.436)  (.514)  (.589)                 (.676)(.713) 
            (.444)      (.522) 
 
    JPS              RBG   SB     AK   WHR                   AS      CT 
            DS       SDO 
               
 
1996 (.242)        (.419)(.428)    (.523) (.58)                     (.69)(.717) 
         (.444)        (.532) 
 
 JPS            SB   RBG      AK   WHR            AS     CT 
             DS        SDO               
 
1997 (.244)        (.415)(.436)   (.521) (.577)              (.694)(.717) 
          (.415)            (.538) 
 
             JPS             SB     DS           AK    WHR             AS     CT 
            RBG         SDO               
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1998     (.244)   (.405)(.428)      (.528)       (.59)        (.693) (.718) 
           (.417)            (.531) 
 
    JPS       RBG   DS         AK     WHR             AS     CT 
              SB          SDO               
 
1999 (.247)(.378)(.401)     (.525)       (.581)        (.698)(.715) 
            (.414)            (.538) 
 
  JPS   RBG    DS       SDO        WHR             AS     CT 
    SB            AK               
 
2000      (.258)(.364)            (.506)          (.577)        (.698) (.717) 
    (.383)                      (.53) 
     (.384) 
 
      JPS  RBG          SDO       WHR             AS      CT 
        SB            AK 
          DS               
 
2001    (.265)(.357)           (.491)      (.536)          (.688)(.715) 
      (.372)               (.56) 
        (.379) 
 
      JPS      RBG            SDO           AK                 AS    CT 
            DS                           WHR  
              SB              
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2002        (.273)   (.353)(.379)     (.483) (.525)            (.667)   (.724) 
            (.364)          (.549) 
 
       JPS         RBG SB         SDO    AK            AS        CT 
     DS         WHR               
 
 
2003         (.274)(.348)   (.384)   (.48)      (.558)    (.654)    (.725) 
       (.355)           (.516) 
 
       JPS  RBG       SB        SDO    WHR       AS        CT 
           DS          AK               
 
 
2004       (.276)(.352)   (.394)         (.474)        (.563)   (.639)     (.728) 
      (.357)      (.503) 
 
         JPS  RBG        SB SDO       WHR      AS          CT 
         DS         AK               
 
 
2005        (.279)(.359)(.382)            (.499)(.558)              (.635)      (.73) 
           (.362)            (.56) 
 
          JPS  RBG  SB              AK   JGR               AS         CT   
                        DS              SA 
 
2006        (.281)  (.358)             (.496)  (.56)              (.635)       (.727) 
   (.37)    (.562) 
    (.375) 
 
           JPS       RBG                AK       JGR                 AS           CT 
      DS        SA 
        SB 
312 
 
 
 
2007         (.289)(.354)             (.493)  (.56)              (.626)       (.718) 
   (.366)     (.568) 
     (.381) 
 
           JPS       RBG                AK       JGR                 AS           CT 
      DS         SA 
        SB 
 
2008           (.278)(.352)  (.388)           (.504)   (.565)(.585)(.619)       (.701) 
          (.362) 
 
           JPS     RBG  SB               AK      JGR    SA    AS           CT 
   DS 
                    
 
2009           (.278) (.356)(.379)           (.501)   (.557)(.587)(.618)       (.692) 
          (.363) 
 
           JPS     RBG  SB               AK      JGR    SA    AS           CT 
   SS 
 
 
2010     (.33)(.36)                  (.505)   (.558)(.595)            (.68) 
       (.373)        (.607) 
      (.375) 
 
     RBG    SS            AK      JGR   SA              CT 
                   EK           AS 
         SB 
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2011  (.312)  (.351)               (.486)  (.545)(.595)          (.678) 
       (.374)      (.601) 
      (.375) 
 
     RBG    SS          AK      JGR   SA              CT 
                   EK         AS 
         SB 
 
 
2012  (.309)                   (.482)  (.539)(.579)      (.674) 
    (.326)  (.376)       (.592) 
 
     RBG             AK       JGR   AS           CT 
           SS    SB         SA 
 
 
2013  (.309)  (.36)               (.469)  (.517)(.569)          (.675) 
    (.312)  (.371)       (.592) 
 
     RBG    EK         AK     JGR   AS              CT 
         SS      SB         SA 
 
 
2014  (.302)  (.357)            (.447)  (.503)  (.563)          (.675) 
    (.305)  (.365)    (.568) 
 
     SS         EK      AK     JGR    AS                CT 
       RBG      SB     SA 
 
2015  (.30)     (.366)          (.437)  (.484)  (.553)          (.676) 
    (.304)    (.372) 
 
     SS         EK    AK     JGR    SA                  CT 
       RBG      SB 
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Appendix F – Voting Disorder Typologies, SCDB Directional Coding 
Composite 
Direction 
Strong  
Ordered 
 Ordered Unanimous Decisions Disordered 
 
Strong Disorder 
 
Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 
 
Morse v. Frederick (2007) 
 
Davis v. FEC (2008) 
 
Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 
 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 
(2011) 
 
Harris v. Quinn (2014) 
 
McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014) 
 
Randall v. Sorrell (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006) 
 
Davenport v. WEA (2007) 
 
TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy 
(2007) 
 
New York State Board of Elections 
v. Torres (2008) 
 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
(2009) 
 
Nevada Commission on Ethics v. 
Carrigan (2011) 
 
Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) 
 
Reichle v. Howards (2012) 
 
Wood v. Moss (2014) 
 
McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 
 
 
Beard v. Banks (2006) 
 
U.S. v. Williams (2008) 
 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association (2009) 
 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project (2010) 
 
Walker v. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans (2015) 
 
 
 
Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican 
Party (2008) 
 
 
Golan v. Holder (2012) 
 
Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 
1000 (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Decisions:  
61.36% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of 
Conservative Decisions:  
55.56% 
 
Pro-Speech Decisions as 
Proportion of All 
Decisions: 34.09% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undetermined 
 
Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 13.64% 
 
Undetermined 
Proportion: 33.33% 
 
All Decisions: 4.54% 
 
 
Liberal 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C. 
(2007) 
 
American Tradition Partnership 
v. Bullock (2012) 
 
 
 
 
Doe v. Reed (2010) 
 
U.S. v. Alvarez (2012) 
 
Agency for International 
Development v. Alliance 
for Open Society 
International, Inc. (2013) 
 
 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C. 
(2006) 
 
Locke v. Karass (2009) 
 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. 
v. U.S. (2010) 
 
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations 
(2012) 
 
Lane v. Franks (2014) 
 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 
 
 
U.S. v. Stevens (2010) 
 
Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 
 
Sorrell v. IMS Health (2012) 
 
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar 
(2015) 
 
 
 
Hartman v. Moore (2006) 
 
Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association 
(2011) 
 
 
Liberal Decisions: 
22.73%  
 
Pro-Speech Proportion:  
30.00% 
 
All Decisions: 6.82% 
 
 (22.73%) (9.1%) (36.36%) (20.45%) (11.36%)  
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Rehnquist Court Era (1994-2004 Terms) 
 Strong Ordered Ordered Unanimous  Disorder Strong Disorder Totals 
 
Conservative 
 
 
 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia (1995) 
 
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC 
(1997) 
 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 
 
LA v. Alameda Books (2002) 
 
 
 
U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union (1995) 
 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board v. Pinette (1995) 
 
Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996) 
 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000) 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002) 
 
U.S. v. American Library Association 
(2003) 
 
 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995) 
 
Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth 
(2000) 
 
Shaw v. Murphy (2001) 
 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District 
(2002) 
 
Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, 
Inc. (2003) 
 
Virginia v. Hicks (2003) 
 
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004) 
 
San Diego v. Roe (2004) 
 
 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 
(1995) 
 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott (1997) 
 
Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes (1998) 
 
NEA v. Finley (1998) 
 
LAPD v. United Reporting 
Publishing Co. (1999) 
 
Good News Club v. Milford (2001) 
 
Eldred v. Aschroft (2003) 
 
 
Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC (1996) 
 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Association (2005) 
 
 
 
Conservative 
Decisions:  59.26% 
 
Pro-Speech 
Decisions as 
Proportion of 
Conservative 
Decisions:  53.57% 
 
Pro-Speech 
Decisions as 
Proportion of All 
Decisions: 34.88% 
 
 
Undetermined   
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Undetermined 
Decisions: 12.96% 
 
Undetermined 
Propotion: 71.43% 
 
All Decisions: 9.26% 
 
Liberal  
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. FEC (2001) 
 
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly (2001) 
 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
(2002) 
 
McConnell v. FEC (2003) 
O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake 
(1996) 
 
Board of County Commissioners v. 
Umbehr (1996) 
 
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 
 
FEC v. Beaumont (2003) 
 
Tory v. Cochran (2005) 
 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston (1995) 
 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island 
(1996) 
 
Reno v. ACLU (1997) 
 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
v. U.S. (1999) 
 
 
 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission (1995) 
 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC 
(2000) 
 
U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group (2000) 
 
Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez 
(2001) 
 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society 
of NY v. Stratton (2002) 
 
Buckley v. American Constitutional 
Law Foundation (1999) 
 
U.S. v. United Foods, Inc. (2001) 
 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
(2002) 
 
Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center (2002) 
 
Virginia v. Black (2003) 
 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004) 
 
 
Liberal Decisions: 
27.78%%  
 
Pro-Speech 
Proportion:  26.67% 
 
All Decisions: 7.4% 
 
 (15.09%) (22.64%) (22.64%) (24.53%) (15.09%)  
 
316 
 
 
Appendix G - Frequency of Cases by Type, Certiorari Dataset  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Prisoner  2 6 
(H) 
1 3 
(M) 
0 1 6 
(H) 
2 
(M) 
0 0 3 
(H) 
24 
Electoral/Policy Speech 
 
5 
(M) 
4 
(M) 
0 2 5 
(H) 
2 4 
(M) 
2 
(M) 
1 0 1 26 
Govt Employee/ 
Whistleblower 
 
7 
(H) 
1 
 
6 
(H) 
4 
(H) 
5 
(H) 
7 
(H) 
2 2 
(M) 
5 
(H) 
1 3 
(H) 
43 
Faculty 0 4 
(M) 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 8 
Religious 1 3 
(M) 
2 3 
(M) 
0 1 4 
(M) 
0 0 3 
(H) 
0 17 
Terrorism/Espionage 0 2 
 
0 1 1 0 1 2 
(M) 
0 1 0 8 
Student 1 2 3 
(M) 
3 
(M) 
2 3 
 
6 
(H) 
0 4 
(M) 
0 0 24 
Religious (Schools) 
 
1 1 1 2 5 
(H) 
4 
(M) 
3 0 1 0 0 18 
Elected Official 
 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 6 
Controversial Ideology/Extreme Speech (Violence, Anti-
War, KKK, Threats, etc.) 
 
2 1 4 
(M) 
0 2 2 1 0 1 2 
(M) 
1 16 
Lawyer 
 
1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Sex/Gender (Adult Ent.) 
 
1 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 
Sex/Gender  
(Women’s Rights) 
 
1 1 1 3 
(M) 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 9 
Sex/Gender 
(LGBT Equality) 
 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Sex/Gender 
(Child Porn) 
 
2 0 1 1 3 
(M) 
0 2 1 0 3 
(H) 
0 13 
Union 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 
Anti-Union/ Nonmember 
 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 
Free Market Electoral 
(Anti-CF Reg) 
 
2 0 1 0 1 3 
 
3 1 3 1 1 16 
Petition/Ballot Access 
 
1 0 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 11 
Commercial/ 
Business 
 
3 0 1 1 0 4 
(M) 
3 2 
(M) 
0 2 
(M) 
2 
(M) 
18 
Libel/ 
Related Torts 
 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
(H) 
0 4 
Media 
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 5 
Miscellaneous 1 0 1 3 
(M) 
0 0 1 3 
(H) 
1 0 1 11 
Totals 33 29 28 33 32 32 46 21 21 19 15 309 
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Appendix H - Case List, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2014 Terms) 
NAAMP v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216 (2015) 
Valencia v. De Luca, 612 Fed. Appx. 512 (2015) 
Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242 (2015) 
Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876 (2015) 
Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197 (2015) 
Werkheiser v. Pocono Township, 780 F.3d 172 (2015) 
Spence v. Nelson, 603 Fed. Appx. 250 (2015) 
Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC., 777 F.3d 937 (2015) 
Loscombe v. City Of Scranton, 600 Fed. Appx. 847 (2015) 
United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074 (2015) 
Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (2015) 
Baker v. Iowa City, 867 N.W.2d 44 (2015) 
Heffernan v. City Of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (2015) 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 24935 (2014) 
Harnage v. Torres, 155 Conn. App. 792 (2015) 
De Ritis v. Unemployment Compensation, Board Of Review, 2014 Pa. Commw. Unpub. Lexis 
445 (2014) 
Reed v. Town Of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057 (2013) 
Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388 (2014) 
Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (2014) 
NAAMP v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037 (2015) 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. San Juan, 773 F.3d 1 (2015) 
U.S. v. Brune, 767 F.3d 1009 (2014) 
U.S. v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414 (2014) 
Hurst v. Lee County, Ms, 764 F.3d 480 (2015) 
U.S. v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891 (2015) 
Liberty Coins v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682 (2014) 
Fields v. Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (2014) 
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (2014) 
U.S. v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (2014) 
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (2014) 
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